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OF

Wellesley, 1st.

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R DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

EDITED BY HIS SON,

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VOLUME THE THIRD.

[DECEMBER, 1825, TO MAY, 1827.]

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DESPATCHES,

CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA,

OF

F. M. THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR IN RUSSIA IN 1812.

1825.

SÉGUR'S WORK* has drawn the public attention to the most extraordinary and stupendous transactions and events of modern times, and of which no times have ever produced a parallel. The details of these transactions and events have consequently been accurately examined by many, and the result has been a conviction that the common sense which guides mankind in the ordinary transactions of life had but little influence either in the origin of, or the preparations for, the Russian war, or the conduct of the operations which are the subject of the work.

It is useless to consider what was the cause of the war between Napoleon and the Emperor of Russia. The ostensible causes of dispute were clearly removed. The diplomatists had agreed upon the principle of the mode of settling them all; and there would have been no difficulty in the application of that principle. But at the very moment at which this principle of settlement was agreed upon, Napoleon moved armies, to the amount of about 600,000 men, into the dominions of the King of Prussia, in consequence of the treaty with Prussia, which Prussia had been induced to solicit; and the Emperor of Russia, seeing clearly that the war was not to be avoided; that the points, the settlement upon which had been agreed upon, were mere pretexts; and that his disgrace in the eyes of Europe in the first instance, and the ultimate destruction of the power and influence of his government, were the real objects

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* *Histoire de Napoléon et de la Grande-Armée pendant l'année* 1812. Par M. le Général Comte de Ségur. Paris, 1824.

of Napoleon, determined that he would resist upon the question of the Prussian treaty and occupation, which brought fairly before the public the real point at issue, and to the recollection of public men that States have an interest in the transactions of other States with their neighbours, and a right to question those transactions.

It is clear, then, that there was no legitimate French interest involved in this war. There was no point of public honour, at least on the part of France. When the principles of the settlement of the trifling points of dispute were agreed upon, there was no occasion for carrying into execution the treaty with Prussia. To carry that treaty into execution was a menace to Russia which was injurious to its honour; and, if submitted to, was calculated to deteriorate the power and influence of Russia both at home and abroad. There might have existed a necessity for endeavouring to destroy the power of Russia growing out of the transactions between France and other States of Europe, and the apprehensions that those States might look to the assistance and protection of Russia. But the legitimate necessity for war, or for measures which must lead to war, must not depend upon the choice between two different lines of policy. In this case there was an option, viz., for Napoleon to soften his policy towards those States in whose favour or on whose behalf the Russian interference was apprehended. That policy was a system of insult and menace. It was not influence growing out of treaty, but it was menace founded upon the success of former wars, the insolence of exorbitant power in the hands of new men, and the constant apprehension which an innate sense of injustice produces even in such minds, that the oppressed must turn against their oppressors. The maintenance of such policy, which cannot be publicly stated and avowed, cannot be fairly considered a ground for war.

There was no French interest involved, and no real ground for war then between Napoleon and the Emperor of Russia. The war was occasioned solely by the desire of the former to fight a great battle, to gain a great victory, to occupy with his army one more great capital, and to subject to his rule the power of Russia.

It was in this light that the war was viewed by the French politicians of the day; and it is curious to observe in these

works the total absence of principle in the examination of this great question of war or peace. Nobody adverts to the injustice of this intended attack upon the Emperor of Russia. Its difficulty, its danger, its expense, the absence of all prospect of remuneration and relief from financial difficulty by confiscation, plunder, or the levy of contributions, and the little probability that success in this intended war would bring to a conclusion the disastrous war in Spain, were all insinuated or urged with more or less of vehemence according to the character, the station, or the degree of intimacy of the person urging those topics with Napoleon. But nobody ventured to hint the injustice of the war itself; and, in truth, all admitted, some in positive terms, that the time was come at which it was absolutely necessary that Napoleon should bring under his subjection this one independent power remaining on the continent of Europe. It is curious to observe his answers to each of those who ventured to hint objections to his proposed measures, each of which contained what he must have known at the time was a falsehood.

Then in the preparations for this war there was as little of national policy as there was in the war itself. This war was in the contemplation of Napoleon for a considerable period of time previous to its commencement. It is believed from the period of the refusal to give him the Russian princess in marriage, and from that of the celebration of the marriage with the Austrian princess, in the year 1810. It is certain that Prince Metternich, on his return to Vienna in the spring of 1811, apprised his sovereign of the probability that the marriage which had been celebrated would not have the effect of giving to Europe permanent tranquillity. Yet, notwithstanding that this war had been so long intended, no political measures were adopted to enable Napoleon to carry it on with advantage. Russia has two neighbours, the Porte and Sweden, with which Powers it had always been the policy of France to connect herself; and such connection was not only honourable to France, but useful to Europe. It is not useless to examine the conduct of Napoleon in relation to these Powers, as this examination will show how entirely the national policy of France was lost sight of by him when his own personal objects were in question.

The first idea of the Russian marriage occurred at Tilsit. This is the real secret of that treaty. In pursuit of that object

Napoleon sacrificed to the Emperor of Russia the interests of the Porte and of Sweden. He lost the opportunity then afforded to him of reconciling the Porte, and of attaching that power to France for ever; and he not only alienated Sweden from France, but absolutely sacrificed that power to Russia by his consent to the conquest of Finland; and he thus destroyed the balance in the North of Europe by depriving Sweden of all means of annoyance against Russia.

Useful as the existence and strength of both these powers were to the world at large, and honourable and advantageous as their connection with France was to France at all times, it was more particularly necessary in a war with Russia, waged on Russian ground. Commanding as those Powers did the navigation of the Russian seas, situated as they were in 1811 and 1812 in relation to the means of defence of Russia, it might have been expected that Napoleon, upon the eve of the war with Russia, would have turned his attention to the conciliation of those Powers, and would have endeavoured to procure their assistance.

But having abandoned them both to the will of Russia at the period of the Peace of Tilsit, he appears to have forgotten that they existed till a period long subsequent to the Austrian marriage; at which period it is clear that he began to think of the attack upon Russia. Even then he neglected the Porte, and made but trifling efforts to reconcile that government to France, and to induce them to connect their cause with his.

Towards Sweden the conduct of Napoleon was even worse than that towards the Porte. Even after Bernadotte had been called to the succession of the crown of Sweden, he treated that Power with more ignominy than ever; and the more probably, as it is hinted in Ségur's work, because Bernadotte had been the rival of Bonaparte in the transactions of Paris which preceded the 18th Brumaire, and on account of their subsequent disagreements. He seized upon Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rugen by way of enforcing the continental system against England, and otherwise insulted Sweden at a moment at which the assistance of that Power would have been worth more to France than that of both Austria and Prussia. A sovereign having the honour and interest of his country at heart, instead of those personal to himself, would have forgotten, or at all events have laid aside for the moment, all consideration of those personal causes of offence; but Napoleon could not

forget them. He, on the contrary, forgot the interests and ancient policy of France, and gratified his personal resentment against the Crown Prince.

Not so the British government. They treated the Swedish government with the utmost moderation and kindness, notwithstanding that the two nations were at war in consequence of the authoritative mandate of Napoleon given to Sweden. They likewise seized the earliest opportunity which circumstances afforded of making peace with Russia and with Sweden, and of mediating a cordial union between those two Powers. They made the greatest sacrifices on the part of Great Britain to induce the Crown Prince to postpone his pretensions to Norway, and the execution of the engagement of the Emperor of Russia to assist Sweden in making the conquest of that country; and the result of these arrangements was not only to relieve his Imperial Majesty from the necessity of defending himself on the side of Finland, but to place at his disposal for operations against the French troops on the Dwina the corps of Russian troops collected in Finland for the purpose of performing his original engagement to Sweden.

Then in respect to the Porte, the British government seized the earliest opportunity of exerting their influence, and succeeded in inducing the Porte to make peace with Russia, thus relieving his Imperial Majesty from the contest with the Porte, and from the necessity of defending himself on his south-east frontier.

If the great statesman who at that period conducted the foreign affairs of Great Britain had never rendered to his own country or the world any other service than those above noticed, his name would have gone down to posterity as the man who had first foreseen and had afterwards seized the opportunity of rendering to the world the most important service that ever fell to the lot of any individual to perform. There is no child who reads these histories who will not see that by those arrangements not only was Napoleon deprived of all the assistance which he might have derived from the operations of the Turkish troops, but that the Russian troops opposed to those operations, and those stationed in Finland with a view to Swedish objects, were at the same critical moment of the campaign thrown upon the rear of the French armies in Russia.

Great as the loss in the French armies was by war and

famine, and the consequences of those irregularities which are inseparable from such a system as that of Napoleon, and aggravated as all the distresses of the army were by the intense severity of the season, it must be obvious to all that the great destruction of the French army in Russia was to be attributed to the position of the Russian troops upon the Orcha and the Berezina, in November, 1812; the very troops thus brought into action in consequence of the political arrangements above referred to. The movements of these troops might have been more scientifically and vigorously conducted, and their operations even more successful than they were. That is the affair of the generals who commanded them; and the question whether they were well or ill conducted can never affect the reputation of the late Lord Castlereagh, by whose political measures and negotiations the Emperor's government had these troops at their disposition to be employed against the common enemy.*

Then another political arrangement, which would have been of the greatest importance to the French army engaged in these operations, related to Poland. The Emperor of Austria had possession of Polish Galicia, and had required from Napoleon an engagement that no measures should be taken to reconstruct the kingdom of Poland without the consent of his Imperial Majesty, and without giving to his Imperial Majesty compensation for the probable loss of his Polish dominions by the retrocession by France to his Imperial Majesty of the Illyrian provinces ceded to France by his Imperial Majesty by the recent Treaty of Vienna. France having lost the assistance for which Napoleon had sought, but sought too late, if really in earnest in his wish to obtain it, viz., that of Sweden and the Porte, there is no doubt that that to which he ought to have looked was the assistance of the Poles. He did derive great assistance from the Poles of the Duchy of Warsaw; and he endeavoured to derive assistance from those of the province of Lithuania, in which he established a government; and he delayed at Wilna for a considerable period of time at the very opening of the campaign in order to organize and put in motion that government. But the Poles soon discovered the secret, that it was

* The policy here attributed to Lord Castlereagh was originated by the Marquess Wellesley, who preceded Lord Castlereagh as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.—Ed.

impossible to constitute, as an independent State, Poland or even those provinces of the ancient kingdom of Poland which should be conquered from Russia, on account of the engagements between Napoleon and Austria; and because it was quite certain that Napoleon would not make the sacrifice to Austria of the Illyrian provinces in compensation for Polish Galicia, which Austria would have lost by the reconstruction of Poland. The language of Napoleon therefore was loose and cold in answer to the addresses of the Poles on the subject of their independence; and the efforts of the Lithuanians were directed against him, or, if made in any instance in his favour, were lukewarm and weak.

Invading Russia as Napoleon did with an army of 600,000 men, the military assistance of the Lithuanians, or of the people of any of the Polish provinces under the Russian government, could not have been necessary to his success; but their good will and activity in supplying his armies would have been desirable, for the very reason that, and in proportion as, their military assistance was not necessary. Great difficulty must have existed in feeding and supplying the large armies with which the invasion of Russia was necessarily made; and the active and zealous co-operation and assistance of the Lithuanians was absolutely necessary in order to overcome or lessen the difficulties which must have been expected, and were expected, as it will appear presently, to attend this important branch of the service.

The advantage of their assistance was lost because Napoleon would not sacrifice to Austria the Illyrian provinces, which were useless to France; and much of the mischief which occurred must be attributed to the same fact. Napoleon then led the armies of Europe into Russia without any of the assistance the country could afford, whether of a military or of a civil or political nature, which common attention, or the ordinary policy of a statesman, would have placed at his disposal. Yet it appears by these accounts that he was well aware of the difficulties and dangers of the enterprise which he had undertaken, and most particularly of those difficulties respecting provisions, which at last destroyed his army. He was to invade a country of great extent, but of small population in proportion to its extent, and that population consisting of slaves, and but very unequally distributed in the different parts of the country. The

country contained but few large towns from which any military resource could be drawn. The soil is in general marshy and overgrown with timber, and the roads and communications very rare, and those which existed difficult at all times, and scarcely practicable for wheel-carriages in wet weather.

Napoleon, aware of the difficulties of subsistence in that country for a large army, formed squadrons, regiments, and brigades of carts loaded with provisions and other necessaries for his army, which followed its movements through Prussia, in which country it was provisioned on its passage, under the treaty of alliance with the King of Prussia. Droves of cattle were moved through Germany from Italy and France. Yet so little did these arrangements answer the purpose intended, that before the army quitted the Duchy of Warsaw we see complaints of the plunder of that country, and remonstrances from Napoleon to his marshals of the evil consequences (compared to those in Portugal) which must result from the irregularity of the troops, and from the mode in which they took provisions from the enemy.

At Wilna, the first place at which a halt was made within the Russian frontier, and at which an hospital was to be established, we see what the means were which this army of 600,000 men possessed.

This army of 600,000 men could establish hospitals for only 6000 men at Wilna. These were without provisions, beds, covering, or even straw to lie upon, and even unprovided with medicine. Yet it is a curious fact that the Würtemberg army had an excellent hospital at Wilna, because the King of Würtemberg paid the expense of the hospitals for his troops. This fact shows to what circumstances all these difficulties were to be attributed. At Vitepsk, where another hospital was formed, we see by the account that hospitals for only 1400 men could be formed; Russians and French in equal numbers; the Russians having been left for three days without assistance, when they were taken into the French hospitals.

The surgeons were obliged to use their own shirts for dressings, as well as those of the wounded soldiers. It must be observed that these hospitals were for wounded only; the sick shifted for themselves as they could. At Smolensk, on the second night after the establishment of the hospitals in that town, everything was wanting to dress the wounds of the

wounded soldiers; and paper found in the archives was made use of instead of lint. Then Ségur says, "Nos chirurgiens accablés, s'étonnent; depuis trois jours un hôpital de cent blessés est oublié. Un hazard vient de le faire découvrir."

After the battle of Borodino 20,000 French wounded were left in the Abbaye of Kolotskoi. Ségur says, "*Les ambulances avaient rejoint, mais tout fut insuffisant;*" that is, nearly three months after the frontier had been passed; and Larrey, the *chirurgien-en-chef*, complains in a publication, that no troops were left with him *pour requérir* those articles which were necessary from the neighbouring villages. *Pour requérir* is, in plain terms, envoyer *à la maraude*—plunder in order to supply the hospitals!!

The causes of the failure of these measures of precaution are worth discussing, as the discussion will convey to the minds of the readers of this paper the real cause of the disasters of the French army in Russia.

The truth is that Napoleon learnt at Paris and Dresden, and the information was confirmed on his arrival at Kœnigsberg from Dresden, that the Emperor of Russia had collected his army in the neighbourhood of Wilna. He conceived that he should surprise his enemy in that position and defeat him; or that in his retreat he would have it in his power to fall upon and destroy some detached corps. Forced marches were then to be undertaken, even from the Vistula, and were continued till the army reached the Dwina and the Dnieper. The carts, the carriages, the cattle, and all the supplies brought from France and Italy, were left behind; all the difficulties of the enterprise were forgotten, and nothing thought of but the prospect of finding the enemy *en flagrant délit*, and of destroying him at one blow.

It is curious to read the statement in Ségur, which is confirmed by all who have written the history of this war, of the loss sustained by the army in the first marches from the Niemen and the Vilia. Not less than ten thousand horses and many men are stated to have been left dead upon the road, and thousands of stragglers from their regiments were wandering about the country. This loss is attributed to the storm of rain which occurred at that period. But those who know what an army is well know that a storm of rain in the summer, whatever its violence and character, does not destroy the horses of an army. That which does destroy them, that which renders

those who survive nearly unfit for service throughout the campaign, and incapable of bearing the hardship of the winter, is hard work, forced marches, no corn or dry fodder at the period at which the green corn is on the ground, and is invariably eaten by the horses of the army. It is the period of the year at which of all others a commander who cares for his army will avoid enterprises the execution of which require forced marches or the hard work of the horses.

In like manner, storms of rain do not destroy soldiers of the infantry, exposed to them in a greater degree than other men; but forced marches on roads destroyed by storms of rain, through a country unprovided with shelter, and without provisions, do destroy soldiers, as every one left behind is without resource, is exposed, unsheltered and starving, to the effects of the storm; he cannot follow and overtake his corps, and he must perish.

The second chapter of the third book of Ségur's work contains a curious and true specimen of what a French army was in the account given of Davoust's corps; and how formidable to its enemy, if common care had been taken of it:—

"Il a soixante-dix mille hommes dont l'organisation est complète; ils portent pour vingt-cinq jours de vivres. Chaque compagnie renferme des nageurs, des maçons, des boulangers, des tailleurs, des cordonniers, des armuriers, enfin des ouvriers de toute espèce. Elles portent tout avec elles; son armée est comme une colonie: des moulins à bras suivent. Il a prévu tous les besoins; tous les moyens d'y suppléer sont prêts."

Called together by the conscription, each battalion of the French army had in its ranks good and bad, of high, low, and middle classes, men of all trades and professions. The French soldiers scarcely required the usual discipline or punishment inflicted on soldiers to keep them in order. The good, under the superintendence and encouragement of the officers, took care of the bad, and kept them in order; and they were upon the whole the best, the most orderly and obedient, and the most easily commanded and best regulated body of troops that ever existed in Europe. They were destroyed by their privations. The French Revolution first introduced into the world new systems of war, the objects and results of which were to render war a resource instead of a burthen to the belligerents, and to throw the burthen upon the country which unfortunately became the seat of its operations. The system of terror and

the misery of the people in France; and the conscription, the execution of which was facilitated by the first; placed at the disposal of the government of the day the whole of the serviceable male population of the country. All that the government had to do or did with them was to organize them into military bodies, arm them, and have them taught the first movements of the use of their arms and of their military exercises. They were then poured into some foreign country to live upon its resources. Their numbers stifled or overcame all local opposition; and whatever might be the loss or misery which the system itself might occasion in the French armies, the first was of men who when dead could not complain; the success stifled the complaints of their survivors.

Napoleon was educated in this system. He succeeded to the power it gave to the government, and carried its action to the greatest possible extent. The system of his tactics was founded upon forced marches. War, being the principal resource of his government, was to be carried on at the smallest possible expense of money to his treasury, but at the greatest possible expenditure of the lives of men, not only by the fire of the enemy, but by privations, fatigue, and sickness. Till this Russian war he had never thought of supplying his armies with the necessaries requisite to enable such great bodies to keep the field. His object was to surprise his enemy by the rapidity of his marches, to fight a great battle, levy contributions, make peace, and return to Paris. But these objects were always attained at the expense of the utmost privations to his troops.

These privations, which must have rendered the soldier unfit for service, and must have destroyed him at once if not relieved by breaches of order and discipline, and by plunder and its consequences, occasioned all these evils, till the army, however well composed originally, and however orderly and well disciplined and formidable as a military body to its enemies, became at last a horde of banditti, all equally bad, and destroying itself by its irregularities. Indeed no other army, excepting the French army, could have subsisted in the manner in which the French army did. No other army known in Europe is sufficiently under command.

His mode is really curious, and worthy of observation. The army started with a certain number of days' provisions upon the men's backs, seldom less than seven days, and sometimes

provision, that is to say, bread or biscuit, for fourteen days. Cattle were driven with the army to supply the rations of meat. These articles were procured either from magazines, or from some large town, or from some rich, well-populated district in which the troops might have been cantoned. The cavalry could not be loaded with provender for the horses for more than three or four days.

Thus provided, the army started upon its expedition by forced marches. In very few days it was generally discovered that the soldiers, unable to carry their loads upon these forced marches, had either consumed in two or three days that which ought to have lasted seven or ten days, or had thrown it away; or the General commanding, being apprehensive that the provisions which his troops had in possession would not be sufficient to last till he should be able to have another regular issue, commenced to procure supplies by what was called *la maraude;* that is to say, neither more nor less than plunder.

Authority was then given to send out a certain number of soldiers of each company to obtain provisions at each village or farm-house in the neighbourhood of the road by which the army marched, or of the ground on which it encamped. These soldiers were to force the inhabitants to deliver these provisions without payment or receipt; and it may well be believed that these acts of violence were not confined to forcing the delivery of provisions. Other articles of value were taken at the same time, and by the use of the same coercive measures; and it is not astonishing that officers and soldiers so employed should become habitual plunderers.

The provisions thus brought in were issued among the troops under the command of the officer who had sent these detachments on the *maraude.* It is obvious that even this system, bad as it was, could not be resorted to with any prospect of success where the country through which the army marched was thinly peopled, or if the army was making extraordinary forced marches, or in the neighbourhood of the enemy; but it must be observed, that even if not resorted to by authority, it was invariably by the private soldiers, and not unfrequently by the officers of the French army, on their own account. They generally required the food because they had consumed or thrown away the enormous loads which had been packed upon them. But even if they did not necessarily require it, biscuit or ammu-

nition-bread, and the meat of an animal but just killed after a forced march, is but bad food in comparison with what can be got from almost any village in the country; and, in addition to the food, the man *à la maraude* could pick up money and other valuable property.

It must be observed that a French army, after quitting its magazines or a friendly country, never received a ration of provisions not procured by *la maraude;* and that this army which entered Russia, from the time it quitted the Niemen, in June, 1812, till it returned to Smolensk, in November, 1812, excepting perhaps some of the Guard, never received a ration which was not procured by *la maraude.*

In all these accounts it is frequently stated that Napoleon complained that his orders were not obeyed, and that magazines of provisions for his army were not formed, upon the retreat, at the places at which he had ordered that they should be formed. This may be true. But it must be observed that these orders were not given as other Generals at the head of armies have given similar orders, pointing out the places where, and the means by which, these provisions were to be collected and stored in magazine; and by supplying the money necessary to pay for their cost. There was but one resource for collecting these magazines; that was, *la maraude.*

Officers were placed in fortified houses or posts in the towns and villages on the high road from Smolensk to Moscow, with orders to collect magazines to supply the troops in the post, and to assist the reinforcements, recruits and traineurs, coming up to join the army, and eventually the army itself. Was money placed at their disposal to purchase these supplies in a country overrun with Jews, who, if money had been produced, would have procured provisions in exchange for it from any distance? No! The officer in command of such post was to plunder the villages in his neighbourhood, already ruined and exhausted by the passage and operations of two hostile armies, and by the repeated plunder which they had suffered by detachments or single traineurs.

If Napoleon entertained expectations that magazines would have been formed in such situations, it is not astonishing that he should have been disappointed on his retreat: it would have been astonishing if any officer had been able to collect a magazine under such circumstances.

At Smolensk and at Orcha on the Dnieper, on the return of the army, in November, 1812, it appears that magazines of provisions were formed; that is to say, some of the squadrons, regiments, and brigades of carts before mentioned had found their way to, and had discharged their loads into the magazines at those places; but the army was at that time in such a state of disorganization that those magazines were of little or of no utility. The truth is, that nearly the whole army was, from the period of the commencement of the retreat, *à la maraude* in search of provisions. Nobody would believe that there could be any regular issue of provisions from any magazine; and no officer or soldier would join his corps in hopes of obtaining his portion of such an issue. Besides, the truth is, that the officers of the French commissariat and the *gardes magasins*, &c., were so little accustomed to make such issues, that they were not expert in the performance of this part of their duty. They performed it but slowly; and men who were starving with hunger and cold were but little disposed to wait to satisfy their appetites till these persons had gone through all the formalities required by their *comptabilité*, the meaning and use of which they did not understand. It is not astonishing, then, that they should have eaten the horses fit for service, employed in the draught of pieces of cannon upon the glacis of Smolensk, while waiting to receive their rations from the magazines in that town.

The system of the French army, then, was the cause of its irregularities, disorders, and misfortunes; and of its loss.

Let us now see what was gained by the forced marches which, it will not be denied, rendered it necessary to leave behind all the means of supplying the army which the foresight of Napoleon had provided.

The object which Napoleon had first in view was to oblige the Emperor of Russia to fight a great battle, or to cut off one of his detachments. The Emperor's position at Wilna, and the entrenched camp prepared at Drissa, on the Dwina, had been known to Napoleon at Paris previous to his departure from thence. The information was confirmed at Dresden; and the conversation and boast of the army was, that the Emperor of Russia should there be caught *en flagrant délit*.

In order to effect this object, the army was to move by forced marches, first from its cantonments on the Vistula to the Niemen, and thence to the Dwina.

In order to understand these movements, it is necessary to follow them in some detail. Napoleon, after having remained at Dresden twelve days, quitted that town on the 29th of May. He stopped at Thorn two days, at Dantzick four days, at Königsberg four days, at Gumbinnen two days; and he arrived opposite Kowno, on the Niemen, on the 23rd of June.

The army which had been cantoned on the Vistula broke up from thence about the 1st of June, and marched in different columns by corps and by forced marches to the Niemen, which river it reached in different points, but principally in the neighbourhood of Kowno, on the 23rd, and commenced to cross it on the 24th.

From the Vistula to Vitepsk, on the Dwina, is 700 wersts, or about 470 to 480 English miles, 3 wersts being nearly equal to 2 English miles. From the Vistula to the Niemen is about half the distance. The whole distance might be marched by an army, with all its train, in forty marches; in fact, an army would march with facility 20 wersts in a day. It appears therefore that up to the Niemen, Napoleon had already lost four days in comparison with an army moving by the ordinary marches. Yet he had moved by forced marches, and had left behind all the equipments and stores of provisions which his foreknowledge of the difficulties of his enterprise had induced him to provide.

Excepting that it is the necessary fate of a French army to move by forced marches, there was no occasion for the movement in this manner from the Vistula. The Emperor of Russia must have known of the march of his enemy from the cantonments on the Vistula, yet he made no movement, as will appear presently, till the 26th of June, two days after he heard that the head of the French army had crossed the Niemen. But an army which makes even the ordinary march cannot procure provisions for everybody by *la maraude.* There is not time. The modern French armies therefore move by forced marches through poor and thinly inhabited countries, and halt for one or more days in the neighbourhood of large towns, or in the richer and better inhabited districts, for the sake of *la maraude;* and thus the time is consumed. The consequence of these forced marches, however, is that the troops, and the horses of the army in particular, become knocked up. The convoys of provisions, &c., are necessarily left behind, and are no longer

under the inspection and control of the superior officers of the army; robberies and other disorders are committed; and it happens not unfrequently that the stores belonging to one corps of the army are plundered by the soldiers of another, probably *à la maraude* in search of provisions.

It appears, then, that the French army not only gained no time, but lost time by its forced marches up to the Niemen. Its subsequent operations to Vitepsk shall now be examined.

The Emperor of Russia had four armies. The first, under Barclay de Tolly, with which he was himself in person, had its head-quarters at Wilna; its right was at Keidany, under Wittgenstein; its centre at Swentziany, on the high road from Wilna to the camp at Drissa; and its left at Lida, under Doctorof. Its numbers were 126,500 men, including 7000 Cossacks, at Grodno, under Platof. It was intended to concentrate this army at Swentziany as soon as the French army should cross the Niemen; and that from thence it should fall back upon the intrenched camp at Drissa. These movements were carried into execution, excepting by the Cossacks under Platof, and a division of the 4th Corps under General Dorokhof, which did not receive in time its orders for the movement. These troops joined Bagration, and retired with him. The main body of the army arrived in the camp at Drissa on the 11th of July.

The second army, was under Bagration. It consisted of 39,000 men, including 4000 Cossacks. This army was besides joined by Platof with his Cossacks from Grodno, and by the division of infantry of the 4th Corps under General Dorokhof. Bagration's head-quarters were at Wolkowisk. Those of Platof at Grodno. One corps of Bagration's army was at Novri-Dhor and another at Zelwa. It must be observed that Grodno and Wolkowisk were 70 wersts asunder, and each 80 wersts from Lida, where the left of Barclay's army was posted; Lida was over 80 wersts farther removed from the camp at Drissa than Wilna, where Napoleon had his head-quarters on the 28th of July, and Wolkowisk and Grodno were 150 wersts farther removed from the same points than Wilna.

It is not necessary now to detail the positions of the 3rd and 4th armies. The third was in Volhynia, under Tormasof; the fourth, still on the Turkish frontier, under Admiral Tchitchakof.

Bagration's army was originally destined to operate in rear of the right of the French army which should cross the Niemen, but that destination was altered by the orders received by Bagration from Barclay de Tolly on the 28th of June, the day on which Bagration received intelligence of the passage of the Niemen by Napoleon. It was found that the King of Westphalia, at the head of an army, supposed 80,000 men, covered that movement of the French army, and it was therefore considered useless to employ Bagration's corps against such a force. Barclay de Tolly accordingly directed him to march by Minsk on Borisof, and thence to the left of the Berezina.

Bagration moved on that evening upon Zelwa; but upon the 30th he received fresh orders from the Emperor Alexander directing him to move upon the camp at Drissa.

It will have been observed that he received these orders two days after Napoleon had established his head-quarters in Wilna, and that Bagration was at 150 wersts of greater distance to the camp at Drissa than the troops at Wilna, or seven days' march. It may therefore be fairly computed that he was seven days too late.

Neither Napoleon nor any other general ever had so fair an opportunity of carrying into execution his favourite measure, of placing his army on the communication of that of his enemy by cutting the army of the enemy in two.

It would appear, however, that he was not aware of the advantage he had over his enemy till the 30th of June. He had detached all the cavalry under Murat (with the exception of the corps of cavalry under Latour Maubourg, and that under Grouchy), three divisions of the 1st Corps under Count de Lobau, the 2nd Corps under Oudinot, and the 3rd Corps under Ney, in pursuit of Barclay de Tolly's army towards the Dwina. On the 30th June a patrol of Davoust's fell in with one of Doctorof's at Osmiana, and it was then that the nature of the movement of Bagration was known.

The 5th Corps under Poniatowsky, the 7th under Regnier, and the 8th under the King of Westphalia, and Latour Maubourg's corps of cavalry, had been collected at Grodno, and were under the command of the King of Westphalia. These troops, except the 7th Corps, which was sent to join Schwarzenberg, were sent in pursuit of Bagration; while three divisions of the 1st Corps under Davoust, and the corps of

cavalry under Grouchy, were detached from the side of Wilna upon Bagration's right flank.

Bagration was even forced to give up the direct line of his march upon Drissa; next that by Minsk and Borisof; and he passed the Berezina with some difficulty at Bobruisk, which post had been fortified. He then marched upon the Dnieper, and endeavoured to pass that river at Mohilef, but failed in consequence of having been repulsed in an attack which he made upon Davoust, near that town, on the 23rd July. He then crossed the Dnieper, on the 26th July, lower down, at Staroi-Bickoff, and marched upon Smolensk, where he formed his junction with Barclay de Tolly on the 1st and 2nd of August.

During these movements by forced marches of the wings of his army, Napoleon remained at Wilna with the Guard and the 4th Corps under the Viceroy, and the 6th Corps under St. Cyr, till the 16th of July, when he likewise moved with those troops towards the Dwina. The troops had moved on the 12th and following days; the Russian army quitted the camp of Drissa on the 14th of July, crossed the river Dwina, and marched by the right bank to Polotsk, where it arrived on the 18th. The Emperor there quitted the army, and went to Moscow. The army renewed its march on the 20th, and went by the right bank to Vitepsk, where it arrived on the 23rd, having again crossed the Dwina, and took up a position on the Luczissa, on the left bank of the Dwina, with the right flank to that river.

Wittgenstein's corps was left behind on the right of the Dwina to observe the road to St. Petersburg. The French army, with the exception of the 2nd Corps under Oudinot, which was left upon the lower Dwina opposed to Wittgenstein, followed on the left of the Dwina the movement of the Russian army on the right bank; and the whole, joined with the Guard and the 4th Corps, at Beszenkowiczy, on the 24th of July.

There was an affair of advanced guards the next day, at Ostrowno; the Russians retired, and the French army *en masse* moved forward upon Vitepsk; and the two armies were *en présence* near Vitepsk early on the 27th of July.

The object of the Russian movement from the camp at Drissa was to effect the junction with Bagration, who had been ordered to move upon Vitepsk, by Orcha; and Barclay de

Tolly would have fought a battle to secure the junction. On the evening of the 27th of July, however, Barclay de Tolly learnt that Bagration, having been repulsed on the 23rd, in his attack upon Davoust, near Mohilef, was under the necessity of passing the Dnieper lower down; that he could not therefore move upon Orcha and Vitepsk, but that he would march upon Smolensk.

Barclay de Tolly therefore marched in the night of the 27th of July towards Smolensk, where he effected his junction with Bagration on the 1st and 2nd of August.

Napoleon might have attacked the Russian army on the 27th, in the afternoon, or he might have posted troops on their flank in such manner as that their movement must have been known to him as soon as it should be made. But this precaution was neglected; and the Russian army made a retreat so clean, and in such regular order, as that some time elapsed before it was known by what route they had marched. Indeed this want of knowledge of the movements of their enemy from positions in their sight was more frequent in the armies commanded by Napoleon than in any other. It occurred again at Smolensk, once before and once after the battle of Borodino, and again in a very remarkable manner at the capture of Moscow.

Thus it appears that the object of all these forced marches was frustrated. There had been no battle; and the two Russian corps were joined.

The French army had suffered severely by the forced marches which it had made; all its supplies had been left behind, and a halt at Vitepsk became necessary. Ségur asserts that the plan was here altered, which is denied by Gourgaud;* but whether it was or not, it is obvious that the distress of the army was imminent, that their losses were already immense, and that the seeds of their destruction were laid.

But not only was the object of the forced marches lost, but time, still more precious, was lost. The army had been fifty-seven days from its cantonments on the Vistula to Vitepsk, the distance being 700 wersts, which might have been marched with ease in thirty-five or forty days.

But I will go farther, and assert that the loss of time by

* *Napoléon et la Grande-Armée en Russie;* par le Général Gourgaud. Paris, 1825.

Napoleon in these first operations was the cause of the failure in effecting the object for which they were undertaken. It is obvious that the corps of troops which pursued Barclay de Tolly were too strong for that officer to attempt to turn round and meet them in the field, as were those under the King of Westphalia and Davoust much too strong to be opposed by Bagration.

Napoleon had the advantage of knowing to a certainty before he commenced this war what his enemy's first movement would be. The intrenched camp of Drissa was the position of his enemy's reserves and magazines; it was near the road to Petersburg; and the position of the Russian army behind the Niemen, and of the head-quarters at Wilna, showed that the first movement would be upon this camp.

Napoleon must be supposed to have made up his mind as to what his object was in the war, and that this object was Moscow. He might then with safety have left his wings to pursue the enemy opposed to them respectively; and he might himself, with the Guards and the 4th Corps, have moved direct upon Vitepsk from Wilna, or upon Rudnia, or even upon Smolensk. He ought to have made this movement as soon as possible after his arrival at Wilna; and certainly as soon as he had received positive intelligence of the position of Bagration. No forced marches would in that case have been required; he might have moved direct upon Moscow from Wilna by the ordinary marches. He would have found himself at Vitepsk on the 20th of July, leaving Wilna as late as the 4th of July, with above 120,000 men between the two armies of the enemy, with no force in his front, with all their lines of communication at his mercy, and with a superior army following each of theirs; and he would have been accompanied by all the resources and equipments avowedly necessary to enable his army to keep the field in such a country as Russia.

On that day Barclay de Tolly was still at Polotsk on the Dwina, having remained in the camp at Drissa only three days, and Bagration still on the right of the Dnieper, below Mohilef, and Napoleon would have had it in his power to choose whether to attack either, or to continue his march to Moscow between both. This advantage was lost, however, by the unaccountable delay at Wilna, from the 28th of June to the 16th of July.

In the mean time Barclay de Tolly made a flank march along the whole front of the enemy's army of not much less than 250 wersts, and ended by effecting his junction with Bagration at Smolensk, on the 1st and 2nd of August, thus defeating his enemy in all his objects. His troops were collected; they had sustained no defeat. They were posted on their own line of communication with the points and provinces which they were destined to defend; and they were evidently in a better position, and in better condition for the future operations of the campaign than were those of his enemy.

Napoleon halted at Vitepsk; and the armies were then posted as follows in the beginning of August.

The Grand Russian Army at Smolensk. The corps of Wittgenstein on the left of the Dwina, at Osweia, in observation of the movements of the French in that quarter; the corps of Tormasof, in Volhynia, opposed to the Austrian corps under Prince Schwarzenberg; and the 7th Corps of the French army under General Regnier, which had been sent back from the army commanded by the King of Westphalia in order to co-operate with Prince Schwarzenberg against Tormasof. There was a Russian garrison in Bobruisk, on the Berezina, and a corps of 15,000 men, under General Hœrtel, at Mozyr.

Tchitchakof's army was still upon the Danube.

The French army was stationed as follows, beginning with the right. The Austrian corps under Prince Schwarzenberg, and the 7th Corps of the French army, were upon the Bug opposed to Tormasof. Latour Maubourg's corps of cavalry was blockading Bobruisk; but was at this time relieved by Dombrowsky's division of the 5th corps; and Latour Maubourg joined the army.

The 5th Corps under Poniatowsky, the 8th Corps under Junot (the King of Westphalia having withdrawn from the army in disgust) were upon the Dnieper, between Orcha and Mohilef. The corps of cavalry under Grouchy, and the three divisions of the corps under Davoust, were cantoned between the Dnieper and the Berezina. These were the troops which had followed Bagration.

The Guards, three divisions of the 1st Corps, the 3rd Corps under Ney, the 4th Corps under the Viceroy, and all the cavalry, with the exception of the corps under Latour Mau-

bourg, at Bobruisk, were with Napoleon in the neighbourhood of Vitepsk, being cantoned between the Dwina and the Dnieper, and along the Dwina as far as Souraij.

The 2nd Corps, under Oudinot was lower down the Dwina, at Polotsk, in observation of Wittgenstein.

The 6th Corps on its march to join Oudinot.

The 10th Corps under Marshal Macdonald, consisting of the Prussian corps and other troops, was in the neighbourhood of Riga, being destined to carry on the siege of that fortress.

On the 31st of July Oudinot had an affair with the corps under Wittgenstein, in the neighbourhood of Kliastisky, on the road from Polotsk towards St. Petersburg, but he was obliged to retire. Napoleon then reinforced this corps by joining to it the 6th Corps, consisting of 25,000 men under St. Cyr. Excepting this affair, and an unsuccessful attack upon Oudinot and St. Cyr, joined at Polotsk on the 19th of August, nothing important was done on either side on this flank of the army from that period till the end of October. Macdonald had collected at Mittau the means of making the siege of Riga; but the place was not even invested.

There were thus on the left flank of the army upon the Dwina the 3rd Corps of 37,000 men under Oudinot, the 6th Corps of 25,000 men under St. Cyr, the 10th Corps of 33,000 men under Macdonald.

On the right flank of the army Schwarzenberg and Regnier, after beating General Tormasof in an affair at Gorodeczna on the 12th of August, obliged him to retire beyond the Styr River on the 29th of August.

The Austrian corps consisted of 34,000 men, of which 7300 were cavalry; the 7th Corps, under Regnier, had 17,000 men.

Affairs remained in this situation on this flank till Tchitchakof, from the Danube, joined Tormasof on the Styr. The army of the Danube, consisting of 40,000 men, commenced its march, on the 1st of August, from Bucharest, and arrived upon the Styr on the 16th of September. The two Russian armies in this quarter, when joined, were 60,000 men.

The accounts are contradictory respecting the objects of Napoleon's halt at Vitepsk. This measure was certainly necessary for his army, already exhausted by its useless and fruitless forced marches. Ségur asserts that Napoleon intended to take up his position for the winter at that point; that he commenced

the improvement of his head-quarters; and various conversations are reported in which that determination is positively stated. Reasons are not wanting which would have made that appear to be the preferable plan for Napoleon.

It must be observed respecting Ségur that he filled the office about head-quarters which was most likely to give a man of talents, which he certainly is, the means and opportunity of knowing all that passed. His particular duty was to take up and distribute the quarters in the head-quarters of the army. It is not improbable that in making this distribution he took care of himself; and he doubtless had a very agreeable house, wherever such was to be had. No officer could have gone to or from head-quarters without communicating with Ségur; and most probably, indeed certainly, if he is the man of ability he appears, he must have heard the story of every officer who arrived at or departed from head-quarters both before and after he had seen Napoleon; and as he had no occupation excepting that of superintending the distribution of the quarters at head-quarters, he must have had ample time to hear everything. There cannot, then, be a better authority than Ségur; and it must be observed that he is a great admirer of Napoleon; and those who know the French army will see that Ségur is not a *faux frère.*

The intention of remaining at Vitepsk is, however, positively denied by others of great authority; and it does appear extraordinary that Napoleon should in the month of July take up his quarters for the winter. However, whether he ever did or not seriously intend to take up his quarters at Vitepsk, he afterwards abandoned that intention, and on the 12th of August made a great movement, which it is the next object of this paper to discuss.

The Russian army at Smolensk, seeing the manner in which the French army was dispersed in cantonments between the rivers Dwina and Dnieper, moved, on the 7th of August, towards Rudnia in order to beat up their quarters. They succeeded in surprising those of Sebastiani, and did him a good deal of mischief in an attack upon Inkowo. In the mean time Barclay de Tolly was alarmed by a movement made by the Viceroy about Souraij, on the Dwina, and he countermanded the original plan of operations with a view to extend his right flank; and for some days afterwards the Russian army

made various false movements, and was in a considerable degree of confusion. Whether Napoleon's plan was founded upon the march of the Russian army from Smolensk, as supposed by Ségur, or upon their position at Smolensk in the first days of August, he carried it into execution notwithstanding that march.

Accordingly, he broke up his cantonments upon the Dwina on the 10th of August, and marched his army in different columns by corps across the front of the Russian army from these cantonments to Rassassna upon the Dnieper. The false movements made by the Russian army between the 7th and the 12th of August prevented their obtaining early knowledge of this march; and they were not in a situation to be able to take advantage of it. On the other hand, Napoleon could have had no knowledge of the false movements made by the Russian army.

Being arrived at Rassassna, where he was joined by Davoust with three divisions of the 1st Corps, &c., he crossed the Dnieper on the 14th. The corps of Poniatowski and Junot were at the same time moving upon Smolensk direct from Mohilef.

Napoleon moved on upon Smolensk.

The garrison of that place, a division of infantry, under General Newerowskoi, had come out as far as Krasnoi in order to observe the movements of the French troops on the left of the Dnieper supposed to be advancing along the Dnieper from Orcha. Murat attacked this body of troops with all his cavalry; but they made good their retreat to Smolensk. Murat endeavoured to destroy this body of troops by repeated charges of his cavalry. These charges were of little avail, however; and this operation affords another instance of the security with which good infantry can stand the attack of cavalry. This division, of about 6000 infantry, had no artificial defence, excepting two rows of trees on each side of the road, of which they certainly availed themselves. But the use made even of this defence shows how small an obstacle will impede and check the operations of the cavalry.

It would probably have been more advisable if Murat, hearing of the movement of Poniatowsky and Junot direct from Mohilef upon Smolensk, had not pushed this body of troops too hard. They might have been induced to delay on their retreat in order effectually to reconnoitre their enemy. The fort would

undoubtedly in that case have fallen into the hands of Poniatowski.

On the 17th of August Napoleon assembled the whole of the operating army before Smolensk, on the left of the Dnieper. It consisted as follows:

	Men.
The cavalry under Murat . . .	40,000
Guards	47,000
1st Corps, Davoust	72,000
3rd Corps, Ney	39,000
4th Corps, the Viceroy . . .	45,000
5th Corps, Poniatowski . . .	36,000
8th Corps, Junot	18,000
	297,000

These corps had, about six weeks before, entered the country with the numbers above stated. They had had no military affair to occasion loss, yet Ségur says they were then reduced to 185,000. The returns of the 3rd August are stated to have given those numbers only.

The town had been attacked on the 16th, first by a battalion (really a division) of the 3rd Corps, which troops were repulsed.

In the mean time Bagration moved upon Katan upon the Dnieper, having heard of Napoleon's movement from the Dwina, and Barclay de Tolly having authorised the resumption of the plan of operations in pursuance of which the Russian army had broken up from Smolensk on the 7th, he moved thence, on the 16th, along the right of the Dnieper back upon Smolensk. He immediately reinforced the garrison of Smolensk. He was followed that night by Barclay de Tolly, who relieved the troops under the command of Bagration which were in the town; and the whole Russian army was collected at Smolensk, on the right of the Dnieper.

Bagration moved during the same night with his army towards Dorogobouje, on the road to Moscow. Barclay remained in support of the troops in Smolensk.

Napoleon, after waiting till two o'clock in expectation that Barclay would cross the Dnieper, and move out of Smolensk and fight a general battle, attacked the town on the 17th with his whole army, and was repulsed with loss; and in the even-

ing the Russian troops resumed possession of all the outposts. Barclay, however, withdrew the garrison in the night of the 17th, and destroyed the bridges of communication upon the Dnieper between the fort and the town.

The enemy crossed the Dnieper by fords, and obtained for a moment possession of the faubourg of Petersburg, on the right of that river, but were driven back. The Russian army, after remaining all day on the right of the river, opposite Smolensk, retired on the night of the 18th; and the French that night repaired the bridges on the Dnieper.

Before I proceed farther with the narrative, it is necessary to consider a little this movement of Napoleon's, which is greatly admired by all the writers upon the subject. When this movement was undertaken, the communication of the army was necessarily removed entirely from the Dwina. Instead of proceeding from Wilna upon Vitepsk, it proceeded from Wilna upon Minsk, where a great magazine was formed; and thence across the Berezina upon Orcha upon the Dnieper; and thence upon Smolensk.

The consequences of this alteration will appear presently when we come to consider of the retreat. It is obvious that the position of the great magazine at Minsk brought the communications of the army necessarily upon the Berezina; and eventually within the influence of the operations of the Russian armies from the southward.

Napoleon's objects by the movement might have been three. First, to force the Russians to a general battle; secondly, to obtain possession of Smolensk without the loss or the delay of a siege; thirdly, to endeavour again to obtain a position in rear of the Russian army upon their communications with Moscow, and with the southern provinces of the Russian empire.

This movement is much admired and extolled by the Russian as well as the French writers upon this war, yet if it is tried by the only tests of any military movements, its objects compared with its risks and difficulties, and its success compared with the same risks and difficulties, and with the probable risks and the probably successful result of other movements to attain the same objects, it will be found to have failed completely.

The risk has been stated to consist, first, in the march of the different corps from their cantonments on the Dwina to Rassassna on the Dnieper, across the front of the Russian army, without

the protection of a body of troops posted for that purpose; and next, in the risk incurred in removing the communication of the army from Vitepsk to Minsk. This will be discussed presently.

In respect to the first object, that of bringing the Russian army to a general action, it must be obvious to everybody that the fort of Smolensk and the Dnieper river were between Napoleon and the Russian army when his movement was completed, and the armies not only in sight, but within musket-shot of each other. It was impossible for Napoleon to bring his enemy to an action on that ground without his consent; and as the ground would not have been advantageous to the Russian army, and an unsuccessful or even a doubtful result would not have saved Smolensk, and there was no object sufficiently important to induce the Russian General to incur the risk of an unsuccessful result of a general action, it was not very probable that he would move into the trap which Ségur describes as laid for him.

Neither was it likely that Napoleon would take Smolensk by any assault which this movement might enable him to make upon that place. He had no heavy artillery; and he tried in vain to take the place by storm, first by a battalion, then by a division, and lastly by the whole army. He obtained possession of Smolensk at last only because the Russian General had made no previous arrangements for occupying the place; and Barclay knew that if he left a garrison there unprovided, it must fall into Napoleon's hands a few days sooner or later. The Russian General then thought proper to evacuate the place when he retired his army from it; and notwithstanding the position of Napoleon on the left of the Dnieper, and his attempts to take the place by storm, the Russian General would have maintained the possession if he could either have maintained the position of his own army in the neighbourhood, or have supplied the place adequately before he retired from it.

The possession of the place depended, then, upon the position of the Russian army; and what follows will show that other measures than those adopted, and other movements, were better calculated to dislodge the Russian army from Smolensk than that which was made. There can be no doubt that upon Napoleon's arrival at Smolensk he had gained six marches upon his enemy.

If Napoleon, when he crossed the Dnieper at Rassassna, had masked Smolensk, and marched direct upon any point of the Dnieper above that place, and there placed his bridges, he would indeed have posted himself with his whole army upon the communications of his enemy with Moscow, and his enemy would scarcely have attempted to pass across his front to seek the road by Kalougha. He must have gone to the northward, evacuating or leaving Smolensk to its fate; and Napoleon might have continued his march upon Moscow, keeping his position constantly between his enemy and his communications with that city and with the southern provinces. The fate of Smolensk could not have been doubtful.

Here then a different mode of manœuvring, even upon the same plan, would have produced without loss two of the three objects which Napoleon is supposed to have had in view by these movements. But these were not the only movements in his power at that time.

The Viceroy is stated to have been at Souraij and Velij If, instead of moving by his right, Napoleon had moved by his left, and brought the 1st, 5th, and 8th Corps from the Dnieper to form the reserve, and had marched from Souraij upon any point of the Upper Dnieper, he would equally have put himself in the rear of his enemy upon his communications.

He would have effected this object with more certainty if he could have ventured to move the 1st and the 5th and 8th Corps through the country on the left of the Dnieper; and in this last movement there would have been no risk: first, because Napoleon's manœuvres upon the Dwina would have attracted all the enemy's attention; secondly, because these corps would all have passed Smolensk before the Russian generals could have known of their movement, in like manner as Napoleon passed the Dnieper, and arrived at Smolensk without their knowledge.

By either of these modes of proceeding Napoleon would have cut off his enemy from their communication; would have obliged them to fight a battle to regain it; and in all probability Smolensk would have fallen into his hands without loss, with its buildings entire. Either of these last modes of effecting the object would have been shorter by two marches than the movements of the whole army upon Rassassna.

The advantage for the French army of this position upon the

Upper Dnieper was so obvious that Barclay de Tolly would not allow a night to pass over his head without occupying it. Accordingly, on the very night of his arrival, that of the 16th, at Smolensk, he sent off Bagration along the Dnieper to proceed as far as Dorogobouje. He retired himself on the night of the 18th, and proceeded at first for some wersts along the road from Smolensk to St. Petersburg, and thence turned to the right to join the road from Smolensk to Moscow. The point of communication of the two roads is at Loubino. Barclay de Tolly's object in moving by the road of St. Petersburg was to avoid the loss which his troops would have sustained by the fire of his enemy's cannon from the left of the Dnieper. But he ought to have kept a sufficient rear-guard in front of Loubino in order to protect the movement of his army from the Petersburg to the Moscow road at that point.

On the morning after the retreat of the Russian army Marshal Ney crossed the Dnieper; and here again the movement of the Russians had been so clean, and had been so little observed by their enemies, that Marshal Ney halted some time before he determined by which of the routes he would pursue the enemy.

He first moved by the route of St. Petersburg, but Napoleon stopped him; he then moved by that from Smolensk to Moscow. He very soon overtook the enemy's rear-guard, when an affair ensued in which both sides sustained great loss. The Russians, however, having reinforced their rear-guard, were enabled to maintain their position during a sufficient length of time for their army to pass Loubino, the point at which the road of communication with the high road from Smolensk to St. Petersburg joins the high road from Smolensk to Moscow. As soon as the whole army had passed Loubino, the Russian rear-guard retired.

Davoust supported Marshal Ney. The failure of the operation of the day is attributed to Junot, who, having been detached from Smolensk to cross the Dnieper at Prouditchevo, upon the left flank of the Russian rear-guard, omitted to move forward after he had crossed the Dnieper with his corps.

It must be observed, however, that parts of three corps d'armée having been engaged in this operation, Napoleon ought to have been on the ground himself to superintend and direct their movements.

The French army was formed into what were called Corps d'Armée, each commanded by a King, the Viceroy, a Marshal, or a General Officer having pretensions founded upon former services to be promoted to that rank. Each corps d'armée was composed of officers and troops of all arms, and completely equipped with bridges, artillery, commissariat, &c., to enable the corps to act separately as an army. A corps d'armée consisted of from six to two divisions of troops, each commanded by a Général de Division. Each division of three or two brigades, each commanded by a Général de Brigade. Each brigade consisted of three or two regiments, and each regiment of three or two battalions. A division upon taking the field was about ten or twelve thousand men; so that the strength of the corps d'armée varied from about 25,000 to 70,000 men. Each of the officers commanding these corps d'armée exercised over the movements of his own corps a command independent of all excepting of Napoleon himself. Not only they declined to obey each other, but would not attend to suggestions or advice in respect to the operations of their several corps in critical moments; and from the great caution with which it appears that Napoleon proceeded in placing one of these authorities in command over others, and the paucity of the instances in which he adopted such a measure, it may almost be believed that he was apprehensive of a refusal to obey the order.

There are several instances throughout this service in Russia of inconvenience resulting from the refusal of the commander of one corps d'armée to obey the commander of the other upon occasions in which it appears from the letters that Napoleon had ordered the senior to take the command of the whole; and as the juniors refused to obey, it is probable that Napoleon had omitted to inform them that they were placed under the command of their senior.

This organization of corps d'armée gave great efficiency to the French army when under Napoleon, and was very convenient in all great movements and operations. But this organization rendered it necessary for Napoleon himself to be present upon all occasions in which it was necessary to employ more than one corps d'armée in an operation. He ought to have been present, then, in this affair with the Russian rearguard. He was aware of, indeed present, at its commencement,

and the action took place within hearing of head-quarters. He knew that two corps, besides the cavalry under Murat, were employed, and that that of Davoust was stationed in the neighbourhood of the field of battle; and he was called upon for reinforcements, and he sent a division of the 1st Corps (Davoust's) to reinforce Ney. If he had gone himself, he would have seen the advantage of moving Junot's corps from the bank of the river. His order would have induced that officer to move, and the result would have been, that in all probability the Russian army would have sustained great loss in its equipments, and all the troops which had not passed the point of junction of the two roads would have been cut off.

The Russian army, however, having effected this movement, was again collected upon the great road to Moscow, with its communication with that city and with the southern provinces of the Russian empire open, and Napoleon's plan had again been defeated.

The accounts shew in what state Smolensk fell into his hands; and that this place did not afford him even shelter for the wounded of his army in the fruitless attempts to take the place by storm; and in the action which followed, which produced no result.

From this place Murat, supported by Davoust, pursued the march of the Russian army; and although some circumstances occurred in this march worthy of observation this paper is already so long that I will observe but little upon them.

As usual, Napoleon delayed for seven days at Smolensk in uncertainty, as stated by Ségur, whether he should proceed or not. He was at length roused by the report of the prospect that the Russians were disposed to take up a position to fight a battle at Dorogobouje, four or five marches from Smolensk. In this expectation, however, he was disappointed, as the Russian generals did not approve of that position. They continued their retreat then to Borodino, where Kutusof, having joined and taken the command, the Russian army halted, determined to fight a general action with their enemy. They were reinforced by all the troops which could be sent to them from Moscow, &c.; and the position they chose was certainly naturally strong; and they augmented its strength by works. But notwithstanding the advantages with which they fought this battle, and the political advantages which resulted from it, it may be doubted

whether, upon military principles, it ought to have been fought.

For political reasons it was necessary to fight a great battle before the enemy should be allowed to obtain possession of Moscow; and it would not have been safe to fight a great battle against such an enemy at a position nearer to Moscow than Borodino was. But a great risk was incurred; and if the result of the day had been more decisive, the campaign would have been lost. Notwithstanding that Napoleon had halted seven days at Smolensk, he was under the necessity of halting two days at Gjatz to collect and prepare his army; and he arrived in presence of his enemy, at Borodino, on the 5th September. The army was thus, from the 19th August, seventeen days marching by forced marches from Smolensk, the distance being 280 wersts, or about fourteen marches.

A criticism upon a battle in which the critic was not present is not likely to meet with much confidence or attention, particularly when made upon the conduct of so consummate a captain on a field of battle as Napoleon was. But it certainly appears that the measure stated by Ségur to have been recommended by Davoust would have been the best and would have had the most decisive results; such as alone could render any action desirable to the French army, or be really detrimental to their Russian enemies.

Davoust's recommendation was to force and turn the enemy's left by the old road from Smolensk to Mojaisk; and to attack the Russian army by its rear from the heights in that quarter of their position.

This operation ought to have been performed by a much larger body of men than was proposed by Davoust; probably the whole of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 8th Corps, and half the cavalry; keeping half the cavalry, the Guards, and the 4th Corps in reserve nearly in the position occupied by the Guards during the battle. The attacking troops might have been formed across the rear of the Russian left on what appears, from the plans and the courses of the rivulets thereon delineated, to be the highest ground in the country. Every movement they would have made would have brought them nearer their reserve; and the slightest success would have cut off the Russian army from its point of retreat, Mojaisk. It is not to be supposed that Napoleon was not aware of this mode

of operation; and it is most probable that he did not adopt it because he must have trusted some officer with the execution of the plan; and he could not trust Murat, or decide between the conflicting pretensions of Ney and Davoust. It is quite clear, however, that having omitted to adopt this plan his success in the battle was not decisive; and not sufficiently so, even in his own opinion, to enable him to allow his reserve of Guards to attack. Indeed some little circumstances are mentioned which show how little decisive the success was, owing principally to the omission to attack the Russian left in sufficient strength.

One of these is that the Russians weakened their extreme left opposed to Poniatowski, in order to strengthen that part of their line opposed to Davoust. Yet Poniatowski could make no progress; and in point of fact made none till Davoust had carried the heights and works opposed to the advance of the troops under his own command; thus facilitating the movements of Poniatowski instead of receiving assistance from the 5th Corps. Another is that the action was continued along the line throughout the evening; and that the Russians, although they had lost their works and their first position, did not retire till the night, and then only as far as Mojaisk.

Their rear-guard again successfully contended with Murat's advanced guard on the day after the battle for the possession of Mojaisk; and the Russian rear-guard did not quit that town till the second day after the battle.

Then if the success was not what Napoleon wished or expected, or of a nature to relieve him from the difficulties of his position, the loss of the French army was immense; and there was but little chance of saving any of the wounded; as the Convent of Kolotskoi to which they were sent was but ill provided as an hospital.

Upon the Russian retreat from Mojaisk one of those circumstances occurred respecting which astonishment has already been expressed. It was not known for some time by what road they had retired. Napoleon suspected that they had retired upon Kalougha, leaving the road upon Moscow open to him; and having already halted the 8th upon the field of battle, he halted the 9th, 10th, and 11th in Mojaisk; he did not move from thence till the 12th, when he had received intelligence upon which he could rely that the Russians had retired upon Moscow. To this point he followed them, and he arrived at Moscow with

his whole army on the 14th of September, in 106 days from the time he quitted the Vistula. The distance from the cantonments of the French army on the Vistula to Moscow is 1200 wersts, or 60 to 70 marches; and they marched over that distance in 106 days by forced marches, attended by such fatigue to the troops and horses of the army as to have arrived at Moscow nearly in a state of disorganization from starvation and distress of every description. Napoleon himself, with his Guards, halted 18 days at Wilna, 18 at Vitepsk, 7 at Smolensk, and 6 days afterwards, making the whole 49 days. These delays will account for the time lost in effecting the march.

The Russian army retired through Moscow on the 14th September, after a council of war, in which it was determined that it was not expedient to fight another battle to save that city; and they directed their march upon Ryakonow. They crossed the Moskwa about four marches from Moscow near its junction with the Pakra, and continued to march along the course of that river by Polotsk, till they reached the old road from Moscow to Kalougha. They then marched along that road till, on the 2nd of October, they took the position of Taroutino on the Nara, about 75 wersts from Moscow and 75 from Kalougha.

Napoleon after delaying some time at the gate of Moscow in expectation that a deputation of the inhabitants would be sent out to lay the keys of the town at his feet, entered the town, and found it abandoned by nearly all its native inhabitants, none of those having remained excepting of the lowest rabble, who had even attempted to defend the Kremlin against Murat's advanced guard.

The French advanced guard appears not to have pursued the Russian army from Moscow. It appears that they did not molest the march which they made round the town, and did not even know for some days, till the 26th September, in what direction the Russians had gone.

They got upon the right road at last, however, and having approached the Russian army took up a position near Winkowo in front of the Russians on the Nara, in which they remained till Kutusof attacked them.

On the day Napoleon entered Moscow he ought to have made his arrangements to withdraw from that city. Moscow was not a military position. The possession of it was important to Napoleon only on account of its political importance to the

Russian empire. But when the inhabitants had fled, with the exception of the German and French merchants and a few of the rabble, the possession of the town lost its value, and after the fire was no resource to the French army, even in the way of provisions or military equipments. The burning of the town is attributed by all these authors to Rostopchin, who on his part has published a pamphlet in which he denies that he had anything to do with the burning of the town.

If these histories * are read with attention it will be seen that Rostopchin was anxious that another battle should be fought even at the gates of the city to save it from falling into the hands of the French, and that a Council of War was assembled on the 13th September to decide whether this battle should be fought or not. The decision was in the negative, and the total evacuation took place next morning, the Russian army having moved through Moscow and the French army having followed them.

It is quite clear that Rostopchin can have taken no measures to set fire to the town previous to the assembly of this Council of War. He could not have foreseen its decision, and if the decision had been in favour of a battle, the Russian army might have fought with the town on fire in their rear, and the reward of their victory might have been its ashes; or on the other hand the Russian army might have had to retire through a town on fire. No man in his senses could have incurred such a risk.

Then between the period of the breaking up the council of war and the retreat of the Russian rear-guard, was there time to adopt the measures stated to have been adopted to set fire to this town? If there were time Rostopchin could not have executed those measures himself. There must have been some agents, some witnesses of the measures adopted, and Rostopchin could not have contradicted the fact in the face of the world without somebody having been found able and willing to state the truth.

The magazines were not burnt. No mischief was done to the powder magazine in particular, yet in a town abandoned by its inhabitants, doomed by its native governor to be destroyed

* In addition to the works of Ségur, book viii. c. 2, and Gourgaud, p. 260, see *Histoire de l'Expédition de Russie;* par. M * * *, vol. i., p. 365. Paris, 1823, in two volumes.

by fire, surely the object to which he would first have turned his attention, that in which he would most willingly have tried his *infernal machines*, would have been magazines of arms, cannon, &c., and above all the powder magazine.

It is by far more probable that the soldiers of the French army, finding the town abandoned by its inhabitants, broke into the houses to search for plunder on the night of their arrival. Light for this purpose is generally procured by flashing off a firelock, and setting fire to the oil rag with which the musket is commonly kept clean. This oil rag is kept in the hand as long as the latter is not burnt, the rag is then thrown upon the ground or anywhere, and something is found and set fire to, to answer the same purpose. It is thus that a house abandoned by its inhabitants, if plundered by troops, is generally burnt.

It will be observed accordingly, in the account, that but few houses were on fire the first night; a very large number the second night, and the whole town the third night.

It is quite consistent with this mode of setting fire to the town that some of the inhabitants were found engaged in burning houses. Such inhabitants as remained in Moscow are not generally unwilling to share in the benefits to be derived from the sack of such a town as Moscow; and it is not improbable that they increased the confusion and pillage.

The destruction of Moscow by fire apparently made no alteration in Napoleon's intention to remain in that city. He had made endeavours to open a negotiation with the Emperor of Russia for peace, which he flattered himself would be successful; and that this event would relieve him from the difficulties and dangers of his position, which it is impossible to believe that he did not see as well as others. He had written a letter to the Emperor of Russia which Kutusof had consented to forward, and it may be supposed that the expectation of a favourable answer had tended to divert Napoleon's attention from his real situation.

It is certain that, excepting to give orders to evacuate the hospital at the Convent of Kolotskoi, he took no step to prepare for his retreat or for his movement at all from Moscow.

When the future prospects of the army were discussed it appears that he never contemplated a retrograde movement to a greater extent than Smolensk. At times he looked to pass the

winter in the southern provinces of the Russian empire about Kalougha, and it appears that he could not bring his mind so far to consider the truth as to calculate the relative strength of the armies opposed to each other upon his flanks, and to ascertain whether it was such as to enable him even to retreat from Russia, or remain within reach of his enemy's armies, much more to maintain a position within that country.

The habit of Napoleon had been to astonish and deceive mankind, and he had come at last to deceive himself. These works contain innumerable instances of this habit of his mind, but those which I am now about to discuss are the most remarkable and the most fatal to himself and his fortunes, and the most fortunate for the world that ever occurred.

It has been already stated that, on the 19th of August, Wittgenstein had made an unsuccessful attack upon the united corps of Oudinot and St. Cyr, the 2nd and 6th Corps, at Polotsk on the Dwina. Wittgenstein had been repulsed, and retired to his position at Sebej to cover the road to St. Petersburg, and no farther operation was undertaken by either party on this flank of the army from that time. Macdonald, with the 10th Corps, had collected the ordnance and stores necessary for the siege of Riga at Runthal and Borsmunde, but no steps had been taken in order to carry on this operation.

The strength of these three corps is stated in page 22 to have been 95,000 men upon their entry into Russia. Before the battle of Polotsk, of the 19th August, the 2nd and 6th were already reduced—the 2nd Corps to 20,000 men, including the corps of cuirassiers under Doumerc, from 37,000 men; the 6th Corps, to 15,000 men from 25,000 men—the former having had only the affair at Kliastitza, and the latter having only made its marches to Polotsk. The 10th Corps having had no severe marching, and having been but little engaged with the Russians, was not weakened to the same degree. But as long as Napoleon persisted in the design of carrying on the siege of Riga, the 10th Corps under Macdonald could not be considered available to the purpose of protecting the left flank of the army at Moscow.

The only troops available for this service were the 2nd and the 6th Corps, which, supposing them to be as strong in October as previous to the battle of Polotsk, consisted of only 35,000 men. Indeed the Russian accounts say they had only 30,000 men.

Wittgenstein, who on the side of the Russians commanded against Oudinot and St. Cyr, had been in the mean time very considerably reinforced from the interior of Russia as well as from St. Petersburg. These reinforcements joined him in the middle of October.

But he was besides joined by the Russian corps under General Steigentheil, which had been stationed in Finland with a view to the defence of that province, and detained there afterwards in order to carry into execution the emperor's engagements with the Crown Prince regarding Norway. The reinforcements augmented his corps to 40,000 men, and the corps of Steigentheil, after leaving some men in the garrison of Riga, amounted to 11,000, so that Wittgenstein was enabled to commence his operations against St. Cyr with a considerable superiority of force.

Accordingly he attacked the French at Polotsk on the right of the Dwina, on the 18th and 19th October, while Steigentheil moved by the left of that river. The French were defeated and obliged to retire towards the Orcha. St. Cyr was wounded and quitted the army, the command of which devolved upon the Bavarian General Wrede. There was, however, a dispute respecting the command which was exercised by the French general, Le Grand, and de Wrede consequently took his own line of retreat towards Glubokoe with the Bavarian troops.

When Napoleon determined to move on upon Moscow from Dorogobouje on the 26th August, he had ordered forward to Smolensk the Duc de Bellune with the 9th Corps, consisting of 33,500 men. The instructions to this corps state that it was to be the reserve of the army at Moscow, and the connecting link of the wings of the army then upon the Styr and upon the Dwina.

But as soon as St. Cyr was defeated by Wittgenstein there was an end of this reserve. Victor was obliged to move in all haste from Smolensk in order to save the 2nd and 6th Corps, and prevent Wittgenstein from performing the part allotted to him in co-operation with Admiral Tchitchakof. He, therefore, moved from Smolensk, and joined on the 31st October to the 2nd and 6th Corps, of which Oudinot had by this time taken the command.

The losses sustained in the affair at Polotsk on the 19th, the separation of the Bavarians and direction given to their march,

had so far weakened the 2nd and 6th Corps that, even when joined by Victor, he did not consider himself strong enough to do more than maintain a defensive against Wittgenstein.

In consequence of being repeatedly urged by Napoleon to make the attack, he did make it on the 14th November at Smoliantzy in the neighbourhood of the Orcha, but failed, not only because he was not sufficiently strong, but because the two marshals, Victor and Oudinot, could not agree in opinion on the plan of attack.

Then on the right flank of the army it appears that the Russian forces on the Styr consisted on the 16th of September of 60,000 men. They were here reorganized and received some reinforcements. General Tormasof was called to fill the place in the Grand Russian Army of Bagration, killed in the battle of Borodino. The whole force was commanded by Admiral Tchitchakof. General Sacken was to command in Volhynia when the admiral should move towards the Berezina.

As soon as the Russian corps joined upon the Styr, the Austrian corps and the 7th Corps of the French army retired before them till they crossed the Bug.

Tchitchakof, after some delay, occasioned principally by the movements of the combined Austrian and French armies before the Bug, separated from Sacken with 38,000 men, leaving Sacken with about 28,000. Tchitchakof pursued his march towards the Berezina, and General Lambert, commanding his advanced guard, took possession of Minsk on the 16th November, having driven out the French garrison. Thus was lost the grand magazine of the French army on its only line of retreat. He followed up this success by marching upon Borisof, of which place and its bridge upon the Berezina he likewise obtained possession on the 21st November. Lambert was wounded in this affair, and Count Pahlen, who succeeded to the command of the advanced guard, pushed forward till he met Oudinot on the 23rd of November at Losnitzka, who having met the troops flying from Borisof joined them to the 2nd Corps, and attacked Pahlen and obliged him to retire across the Berezina at Borisof, of which place, however, the Russians destroyed the bridge.

The admiral had passed the Berezina with his whole army, and had that river at his back with only one bridge to retire by. He consequently lost in Borisof all the baggage of his

army. Admiral Tchitchakof then posted his army upon the Berezina from Bobruisk to the neighbourhood of Zembin.

Schwarzenberg, whose Austrian force was by that time reduced to 25,000 men, followed the movement of the admiral, leaving Regnier with the 7th Corps of the French army opposed to Sacken. But Regnier was soon found too weak to hold his ground; and Schwarzenberg was obliged to return in order to prevent the Russians from reaching Warsaw.

Thus then both Napoleon's flanks were turned and overpowered, and the greatest of all misfortunes threatened the retreating French army, that of large and superior bodies of troops posted on its line of retreat to impede and prevent its march, while others were pursuing it. I will presently discuss the measures taken to get the better of these difficulties, and the nature, amount, and causes of their success. It is now necessary to discuss a little the causes of the misfortune.

Napoleon would never believe, or act as if he believed, either that he was himself, with the body of troops under his immediate command, under the necessity of retreating from his position of Moscow, that any preparatory steps were necessary to enable him to perform that operation, or that the French corps destined to protect his flanks were not stronger than the Russian corps opposed to them.

There is a curious instance in these works of the disposition of his mind to despise and depreciate his enemy, and to exaggerate the means at his own disposal.

General Hœrtel throughout the campaign commanded a corps of observation at Mozyr, and Latour Maubourg, who was employed with his cavalry to blockade Bobruisk on the Berezina, and afterwards Dombrowsky, who relieved him, were repeatedly urged to destroy this corps of General Hœrtel. Both felt they were unequal to the task. But at last General Hœrtel fell upon Dombrowsky and drove him from the blockade of Bobruisk; and it was not till this misfortune occurred that Napoleon was convinced that it was not in the power of Dombrowsky to destroy the corps of General Hœrtel. If Napoleon could have taken a correct view of his position he would have seen, as will appear soon, that it was not in his power, retreating from Moscow on the 19th October, to maintain himself within the Russian frontier during the winter; and that even if he did he could not during the winter carry on the operations of the siege

of Riga. He ought then, as early as September, to have sent away his battering train and stores. This measure would have rendered Macdonald's corps disposable for operations in the field, and would have given the French a numerical superiority over Wittgenstein upon the Dwina; even after the junction with the latter of the corps of Steigentheil.

Then Napoleon must have known of the direction of the march of Tchitchakof from the Danube, of his arrival upon the Stener and junction with Tormasof, of his consequent numerical superiority to Schwarzenberg; and of the impossibility that the latter should be able to maintain his ground. Napoleon should have reinforced his right by moving thither the 9th Corps under Victor. He had nothing to apprehend in his rear excepting by movements from his flanks, in consequence of the superiority of his enemy on both flanks. But there were still Durutte and Loison's division and other troops at Wilna which might have reinforced the centre of the army, and have occupied points in its rear if such reinforcement had been necessary to the centre after the wings had been secured.

These arrangements, however, particularly that of sending back the battering train and its equipments, which to be of any use must have been made in September, would have betrayed to the world the fact that Russia was not to be conquered by coup-de-main or in one campaign. That on the contrary the natural difficulties of the enterprise and the resistance had been found so much more formidable and effective than had been expected, that the means of conquest, however in magnitude and efficiency surpassing any ever before heard of, were not equal to the task of subduing the country; and that the concentration of all was necessary to enable Napoleon to withdraw his main body, his guards, and his own person from the position into which he had adventured. It was preferred to incur all risks, and to trust to all chances rather than to let out this secret. Napoleon endeavoured to convince everybody around him, even to the last moment previous to his departure from Moscow, that he had it in his power to remain for the winter in that city or where else he pleased in Russia. But these relations make it clear that if he deceived himself, if he deceived others at a distance from the seat of the war, at least the principal officers of the army were not deceived, all of whom were aware of the critical nature of the position in which they were placed.

On the other hand the Emperor of Russia appears to have taken every measure which could tend to the total defeat and destruction of his enemy. He took no notice of the insinuations made to him of Napoleon's *love* for him personally, and of his sincere desire for peace, excepting to censure the officers who had conveyed them. He reinforced his armies most judiciously, and particularly those destined to act upon the flanks of the enemy; and his orders for the recommencement of their operations after the junction of the reinforcements at the same period of the month of October are most judicious. It appears that after Murat had discovered the direction of the retreat of Kutusof from Moscow, on the 26th of September, he followed his movement, and after some skirmishing the French advanced posts finally took up their position opposite the Russian army on the 27th September.

Poniatowski, with the 5th Corps, was at Wereia, and it was necessary to detach many other troops from Moscow to support the advanced guard or to protect the communication with Smolensk, as notwithstanding that in the course of the communications between the two armies there was a sort of understanding between Murat and Kutusof that hostilities should be suspended, which suspension extended only in front of the two bodies opposite to each other, operations were carried on much to the disadvantage of the French army in their rear, and even upon the troops of the French advanced guard on their foraging parties, and it was agreed between the parties that even this suspension of hostilities might be put an end to by either party giving to the other six hours' notice.

Nothing could be more disadvantageous to the French army, and no proof more strong could be given of their weakness than the consent of Napoleon to such an arrangement; and the Russians took every advantage of it.

At length, however, even this state of repose, and Napoleon's dreams of peace, of passing the winter at Moscow, &c., were put an end to, and Kutusof attacked Murat in his position in front of the Russian army on the 18th October. He defeated Murat; and the advantage he gained over him was very considerable. But certainly not what the Russian general had a right to calculate upon. As soon as Napoleon heard of this attack, on the 18th October, he put his troops in motion, and his army marched on the following morning by the old route of Kalougha.

He left behind him Mortier with *la Jeune Garde* and other troops, with orders to maintain himself in the Kremlin. He sent orders to Mortier on the 20th to remain till 23rd at night, then to blow up that palace, &c., &c., and to retire upon Wereia. It is impossible to advert to this fact without expressing the horror which it inspires. If Napoleon had destroyed a magazine or a work of utility to the Russian army or nation, or even a monument of art, or one to recall the memory of some glorious action by the Russian army or nation, the reader would not have been shocked as by the perusal of formal instructions to destroy the ancient palace of the Czars, solely to mark the impotent desire of revenge because the Emperor of Russia, having declined to submit to insult, had afterwards refused to listen to insidious offers of peace.

Then we shall read of the complaints of the French nation of the occupation of their capital, and of the contributions which they were obliged to pay!

The first marches of Napoleon from Moscow were evidently directed to relieve Murat from the difficulties of his position. After the affair of the 18th he had retired across the Moskwa; and the advanced guard of the army, under the Viceroy, having crossed the Pakra on the 20th, they were in immediate communication with Murat. Ney joined him; and the remainder of the army moved by a cross road from the old to the new road to Kalougha; which road they entered at Fominskoe.

Napoleon's head-quarters were at Fominskoe on the 22nd October.

On the 23rd the Viceroy with the advanced guard was beyond Borowsk. Delzons' division of the 4th Corps was forward; from which two battalions were detached to take possession of Malo-Jaroslavetz. Napoleon had his head-quarters at Borowsk on that day.

It appears that Kutusof, who after the affair of the 18th had left Murat beyond the Moskwa, returned to his camp at Torontino; and in fact had no intelligence of the French army till the 23rd, when he learnt from Miloradowitch, who commanded his advanced guard, that the French had evacuated Moscow; and that after making two marches on the old they had crossed the country to the new road to Kalougha. He immediately detached Doctorof with his corps, and directed him first upon Borowsk; but finding that the French were there in force he

directed him upon Malo-Jaroslavetz, and followed with the whole army in two columns in the evening.

Doctorof arrived at Malo-Jaroslavetz early on the 24th, and immediately attacked the two French battalions in the town, and drove them out. They were supported first by the whole of Delzons' division, and afterwards by the 4th Corps, and then by the 1st Corps; while Doctorof was supported by the Russian army as it arrived. A furious combat ensued, which ended by the town remaining in possession of the French; but during its continuance Kutusof had taken up a position across the new road to Kalougha from Moscow, about two wersts from Malo-Jaroslavetz behind the little stream Louja; in which in the reduced state of the French army, and particularly of the cavalry, it was not thought expedient to attack him.

Napoleon had moved his head-quarters on the 24th to Gorodnia. The 25th was passed in an examination of the ground on which the battle of the previous day had been fought; the whole army made a forward movement towards Malo-Jaroslavetz on the 26th; but as the retreat was then determined upon, and that it should be made by Mojaisk and Wiasma, they returned the same day and Napoleon had his head-quarters that night at Borowsk. He moved on the following day, the 27th, to Vereia, and arrived at Mojaisk on the 28th, having thus passed ten days from the day of his retreat from Moscow, and being only four days' march from that city. Davoust had the rear-guard, and the Viceroy was to support him.

Before I proceed farther it may be as well to consider the objects of these movements since the departure from Moscow.

The armies opposed to each other were of the strength as follows:—

French infantry, 89,640, including 4000 dismounted cavalry; 15,314 cavalry, 12,000 artillery, &c., with 569 pieces of cannon.

Junot, with the 8th Corps, was at Mojaisk; and Poniatowski with the 5th at Medyn; and Mortier had been left in Moscow with 6 or 8000 men. These detachments would make a deduction from those numbers of about 15,000 or 16,000 men.

Prince Kutusof had on the 18th October 78,440 men, and 620 pieces of cannon, without including the Cossacks.

Napoleon, therefore, had still a superiority of force even after his detachments are deducted from his numbers.

It is evident that his first intention was solely to relieve Murat; and he probably hoped that his adversary would give him an opportunity of fighting a battle with advantage. The mode in which it appears that his intentions were at first confined to these objects is that he did not send Mortier his instructions to march on the 23rd at night upon Vereia till the 20th; the day on which his advanced guard crossed the Pakra, and was within reach of Murat. It is likewise probable that if he had left Moscow, having in view eventually even the march upon Kalougha, he would have sent his baggage and incumbrances by the new road on that place, which was the most direct; and would have marched with a light army only for the relief of Murat, and for the eventual purpose of attacking Kutusof. Napoleon started then from Moscow with one principal object in view and another eventual, and he took up a third two days afterwards; that is to say, to march upon Kalougha upon his enemy's left flank, to anticipate his enemy in that town, avail himself of his enemy's magazines, &c., and make his retreat thence upon Smolensk. When he formed this design it must be observed that although two marches nearer his enemy than when at Moscow, he was at nearly as great a distance from Kalougha as when at Moscow. Indeed as he was obliged to march from the old to the new road to Kalougha across the country, the time necessary to march over the ground would be as long as if he had started from Moscow, and moreover the probability that the design would be discovered by the enemy was much greater than if he had marched at once upon Kalougha from Moscow by the new road to that town. When he determined upon this movement upon Kalougha he was seven or eight marches from that city; and Kutusof, at Taroutino, was only three or four marches.

It is certainly a matter of surprise that Kutusof should not have heard till the 23rd of the direction of Napoleon's march made on the 20th; but it will have been seen that Kutusof was still in time, and was enabled to take a position in front of his adversary between him and the object to which he was directing his march. Even if Kutusof had been a day later, he would have had it in his power to anticipate his adversary and to reach Kalougha before him; but his march on the evening of the 23rd was important inasmuch as it placed him in such a position in relation to the roads from Kalougha to Smolensk, as

that Napoleon could use none of them; and was obliged from Borowsk to retire by Mojaisk, leaving to his adversary the shortest road to Smolensk, the best and most plentifully supplied with provisions.

It will have been seen that Napoleon, even after deducting his detachments, had still a numerical superiority of force to Kutusof. It is astonishing that he did not attack his adversary previous to the commencement of his retreat; and endeavour to remove him to a greater distance; and particularly from the roads leading from Kalougha upon Smolensk.

The consequence of this omission will appear hereafter; as will likewise that of the time lost (six days) in moving from Moscow by Malo-Jaroslavetz upon Mojaisk. The leaving Kutusof in possession of these southern communications with Smolensk must likewise be viewed, in connection with the establishment of the great magazine of the army at Minsk. If Napoleon could have directed his retreat upon Vitepsk, the possession of those southern communications by Kutusof was not of such importance. But as he was obliged to go to Smolensk and thence along the Dnieper and across the Berezina upon Minsk, the possession of those communications would have been fatal to him and his army if the Russians had been more active.

Then in respect to the mode in which the retreat was made it appears equally faulty with all the previous measures and manœuvres.

Napoleon should have rendered his army as light as possible, should have destroyed all superfluous baggage, and have reduced as much as possible the number of wheel carriages; as however convenient to individuals they are the most inconvenient and burthensome to the army, create great delays, expose the rear-guards in whose charge they fall, and aggravate all the difficulties which occur on the march.

He should then have marched by two or three separate roads, one column covered by its rear-guard being on each road; or he might have marched back as he marched forward, in three columns, on or immediately close to the same road, which might have been given up to the wheel carriages of the army.

By any of these modes he might have saved his army at least from any military disaster; and time, of the greatest importance to him, would have been saved.

Instead of adopting any of these modes of retreat he marched in one long column which extended the distance of two or more marches.

In this form the army continued its retreat to Smolensk, where Napoleon with the Guard arrived on the 9th November. Junot with the 8th Corps had arrived before him. The rear-guard under Ney; the 3rd Corps having relieved the 1st at Viasma on the 3rd November, where Miloradowitch attacked the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Corps, and they sustained great loss.

On the 7th of November the frost had commenced; and it is curious to observe the use that is made of this event in all these accounts, particularly by Gourgaud, who is Napoleon's apologist. First, the frost was premature, and earlier in that season than it had ever been known in others. This is not the fact; but what is the fact is that an early frost was foreseen; and the necessity of guarding against this state of the season urged in the 23rd and 24th bulletins in the midst of all the boasting which those documents contain. Any other people in the world, after reading these words written on the 9th, 14th and 20th October, would have been astonished that the famous 29th bulletin of the 3rd December should have attributed the misfortunes of this army to the frost.

But if the frost destroyed the army, and particularly the horses of the army, how did it happen that those corps of the army under Napoleon's own direction lost * men and * horses between the 1st of June and the 18th of October, of which number not one-sixth were lost in military actions in the field.

Then we are told the loss was occasioned because the French horses were not rough shod. Why were they not rough shod? Is there never any frost in Russia? But the excuse is not founded in fact. Those who have followed a French army well know that their horses are always *rough shod.* It is the common mode of shoeing horses in France; and in this respect a French army ought and would have suffered less inconvenience than any other army that ever was assembled.

The date of the commencement of the frost is well known; and the reader has only to refer to the following passages to see that the confusion and indiscipline in the army commenced before it had arrived at Mojaisk, nine days before the frost appeared; and in point of fact Miloradowitch took advantage of

* Blank in manuscript.

that confusion at Viasma in his attack upon the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Corps.

It will be seen from these observations that Napoleon was obliged to abandon all his projects one after the other, and to choose for his retreat the road least advantageous in his own opinion for his army, the most circuitous, not only positively but relatively, with that which he left in the power of his adversary; and this without attempting to gain a military advantage over his enemy, notwithstanding his own still existing superiority of numbers. Yet the following letter will shew that he was still on the 11th November, when at Smolensk, thinking of taking his winter cantonments on the Dnieper; although having retreated with his centre without fighting he knew at the same time that one of his flanks had been overpowered, that he had reason to believe that the other would be so likewise, and that in fact he would find not only that he could not maintain himself within the country, but had not the power of retreating from it.

Napoleon having arrived at Smolensk on the 9th November and remained till the 14th, must have been aware that Kutusof had arrived at Jelnia. A brigade of a division of troops under General Baraguay d'Hilliers had been cut off, and other military misfortunes had occurred in that direction, which must have proved to him that his adversary was in force on the roads which lead from Kalougha to Smolensk and all the towns on the Dnieper.

The Russian army had on the 26th of October, the day on which Napoleon finally retreated from Malo-Jaroslavetz, likewise made a retrograde movement and took up another position twenty wersts from Malo-Jaroslavetz and nearer Kalougha, at Gonczarowo. Davoust with the French rear-guard evacuated Malo-Jaroslavetz in the night of the 26th, and the next morning the retreat of the French army was known to the Russian generals. The Russian army, however, did not move till the 27th at night, and then towards Medyn. But Kutusof did not at once take advantage of his position to move direct upon Viazma or Smolensk; but he followed the direction of Napoleon's march, although it was obvious that the head of the French army, being at Mojaisk on the 28th, had already gained four marches upon him.

The reason for moving in this direction was that it was not

supposed possible in the Russian army that Napoleon should move on his retreat by the road by which he had advanced, and upon Minsk. The movements at that time in the course of execution by the Admiral Tchitchakof on the Berezina were known to the Russian generals; and they believed that Napoleon would prefer to direct his march by Wolokowisk, &c., towards Witepsk.

It was only at Kremenskoe, on the 30th of October, that the true line of the French retreat was known in the Russian army. Platof was then ordered to follow their rear with the Cossacks and one division. Miloradowitch was directed upon Gjatz, and Kutusof himself with the main body moved on the 31st towards Viasma. Napoleon was at Viasma on the 1st of November, where he left Ney, and marched on the 2nd to Semlewo.

On the 3rd of November there was a serious affair between the French troops at Viasma and Miloradowitch in which the French sustained considerable loss. After this affair Kutusof directed his march upon Jelnia with a view to intercept his enemy at Krasnoi. The Russian army arrived at Jelnia on the 8th of November, that is on the day before that on which Napoleon reached Smolensk. He halted there the 9th, on which day his detachment gained the success above-mentioned against the French division commanded by General Baraguay d'Hilliers. In the mean time Miloradowitch and Platof were,—the first marching on the flank of the French corps moving on the great road towards Smolensk, and the last following the French army; and both doing them all the mischief in their power.

Thus then on the arrival of Napoleon at Smolensk his adversary, notwithstanding all the mistakes and false movements he had made, was as forward as he was; while the French whole column was harassed and distressed by the corps of Miloradowitch on their flank, and their rear-guard, which since the affair of Viasma on the 3rd of November had been commanded by Ney, was pursued and harassed by Platof.

Under these circumstances Napoleon halted at Smolensk till the 14th November.

If he had remained with a view of refreshing the exhausted troops, or of collecting his columns in order to march *en masse*, and to be able to oppose his whole force to the force of the enemy in case they should endeavour to avail themselves of the

advantageous position which they had acquired, either to attack the French army or to intercept its march, this delay would not have been surprising, as the Viceroy, who with the 4th Corps had passed by Dukhowizina from Dorogobouje, sustained great loss in the passage of the Wop; and the 4th Corps did not arrive at Smolensk till the 13th November. The rear-guard under Ney had been delayed on its march to protect the movement of the Viceroy, and did not arrive till the 15th. But the improvement of the mode of the retreat was not the object of this halt however dangerous and disastrous, and however this improvement was necessary, as it must have been known that the Russian army had been at Jelnia since the 8th of November. The French army commenced afresh, on the 14th, its retreat from Smolensk in the same form as that in which the retreat had been made up to that point, and Ney with the rear-guard was ordered not to quit Smolensk till the 16th, and he did not in fact march till the 17th. On the 14th Osterman was with his corps near Koritnia, and Miloradowitch close to Krasnoi; and Kutusof was near enough with the whole Russian army to support him.

It is astonishing then that the French army should have suffered the military disasters, described nearly in the same words in all these works, which it did suffer on its march from Smolensk to Orcha. These disasters were short only of total destruction; which must have been the fate of the army on this ground if the Russian generals could have known the state to which their enemy was reduced, and Kutusof had been a little more active. But a close examination of the movements of these armies will shew how little of the internal state of one hostile army is known to the other; and it is not astonishing that Kutusof, being aware of the numerical inferiority of his own force to that of his adversary when the retreat commenced, and of his own losses in the pursuit, should not have believed that the Guard and those troops which had been the terror of the world were so reduced in numbers, in discipline, and efficiency, as to be unequal to defend themselves against the reduced numbers which he could bring upon them. He was aware of what was passing upon the Berezina and Orcha, and he had reason to expect that the armies under Tchitchakof and Wittgenstein. and fresh and increased natural difficulties, would to a certainty accomplish that destruction of which the commence-

ment had in a short time been so well effected by the troops under his command.

Each of the corps marching from Smolensk, excepting the Guard, was obliged to quit the high road and to abandon every equipment it possessed. Ney's corps not only quitted the high road, but crossed the Dnieper on the ice, to march along the right bank of that river; and every wheeled carriage, and every horse, and every creature unable to make the greatest exertion for his safety, was left behind and fell into the hands of the enemy.

It will have been seen that Napoleon delayed from the 9th till the 14th at Smolensk. He did not arrive at Orcha till the 19th on account of the necessity under which he found himself of waiting again at Krasnoi for the troops in his rear, both to save them and himself and his Guard.

He heard at Dombrowna on the 18th that Minsk had been on the 16th taken by Admiral Tchitchakof, and although he immediately saw all the consequences to the future safety of his army, he still hoped he might be in time to cross the Berezina at Borisof.

Ney did not arrive at Orcha by the right of Dnieper till the 21st, at midnight, with the remains of his corps; but Napoleon had left Orcha in the night of the 20th, having waited there one day in hopes of Ney's junction. The retreat was still continued in the same form, notwithstanding the military disasters and loss of time which had resulted from the use of it. Napoleon heard at Toloczin, on the 22nd, of the loss of Borisof; and that Oudinot had immediately determined to attack the Russian advanced guard, which had been under General Lambert, but which was commanded by General Pahlen since Lambert had been wounded in the attack of Borisof. The Russians had, however, destroyed the bridge on their side of the river, and Oudinot found the localities were of that description that it was impossible to attempt to pass the river at that point.

Napoleon was then in this situation on the 24th November, in the morning. His army, which had been to Moscow, on its march between the Dnieper and the Berezina in one column, of which the head was three marches in front of the rear-guard; and the rear-guard was quitting Orcha upon the Dnieper.

The grand Russian army under Kutusof was upon the

Dnieper, Miloradowitch with the advanced guard had crossed that river, and threatened the rear and left of the French army.

The Berezina was in his front and must be crossed. This river is difficult to cross at all times. There are but few places of access to it. There are marshes upon both banks, which as well as the river itself must be passed by roads on which there are bridges; and both might be destroyed with the utmost facility.

The Berezina was occupied by the army of Tchitchakof from Bobruisk to Zembin.

It has been seen that Napoleon had been obliged to withdraw Oudinot from the body of troops opposed to Wittgenstein on the Orcha; and that Oudinot had already cleared his road for him to the Berezina. But the consequence was that Victor was no longer in strength to hold his ground opposite to Wittgenstein. Victor was obliged to follow Oudinot's march with the 9th Corps. Victor was within a march on the 24th of the road on which the main French column was marching; and Wittgenstein attacked his rear-guard. The right of the French army on its retreat, as well as its front, rear and left, was exposed to the enterprises of a superior enemy's army.

Oudinot had been directed to discover a place for the passage of the army over the Berezina; and he by accident and fortunately discovered that there was a passage near the village of Studianka.

He moved there on the 25th from Borisof; and immediately commenced the construction of the bridges for the passage of the army at that place. When Oudinot arrived at Studianka there was still a Russian corps under General Tchaplitz posted on the opposite bank of the Berezina. But this corps had been ordered to move upon Borisof, as the movements, dispositions, and demonstrations of the French had indicated an intention of passing between Borisof and Bobruisk, and even at Borisof rather than above that town.

The admiral, therefore, had been led into error. But General Tchaplitz, from what he had seen on the 25th, left a regiment of infantry and twelve pieces of cannon in a position opposite Studianka.

On the 25th Wittgenstein moved upon Baran within * wersts of Studianka. On the 26th Napoleon arrived with the

* Blank in manuscript.

Guard at Studianka. Oudinot crossed the Berezina upon the bridges; took possession of Zembin and drove away the Russian troops as far as Stachova. On the 27th all the troops crossed the river as fast as they arrived at Studianka. Victor had been the rear-guard at Borisof, and one division of his corps remained as rear-guard at Studianka; while another, that of Partonneau, followed the march of the army and left Borisof on the 27th at night. This division was, however, taken by Wittgenstein.

At length, on the 28th, the Russians ascertained where the French were crossing the Berezina. Tchitchakof attacked them on the right of that river, while Wittgenstein attacked Victor on the left bank at Studianka. Both were repulsed, but with immense loss to the French. On the 28th, at night, Victor crossed the Berezina; and on the 29th, in the morning, the bridges were destroyed; and the French army continued its march upon Zembin towards Wilna. From this time there was nothing in their front to impede their movements. They were followed, harassed, &c., by Cossacks, &c., but there was no body of Russian troops which could venture to stand between the army and Loison's and Pino's Italian division, which were still in reserve at Wilna.

WELLINGTON.

The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

[Most secret and confidential,
and for yourself alone.]

MY DEAR FRIEND, Royal Lodge, 27th December, 1825.

In consequence of an interview which I have just had with Mr. Canning I have determined upon sending you the enclosed letters, in hopes that they will reach you, before that you can, or will, hear from Mr. Canning, and which I am confident that you will shortly. If upon reading my letter,* you should not approve of it, the only apology I can offer, is that which I am sure the generosity of your heart, and of your nature, will of itself naturally suggest to you for me, *the sincerity and warmth of my most affectionate feelings towards you, which will at all times supersede every other consideration.*

I must in justice to Mr. Canning add, that every expression he made use of was in a very friendly and proper tone. *My fear was*, that you might think that the proposal originated with *me*, and therefore that you might

* The subject of this letter was the project to send the Duke to St. Petersburg.

consider it as something in the shape of an *official order* without any previous private consultation, on *my part, with you my friend*, as to *that* which might be *agreeable* to *your feelings*, and of which, I do entreat of you to believe, that I am wholly and entirely incapable.

Mr. Canning's *fear*, on the other hand (from what I have just heard from him), seems to have arisen from *this*, the apprehension, that if this proposal was not, in the *very first instance*, made to *you*, *you* might possibly suppose that, from some unjustifiable reason, he had overlooked your superior consequence, pretensions, and ability; and therefore, that he might be deemed as guilty of not showing towards you *all* that high consideration and respect, which *are no more than your due*, and with which, as well as with private regard for you, he not only expresses himself, but appears to be strongly impressed.

By the statement I have just made to you, you will perceive (when you receive Mr. Canning's communication) that the matter now stands on a perfectly different footing and principle than it did appear to me to do when I wrote my answer to Mr. Canning's first letter, for *now*, you *will, if you please*, consider it either as merely a matter of personal respect and compliment to yourself, or deal with it, in any other way, that may be most congenial and satisfactory to your own feelings; *and it is upon this ground and this ground alone*, that I assented to Mr. Canning's approaching you *at all* upon the subject; after a further consultation with Lord Liverpool, to whom he is gone at Coombe, immediately upon leaving me.

Advice I do not pretend to offer, but, as to *my* wishes, they are to be summed up in very few words indeed; and not to repeat all I do so sincerely feel personally towards you, I must say, that your absence for any length of time, or rather, *the want of your presence*, would be *quite intolerable to me*, besides, the risk, which your health would run, perhaps even your life, which is too *frightful a consideration*, either for the private man that *loves you*, or the public man that cares for his country, or for the interests of all Europe, to entertain or tolerate for a single instant.

Believe me, my dear Duke,

ever your most affectionate friend,

G. R.

P.S.—When you have done with Canning's letter, as well as with the copy of my answer, I will thank you to return them.

504.] *To the King.*

Apethorpe, 29th December, 1825.

I had the honour of receiving yesterday, on my road from Sudbourne to this place, your Majesty's most gracious letter of the 27th instant; and I beg leave to submit to your Majesty my most grateful acknowledgments for your Majesty's kind consideration for me on the occasion of the proposition made to your Majesty by Mr. Canning for the employment of my service.

I am at all times ready and willing to serve your Majesty in any station in which it may appear to your Majesty and your servants that I can be at all useful to your service.

My health is at present in so good a state as that I can, without the risk of danger or inconvenience, undertake the mission upon which Mr. Canning has proposed to your Majesty that I should be employed; and I am ready to set out whenever it may be necessary.

I have only one observation to make to your Majesty upon Mr. Canning's letter; and that is, that as this proposition is made to your Majesty upon what I think very just views of the public interests, so I am convinced, and always was convinced, that the selection of another person upon a former occasion was founded upon the same views, and that a more proper selection could not be made. Indeed, I must say, that till your Majesty incidentally mentioned the subject to the French ambassador in my presence, it had not occurred to me that my services would be required upon such an occasion.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 31st December, 1825.

I wish very much to have some Russian talk with you; but I would not give you the trouble of coming up to town a day sooner than you otherwise intended. Liverpool tells me that you must necessarily be here by the 9th, and that he has written (or will write) to you, to propose to you to meet me at Coombe on Sunday the 8th. If that suits you it will be quite time enough.

I do not know why I should not at once tell you that the first question which I shall have to propound to you is whether you would like to be the bearer of the King's condolences and congratulations to the new Emperor. At such a distance as St. Petersburg, the two missions (corresponding to those of Lord Granville and the Duke of Northumberland) must be compressed into one. Indeed, I do not know whether there is any ceremonial of coronation. The King rather thinks not.

The last words will show you that I *have* mentioned my intention of putting this question to you to his Majesty. His Majesty's first feeling was strongly against it, on the ground that you would take such a question, if put with his Majesty's sanction, as a command; and would risk your health, which is more valuable to the country even than any service that you could perform.

After much discussion, however, the King (assuring me that he had no *other* ground for doubting the propriety of the choice) consented to the proposal being made to you, on the express condition that I should

accompany it with the signification of his Majesty's positive command that you should not think of undertaking the mission unless not only your own feelings (which his Majesty says you would be too ready to submit to a sense of duty) but your medical advisers unanimously concur in saying that you may undertake it without inconvenience.

Supposing such to be *their* opinion I confess I think your going to St. Petersburg might be attended with the greatest public advantage. But upon this point it will be quite time enough to enter when I have the pleasure of seeing you on Sunday.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,
ever most sincerely yours,
GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—The chances seem to be after all that Constantine will decline the Imperial Crown. So writes Lord Clanwilliam, in a despatch which I have received this morning, and have just sent to the King; and so Charles Bagot, in a letter which I herewith enclose.

G. C.

P.P.S.—Lord Liverpool is the only person to whom I have mentioned the subject of this letter, beside the King.

G. C.

105.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Apethorpe, 1st January, 1826.

I have received your letter; and had written yesterday to Lord Liverpool to inform him that I was to meet you at Coombe Wood on Sunday, the 8th instant.

I am quite well, and as well able and willing to undertake a long journey as ever I was; and I am always ready to do anything which may be thought useful to the public service.

It appears to me that it is desirable under existing circumstances to send a person to Petersburg, whose mission would be considered a compliment by the new Emperor; and on whose judgment the government could rely; and I know of no preparation that is necessary to enable me to be ready to go whenever you may think proper.

I should not be surprised if Constantine were to abdicate. This act will show that he agrees with others in thinking that assassination is the legitimate charter of the Russian people.

I have not said anything upon this subject here, nor shall I; although I have great difficulty in accounting for the arrival of the messenger.

Believe me, &c.,
WELLINGTON.

Viscount Granville to the Right Hon. George Canning.

SIR, Paris, 2nd January, 1826.

The Baron de Damas called upon me on Friday evening, and showed some anxiety to learn whether I had heard from you respecting the conferences that had taken place on the Greek question between Lord Strangford and Count Nesselrode, and of which he had spoken to me some days ago.

I answered that I had that morning received a letter from you, informing me that no instructions had been sent to Lord Strangford of a later date than those which I had seen; and that as these instructions did not authorise his Majesty's Ambassador to intimate the readiness of his Court, upon the sole condition of a Russian minister being sent to Constantinople, to be a party to a joint intervention, by all the Allied Powers, in the affairs of Greece and Turkey, I concluded that Count Nesselrode had misapprehended what had been said to him by Lord Strangford.

The Baron de Damas seemed much disappointed with this answer to the question he had put to me. He said that he felt much unfeigned regret that the British government still declined to act in conjunction with its Continental Allies upon this difficult and embarrassing question; he was sure that Russia could be restrained from a war with Turkey only by an effective intervention of the great Powers in favour of the Greeks.

I repeated to him the objections felt by his Majesty's government to a forcible intervention, or to the holding out any menace which it had no design to execute; and I asked him what was the threat which he proposed that the Allied Powers should employ, in which he hoped for the concurrence of Great Britain, and which he expected would have the effect of inducing the Porte to submit to that mediation, which they had haughtily rejected last year. He answered, that the Powers of Europe must warn the Grand Signior, that if he persisted in rejecting the mediation of the Allies, he must be prepared to *encourir les conséquences de sa résistance.* I replied to the Baron de Damas, Do you mean by these words that he must encounter the danger of a war with Russia? And do you understand that his Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg agreed, that if the Porte should not consent to the proposal made to her, Great Britain, in common with the other Powers, would acknowledge the right of Russia to make war upon Turkey? He said, *reconnaître le droit de la Russie de faire la guerre* were not the words which Lord Strangford was reported to have used, but, without doubt, that meaning was implied by the words, "*encourir les conséquences de sa résistance.*"

I then questioned the Baron de Damas as to the part which Count Lebzeltern had taken in these last discussions at St. Petersburg, and learnt that the Austrian minister had declared that his instructions would not permit him to agree to the proposed course of proceeding. The French minister continued the conversation by expressing, in strong terms, his conviction that no separate efforts of England, though they might retard for a short time the period of the rupture, would prevent a war between Russia and Turkey. The Emperor Alexander, from his love of peace, and from his desire of acting uniformly upon the system of referring all matters affecting the tranquillity of the world to the collective decision of the great Powers of Europe, had consented to place himself upon a footing,

relatively to the Porte, very inferior to that on which the sovereigns of Russia had stood for the last preceding fifty years, ever since the Treaty of Kainandge, and has been content to relinquish that ascendency over the councils of the Divan, which had been almost exclusively exercised by Russia; but if the Allies stood aloof, and withdrew themselves from all concert with the Court of St. Petersburg, for the re-establishment of tranquillity in that quarter of the world which peculiarly interested Russian interests and feelings, the sovereign of Russia will, without doubt, act separately and for himself, and will not hesitate to make war, as the only means of resuming his former attitude towards the Ottoman Porte, and compelling it to enter into such arrangements as may be thought necessary for the security of his co-religionists in the Turkish dominions. If Russia, the Baron de Damas added, makes war, as the instrument of the general Alliance, to compel the Sultan to conclude an equitable settlement of his quarrel with his Greek subjects, the object of the war is limited and specific, and Russia would acknowledge the right of the Allies to be consulted upon the conditions of the peace which it may be expedient to impose; but if Russia engages in war without any previous understanding with the Allies, Russia will feel unshackled, and at liberty to seek, through that war, the aggrandisement which has always been the favourite object of the Russian army and people.

The French minister concluded by saying, that whatever might be the determination of Great Britain, France would not take the position of a mere spectator; Austria will perhaps threaten to resist Russia; but will more probably, in the end, seek security, however fallacious, rather in a share of the spoil than in an attempt to prevent the spoliation; but France cannot submit to a second partition like that of Poland.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GRANVILLE.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Coombe Wood, 3rd January, 1826.

Your answer * to my letter of Saturday † has given me great pleasure.

I wrote to you by a messenger, having been informed (it appears erroneously) that you were at Sudbourne, in which case, a day would have been gained. I did not learn till too late that you were at Apethorpe.

You have omitted to return to me Sir Charles Bagot's letter.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[06.] *To the Earl of Carnarvon.*

MY DEAR LORD, London, 9th January, 1826.

I have received your letter, and had an immediate opportunity of attending to your wishes respecting a magistrate in

* 1st January, 1826. See p. 56. † 31st December, 1825. See p. 55.

the neighbourhood of High Clere, and I have inquired respecting the subject of Mr. ———.

It appears that he has married a lady with a large fortune, and he is in respect of fortune qualified. But he was born in the East Indies of a native woman, and is, in fact, a half-caste man, and has the appearance of one.

In the eyes of some there may be no objection to make such a man a magistrate, but it appears to me to be necessary to consider not only the duties which he has to perform, and the importance that he should inspire respect among the inferior classes of society, but likewise that he is to be brought into intercourse and association with the principal noblemen and gentlemen of the country. I should think, then, that there ought to be either some very pressing necessity, or some strong claim from talents and qualifications, which should induce the Lord-Lieutenant of a county to insert in the commission of the peace the name of a person against whom it is to be feared that a very general prejudice would exist.

If, then, your Lordship knows of anybody else that is fit for the situation, I should prefer him to Mr. ———; but if you should not, I will have his name inserted in the commission.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir Thomas Munro to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Madras, 9th January, 1826.

We are still as busy as ever with the war in Ava. We have just embarked two complete squadrons of Native cavalry, which are more than enough to lick all the cavalry in the Burman empire. We send off to Rangoon in a few days a regiment of sepoys, and another about a fortnight after, which will make 18 battalions of sepoys absent on foreign service; for two that we had in Arracan have not yet returned, and when they do they will be nearly unserviceable. The 54th, when it left this for Chittagong, was above 700 strong. It returned last week only 208, the greater part sick, a few convalescents, but not a man for duty. This will give you some idea of the havoc made by the climate of Arracan. The Natives have suffered less than the European troops. But the army there, as an efficient military force, has been completely destroyed. The position of Arracan was certainly very ill chosen. It was known from report to be very sickly, and we might have been pretty sure that it was so from our knowing that both in the Northern Circar and the Malabar coast, if we

* Governor of Madras.

station a body of men among the hills forty or fifty miles from the sea, half of them will die in a few months. But it is said that there was no choice, as there is no sandy beach or any ground near it but swampy sunderbunds. I shall not believe this until I hear that it has been established by a careful examination of the coast.

I am much mortified by the failure of this force, for I had from the very beginning great confidence in the effect of an invasion of Ava from the eastern frontier of Bengal, and I recommended it strongly to Lord Amherst. I had, however, no means of acquiring any particular knowledge of the country or the routes. But judging merely from the map, and from Bundoola having invaded Bengal from that quarter, I did not doubt that some road or path would be found by which a force lightly equipped would be able to reach the Irrawaddi. The force assembled under Colonel Morison was, however, more than double of what I ever contemplated. I should have thought a body of about 5000 men quite enough. The great advantage which I expected from this force was not so much its military co-operation as the facility which it would have given for throwing into Ava bullocks, horses, and elephants, which it is so difficult to send by sea. All thoughts of invasion by land having now been abandoned our operations against Ava must be hereafter carried on from the single point of Rangoon. But this one possesses many great advantages. The river is a very powerful auxiliary, and is itself worth an army. It runs through the most fertile and populous part of the empire, and by our having the command of it we command the country. A very small flotilla is sufficient for this purpose, for the Burman war-boats are still more contemptible than their land forces. Their whole navy will not look at eight or ten man-of-war boats. It enables us to carry whatever we cannot carry by land. The village people on its banks are more useful than Bringarries in carrying grain. They threw into Prome a supply of six months' rice for the whole force there in a few weeks last year. As we ascend the river the country people seek our protection and bring in supplies. All through Pegu they are perfectly friendly, and even in Ava Proper, as far as Meaday above Prome, they have evinced the same disposition. Our situation in Ava is a very extraordinary one. We have not a fort or military work in the country. Even at Rangoon there is not a redoubt, and the people have been told that we mean to restore the country to the Burman government. I do not like this state of things much. It risks the safety of the army too much. In any other country but Ava such a plan of operations would have exposed the army to certain destruction. But in Ava there are several circumstances which lessen the danger. The people take no part against us, but rather favour us, and the Burman military force is much more contemptible than that of any of the Native powers of India. Their troops are never seen in the open field They have never ventured when they repulsed a party from a stockade to follow it out of the jungle. They fire and do considerable execution from behind a work as long as we stand at a distance examining it; but the moment we begin to escalade they run to the next stockade or jungle and those who cannot get out soon enough make no resistance. They are badly armed, one man in four or five may have a firelock, the rest have swords and pikes, generally of a very miserable description. My chief apprehension has been that they would send strong detachments from their main army to our flanks and rear and intercept our supplies, and compel us

to fall back; or that they would raise an armed population in our rear like the peons in Mysore and the Deccan. But from what we have already seen I imagine that there is not sufficient discipline or authority in their armies to make detachments act at a distance from the main body. They seem never to advance unless when it is near to support them, and always to retire along with it. They do not appear to have any local militia or armed body like the Candahar peons in India, so that when the main army of the Burmans retires before us it leaves the country behind in our quiet possession. I suspect too that a large Burman army cannot be long kept together, that only a small portion of it has regular pay, and that the rest is composed of men hastily collected for the occasion from all quarters, and who are always ready on any reverse to disperse and return home. In a late report from Sir Archibald Campbell the population of the Burman empire is reckoned at 9,000,000, viz., 3,000,000 in Pegu and 6,000,000 in Ava. Had I not seen this report I should not have estimated the whole at more than 6,000,000 or 7,000,000. But even the higher number is but a very small one for a country so extensive, and the population being thinly scattered when not hostile is in favour of an invader.

I am, therefore, in hopes that our army may reach Amrapoora in the course of the present campaign if the enemy do not call for peace sooner. I do not know that even the possession of the capital will give us peace this year; but it will at least enable us to reimburse ourselves for a considerable part of our expenditure from the resources of the country. The only thing that makes me feel any apprehension as to the entire success of the campaign is the want of arrangement and foresight in almost everything essential to the movement of an army. If your Grace saw all the delays and omissions and want of concert which have taken place, you would hardly believe that such things could have happened.

Lord Amherst has had many difficulties to contend with, and has, I think, acted with more firmness and conducted affairs better than most men would have done in his situation. He has had very little assistance from his military advisers, and his own opinions have been much more judicious than theirs. I have ventured to differ from him in one point. I have recommended the emancipation of Pegu. He opposes it, and is probably right, because all the authorities at home would be alarmed at our engaging in an attempt which would be regarded as quite quixotic. We have had a great deal of correspondence about it without making the smallest impression on each other. His doctrine is, that we ought not to mingle in the politics of the nations lying between India and China. That the states of Ava, Siam, and Cochin are pretty equal at present, and that the independence of Pegu, by weakening Ava, would overthrow the existing balance of power, which ought to be avoided. I think that there is no such thing as a balance of power among these nations; that they have no treaty of Westphalia among them; that their relative power is constantly fluctuating according to the character of their rulers. As to our having no political relations with them, it is not easy to see how we can avoid it considering that we are neighbours. Ava has invaded us and we Ava, and after this we can hardly pretend not to know each other. We ought not to trouble ourselves about the balance, but to break down the Power which alone can injure us, and the easiest and indeed the only effectual way of doing this is

by the separation of Pegu from Ava. At first I should have thought it desirable to make peace upon the simple condition that the Burmans should relinquish all claims upon our tributaries and eastern frontiers. But after landing at Rangoon and finding that our offers of peace were rejected we ought not to have lost a moment in taking measures to render Pegu independent. As there was not a single fort or place of strength in the country by which we could protect ourselves, such a measure, independent of all political considerations, seemed to be absolutely necessary for the safety of our army. Even now, after all our successes, where they to rise and join the Burmans, or merely to abscond and withhold their aid in furnishing supplies, we should be compelled to retire. Had we begun early we might in two years have made the Peguers strong enough to maintain their own independence. They are as soldiers neither better nor worse than the Burmans. The Burman army is composed of both nations indiscriminately, and is little better than a body of armed tank-diggers. I would have given the Peguers no pledge to support them after the end of the war, but have told them that they must then defend themselves. Even if it were found advisable to leave a body of 5000 or 6000 men for three or four years as auxiliaries, it would be rather a saving than an expense, because the Pegu government would defray the whole or the greater part of the charge, and because if Pegu is not separated from Ava the Bengal government will be obliged to bring 5000 or 6000 troops into their Eastern Provinces to watch the Burman frontier. Even with regard to expense it would be cheaper to keep an extra force in Pegu than in Chittagong, and the security would be much greater, for no enemy in Ava will ever disturb the Bengal frontier while Pegu is independent. I shall not think of applying for leave to come home while the war lasts. I wish it were well over and bed-time. This is an unconscionable long letter, and I shall not make it longer by apologies.

Yours very sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

507.] MEMORANDUM FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO SIR JOHN COPLEY,* ATTORNEY-GENERAL, ON THE DECCAN PRIZE.

11th January, 1826.

The first point that it will be necessary to make quite clear is the necessity for this fresh proceeding before the Treasury.

The Trustees having executed the first part of the trust reposed in them by his Majesty's Warrant, and having ascertained and collected the booty at the disposal of his Majesty according to the best of their judgment, and having called for and obtained the prize returns, found that it was impossible for them to carry into execution the second part of the trust, viz., to suggest for his Majesty's consideration a scheme for distribution; inasmuch

* Afterwards Lord Lyndhurst.

as, with the exception of a small part of the booty, about 150,000*l.*, there were no actual captors of the remainder. In respect to the sum of 150,000*l.* the returns before the Trustees were not sufficiently detailed to enable the Trustees to suggest any distribution of it. It appears from Mr. Harrison's statement that Sir Thomas Hislop had in his possession more detailed returns. But he did not think it proper to give them to the Trustees.

The Trustees, then, finding that there were no actual captors of by far the greatest proportion of the booty reported to their Lordships; and their Lordships having found upon examination that the booty was not the result of any actual operation or capture by the troops, or by any detachment, but that of all the operations of the war, and that this part of the booty must be considered as coming under the principle of their Lordships' Minute of 5th February, 1823, determined to hear the parties again upon that part of the case.

Their Lordships do not intend to recommend to his Majesty to alter his Warrant; but rather to make such additions as will render it applicable to the true circumstances of the case, as they have appeared by the report of the Trustees, and have been confirmed by these discussions.

It cannot be denied that this Board and his Majesty were deceived and misled by the errors of both parties in the late discussions.

It had been stated that there was a great booty taken by particular parts and detachments of the army at Nagpour, Mahidpour, and Poonah. [Here discuss the state of the case at Nagpour and Mahidpour, the materials for which will be found in the queries put to the law officers of the Crown by the Trustees.]

It will here be desirable to do ample justice to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, who, instead of opposing the Trustees, have, since they have fairly understood the object of his Majesty's Warrant, co operated with them, and have laid open to them their records to give them every information in their power.

The Crown has, in its various charters to the East India Company, reserved to itself all booty captured in conjoint operations of the King's and Company's troops. But the Crown has made over to the Company the civil and political government of

its territories in the East Indies. And it would be unwise and unjust, even if it were possible, consistently with the charters and the laws, to call upon the Company to account for treasures or booty which may have been in the momentary possession of the officers of the East India Company, but have never been carried to the account of the East India Company, and have passed from its government in the course of its military or political transactions.

That to which the Crown have a right, that which has been claimed, that of which the claim has been conceded, is all treasure or proceeds of booty which have been carried to the account of the Company. This we have got, and can claim no more.

In respect to Poonah, the Peshwah's army retired from that town on the 15th November, and the town was taken possession of by the 4th Division of the Army of the Deccan under Major-General Smith on the 16th November, 1817.

There was no booty actually captured at Poonah, excepting the small part of the sum of 150,000*l.* before adverted to.

If more can be found or claimed let a clear statement of it be made, not of rights of *choute* upon the Nizam, not of claims of treasure-trove in a house never mentioned in any official document, excepting a paper sent to this Board, contributed for no other purpose but to excite false hopes, dissatisfaction, and clamour.

Then what is the nature and amount of the booty at the disposition of the Crown; and where and how did it come into the possession of the officers of the East India Company? [The nature and description of the booty, and where and how it came into the possession of the officers of the East India Company, will be found in the Duke's Memorandum of September, 1825.]

[The amount under each head will be found in the letter from the Trustees to the Treasury of January, 1825.]

Let us now see whether the detachment which took Poonah in November, 1817, can be stated or considered in law as the actual captors of that part of the booty.

After the capture of Poonah the Peshwah remained for some time with his army in that part of the country, and then went to the southward towards the River Kristna, and the frontiers of the East India Company and the Rajah of Mysore. Operations against him were there carried on by the 4th Division under Brigadier Smith, and the reserve division under Brigadiers Munro and Pritzler; the result of which was in the month of January

his march to the northward. [Here the remainder of his operations till he fell into the hands of General Malcolm at Asseerghur in June 1818, from the Duke's Memorandum of September, 1825.*]

The whole of this booty being the deposits made by the Peshwah, or the debts, the revenue or the tribute due to him, or the jewels left by his Highness in his flight, and never captured by any body of troops, and this booty having none of it fallen into the hands of the Company's officers till months after the army, which claims it exclusively, had been broken up, and the greatest part not till the Peshwah had been captured; the course of operations, the fate of his Highness and the result of this episode of the war having been as stated, how is it possible to give this booty to the 4th Division as the captors of Poonah in the month of November, 1817? What is to become of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and General Doveton, who fought an action with the Peshwah; and, above all, of Sir John Malcolm, to whom the Peshwah surrendered? Indeed, it is remarkable in this case that the Trustees have a letter from Sir Thomas Hislop protesting against Sir John Malcolm sharing at all!!! he, Sir John Malcolm, having been the officer to whom at the head of a body of troops on the Nerbudda the Peshwah surrendered in the month of June, 1818, Sir Thomas Hislop being at the same time residing in his house at Fort St. George, at above one thousand miles distance.

But it is impossible to view this case in this narrow light. The truth is that the capture of the Peshwah was the result of all the operations of the war.

[Here look at the Duke's Memorandum of September, 1825,* to see how these hang by each other, and how the several parts were connected; how the just and necessary war against the Pindarries occasioned that with the Peshwah, and how the success against the former tended to, and occasioned at last, the defeat and capture of the Peshwah.] [Then argue this point, that the Peshwah's debts, deposits, arrears of tribute, revenue, &c., could not have been claimable with justice, (and here we have to do only with justice,) even if they could have been known till the captivity or deposition of the Peshwah.]

This will put an end to all the cases, as, in fact, the capture would date only from the day of the Peshwah's surrender.

WELLINGTON.

* See vol. ii. of this Series, page 489.

508.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 13th January, 1826.

I enclose a letter and its enclosures, which I received from Lord Granville when I was leaving Paris last summer, upon a case of Madame la Comtesse de Lissona's, upon which I have only lately read the papers in the Foreign Office.

The case of Madame de Lissona is this:—General Murat and Madame Murat purchased certain property in France, which they held till the former, having been created Grand Duc de Berg, ceded by treaty in 1808 with Napoleon the Duchy of Berg for the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, of which Murat was declared king. There was at the same time another treaty between these parties, by which Murat ceded to Napoleon his landed property, furniture, &c., in France, in consideration of receiving for himself and Madame Murat five hundred thousand francs de rente, out of a million of francs de rente, which Napoleon had reserved to be at his disposal in the kingdom of Naples when he appointed his brother Joseph to be King of Naples and Sicily in 1806. Murat's property in France became from that period part of the domaine extraordinaire.

Naples had been occupied by Napoleon as a conquest, but had never been ceded by treaty with its legitimate Sovereign. He had no right, therefore, to grant the Crown of Naples, or a rente upon the revenues of the country; and of course when the legitimate Sovereign returned he annihilated all such grants. Madame Lissona then comes upon the French government to claim her property in France, for which no valuable consideration had been granted.

This claim would naturally depend upon the application of the law of the country to the case, and the answer to her request would naturally be: Apply to the French government or to the French courts of law for redress; we have nothing to say to the case.

But Madame de Lissona says besides, that she belongs to the family of Napoleon, that the members of this family are under some special regulation of the Allied Courts, and are not liable and cannot take advantage of the municipal laws of any country in Europe in their favour. I don't believe this is a true statement of the case. The members of this family having governed nearly every country in Europe conquered by Napoleon and

reconquered by the Allies, and restored to their ancient sovereigns, or otherwise disposed of by the treaties of Paris and of Vienna, their conduct was a natural object of attention and jealousy during the conferences of the Allied ministers in 1815, and various orders were given and regulations made regarding their residence, their removal from place to place, &c., &c., at that time and since. But I don't recollect and cannot find any order or regulation regarding the private property of any member of the family of Bonaparte.

As his Majesty's ambassador at Paris, I bought in 1814 the house and furniture in which the King's ambassador now resides from la Princesse Borghese with the full knowledge of the French government. I believe la Reine Hortense now possesses landed property in France. I know that since the year 1815 she sold a property in the Vallée de Montmorency to the Duc de Bourbon.

If she can hold and sell property, another member of the family can go into the courts and sue to have her property restored to her if unjustly kept from her.

Upon the whole, then, it appears to me that this is not a diplomatical case; even admitting the claim of Madame de Lissona to be well founded in justice, which, being a question of law, I cannot be deemed competent to judge of.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall Place, 16th January, 1826.

Enclosed I send you a secret despatch from Lord Amherst with its most material enclosures.

Surely the policy of encumbering ourselves with the permanent possession of Arracan, and still more of Mergui and Tavoy, is of a doubtful nature. Though the Madras sepoys have so readily embarked for foreign service, it is in the hope and expectation of return, and permanent garrisons would, independent of all the expense of maintaining them, require frequent reliefs.

Might it not also be apprehended that these are possessions likely to involve us in discussions, and probably wars, with Siam as well as Ava?

Ever most sincerely yours,

C. WILLIAMS WYNN.

9.] *To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.*

MY DEAR WYNN, Stratfield Saye, 18th January, 1826.

I return the box with the papers on the negotiations for the peace, which are become much more difficult in consequence of the duration of the war. It will not answer *now* to make peace without requiring some sacrifices on the part of the enemy, whether to inspire a salutary terror in Ava, to serve as an example to the Native Powers in India, or to prevent them from entertaining the notion that we have not been so successful in this war as we have represented, and that this war has been excessively troublesome and expensive to us. We may rely upon it that if these notions should be entertained, and the Burmese should not be made to feel permanently the effects of their hostility, the King of Ava will become a part of the political system of India; and probably to us the most troublesome and inconvenient part.

I conceive, then, that you must take something from him. I would take as much money as I could get. Those upon the spot would be the best judges of the sum which the King could pay in a reasonably short space of time; say two years. I would then take the whole of Arracan, and the Islands of Ramre, &c., upon that coast; more particularly if it should be found that there is a tolerable communication by land or water from Arracan or the Islands, which I suspect there is, with the valley of the Irrawaddy. I suspect that the islands of Ramre have been formed by the river flowing from the mountains which divide the valley of the Irrawaddy from the sea.

If this be true, Arracan will possess the following military advantages. It will protect your position in Chittagong. It will give you the facility of attacking the King of Ava in the heart of his dominions whenever you think proper. It can with ease be relieved and supported by sea. From the accounts which I have seen of the country, I believe it is not unhealthy; and at all events the most healthy part of the coast. Arracan should be kept by the British government at all events, whatever might be the disposition made of the territory. But I must observe to you, that however low the King of Ava and his Burmese are in our estimation as a military power, they have raised themselves vastly in the estimation of the natives of that part of the world by their contest with us. We can

dispose of territory then (which it is important to us to keep out of the hands of the Burmese) to other Powers, such as Mughs, Siamese, and Peguers, only by guaranteeing to them the possession, and protecting them in it. I should think then that we ought to keep Arracan to ourselves. I would give as much more as could be got to the Mughs, the Siamese, the Peguers, the Rajahs of Munneepoor, Cachar, &c., but upon the clear understanding that they were not to expect our protection in the maintenance of their possession.

In respect to the stipulation that there is to be no communication with European or American Powers, it has been common in all treaties with the Native Powers in India; and, considering the character and the physical powers of the Burmese, I should consider it more important to prevent the communication between them and European Powers than any Natives in India. I suspect that if they had been well armed and well supplied with ammunition and stores the contest with them would have been much more difficult and disastrous; and the object of this stipulation is to prevent the importation into Ava of arms and ammunition, with which our good friends in Europe and America, and even in London, will certainly supply them if the treaty of peace should not contain such a stipulation, whether patent or secret. But it may be a question whether in time of peace we can propose such a stipulation consistently with all that we are doing elsewhere.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. Planta to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Foreign Office, 21st January, 1826.

Mr. Planta presents his best respects to the Duke of Wellington, and, by Mr. Canning's directions, encloses to his Grace a communication which he has received respecting the Russian army, for the authenticity of which, however, Mr. Canning cannot vouch.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Brevet-Major F. D'Arcy Bacon to the Right Hon. George Canning.

SIR, Paris, 15th January, 1826.

From the conflicting statements in the several English and foreign journals relative to the present state and probable ulterior views of the Russian government, as to its relations with the Ottoman Porte; having travelled for the last

three years in Russia, Turkey, and in Greece; as a British subject I feel emboldened to take upon myself the liberty of addressing you upon this occasion. From the formidable and warlike position of strong divisions of the Russian army, from the warlike feeling universally expressed, as also from my personal observation and knowledge, I cannot but conclude that this government is upon the eve of hostile declaration as against the Turkish empire.

The numerous divisions of the Russian force cantoned upon its western and southern frontier in complete state of equipment, will be fully prepared to take the field at the commencement of the ensuing spring. The several Russian corps d'armée are generally stationed as follows, and may be estimated at 400,000 men, exclusive of the Polish Russ army, and in situations to form junction in a few weeks. On the rivers, the Pruth, the Dniester, the Boug. In the government of Kiou, Nikolaiev and Kerson. On the Dnieper and the Don. In the extensive plains of the government of Nikolaiev are, and have been collected, immense herds of cattle, as also horses for the use of this army, in the event of its taking the field.

Further in the government Caucase are numerous divisions, which, by the line of the Kuban river and the Crimea, can be brought to bear with the utmost facility and expedition upon the point of attack.

Further in the province of Gouriel upon the Black Sea and adjoining the Asiatic frontier of Turkey, there is a strong corps d'armée, which can be readily augmented from the Georgian Russ army, and which may be estimated at 80,000 men. However chimerical may be deemed the suggestion, in the event of hostilities Europe may be surprised to learn, and Constantinople itself succumb to a Russian force which shall make its appearance upon the heights of Scutari. The Russian corps in the province of Gouriel is but a few days' march from Trebisonde, where there is a good port. The Russians have also a good roadstead at Poti, in the province of Mingrilie.

At Nikolaiev, Sevastopol in the Crimea is the station of the Russian Black Sea fleet, which may be estimated at fifteen sail-of-the-line with numerous transports; in the month of May, 1825, they had eight sail-of-the-line fit for sea; and Admiral Greg was making every exertion to put this squadron in a state for service. The English house of Messrs. Attwood and Co., at Odessa, have lately entered into large contracts with the Russian government for the equipment of this fleet; and any number of troops may be conveyed from the bouches of the Dniester and the Dnieper rivers, and from the ports in the Crimea to the port of Poti in Mingrelie, and to Trebisonde, in five or ten days at the utmost. Such is the state of absolute décadence of the Turkish empire, that upon its Asiatic frontier it could offer no obstacle to the advance of even a small European force.

From the bouches of the Danube troops may be readily conveyed to Varna in Bulgaria, and disembarking in the rear of the passes of Mount Hæmus, they may cover the march of their main army through this somewhat difficult defile. Such is the state of Turkish décadence, that I apprehend but little opposition would be offered; the inhabitants of Bessarabia and Bulgaria (of whom many are Greeks) would join with and facilitate the march of the Russian army.

In making this communication I shall be most willing to render any further explanation, and I shall hold myself in readiness to proceed from hence to London if required so to do.

From my knowledge and acquaintance with the several countries alluded to in this communication, with deference I offer my humble services in any manner that may be deemed expedient. And I trust from my time of life, and having served nearly twenty years in the British army, from which I am

now retired, and in which I had the honour to hold the rank of a Brevet-Major, I trust I may not be found unworthy of confidence; and competent to any charge with which I may be entrusted. And should it be deemed expedient, I should have no hesitation to revisit the countries above mentioned.

With the highest respect, Sir, I beg leave to subscribe myself your most humble and devoted servant,

FRANCIS D'ARCY BACON,
late Brevet-Major 17th Light Dragoons.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 23rd January, 1826.

By what I can learn from Count Lieven, the time of the coronation is by no means certain; and that it will not be so soon as may seem probable, from the length of time which Count Lieven tells me the funeral ceremonies will occupy. The body of the late emperor is not expected to reach St. Petersburg before the end of February; and there are then several weeks (as I understood) of lying in state before the interment.

Under this uncertainty, it has occurred to me that you might not like to be under the obligation to stay out the whole affair, up to the coronation, whenever it may take place, but would rather return as soon after the end of the first set of ceremonials, as you can execute the political object of your mission. I beg that you will decide this question for yourself, entirely according to your own wishes and convenience. I have no choice, and no wish but to decide what may be most agreeable to you.

If you should prefer coming home, perhaps it would not be desirable that you should be encumbered with much suite. I gathered from Prince Esterhazy yesterday that their Archduke goes with very few attendants. But in this again I desire that you would make your own decision.

I have no wish to send any one with you (in the case of your not staying the coronation) as mere suite. Lord Hastings has declined the offer for his son (on grounds entirely domestic) with many thanks for your obliging readiness to take him.

The (public) Secretary of the Embassy I think it best and most useful to you to take from the ranks of this office. Lord Dunglas, who is Précis-writer, was for some time with Sir Charles Bagot in Russia, and will therefore be of use locally, as well as officially.

He is an excellent young man, sufficiently versed in business, clever, but singularly modest and unpretending.

He would take with him his assistant, Mr. Jerningham, who is to remain as attaché at St. Petersburg, and will therefore be no burden to you on your return.

I will do nothing more, until I know your mind, upon the question which I have propounded to you.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S. At what time shall you be ready to set out?

Sir W. Knighton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

[CONFIDENTIAL.—G. R.]

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Royal Lodge, 24th January, 1826.

I am honoured with the commands of the King to send your Grace his Majesty's affectionate regards, and to assure you that his Majesty looks with the most earnest solicitude as to the period of your stay in Russia; that his Majesty will take care to fix the time of your return, quite independent of the coronation, and agreeable to his Majesty's first intentions, when his Majesty consented that your Grace was to undertake this mission. Whenever you may settle as the most convenient time for your coming here, I am commanded to say that his Majesty will be delighted to see you.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord Duke,

yours very sincerely,

W. KNIGHTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, 25th January, 1826.

I have received your letter of the 23rd, and I intended before I went to have some conversation with you regarding the period of my stay in Russia.

It occurred to me upon reflecting upon the subject, that the earliest period talked of for the coronation being the end of May, I could not be in England till the end of June, which is a longer period than could have been intended. Indeed, I don't see how I could be so long absent only for the purpose of a ceremonial, and hold my seat in the Cabinet; and upon talking with the King upon the subject, he expressed a wish that I should be back by the beginning of May.

However, if upon seeing all the conveniences and inconveniences the King and you had considered my stay advisable, I should have had no objection. But I must observe that, excepting the expense of the journey, there can be no expense attending a double mission, as, if my stay had been determined upon, my carriages, horses, servants, &c., must have been sent by sea as soon as the ice should open; and the expense of a large suite at Petersburg for five months would probably more than balance that of the journey of the second ambassador. I quite agree with you that the fewer persons I take with

me the better; and I have spoken to nobody, excepting my aide-de-camp, Captain Cathcart, who has been in Russia before, and served with the Russian army.

I don't know Lord Dunglas, but have no objection to him or anybody else you please. But the fewer we have the better we are likely to get on.

I shall be ready to set out at the time we talked of, the end of the first week in February, that is to say, the 4th. I will give you in town, where I return to-morrow, a Memorandum on what occurs to me in reading the papers which I have got.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [511

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 25th January, 1826.

In consequence of the prospect of my early return, I settled with Mr. Canning that I would take nobody with me excepting my aide-de-camp, Captain Cathcart, and he sends with me Lord Dunglas and Mr. Jerningham, whom I don't know.

I could, under these circumstances, scarcely propose Apsley to him; but if you will, I shall have no objection.

I think it best to send you this note before dinner.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [51:

MEMORANDUM OF THE CONDITIONS ON WHICH THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON IS TO ALLOW HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR TO GO TO A CONFERENCE ON GREEK AND TURKISH AFFAIRS, AND OF HIS VIEW OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE CABINET; ALSO QUERIES REGARDING THE WISHES OF THE GOVERNMENT ON CERTAIN POINTS.

London, 26th January, 1826.

Although I consider all farther reference to a conference to settle the Russo-Greek and Turkish question to be nearly

useless, I mention it in order to bring the whole case under review; and I understand, then, that I am to consent that his Majesty's Ambassador shall go to a conference, on condition, First, That all the Powers parties to the conference declare beforehand their determination not to go to war, whatever may be the result of the effort to produce peace between Turks and Greeks. Secondly, That all parties to the conference shall stand upon the same footing as friendly Powers at Constantinople, by the re-establishment of the Russian mission at Constantinople in the person of M. de la Ribeaupierre, or some other of the same diplomatic rank. Thirdly, That each of the Powers parties to the conference shall declare the determination of its government not to use the influence which it may possess over the councils of any of the belligerents, for its own aggrandizement or advantage.

The mode of settling the Greek question which is preferred is by the use of the influence of the British government at Constantinople and with the Greeks, to induce both to come to a reasonable accommodation under the mediation of the British Government.

The first declaration to be made to the Russian ministers is the desire of this government to come to an understanding with them upon the whole of this Greek and Turkish question, and, in the words of the instructions, to answer confidence with confidence.

Is it intended to reveal to the Russian government that Mr. Stratford Canning has already been instructed to endeavour to prevail upon the Turks to put an end to this contest by consenting to some reasonable accommodation with the Greeks?

The object of my negotiation will be to induce the Emperor of Russia to put himself into our hands. Must I inform his Imperial Majesty that we don't admit that he has any right to make war upon the Turks, either to force an arrangement with the Greeks, or upon any other alleged ground? Must I state to him the necessity that he must disclaim distinctly to us all intentions of following up with hostilities our negotiations even if unsuccessful?

What inducement shall I hold out to his Imperial Majesty that he may close with our proposal, and put himself in our hands?

Might I offer that he should be with ourselves joint mediator

between Turks and Greeks in case our negotiation at Constantinople should succeed? Or if the Turks should not consent to his Imperial Majesty being so ostensibly, might I engage that we would consult with his Imperial Majesty upon any part of the transaction?

The means of negotiation with the Turkish government are the statement of our sense of the probability of eventual hostilities on the part of Russia in case the Greek contest should be continued.

Must not the Emperor be informed that these are the means of which we propose to avail ourselves? And this, notwithstanding that we don't admit the right of the Emperor to have recourse to such hostilities, and insist upon his Imperial Majesty disclaiming any such intention?

In respect to the Emperor's right to commence hostilities against the Turks, what is the opinion of this government of his right resulting from the published treaties with the Porte?

I have always considered it the right of a friendly Power to remonstrate, through the medium of an Ambassador at the Porte, in case of any violation of the religious rites and ceremonies of the Greeks. The Emperor is certainly not now precisely in the situation of a friendly Power, nor is there any violation of the religious rites and ceremonies of the Greeks, excepting as measures of war, of which the origin was the rebellion of that people.

I consider all the questions respecting the military and civil state in the Principalities, and respecting the Principalities generally, to be settled, in fact, and that the Emperor can have nothing to complain of on that ground.

Supposing the Emperor should claim the right to go to war, founded upon the declarations of the late Emperor, both previous to, and at the Congress of Verona, and upon the recent conduct of Ibrahim Pasha in the Morea, (such as his indiscriminate destruction of the population, without distinction of guilty or innocent, or of age or sex; his seizure of the youth for circumcision and conversion to the Mahometan religion; his declared intention of transporting the Greeks to Egypt, and of planting colonies of Arabs and Egyptians in the Morea), what am I to answer? It is certainly true that the facts are not sufficiently substantiated. But if they should be so?

WELLINGTON.

General Lord Combermere to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Camp near Bhurtpore, 26th January, 1826.

In my last letter I informed you of our having commenced operations against this place.* You will be happy to hear that it fell to us on the 18th instant.

Finding after a week's battering that the mud walls did not yield to the 24-pounders, I made the engineers try the effect of mining; having sapped to the ditch, this was easily effected, and on the 16th a mine was sprung in a bastion to the left of the north-east angle of the outer fort; at the same time the counterscarp was blown in, and a practicable breach effected by the night of the 17th, with the assistance of the 24-pounders. By the morning of the 18th another mine was ready near the breach we had attempted to make to the right of the north-east angle. I assembled the two columns an hour before daybreak in the trenches and batteries, the signal (which I gave at half-past eight) for the assault was the springing of the mine; the two columns advanced, and gained the summit of the two breaches with trifling loss, and we had complete possession of the town; in an hour afterwards the citadel surrendered.

The enemy lost about 7000 men, and ours does not exceed 500. Doorjun Sal and all the chiefs (except those who were killed) were made prisoners.

Deeg, Koombher, Biana, Weer, and Kurna, have surrendered to me since the 18th.

In the present state of India, and considering the small disposable European force (two regiments only of infantry), as well as the disorganised state of the Native army, this blow is of considerable importance. I am in hopes it will have a good effect upon the Burmese war; at all events, should that continue, and the supreme government determine to push Sir A. Campbell on to Ummerapoora, we shall be enabled, when reinforcements arrive from England, to send two seasoned regiments to Ava. I fear the force at Arracan will not be able to form a junction with Sir A. on the Irrawaddy over the mountains.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord Duke,
your very faithful and attached,
COMBERMERE.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Maresfield, 30th January, 1826.

I return the Memorandum on our conversation of yesterday, of which, with the exception of an addition under the head of Nos 4 and 5, and of one under No. 16, I have given the details sufficiently accurately.

The last to which I have referred will certainly go to the

* See vol. ii. of this Series, p. 579.

settlement of the whole case, unless in the very improbable hypothesis that the Turks will change the character of their war in the Morea, and check the cruelties of Ibrahim Pasha. In this case we might be obliged to allow the war to continue. But in any other hypothesis we must settle the question in the best and safest manner in which it can be settled.

We must not, however, suppose that there will not be great difficulties in the way of this arrangement; not in our military or naval operations, but in the Cabinet and among the Allies.

The Cabinet will be very unwilling to authorize an instruction which must lead eventually to an hostile operation, and an armament, however small in amount. They will wish first to discuss the expediency of our interfering in the Greek case.

There will be great jealousy, particularly in France, of our proceedings. They must be kept secret from all; and, however beneficial to all in the end, they will, till completed, occasion a great deal of uneasiness, particularly in Austria. However, as the Austrian Cabinet approved of the Emperor of Russia's plan of pacification between Turks and Greeks, they would probably approve of another, of which the difference would be, that it would be better for the Turks in a pecuniary view, and better calculated to be permanent, inasmuch as it would provide against the perpetual collision between two parties in a State, which can never be expected in future to live in peace together.

The greatest difficulty will be France. They will be jealous of the reputation which this country will acquire by such an arrangement as I have supposed, will increase the suspicion and mistrust of all, and they will throw every difficulty in your way short of hostilities.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

29th January, 1826.

Upon conversing with Mr. Canning upon my Memorandum of the 26th instant, what follows is the result.

(1) Mr. Canning thinks that I have accurately detailed the conditions upon which it may be stated that the King's

ambassador might be permitted to go into a conference, in case the mediation of the King alone should be rejected, and that I should be forced to declare our meaning upon that point.

(2) The mode preferred, however, is by the use of the influence of the British government between Turks and Greeks; (3) and I am to decline to discuss that first mentioned, excepting to point out its probable failure, till all hopes of the acceptance of the 2nd will have vanished.

I am to make the Emperor acquainted with the existence of Mr. Stratford Canning's negotiation (4); and with its progress as far as it should have come to my knowledge, if such communication of progress should be prudent at the moment it will come to my knowledge, and of a nature to lead to a judgment of the final result (5).

(6) The Emperor of Russia must be informed that we don't think he has any just ground of war with the Turks, excepting in a case to be discussed hereafter under No. 16; and we must understand from him distinctly that his Imperial Majesty entertains no intention of (7) commencing a war of conquest upon the Turks, in case our efforts to settle the question at Constantinople should fail.

(8) The inducements to his Imperial Majesty to put himself in our hands exclusively are, the offer to be (9) joint mediator with ourselves or to be consulted by us in the negotiation between Turks and Greeks in case the Turks should not consent that he should be joint mediator, and the prospect of our co-operation with his Imperial Majesty in the case discussed under No. 16.

(10) The means of negotiation with the Turks are accurately stated, and the use to be made of these means must be admitted in discussion with the Emperor's ministers notwithstanding their disclaimer.

(12, 13, 14) The justice of war by the Emperor on the Turks is correctly stated in 12, 13, 14, and it does not appear that either at or previous to the Congress of Verona (15) the right of going to war with the Turks was admitted by the Plenipotentiary or the government of this country.

(16) The case supposed in No. 16 would afford to every Christian Power ground for complaint, and even for measures to prevent the execution of the designs supposed to be entertained. They would even affect the interests of every Power whose sub-

jects navigate the eastern parts of the Mediterranean and the Adriatic.

It appears that they are sufficiently accurately stated in the Memorandum of the 26th, and if it is found that the Porte will not attend to our offers of mediation, or listen to any terms of accommodation, and that, in fact, such a design is entertained as to remove the Greeks from the Morea to Egypt, and to plant colonies of Egyptians or Arabs in the Morea, his Majesty's ministers would have no objection to declare to the Porte, in concert with the Emperor of Russia, that they would not permit the execution of such a design; and that, in order to prevent it, they would use the force at his Majesty's disposition to prevent the communication between the ports of Egypt and the Morea.

It must be stated that we are aware that in doing so we shall, in fact, decide the result of the war; but that must be for the consideration of the ministers of the Porte; and we must clearly understand from his Imperial Majesty's ministers not only that he will not invade the Turkish dominions, but that he will co-operate with us in prevailing upon the Greeks to agree to a settlement with the Turks under our joint mediation, which shall leave them under the dominion of the Grand Seignior, but with a reasonable security for the safety of their lives and properties, and shall secure to the government of the Porte the payment of tribute, &c.

This settlement to be guaranteed by Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France.

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM ON THE PARLIAMENTARY GRANTS FOR THE WORKS OF DEFENCE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA.

31st January, 1826.

It is my opinion that the sum of 100,000*l.*, proposed to be granted by Parliament in the next Session to be laid out in his Majesty's dominions in North America, be divided as follows:—

The Grenville Canal being provided for, 50,000*l.* upon the canals to be constructed on the Chûte à Blondeau, and those of St. Ann, and the Rideau communication between the Ottawa and Kingston; 30,000*l.* for the works at, and in the neighbourhood of Kingston; 20,000*l.* for those at Halifax.

It will be impossible to go before Parliament upon this subject without laying before the House the whole of our scheme, at least as far as it is to be applied to the particular works for which we require the grants.

That is to say, the whole scheme of canal from Montreal to Kingston, and for the works at Kingston and at Halifax.

I doubt whether even this ought to be communicated except to a Secret Committee of the House of Commons.

If I am right in this point, I believe the best plan would be to lay before a Secret Committee the whole Report, with a view not to an immediate grant of the whole money, but to their approbation of it, and to their recommendation to Parliament of grants from time to time to carry into execution the object proposed.

However, those had better decide this question who know the forms of Parliament and the House of Commons better than I do.

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM UPON THE WORKS IN NORTH AMERICA.

17th February, 1826.

The Lieutenant-General and Board having had under their consideration the Master-General's Minute of the 31st ultimo [annexed] upon the subject of the sum proposed to be granted by Parliament this year for new works in his Majesty's dominions in North America, and the Clerk of the Ordnance having conferred with the Chancellor of the Exchequer upon the subject, and, in consequence of that conference, submitted to him the accompanying Memorandum, dated the 10th instant, which, having been subsequently laid before Lord Liverpool, it has been finally arranged between his Lordship, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Clerk of the Ordnance, that the following new Works only should be undertaken this year, viz.:—

*Grenville Canal	£10,000
†Rideau Canal	15,000
	£25,000

and that the remainder of the new works proposed by the Canada Commissioners should be postponed; but that the old works already undertaken and in progress should proceed, and that the estimate to Parliament should be prepared accordingly.

HENRY HARDINGE.

* Grenville Canal under charge of the Staff Corps.

† Rideau to be under the Ordnance and Lieutenant-Colonel By's superintendence.

5000*l.* was taken on account for Kingston for quarrying stone. No detailed plans to carry on the projected works having been drawn out, it is considered that 5000*l.* will be as much as can be spent this year.

MEMORANDUM relative to the Money required for Works of Defence and Water Communications in the Canadas, in consequence of the Commissioners' Report.

1st March, 1828.

Water Communications.

Colonial Estimate :—	£.
Proposed and taken for the Rideau Canal in 1827 ..	41,000
Proposed and taken for the Grenville Canal in 1827, not carrying on under the Ordnance	15,000
Total taken in 1827	56,000

To be voted in the Colonial Estimate :—	£.
Proposed to be voted for the Rideau Canal in 1828 ..	41,000
Proposed to be voted for the Grenville Canal in 1828 ..	15,000
Total in 1828	56,000

	£.
Total expense of the Rideau Canal, agreeably to Lieut.-Colonel By's detailed estimate, but upon which no final decision is yet come to	474,844*
Already taken for it, including the proposed vote in 1828	82,000

Works of Defence.

In regard to the works of defence nothing has yet been voted; but in 1827 the Board authorised 5000*l.* to be expended at Kingston in the preparation of materials, &c. It was proposed from General Mann's office to take 10,000*l.* towards these works in 1828, but in consequence of the question for reforming the works at Kingston not having yet received the sanction of the Cabinet, the proposed sum has been reduced from 10,000*l.* to 5000*l.*, which is the sum taken in the parliamentary estimate for the present year. In respect to the other points where works of defence are proposed to be constructed, nothing has yet been decided; but the detailed estimates and plans are received, and the several amounts, including Kingston, are enumerated below.

	£.
Fortress at Montreal	315,122
Kingston	214,649
Niagara Fortress	288,746
York	132,312
Ouse	83,862
Chatham	117,593
Chambly	198,289
St. John's	48,187
Chateauguay	43,033
St. Helen's	52,311
Amherstburg	67,966
Penetangueshene	56,632
Total	1,618,702

* If the broad locks are determined upon, 53,000*l.* will be required in addition to the 474,844*l.*

N.B.—In this Memorandum nothing is yet noticed for Nova Scotia, which it may be necessary to advert to, the estimate for which has been prepared, and is as follows:—

	£.
Citadel, Halifax	115,998
Needham Hill, ditto	8,865
Reform of Fort Clarence, ditto	32,528
Annapolis	39,209
Windsor	31,389
Partridge Island, for the defence of the harbour and mouth of the river St. John, New Brunswick	14,019
Total	242,008

V. G. ELLICOMBE.

Lord Bathurst to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

MY LORDS, Downing Street, 8th February, 1826.

His Majesty has long had reason to lament the atrocities which have disgraced the contest in which Greece has been for many years unhappily involved. It had, indeed, been expected that Ibrahim Pasha would have introduced a system of warfare less abhorrent to the practice and opinions of civilized nations. He may possibly plead as an apology for his departure from that moderation which at the outset he professed, the ill return which he received from those against whom he was opposed. The events which passed at Hydra and elsewhere may be urged as giving him a right of retaliation; and it cannot be denied that each party may instance the barbarities of the other, not to justify certainly, but to account for their own. His Majesty, however, in deploring the continuance of these excesses, has not thought fit hitherto to interpose, except in those cases in which the rights of his subjects and of those of the Ionian States placed under his sole protection have been clearly compromised. But when it is understood that, whether with the consent of the Porte or not, designs are avowed by Ibrahim Pasha to extirpate systematically a whole community, to seize upon the women and children of the Morea, to transport them to Egypt, and to re-people the Morea from Africa or Asia; to change, in fact, that part of Greece from an European State to one resembling in character the States of Barbary; his Majesty cannot, as Sovereign of an European State, hear of such an attempt without demanding of Ibrahim Pasha either an explicit disavowal of his ever having entertained such an intention, or a formal renunciation of it if ever entertained.

I have therefore received his Majesty's commands to signify his pleasure that your Lordships should issue the necessary instructions to the Commander of his Majesty's naval forces in the Mediterranean to select an officer on whose discretion he can rely to proceed to the port in the Morea from which it may be most convenient to have personal communication with Ibrahim Pasha, and that this officer be instructed to represent to him that his Majesty cannot permit the execution of such a design; and that he

is therefore directed to give the Pasha distinctly to understand that unless he shall in a written document explicitly disavow, or, if ever entertained, shall formally renounce the intention of converting the Morea into such a State as that above described—by transporting the population, particularly women and children, to Asia or Africa, and replacing them by the population of those countries—effectual means will be taken to prevent, by the intervention of his Majesty's naval forces, the accomplishment of so unwarrantable a project.

The officer entrusted with this commission must be directed to inform Ibrahim Pasha that he is instructed to remain a given time, not exceeding one week, to receive the final answer from the Pasha, and that, if at the expiration of that time Ibrahim Pasha shall decline to sign a satisfactory declaration, it will be considered as a refusal to comply with his Majesty's demand, and that this refusal will be forthwith reported to his Majesty.

And your Lordships will further cause him to be instructed to inform your Lordships without delay, in duplicate, of the result of this negotiation.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

BATHURST.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD, Foreign Office, 10th February, 1826.

The King having been pleased to select your Grace for the purpose of bearing his Majesty's congratulations to the Emperor of Russia on his Imperial Majesty's accession to the throne, I transmit to your Grace herewith the letter by which his Majesty accredits you to the Emperor of Russia for that purpose.

I also enclose a special letter of congratulation which the King has addressed to the Emperor of Russia on this occasion; and I am to desire that your Grace will deliver these letters in the usual form, accompanied by suitable compliments in his Majesty's name, and by assurances of the King's sincere esteem and regard, and of his earnest wishes for his Imperial Majesty's welfare and happiness.

I also transmit to your Grace copies of his Majesty's letters, and am, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The King to the Emperor of all the Russias.

SIR, MY BROTHER, Windsor Castle, 6th February, 1826.

Being anxious to offer to your Imperial Majesty a public and unequivocal testimony of my distinguished regard and esteem on your Imperial Majesty's accession to the thrones of the empire of all the Russias, of the kingdom of Poland, and of the grand duchy of Finland, I have directed Field Marshal the Duke of

Wellington, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, and of several other illustrious orders, to repair without loss of time to the court of your Imperial Majesty, for the special purpose of offering to your Imperial Majesty my cordial congratulations on this happy occasion. In making choice of the Duke of Wellington for this auspicious embassy, I trust that I have succeeded in my desire to select an individual particularly agreeable to your Imperial Majesty. I request that your Imperial Majesty will give entire credence to whatever the Duke of Wellington may represent to your Imperial Majesty in my name, more especially when he shall convey to your Imperial Majesty the assurance of my attachment, and of my earnest solicitude for your Imperial Majesty's welfare, happiness, and prosperity. That your Imperial Majesty may, under the favour of Providence, long rule the destinies and constitute the happiness of a brave, loyal, and united people, is the ardent wish of

Sir, my brother, your Imperial Majesty's good brother,

Manû Regiâ. GEORGE R.

II.

The King to the Emperor of all the Russias.

SIR, MY BROTHER, Windsor Castle, 6th February, 1826.

The Count de Lieven, whom your Imperial Majesty has been pleased to continue in the character of your Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at my Court, has presented to me the letter which your Imperial Majesty addressed to me on the 23rd of December last (O.S.), announcing the demise of your royal and beloved brother the Emperor Alexander I.

The notification of this melancholy event has filled my heart with the deepest affliction, and I sincerely sympathise in the grief of your Imperial Majesty at the demise of a Sovereign whose virtues and magnanimity secured to him the love of his subjects, confirmed the prosperity of his empire, and established the glory of his eventful and memorable reign.

In seeking consolation for the loss of a Sovereign to whom I was allied by the strongest ties of friendship and attachment, I can look for it only in the estimable qualities of his successor.

I avail myself, therefore, of the earliest opportunity to offer to your Imperial Majesty my cordial congratulations on your Imperial Majesty's accession to the crowns which have devolved upon your Imperial Majesty by the renunciation of his Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Constantine.

At so important a juncture it is gratifying to me to receive from your Imperial Majesty the assurances that your Imperial Majesty is actuated by the same desire as your late lamented brother to maintain the alliance which has so long and so happily subsisted between our two crowns, and to preserve the general tranquillity.

I can, with equal truth, assure your Imperial Majesty that the same line of policy which directed my councils during the reign of the Emperor Alexander will still govern them at the present moment.

With such mutual assurances I cannot but confidently hope that the harmony and good understanding between the two countries will be established on a basis not to be shaken, and that by our united councils the peace of the world may be preserved.

I am, Sir, my brother, your Imperial Majesty's good brother,

Manû Regiâ. GEORGE R.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 10th February, 1826.

The King having been pleased to make choice of your Grace to convey to the Emperor Nicholas his Majesty's congratulations on his Imperial Majesty's accession to the throne of Russia, I have received his Majesty's commands to take advantage of the valuable opportunity which your Grace's access to the Emperor and to his ministers will afford, for ascertaining the real views of the new Emperor with respect to the affairs of Turkey and Greece, and for endeavouring to come to some direct and confidential understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg upon that subject.

The war carrying on in Greece has long disquieted the repose, and excited the anxiety of Europe; and unless the causes out of which it arose, and the complications which have grown out of it, be soon put into a train of settlement, they may, and probably will, in spite of the pacific disposition of most of the great Powers, lead, at no distant time, to general strife and confusion.

The principles and the considerations which have hitherto prevented his Majesty's government from taking part in the several projects of interference which have been discussed among the four great Powers of the Continent, with a view to the pacification of Eastern Europe, need not be stated in an instruction addressed to your Grace.

They are recorded and explained in the correspondence of this office: and it is a satisfaction to his Majesty's government that however those Powers may have regretted, or even blamed at the time, our several successive refusals to become parties to their conferences on this subject, every one of the Courts concerned in those conferences, with the single exception of Prussia, has successively admitted, that on our own declared principles we could not be expected to take part in them, and that our predictions of their fruitlessness have been accurately fulfilled.

Austria, indeed, the leading member of their conferences, never pretended to us to look for any other result from them than that of gaining time; although to the Emperor Alexander, Prince Metternich held out expectations of an impression to be made on the Ottoman Ministry which would bring the Porte to reason, and place the fate of Greece in the hands of the Alliance.

So little pains, indeed, were taken by Prince Metternich to disguise the real meaning of all these promises, during his visit to Paris in the last spring, that the facility, and almost *dupery* of the Emperor Alexander, became matter of common talk in that metropolis; a talk which, being faithfully reported to his Imperial Majesty by his Ambassador, General Pozzo di Borgo, contributed more perhaps than the subsequent foreseen and inevitable failure of the steps taken by the several missions of the Allies at Constantinople, to irritate the feelings of the Emperor Alexander, to destroy altogether his confidence in his Allies, and to throw him back upon himself, in that temper of gloomy abstraction in which it is now known through Lord Strangford's despatch No. 6 of the 17th of January, that he had resolved upon immediate war.

The knowledge thus acquired of such a resolution on the part of the Emperor Alexander throws a new and most important light upon the first

professions of the Emperor Nicholas, and gives to his Imperial Majesty's repeated declarations that he is determined to follow in all things the policy of his late Imperial brother, a much less cheering colour than that in which they originally appeared to other Powers. Nor has his Imperial Majesty's own construction of his own words been either reluctant or ambiguous. He appears, by Lord Strangford's above-mentioned despatch, to have fairly avowed to the French Ambassador, that unless his Allies come effectually to his aid, he must look to the employment of his own resources.

A crisis, therefore, had arrived in this long-pending and much-agitated question, even before the death of the Emperor Alexander, which crisis, if it had not been precipitated, had at least not been prevented, by the system of conferences and joint interposition.

Count Nesselrode's first conversation with Lord Strangford sufficiently shewed the sense entertained of that system by the Russian government.

Count Nesselrode spoke in terms of bitterness and contempt of Prince Metternich's delusive and worn-out policy.

He declared, further, that the Emperor Alexander (for this conversation passed before that monarch's death) had never relied on France for any honest or useful assistance, and while acknowledging frankly the dissatisfaction with which his Imperial Majesty had seen the obstinate refusal of England to join in the conferences of St. Petersburg, he yet admitted that that refusal had been fairly (if not to his Imperial Majesty's mind conclusively) explained and justified; that his Imperial Majesty had no ground of complaint against us for it, and that his reliance, after all, was upon England alone.

Your Grace will therefore probably find the Russian Ministry prepared to receive any overtures from your Grace, on the footing of perfect confidence.

In that expectation I now proceed to trace out, for your Grace's information, the course which it is the wish of his Majesty's government that your Grace should pursue in your communications with the Russian Ministry.

Our object is, if possible, to prevent Russia from going to war; the probability of which decision, already sufficiently imminent at the moment of the Emperor Alexander's death, and from deference to his alleged intentions, may probably be aggravated by the untoward events of the new reign, and by the consequent desire to find employment for the Russian army.

It would be idle to imagine that a disposition, natural enough in a young military monarch who finds himself suddenly placed at the head of 800,000 men, and fostered by so many concurrent considerations both of sentiment and of policy, can be diverted from its straightforward course by general recommendations to cultivate peace and tranquillity. The situation of affairs in Russia *may* not improbably be felt to be one in which tranquillity at home would be least surely preserved by peace abroad, if the maintenance of that external peace should be as offensive as is apprehended to the feelings of the Russian nation.

Every effort must, however, be made to induce the Emperor of Russia to forego, or at least to suspend, an appeal to arms.

The first, and that which from Count Nesselrode's language appears likely to be the most acceptable inducement for this purpose, is, the offer of our single intervention between his Imperial Majesty and the Ottoman Porte on the one hand, and between the Porte and the Greeks on the other.

Your Grace is in possession of the instructions with which Mr. Stratford Canning went to Constantinople,* a copy of which is herewith enclosed. It is therefore unnecessary to particularise the overture which he was directed to make to the Ottoman Porte, and the topics with which he was to enforce it.

It may be urged by your Grace, as a proof of the sincerity of our desire to come to the aid of Russia for the purpose which the conferences of the last year failed to obtain, that Mr. Stratford Canning's instruction was framed in that interval during which Russia had abjured communication with England on the affairs of Turkey and Greece, and before Count Lieven had been instructed to make (or had made) any overture for the renewal of that interrupted communication.

It would be a waste of time to conjecture the degree of success with which the execution of that instruction may have been attended, when we are in almost daily expectation of learning the result of it from Constantinople.

Mr. Stratford Canning may have succeeded in prevailing with the Porte to accept our proffered intervention, or he may have failed. The chances of failure, it cannot be denied, have been increased by Lord Strangford's proceedings at St. Petersburg, of which, if the report should have reached Constantinople before the arrival there of Mr. Stratford Canning, or before he was apprised of the disavowal of those proceedings by his government, the singleness of our position (upon which mainly, if not solely, rested the hope that our overture would be well received) will have been completely destroyed in the eyes of the Turkish ministry, who may, in that case, listen to Mr. Stratford Canning with distrust, and consider all that he has to say as the counterpart of that disjointed and abortive intervention which was employed by the Allies last year.

If, on the other hand, the report from St. Petersburg of Lord Strangford's proceedings should not have anticipated either Mr. Stratford Canning's arrival or the receipt of the instructions by which Mr. Stratford Canning has been able to destroy the impression of that report, it is still to be hoped that the Turkish ministry may catch at the single mediation of Great Britain as the last chance of averting hostilities with Russia.

The Turks are sufficiently well informed upon all passing events in Europe to be aware that the patience of the Emperor of Russia had been at length wearied out, and that the commencement of the war has only been intercepted by that event which has devolved his power and his projects into younger and more enterprising hands.

But we must be prepared for either alternative.

If Mr. Stratford Canning's overture shall have been favourably received at Constantinople, it is not too much to hope that the issue of it will be more or less patiently expected at St. Petersburg.

But the overture at Constantinople may, from whatever cause, have been rejected.

* See vol. ii. of this Series, page 530.

What is then to be interposed by us to avert the Emperor of Russia's declaration of war?

It appears to us that your Grace may then propose to Count Nesselrode to renew the like overture at Constantinople, with the previous knowledge and consent of the Russian government, a difference so material as to give a new character to our intervention.

It is possible that this proposal may be accepted by the Russian government simply and without qualification.

It is possible, on the other hand, that the Emperor may build upon it a proposition that instead of waiting the result of the intervention of England between Russia and Turkey, Russia should pass over this intermediate step and should at once join herself to England in a mediation between the Porte and the Greeks.

To this proposition your Grace must, we think, answer that we have no objection to it whatever, if the Turks are prepared to accept it. But great care must be taken not to pledge ourselves to the acceptance of it without the previous consent of the Turks, lest their refusal of it should be assumed by the Emperor of Russia as a ground of offence, and as a cause of war.

In either of the two cases, of separate or joint intervention, your Grace will be careful not to admit, nor to allow it to be taken for granted, that the failure of either would confer on Russia a right of war against Turkey.

Such a right is not given by the treaties which authorise the interference of Russia on behalf of the Greeks; but which authorise it in Russia only as a friendly power, and through a minister residing at the Porte, and authorise it only on behalf of Greeks living in submission to the Ottoman government.

Other grounds of merely Russian quarrel we never can allow to be pleaded as justifying a war against the Turks. All those grounds, or nearly all which were committed to Lord Strangford's management at Constantinople, have been removed. Enough certainly does not remain of them to warrant, in our judgment, the commencement of a war, which, when once kindled, must too probably spread throughout Europe.

Of the points in dispute between Russia and the Porte, with which Lord Strangford was *not* commissioned to interfere, the principal one is that of the Asiatic fortresses; and it is one on which the Porte appears to have the right on its side.

A war, therefore, by Russia against the Porte, on any other account than that of the Greeks, would be a war of ambition and conquest;* and it is not with respect to a war of that nature that England could take counsel with Russia, or could do otherwise than dissuade and deprecate it, and point out in frank, though friendly language, the wide and disastrous consequences to which it must inevitably lead.

There is nothing in this language, when addressed to Russia, inconsistent with that which Mr. Stratford Canning will have addressed to the Porte, to warn that government of the impending hostilities of Russia. That warning is founded on facts of which the existence is unquestionable; but the

* [See previous reasons on this point.—W.]

disposition to make war, and the *right* to make it, are different things; and the prognostication of an act of violence by one party, as likely to be consequent upon any particular line of conduct in another, does not imply any approbation of that consequence when it actually occurs.

In either of the two cases which have been here supposed, it seems desirable not to revive the discussions respecting the re-establishment of a Russian mission at Constantinople.

In the first case, that of our separate intervention, it cannot now be properly demanded; since that separate intervention has, in fact, begun in the absence of a Russian Minister.

In the second case, that of a joint mediation by us and Russia, previously consented to by the Porte, there might, perhaps, be in strictness a right to require, as a preliminary, the mission of Monsieur de Ribeaupierre, or of some one in his stead, to Constantinople.

But as it is highly desirable to avoid encouraging any proposal for the renewal of the conferences of last year, and for our accession to them, it may be better not to bring forward a demand, which would at once disincline Russia from the acceptance of the plan which we wish her to accept, and might suggest to others the revival of that of which we wish to avoid, not only the adoption, but even the discussion.

It is to be hoped that the renewal of the conferences will not be proposed by any one. No Power, except Prussia, has lately adverted to it, as within the scope of reasonable expectation. But Prussia having no contact with Turkey, and no intercourse with Greece, has no more interest than any of the remotest Powers of Europe in the question at issue. Nothing can exceed the soreness of other Powers, of the Netherlands in particular, at the association of Prussia in an alliance assuming the general direction of Europe; more especially since a question between Prussia and the Netherlands was decided at Verona against the latter; the Netherlands not being summoned to state their case, and Prussia sitting as a judge in a cause in which she was a party.

In any question of common interest to maritime Europe (such as are all the questions respecting Greece), there can hardly be a doubt that the Netherland government would be at least as well entitled as Prussia to have a voice in consultation.

I advert to this matter the rather because wishing as we do to avoid the fruitless and perplexing process of a conference, there can perhaps be no more convenient mode of avoiding it than by multiplying the conditions which alone would induce us to attend to it.

Those conditions, as already repeatedly stated by us, are:—

1st. The complete re-establishment of the Russian mission at Constantinople.

2ndly. An abjuration by all parties concerned of any employment of force against either Turks or Greeks.

To these must now be added:—

3rdly. An abjuration by all and each of the intervening parties, of any views of aggrandisement or peculiar advantage to be derived to themselves, either from the success or from the failure of the intervention.

If we further insist, as it is but reasonable to do,

4thly. That the King of the Netherlands, the maritime and commercial

Power next in importance in Europe to England and France, shall likewise be invited to any conference to be held on a question so nearly touching maritime interests; and further if we require (as has been already proposed by Prince Metternich),

5thly. That the seat of the conference should be in London; the result may probably be, either that we shall get rid of the proposal altogether, through the separate objections of different Powers to the several conditions to it; or that, if (contrary to all expectation) all parties shall waive their objections, for the sake of obtaining our co-operation, we shall, at least, afford that co-operation on our own terms. We shall then go into a conference wholly different in character from those against whose decisions we have twice had occasion to protest in the face of the world; and we shall have an account of the principles and intentions of that conference to render, which may be rendered without disguise, not only to the parties whose interests we discuss, but to the British Parliament and nation.

It cannot be supposed,—it is in truth utterly hopeless,—that even such a conference should be able to settle the disputes of Turkey and Greece. But it would have a better chance of doing so than a conference consisting of five Powers, of whom one, Russia, would be in a state bordering on hostility to the Turks; another (Austria) virtually and in conduct their ally; the third (France) involved in complicated intrigues alike with Greece and with Egypt; the fourth (Prussia) only either the instigator or the abettor of violent counsels in Russia; and England paralysed in her endeavours to do good by the conflicting interests and passions of her Allies.

Dismissing, then, the notion of a conference, let us revert to the case which is most immediately in our contemplation: that of a confidential concert between Russia and England.

We have already considered the several cases of possible failure: 1st., of Mr. Stratford Canning's present offer of intervention; 2ndly., of such an offer to be renewed with the express authority of Russia.

In both these cases, it has been assumed that the Greeks would admit of our mediation, singly or jointly. Singly, there is little doubt that they would do so.

They have, in truth, thrown themselves upon our aid so confidently, that we have only to name the terms of our interference. The enclosure in Mr. Stratford Canning's despatch sufficiently evinces this disposition. Whether they would admit our mediation jointly with Russia may be more doubtful; but if our attempt at separate intervention should have failed, it is difficult to suppose that in their present, or in any thing like their present state, the Greeks would reject the only remaining hope of extrication from their dangers.

It remains to consider what is the course to be recommended to Russia, and to be adopted by ourselves, if the offer of the joint intervention of England and Russia should be equally rejected by the Porte.

In solving this question, it is necessary to ask ourselves,—however we may deny the right of Russia to go to war,—what probability there is of our preventing it.

This must be done either, 1st., by a combination with Austria and France; or 2ndly, by our single admonition to Russia that we would not see the Turkish Power destroyed.

As to the first mode, the Baron de Damas has distinctly declared that France could not see with indifference a partition like that of Poland, meaning a dismemberment of the Turkish empire, by which Russia and Austria were to benefit.

Austria, too, undoubtedly dreads and deprecates a Russian war.

But both these Powers have objects of indemnification in view, to which they attach an importance secondary only to that of the prevention of hostilities.

Their opposition, therefore, would probably dissolve before the first Russian successes; and they might both, or either of them, be bought off by a conditional promise of a share in the partition. Thus the burden of the resistance to Russia would still be left upon us; and supposing the Turkish Power overthrown, we should probably be involved in hostility, not only with Russia, but with our Allies.

As to the latter course, can we believe that we could, if we were so disposed, take upon ourselves the defence of the Turkish Power, Russia allying herself (as in that case she unquestionably would do) with Greece? And that we could obtain from Parliament in such a cause the supplies for a single campaign?

Is it to be expected that the simple question of balance of power, which was insufficient in the year 1791 to induce the Parliament to check the progress of Russia towards Turkey, before the name of Greece had been heard in recent modern history, would now reconcile Parliament to an active alliance with Turkey, involving in its consequences hostility not only to Russia, but to the Greeks?

We have maintained for a long time, and under very difficult circumstances, a just and even-handed neutrality between the Ottoman Porte and the Greeks.

So long as there is no third party to the war this is still in our power, and is most unquestionably our policy.

But should Russia take the field, will it be longer possible to see with that indifference which neutrality implies, a conflict which must probably end in the dismemberment of the Turkish empire, and in a general contest for its spoils?

Is there, in short, any reasonable chance of avoiding permanently any participation, of whatever kind or for whatever purposes, in the consequences which may grow out of the present state of things in the East of Europe?

May it not, therefore, be worth our while to consider whether, in the hopelessness of avoiding altogether an ultimate participation in those consequences, we might not, in perfect consistency with the principles which we have hitherto professed, take some active measure, which, by restraining the excesses of the existing war between the Ottoman Porte and the Greeks, might force upon the Porte that disposition to accommodation which would afford the best, if not the only, chance of producing a change in the warlike counsels of the Emperor of Russia?

In the month of October last, after a discontinuance of diplomatic intercourse between England and Russia upon the subject of Turkey and Greece from the beginning of the year (at which period we had finally refused to enter into the conferences at St. Petersburg), Count Lieven made an over-

ture to renew that intercourse with me; whether upon the receipt of fresh instructions from his Court I am not sure, but certainly after a full knowledge of the failure of the intervention of the Allies at Constantinople.

His Excellency communicated to me, in the most entire confidence, despatches from Count Nesselrode containing the substance of the communications made by the Allies to the Porte, and of the answers received from that government.

In these despatches Count Nesselrode comments, in terms of the most unsparing severity, upon the feebleness and apparent want of sincerity on the part of the Allies in the execution of a measure, in the faith of which the Emperor of Russia had postponed the redressing by his own power of his just griefs against Turkey, and had foregone the opportunity of saving the Greeks from extermination.

In explanation of this proposition, Count Lieven confided to me a Report which had been, as he said, some time in possession of his government, and by which it appeared that the plan of campaign of the Turkish government, to be executed by the Pasha of Egypt, was no longer to carry on the war with the moderation and forbearance which had hitherto marked the more regular operations of the Egyptian army, as compared with that of the Turks; but to *drive*, as it were, the whole of the Greek population of the Morea; to transport them into slavery in Africa; and to re-people the country thus depopulated by a Mahometan colonisation.

A plan so monstrous and extravagant did, I confess, appear to me to be incredible.

Mr. Stratford Canning's despatch from Corfu, however, shows a prevalent belief in the existence of some such plan, and the enclosed copy of a despatch to Mr. Stratford Canning states the nature of the confirmations which we have since received of this surprising intelligence.*

Our information is not sufficient, indeed, to authorise a positive averment of the fact; but it is such as to preclude the possibility of altogether doubting it.

Supposing the fact true, it may surely be questioned whether a warfare of such a nature can be tolerated by Christian nations. It may be questioned whether, if the introduction of such a system of warfare into Greece were known and believed in this country, it would be possible for us to justify to the country a continued abstinence from all interposition; or whether, if we still so abstained, we could hope hereafter to interpose, with the consent of the country, any effectual resistance to whatever enterprise Russia (alone) might undertake at the impulse, and under the pretext, of so enormous a moral as well as political provocation.

If this be so, and if we may be compelled to act hereafter upon this case (supposing it to be true), we shall take the chance, at least, of making the best advantage of that eventual necessity, by determining upon our course *now*, and by enabling your Grace to make to the government of Russia a full confidence of our intentions. By that confidence, it is possible that your Grace may purchase a suspension, at least, of the warlike designs of the new Emperor against the Porte; and if you succeed in doing so, the separate, limited, and unquestionably just exertion of British power, which is announced in my despatch to Mr. Stratford Canning, and in the instruc-

* See page 104.

tion (of which a copy is herewith also enclosed) to be issued for the guidance of his Majesty's naval forces in the Levant, may probably save the Porte herself from destruction, and Europe from a general war.

With respect to the terms of any arrangement to be made between the Turks and the Greeks, your Grace will express the willingness of your government to enter into the most unreserved communication with the Emperor of Russia, and its readiness to place that arrangement, when made, under the guarantee of Russia, jointly with that of Austria, Prussia, and France.

Your Grace will disclaim for your government the desire to obtain in such arrangement any accession either of territory (as has been sometimes apprehended) to the Ionian States, or of general influence to Great Britain.

So far from entertaining any jealousy of Russian influence in Greece, your Grace may declare the persuasion of your government that it is by the union of that influence with our own, and through the conviction of the Greeks that these two influences are united and not opposed to each other, that the best prospect will be afforded of inducing the Greeks to accept such terms of accommodation as it is our hope to induce the Turkish government to propose.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Strangford.

MY LORD, Foreign Office, 10th February, 1826.

I take advantage of the departure of the Duke of Wellington for St. Petersburg to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatches to No. , which have been laid before the King.

The Duke of Wellington being, from his situation as one of his Majesty's confidential servants, necessarily in full possession of the views and opinions of his Majesty's government upon all those points arising out of the present position of Russia, in relation to the affairs of Eastern Europe, which are likely to come into discussion with the Russian Ministry, it is no disparagement to your Excellency that so long as his Grace remains at St. Petersburg the discussion of all such points shall be entrusted exclusively to his Grace.

Your Excellency will furnish his Grace with every information and assistance in your power, and afford him access to the archives of the embassy.

The Duke of Wellington not taking with him credentials as an ambassador his special embassy will not interfere with your Excellency's carrying on of the ordinary duties of his Majesty's resident Ambassador, nor occasion any interruption in your Excellency's regular correspondence.

I have the honour, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 10th February, 1826.

In illustration of the views of France in respect to Greece, I enclose to your Grace the copy of a paper which has been transmitted to me privately by Lord Granville, with an offer from the writer of it to come over to England for the purpose of discussing the contents of it with me, and of satisfying me that the great persons whose names are mentioned therein are, in truth, cognizant of the contents of this paper, and parties to its communication.

The writer will not be encouraged to come over to England; nor will any answer (beyond a civil acknowledgment) be returned to the overture conveyed in his paper.

It would not be fair to Lord Granville that this paper should be communicated, or that the contents of it should be directly stated to the Russian government; but your Grace will, from being in possession of it, feel yourself the more warranted in describing the hopelessness of a frank and straightforward concert of views between all the great Powers of Europe for the settlement of the affairs of Greece.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Paris, ce 15me Janvier, 1826.

Une déplorable jalousie, une funeste rivalité, qu'une politique aveugle et cruelle se plaisait à entretenir, ont longtems, pour le malheur des deux nations, armé la France et l'Angleterre, l'une contre l'autre. Courbée sous le poids des dettes et des impôts, elles en expient aujourd'hui les désastreux résultats.

Grâces aux redoutables leçons de l'expérience, et aux lumières repandues dans les deux pays, ces deux grands peuples à quelques exceptions près, aspirent à se rapprocher. Ils sentent aujourd'hui que leur intime union ferait leur mutuelle prospérité.

Leur alliance assurerait avec les bienfaits et une longue paix le bonheur du monde, elle ouvrirait de toutes parts à leur commerce de nouvelles sources de richesses, et protégerait tous les états sécondaires contre les envahissemens dont ils sont menacés.

Mais au milieu des dangers que la puissance colossale de la Russie fait planer sur le vieux continent, les hommes qui jettent dans l'avenir des régards pénétrans, appellent de tous leurs vœux plus ardemment encore cette alliance entre la France et l'Angleterre.

En effet la Russie adossée contre le Pole, inconquérable dans sa vaste étendue, fière d'une armée aguerrie de 850,000 soldats, et des colonies militaires qu'on veut pousser jusqu'au 1,200,000 soldats, innombrables auxiliaires en réserve, qui ne lui coûtent aucune dépense, et qu'elle pousse déjà dans la Bucharie et le Turkestan, dans l'espoir d'en inonder un jour les rives de l'Indus et du Ganges, la Russie, dis-je, présente encore à l'Europe épouvantée une masse de population de 55,000,000 d'habitants, avec l'accroissement annuel de 800,000 naissances au-delà du nombre des mortalités. Quel sera donc dans cinquante années le nombre effrayant de ses sujets?

Le successeur d'Alexandre, redoutant sans doute une ligue de toute l'Europe, suspendra peut-être pendant quelques années les projets d'envahissement que nourrit le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg: mais avec un voisin aussi puissant dont les forces s'accroissent sans cesse, il n'est plus de sécurité pour l'Europe.

La foudre des conquêtes peut s'endormir, mais elle restera toujours suspendue sur tous les états, et elle éclatera tôt ou tard.

Les intrigues de la politique ne pourront qu'en retarder l'époque. Un Prince entreprenant s'asseoira nécessairement un jour sur le trône des Czars. Quelle digue alors à opposer à ce torrent?

La Turquie n'est plus qu'un cadavre dévoré par l'anarchie militaire, et minée depuis longtems par les violences du pouvoir absolu, la fureur du fanatisme, et la barbarie de l'ignorance. Tous les efforts, tous les sacrifices ne le ranimeront jamais: ce n'est plus qu'un fantôme d'Allié, impuissant et stupide.

Les excès de la plus affreuse tyrannie ont insurgé la Grèce. Les Turcs ont cru pouvoir étouffer cette vertueuse insurrection dans le sang des héroiques Hellènes, les ruines sanglantes de l'opulente Chio et d'Ipsara, l'extermination de leurs nombreux habitans, les massacres de Chypre, de Salonique, de Smyrne, Scala Nuova, Sidonié, Bysance, et de vingt autres cités, la dépopulation et le ravage de la Morée, proclament assez le sort terrible réservé à la population chrétienne de ces contrées.

De nouveaux essaims de barbares viennent de fondre sur cette Péninsule. L'Elide, seule province qui avait jusqu'ici échappé à leurs ravages, vient d'être envahie par l'armée d'Ibrahim, qui s'est portée sur Patras; Pyrgos sa capitale a été incendiée, les campagnes dévastées, les villages brûlés, les oliviers coupés au pied, et l'on porte à huit ou dix mille le nombre des femmes et des enfans qu'il a égorgés, ou envoyés comme esclaves en Egypte. Infortunés que la fuite dans les montagnes n'a pu dérober à ses fureurs.

On ne peut se dissimuler que la population Grecque ne court en outre les dangers de périr de faim et de misère dans les bois, et les rochers, où elle s'est réfugiée, si l'Europe chrétienne, et surtout la France et l'Angleterre, obéissant à la voix de la religion et de l'humanité comme à celle de la politique, ne leur envoient pas des secours de toute espèce.

A coup sûr la dévastation et la dépopulation de la Grèce, en affaiblissant l'empire Ottoman, qui ne régnera plus que sur déserts ensanglantés, sont dans l'intérêt de la Russie.

Elle la livre presque sans défense à cette éternelle ennemie; la Turquie en sera une proie plus facile à dévorer un jour. Mais il n'est pas de même de la France, et de l'Angleterre, et de la Prusse même, qui, vulnerable presque partout, étend ses bras décharnés des rives du Niemen à celle de la Moselle. Ces trois puissances doivent désirer que sur les ruines de l'empire Ottoman qui tombe en lambeaux, il s'élève un royaume grand, fort, indépendant, qui puisse aider à raffermir l'équilibre ébranlé de l'Europe, et contribuer avec ses Alliés à s'opposer aux envahissemens des Russes. Je ne parle pas de l'Autriche, ambitieuse et rapace, détestée en Pologne et en Italie par son administration; soupçonneuse, despotique, et brutale, elle préférera, si elle ne peut empêcher les armées Russes d'envahir la Turquie, s'unir à elles pour en partager les dépouilles, et obtenir pour son lôt la Servie, la Croatie Turque, la Bosnie, la Dalmatie, l'Albanie, et peut-être la Grèce. Si la France et l'Angleterre laissent échapper le moment favorable de donner conjointement aux Grecs un monarque de leur choix, avec un gouvernement constitutionnel, l'Europe et ses Puissances elles-mêmes seront un jour victime de leur lenteur et de leur aveuglement, la postérité accusera leur indifférence et leur impré-

voyance, de l'extermination d'une nation chrétienne, et des dangers que la colossale Russie fait planer sur l'ancien monde.

Cet heureux accord qui sauverait la Grèce, conduirait nécessairement la France et l'Angleterre à s'unir plus étroitement que jamais, par les liens politiques et commerciaux.

La force des raisons exposées dans ce Mémoire, et la sagesse éclairée et philanthropique de M. le Dauphin, font croire que ce Prince n'est pas éloigné d'adhérer à ce systême qui maintiendrait l'équilibre de l'Europe et lui assurerait le bienfait d'une longue paix. Il serait donc à désirer que le ministère Anglais voulut s'aboucher avec l'auteur de ce Mémoire, qui se rendrait s'il le fallait, volontiers à Londres, pour cet effet, n'étant mû que par le désir d'être utile aux deux pays, et spécialement à la Grèce, dont lui le premier s'est montré le défenseur à la tribune, ayant toujours les rapports les plus intimes avec les chefs de ce pays, et exerçant sur eux la plus grande influence.

Si l'Angleterre consentait à l'élection du second fils de M. le Duc d'Orléans pour Roi de la Grèce, on obtiendrait pour l'Angleterre toute la garantie et tous les avantages qu'elle pourrait désirer.

La Régence même, pendant la longue minorité du jeune Prince, serait presqu'exclusivement à son choix, mais on serait accessible à tout autre communication.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 10th February, 1826.

I saw Count Lieven yesterday. He did *not* execute the instruction, of which we believe him to be in possession. He stated Count Nesselrode's exculpation of Lord Strangford, so far as related to his, Lord Strangford's, having brought forward his propositions merely *as his own*, and not as those of his government; but he said nothing of the *particular* blame imputed to Lord Strangford of having gone too near to the acknowledging of the right of war in Russia, nor consequently of the Emperor's assertion of that right. The assertion therefore is one which we are not bound to know.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 10th February, 1826.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I received from Count Lieven in answer to one (upon the copy of which I cannot at this moment lay my hand), in which, by the King's command, I offered to Count Lieven any expression of his Majesty's confidence and goodwill which might possibly be of use to Count Lieven with the new Emperor of Russia; but left it to Count Lieven to decide whether such intervention was likely to do him more good than harm. You see, he declined the proffered intervention; upon the whole, I think, prudently.

At his audience, however, last week Count Lieven said something to the King which sounded as if he would be not unwilling now to accept the help which in the first instance he declined. I asked him yesterday

whether I had understood him rightly; and he frankly owned to me that I had.

I do not know how you can better do him service than by making such use as you may find opportunity to make of the enclosed letter; which shows at once the King's feelings towards him, and his own very proper desire to rely entirely on the unsolicited favour of his own sovereign.

You cannot say more than is *true* of our desire to keep him here. The only limit to what might be said to that purpose, is the consideration of how it would be taken? and what would be its effect? and of the precise point where that limit is to be drawn you only can judge.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 10th February, 1826.

I hardly need repeat to you that it is entirely at your own option to prolong your stay at St. Petersburg, or to hasten your return, according as your own views of the public service and your own feelings of personal convenience may dictate.

I have no wish but that you should do exactly as you like best; and, I am sure, neither the King nor our colleagues have any other.

The only thing that I would ask of you, as a great kindness, is that so soon as you have made up your mind whether to remain for the coronation or not, you would let me know your determination; and that you would, if possible, put me in possession of it before it becomes otherwise known here. For it will be a signal for many applications.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 10th February, 1826.

I enclose to you, by Huskisson's desire, the copy of a paper which he has drawn up on the subject of the currency.

We expect great difficulties to-night, from a combination of country bankers and city merchants, with no small sprinkling of country gentlemen connected with the former class, which threatens to run very hard Robinson's one pound note propositions.

Unluckily, a great proportion of our steadiest friends have left town, in the faith that there would be no opposition at least to the first stage of these measures.

We must stand to them, and abide the consequences.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

8th February, 1826.

In all the circumstances of this country there is nothing more calculated to create anxiety, and call for early consideration, than our want of adequate preparation in respect to the arrangement of our currency and finance, to meet those demands which war may at any time render necessary.

Our riches and power are greater than at any former period; but our wealth is a mine placed by the side of a volcano, and our strength may fail us at the moment when we may require its greatest exertion.

It is unnecessary to show that, in point of currency, the country is not prepared for the drain of a war.

We must now be convinced that we could not have met the contingency of a bad harvest, and we are aware that without either of these occurrences, even the inevitable recoil of the late overtrading proved all but fatal to the solvency of the Bank.

The plan for gradually diffusing over the country a metallic circulation, in lieu of the one and two pound notes, will unquestionably effect a considerable diminution of this evil, but will it be a sufficient remedy, either in point of amount, or perhaps in point of time? I certainly think not.

In proportion as sovereigns take the place of small notes in general circulation, the Bank of England will be comparatively safe against all sudden calls, which panic may occasion, for internal use, although the amount of their own treasure may be kept considerably lower than it has been upon the average of the last three or four years.

An external drain, in the ordinary course of commerce, may mostly be foreseen; its symptoms are known, its approaches are gradual, its amount may be checked; and against the effects of such a drain, therefore, the Bank may protect themselves by such a proportion of treasure to the amount of their notes as it would at all times be prudent to keep, to be prepared for internal exigencies. Beyond this limit, the Bank Directors cannot be expected to hoard bullion. It is no part of their business, nay, it would be a violation of their duty to their proprietors to accumulate treasure, useless and unproductive to themselves as bankers, for the purpose of providing for the contingent wants of others or of government.

When those wants occur upon a large scale, the Bank therefore will not be able to meet them, and if they are supplied from the metallic currency in circulation, there will not only be great pressure, and consequent risk of a panic, with all its usual consequences, but even without absolute panic, a rapid contraction of paper, both by the Bank and all country banks; and, by the latter, a simultaneous effort to increase their store of gold, in order to be prepared against the possible consequences of a run.

I agree with Mr. Baring, that such a state of things, after great disasters and suffering, would, at the end of one or two campaigns, either paralyse our exertions, or lead to another suspension of cash payments. What the immediate effects, and what the final consequences of such a suspension might be, are considerations which I shall not now enter upon.

To avoid it we must give a broader foundation to our metallic currency, one sufficient to protect us, without violent fluctuations, not only from the effect of any ordinary disturbance in the foreign exchange, occasioned by the course of commercial speculation, but also from the greater pressure which may be brought upon the money market by a bad harvest or a war. There appears to me but one mode by which this can be effected, without pushing further than is now intended, or would at any time be prudent, the principle of substituting a gold coin for circulating credit in the transactions of the country.

Silver, it is well known, is the basis and standard of the metallic circulation of all other civilised countries. It was so of this country in former times. It continued to be a legal tender by *weight*, though not by *tale*, according to the standard of the Mint (5*s*. 2*d*. an ounce) until the year 1819.

Upon the issue of our new silver coin, at the standard of 5*s*. 6*d*. an ounce, it was provided that this coin should not be a legal tender for any amount exceeding 40*s*.; and it would be impossible, with such a high rate of seignorage and consequent disproportion in its denominative value to that of our gold coin (which remains at the old standard, and upon which there is no seignorage at all), to allow our present shilling to be a legal tender for any larger sum.

Our present monetary system therefore does not admit of the use of silver coins, except upon the same principle as those of copper, namely, as tokens, to the extent necessary for the convenience of change in the adjustment of small pecuniary transactions. To this extent silver coin has been provided, and the supply is now fully adequate. Except for the use of our manufactures, in which silver is wanted as a commodity, there is now, therefore, no demand for silver in this country. This consumption is very inconsiderable compared with the quantity which our commercial connexion with the New World has for some time furnished, and is henceforward likely to pour into this country. It is the great staple of their commerce; the only one of any great amount by which, for many years, they will be able to pay for our manufactures.

Another inconvenience of our monetary system is, that when the Bank is in want of treasure from the continent, as it was at the late crisis, and is still at this moment, it must confine itself to the purchase of gold. This is attended with great expense, in the first instance to the Bank, but which is ultimately a loss to the country. Whenever the exchanges are against us this gold must go forth again, because it is the only available element of adjustment. Neither is expense the only evil, or perhaps the worst. By resting our operations on this narrow basis we take them out of the ordinary course of commercial dealings. We proscribe that metal in which the pecuniary transactions of Europe, political or commercial, are balanced in the ordinary course; and the result is that we place ourselves, in matters connected with the foreign exchanges, and the means of supplying our metallic wants, at the mercy of a powerful house here, acting in concert with their connexions on the continent, and vest them with a power, the use of which, however profitable to them and their connexions, it is neither desirable for the interests of commerce, nor safe for those of the country, to place in any such hands.

The use of silver being virtually prohibited in this country for that purpose which constitutes its principal use and consequent demand all over the world, it comes here from South America under the like disadvantages as other commodities not allowed to be brought into home consumption. It has not the advantage of our own, which is the best market. It is, in consequence, less valuable to the importer; the price is kept down, at least to the extent of the charge and profit of the purchaser, who buys it for re-exportation; and this is considerable when, from the exchanges not being against us, there is no immediate demand for such exportation. The consequence is that our trade with the New States of America,—a trade which, in every point of view, it is of the greatest importance to promote,—must continue to be carried on to a positive disadvantage in competition with the like trade from France or the United States, so long as the system remains unaltered.

If I have established that for the sake of our internal circulation, for the steadiness of our foreign exchanges, and for the interests of our trade, it is desirable to introduce the use of silver in the monetary system of this country, it remains to be considered how we can reconcile that introduction with our present *token* currency of the like metal, and with our gold coinage.

The mode by which it appears to me these objects can be most conveniently and effectually attained, is simply this :—

To erect the Mint into a bank of deposit for silver only, upon the principle of the Hamburg Bank.

The outlines of the plan would be shortly these,—

1st. That the Mint should receive the deposits of silver bullion tendered for that purpose, and should give a receipt or receipts according to a prescribed form for the same. Each receipt to specify, in ounces, the quantity of silver of standard fineness which it represents, and its equivalent value in our money at the fixed rate of * per ounce.

2nd. No deposit to be received of less than 200 ounces, and no receipt to be given for less than 50*l.* sterling.

3rd. The quantity of silver specified in the receipt to be delivered by weight to the bearer thereof, whenever he might call for the same, and in no other manner, and on no other account whatsoever.

4th. These receipts to circulate as money in all transactions.

Various regulations of detail,† not necessary to be entered upon at present, would become requisite for giving effect to this plan. But it is essential to state the fixed rate at which silver should be deposited at the Mint, and, by the receipts for it, become part of our currency.

That rate, I propose, should be precisely the same in proportion to our gold as the proportion established by the Mint regulations of France between their silver and gold coins, namely, 15½ to one. This would give, I believe, 5*s.* ½*d.* an ounce as the standard price of silver bullion in the Mint receipts.

The advantage and success of the plan would depend, in a considerable degree, upon this equality of proportion.

In the first place, it is fairly to be assumed that this proportion, established in France, is the nearest that can be attained to the relative marketable price of the two metals. The agio on their gold coin (except from some very extraordinary state of things, such as a political panic) never exceeds ¼ per cent., it is frequently ⅛, and sometimes there is no agio at all; in short, not more than may be accounted for from its superior convenience for carriage in travelling, and the like purposes. Secondly, France has by far the greatest quantity of metallic money of any country in Europe. It has been estimated as high as seventy millions sterling. The bulk and basis are silver, but there is a considerable portion of gold. They both retain their places in circulation without interfering with each other; and it is obvious that a country possessing so very large a portion of the metallic wealth of Europe will have a great influence in maintaining, in the general market of Europe, the proportion which, by its Mint regulations, it may assign to gold and silver, unless the intrinsic value of one of these metals in relation to the other should, in process of time, be greatly varied by the state of the supply from the New World. What I mean is, that the Mint regulations of France, having been formed on the existing proportion, those regulations have a great tendency to give steadiness to that proportion. Thirdly, France, not only by the amount of her metallic currency, but by her proximity to this country, and her position on the continent, and by the great public credit which she possesses, is become very much the centre (*the clearing-house*) of all the great pecuniary dealings to which commerce, exchanges, loans, and the movements of the money-market, give rise between

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† These regulations might very properly become the subject of an enquiry, by examining witnesses before the Board of Trade.

this country and the continent. The example of France in the last twelve years shows what great stability against ruinous fluctuations at home, and what power of adjustment in respect to foreign drains, she derives from her great metallic circulation. Neither invasion and the occupation of her capital and part of her territory, nor the payment of a very large foreign tribute, nor the disquietude which continued some years after the restoration of the Royal family, nor the Peninsular war, ever for a moment deranged her currency, or brought great pressure upon her foreign transactions. The nearer, therefore, we can approximate to the state of France, without giving up the peculiar advantages of our circulating credit, the better; the more we can render her system the means of affording at least occasional props to our own, the better.

It is clear that if our deposit price of silver at the Mint be equivalent to the mint price of France, there can be no inducement to carry it there, unless when the state of the exchange requires a remittance, and then it ought to go. It is equally clear that the current value of our gold being fixed in the same proportion to that of silver as they bear to one another in France, our gold coin will be equally safe from exportation under the like circumstances.

When the exchanges are against us, to a certain degree the silver bullion or the gold may be equally exported; but it is at least as probable the silver would be preserved, because it is the basis of the French circulation; and at any rate it would be a treasure to which the Bank might have recourse to rectify the exchange without parting with too much of its gold. The preference for silver could not fail to preponderate as soon as the drain of gold created a pressure upon the country circulation.

In the ordinary state of peace and of commerce a large accumulation of silver would probably take place in the course of a few years from the adoption of the plan.

So much the better. It would remain in the Mint as our reserve, whilst receipts being issued to the same amount, would give it all the activity of circulation.

The triple advantage which I expect from the plan would be thus realised.

1st. It would, from its outset, relieve our silver trade with the New World from the disadvantage under which it now labours.

In the eager competition and low profits of trade, this alone would be no immaterial benefit.

2ndly. It would enable us to meet an unfavourable exchange, occurring in the ordinary course of commerce, without a material drain on the gold coin in the hands of the Bank, or on that which, after the withdrawing of the one pound notes, will necessarily be in active circulation for all the smaller transactions of the country.

3rdly. It will afford a fund for the extraordinary occasions of dearth, armament, or war.

Whether there should be more than one place of deposit in the United Kingdom to suit the wants and convenience of commerce, is a question which need not be discussed at present.

The principle of the plan is not to add to the currency in general circulation of country districts. Of that they will have enough in the issues of banks of credit, and in our gold circulation, and our silver tokens; but it would bring a new element of currency, and that of the most secure and unvarying kind, into the great pecuniary and commercial operations of the metropolis, and possibly of one or two other great marts.

It would give to them all the direct advantages which Hamburg finds in its bank, whilst to the country circulation it would afford the greatest subsidiary advantages, by diminishing the risk of pressure and of consequent distress.

If this plan be adopted, or something equivalent to it,—if the one pound notes be gradually withdrawn,—if the Bank of England, and every banking establishment in the kingdom be in consequence under the necessity of keeping a stock of gold coin, in some fair proportion to its circulation,—I shall be sanguine that we shall be safe against the risk of again suspending cash payments; that we shall be much less liable to those violent fluctuations, sometimes favouring unduly the debtor, and at other times the creditor part of the community, but always attended, not only with flagrant injustice and severe individual suffering, as well as with great national loss, and the imminent hazard of disturbing the public tranquillity; and, lastly, that we shall be in a state to meet a war without incurring an act of bankruptcy.

Without both these measures I dare not entertain such a hope. It may be very well to have, if we can, bank companies as solid as those of Scotland, but the property of those who issue circulating paper, however it may be a security against the risk of their not ultimately paying in full, is no guard (perhaps rather the reverse) against their not issuing to excess. They may have land or stock in abundance, but is the value of all the acres, of all the Three Per Cents of as many owners as may connect themselves in the banks, to be put into circulation?

Is the Bank of England alone to continue subject to the liability of providing gold, not only to answer the demand of foreign exchanges, from whatever cause arising, but to satisfy all other extraordinary and indefinite calls, which, from overtrading or any other cause, may unexpectedly and simultaneously be made upon it from all these banking establishments? The expectation is most unjust as far as the Bank is concerned, and would infallibly prove fatal both to their credit and to the best interests of the country.

Yet such is our present situation. It will be improved in proportion as the one pound notes shall be withdrawn; but, neither the Bank nor the public will be dealt fairly with if those notes are to continue, under any system of banking, to form a part of the *permanent* currency of Scotland and Ireland.

In Ireland the National Bank already leans, more than in fairness it ought, on the Bank of England for gold; all the country establishments of Ireland will, therefore, directly or indirectly, depend on being supplied from the same source; and I am convinced that, if the issue of one pound notes be once *permanently* guaranteed to them, not many years will elapse before we shall witness again failures such as those which took place very generally in Ireland a few years ago. The Irish banks are not the less exposed to this danger from their advances being more exclusively connected with agriculture.

I know nothing more likely to undergo great fluctuations than corn, especially in the present state of our law, and no banks, by consequence, more liable to be tempted into great advances at one time, and compelled to great contraction at another, than those of Ireland.

Scotland, it is notorious, with banks perfectly solvent, has contributed its full proportion of the undue facilities which have produced the late crisis. Both from London and Lancashire, the paper which could not find discount in England was sent off to Scotland, where it met with that accommodation; and now, upon the change, not that extravagant accommodation only, but even the most cautious, is at once withheld, to a much greater extent than in England.

This sudden veering about may be a very good manœuvre to save their own vessel, but it has been the cause of many wrecks here, and has greatly added to the want of confidence and to the stagnation in the commercial world.

I have no doubt that some of the Scotch banks, from bad debts, and from the necessity of putting themselves in cash by sale of securities in England,

will sustain on this occasion heavy losses, the recollection of which may render them more prudent hereafter. But when we are setting our currency to rights, we ought not to trust to the permanent prudence of those who have a direct interest the other way.

Besides, is it consistent or impartial, when you have removed the principal obstacles to the introduction of the Scotch system of banking into England and Ireland, to place the establishments here under disabilities and charges in carrying on their business, from which their competitors in those countries are to be exempt?

Will you compel one party to be at the expense of insurance, and leave him exposed to the risk of being burnt by the other party, his neighbour, who does not bear his share of that expense? This very exemption gives an advantage which enables him to be more adventurous, because he can afford greater losses in carrying on his business; and, after all, if overtrading takes place, no matter in what part of the United Kingdom the advances are made by which it is excited, its consequences reach those who have not, as well as those who have, participated in those advances.

It is not safe to argue from what existed before 1797, as to what may hereafter be suffered safely to be continued in Scotland. To do so would be to overlook the occurrences of the last thirty years, and the change which they have produced in everything which bears upon this question.

My opinion therefore is, not that it is necessary to put an end to small notes in Scotland at the same period as in England. I have no objection to giving them a longer term, though I should be very unwilling to grant the same extension in Ireland.

Were all done that I think ought to be done in respect to currency, the country would still remain unprepared for war without a great reduction of its unfunded debt.

We lived for so many years without cash payments, and the last war lasted so long, that we have lost sight of all the measures of forecast which, on all former occasions of the restoration of peace, were taken as soon as possible.

We have now thirty millions of exchequer bills unprovided for. In former periods of peace we had none. With these bills we too much resemble a country banker who gets into difficulty by an over-sanguine calculation that his notes will not come in for payment.

The whole of these thirty millions are *virtually* payable on demand. Let it be considered how they would hamper us, even upon an armament, and much more upon the actual breaking out of a war. What a drag they would be upon any loan we might then be forced to make; how much a very great fall in the funds, besides creating real distress in many quarters, would, at the outset of a contest, or with the question still pending in negotiation, tell inconveniently upon public feeling, both at home and abroad.

In possible contingencies, too, such an unfunded debt might make it very difficult to provide for the quarterly dividends. Its existence in its present amount is contrary to all sound policy in reference to our political situation, and in the end will prove the very reverse of economy.

In my opinion, two-thirds of it ought to be reduced in this and the next year.

Even then we should remain with a demandable debt of ten millions unprovided for, such as never existed before at the breaking out of a war.

Neither is this all. Heretofore the Bank, at such a period, had all its resources free. Now it has 1,200,000*l.* locked up on mortgage, and in two years more its advances on the *dead weight* (over and above the whole sum received back in payment of the long annuity) will be upwards of *ten* millions more.

With these advances, exclusive of those on land and malt, and the quarterly dividends, we cannot look to the Bank to provide for the expenses even of an armament, much less to help us in the first year of a war.

I hope the Directors will be induced gradually to sell some of their long annuity, and to get rid of their loan on mortgage. Both for their own security, and the convenience of the government, it is very desirable that they should have a larger proportion of their funds immediately available.

Would it not be fair to the Bank, and desirable for the public interest, that in the course of the next year, or in the session of 1828 at the latest, there should be an understanding with them upon the renewal of their charter?

This, I think, ought to form a part of our general setting to rights of our currency and finance.

W. HUSKISSON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Mr. Stratford Canning.

SIR, Foreign Office, 10th February, 1826.

I have no despatches to acknowledge from your Excellency since those which you addressed to me on the 17th December from Corfu.

It was my purpose to defer writing to your Excellency until I should receive despatches from you, either after your arrival at Constantinople, or at least after you should have collected that more detailed and accurate information respecting the state of Greece which you announced your intention to endeavour to collect in your voyage from Corfu to the Dardanelles.

Such information would have been particularly useful, as bearing upon the immediate subject of this despatch, which I feel it nevertheless necessary to address to you without further delay, on account of the Duke of Wellington's immediate departure for St. Petersburg.

The King has been pleased to make choice of his Grace as the bearer of his Majesty's congratulations to the Emperor Nicholas. The opportunity to be afforded by his Grace's access to the Emperor of Russia and to his ministers is too valuable not to be improved to the utmost of our power.

The knowledge which we have recently acquired that the Emperor Alexander had determined to make war upon Turkey, gives to the declarations of the Emperor Nicholas that he is resolved to follow in all things the example of his Imperial brother, a colour very different from that which was at first put upon them by the general wishes of Europe.

In this state of things it becomes urgently necessary for England to come to a direct understanding with Russia, and to employ every effort to preserve peace.

It would, as I have said, have been very fortunate if I could have known the reception which your first overtures have met with at Constantinople, before I had to furnish you with any fresh instructions.

But the occasion presses; and I have therefore received his Majesty's commands to instruct you, whatever the reception of your first overtures may have been, to ask an audience of the Reis Effendi immediately upon the receipt of this despatch, and to urge him in the most strenuous manner to obtain from the Divan an instant declaration of their readiness to treat for an accommodation with the Greeks (upon any reasonable basis

which the Ottoman government may suggest) as being the single and indispensable condition by which war with Russia may be averted.

I need not enlarge upon the general topics with which your Excellency is to enforce this appeal to the Reis Effendi.

I come now to the matter which is more specifically the occasion and the subject of this despatch.

Your Excellency is already apprised that not long after your departure from England Count Lieven, who had, from the time of the Emperor Alexander's abjuration of any further intercourse with this country upon Greek and Turkish matters, abstained altogether from any communication with me upon them, sought an opportunity of re-opening a discussion upon that subject. Enclosed is the extract of a memorandum of a confidential conference which passed between Count Lieven and me in the month of October.

The intelligence which it contains appeared to me monstrous and incredible, and the restrictions of secresy under which it was communicated to me by Count Lieven precluded his Majesty's government from acting upon it, until it should have received confirmation from other sources.

Your Excellency's despatch, No. 2, from Corfu contains the following passage:—

"You may remember, Sir, that the earliest operations of this Pasha in the Morea were carried on with some appearances of forbearance and conciliation.

"Whatever may be the cause of the change, his conduct is no longer the same. *If the statements which have reached me be true*, he now acts on a system little short of extermination. I have not indeed heard of any acts of slaughter committed by him in cold blood; but he *seems* to spare no one where the slightest show of resistance is made.

"*There is room to apprehend* that many of his prisoners have been sent into Egypt as slaves; the children *it is asserted* being even compelled to embrace the Mahometan faith."

This passage shows beyond doubt a general belief of the existence of some such plan as that of which Count Lieven had conveyed to me the first intimation.

But under the qualified terms in which your Excellency's statement is (very properly) made, and in the absence of any more direct and detailed information, his Majesty's government did not feel itself warranted in founding upon that passage alone a direct and positive instruction. From various other quarters, however, there have since reached us repeated allusions to this plan, as having been notoriously adopted by the Turkish government and Ibrahim Pasha, and as being already at least in partial operation.

Although, therefore, we have even now no such evidence as would justify us in at once imputing this plan to the Porte, and acting as if they had admitted its existence; it is at the same time material that the opinion of the British government upon such a plan, if adopted and attempted to be carried into execution, should be distinctly declared. Your Excellency will therefore, if you should have acquired in the interval any more satisfactory knowledge upon this subject, or if your belief in what you have reported thereupon shall not have been shaken, declare in the

most distinct terms to the Porte that Great Britain will not permit the execution of a system of depopulation which exceeds the permitted violences of war, and transgresses the conventional restraints of civilization.

The consequences of such a system of warfare must be to change as effectually the face of Greece as that of the Eastern empire was heretofore changed by the first irruption of its Mussulman conquerors. It goes to establish in the very centre of Christendom a new Barbary State.

The inconvenience which is felt by European commerce, and the disgrace which attaches to all maritime Powers, from the existence of such States on the opposite coast of the Mediterranean, is sufficiently known.

It has been the policy of England, out of consideration for the Ottoman Porte, to treat those piratical States rather as independent Powers, than as provinces of the Ottoman Empire. I say, "out of consideration for the Ottoman Porte," because, if we did not treat them as independent, we must, in abundant instances, have demanded atonement and reparation from the Porte for their insolence and aggressions. The British fleet which exacted redress at Algiers must, in that case, have been directed to the Dardanelles.

But the Porte is not to imagine that we can suffer a State of the like character to be erected anew, under Ottoman protection, and to have its seat in Europe.

The Porte will take its choice whether to consider a determination on our part to prevent the growth of such a State as a determination with which the Porte has no more concern, and which it is no more interested or authorised to resist, than our expedition against Algiers, or as a direct attack upon its own sovereignty. We trust that the Porte will consider it in the former light; but be that as it may, our fixed determination is, that such new State shall not grow up in Christian Europe. This determination is one which Great Britain can execute of herself, by interposing, if necessary for that purpose, her maritime power between the Morea and Egypt.

We do not disguise from ourselves, nor intend that your Excellency should disguise from the Porte, that, by such interposition, we must incidentally but no doubt materially affect the operations of the war in Greece.

That is not our object. The steadiness and perseverance with which we have maintained our neutrality between the Porte and the Greeks, and the measures which we have taken, when necessary, for vindicating it impartially with either belligerent, are sufficient proofs of the sincerity of this declaration.

But the apprehension that such would be the incidental consequence of a step to be taken in the pursuit of an avowed and legitimate object will not divert us from that pursuit.

The only thing by which we can be diverted from it is the disavowal by the Porte of any compact or connivance with Ibrahim Pasha to the effect imputed in the intelligence which has occasioned this despatch; and a prompt transmission of orders to Ibrahim Pasha, should the plan imputed to that Pasha have been adopted without the authority or concurrence of the Porte, to desist from the execution of measures which the Porte may be assured that Christian Europe will not tolerate.

I enclose the copy of an instruction on this subject, which is sent through the Admiralty to his Majesty's naval officers in the Levant, and which will be immediately communicated to Ibrahim Pasha. Your Excellency will let the British Admiral know the result of your communication with the Reis Effendi.

I have, &c.,

G. CANNING.

Count Nesselrode to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

St. Pétersbourg, ce 1er (13) Février, 1826.

Le Comte de Lieven nous ayant annoncé votre prochaine arrivée, je m'empresse, Monsieur le Duc, d'envoyer à votre rencontre un feldjeger, qui sera chargé de tous les soins et de tous les détails que réclamera votre voyage depuis la frontière jusqu'ici. Je profite de cette occasion pour vous assurer de tout le plaisir que j'aurai à vous revoir dans une circonstance aussi importante. Le Roi ne pouvait faire un choix qui honorât davantage la mémoire de feu l'Empereur, ni qui fût plus agréable à l'Empereur actuel. Sa Majesté Impériale apprécie vivement la délicatesse d'un tel procédé, et sera charmé de le prouver à votre Excellence pendant tout le temps qu'elle restera auprès d'elle. Veuillez, Monsieur le Duc, agréer avec cette assurance l'hommage de mon bien sincère et invariable attachement.

NESSELRODE.

The Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MON CHER DUC, Vienne, ce 14me Février, 1826.

Je vous écris là où je sais vous trouver, et je suis charmé que ce soit à St. Pétersbourg.

Vous y arrivez dans un moment fort important, et tel peut-être que l'histoire n'en offre pas un second.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous recommander M. le Comte de Lebzeltern ; il y a longtemps qu'il a l'honneur d'être connu de vous.

De grands et d'immenses évènemens se sont passés en Russie depuis le décès de l'Empereur Alexandre. Ils auront peut-être causé plus d'étonnement en Angleterre que de surprise chez nous. Il y a bien longtemps que nous avons reconnu, suivi, et combattu, là où il s'est mis à découvert, un mal malheureusement bien réel.

Il sera bien important, mon cher Duc, que le nouveau monarque russe ne soit point livré à un sentiment d'isolement. Si nous croyons être en droit de nous flatter d'avoir acquis quelque mérite en ne nous écartant pas de la ligne des pensées et des calculs de l'Empereur mon maître, et d'avoir par ce fait même contribué à sauver jusqu'à cette heure l'Europe des suites placées hors de tout calcul d'une guerre entre la Russie et la Porte, il nous serait impossible de fonder une même sécurité sur le nouveau règne. La situation d'un jeune Prince qui commence son règne diffère en tous points de celle d'un prédécesseur qui finit le sien. Les mêmes calculs ne vont pas aux deux positions, et nous osons l'espérer, aucun Cabinet ne se livrera à l'illusion sur une vérité aussi incontestable.

Nous regardons comme une combinaison fort heureuse votre course à St. Pétersbourg. Nous formons des vœux, mon cher Duc, que vous saurez en rendre les résultats dignes de votre caractère, et par ce fait même utiles à la cause générale.

Veuillez agréer l'hommage de mes sentimens connus de haute considération et d'amitié.

METTERNICH.

NOTES ON THE CONNECTION OF RUSSIA WITH PERSIA, &c.
By SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Hyde House, Inbridgeworth, 16th February, 1826.

Peter the Great surveyed the Caspian in the beginning of the last century. This alarmed the Persians. In 1725 he leagued with the Porte for the dismemberment of Persia, which he invaded. In two campaigns he subdued the provinces on the western shores of the Caspian, which were ceded * to him by the Persian monarch Shah Tamasp for promised aid against the Affghans, which Peter never gave. The death of Peter, the success of Nadir Shah, and the apprehensions of the Empress Anne, led to a complete abandonment by Russia of all its conquests in Persia.

Nadir continued to watch Russia. He sent a splendid mission to St. Petersburg in 1740. He encouraged the English to open a trade with Persia, and, through the aid of Captains Elton and Woodriffe, he equipped a fleet on the Caspian that gave him for a period the command of that sea; but this naval ascendancy was lost immediately after his death (A.D. 1748), owing to the distraction into which Persia was thrown by contention for the throne, and no attempt has ever been made to regain it.

Matters remained in much the same state until the death of Heraclius Walior, Prince of Georgia (A.D. 17—). Aga Mahomed Khan made a cruel inroad into Armenia and Georgia in 1795, which caused the Empress Catharine to listen to the appeal of the Prince Goorgeen,† the son of Heraclius, and to invade Persia with a large army (A.D. 1796). This force, which disembarked near Derbend and advanced as far as Chowal Mogham,‡ was joined by a brother of the reigning sovereign and several of the discontented chiefs of tribes. There is little doubt but that it would have established the power of Russia over a part of Persia had its progress not been arrested by the death of the Empress, whose son Paul recalled it into Russia. He did not, however, abandon Georgia; on the contrary, when he made overtures for a treaty of peace with Persia he insisted on an abandonment of all claims to that province being a preliminary article. This § Futtah Aly Shah, the reigning sovereign of Persia, refused.

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* This cession included Mazanderan and Asterabad in addition to the Jero province of Ghilan and the Derbend, which Peter had subdued.

† A proclamation was issued by the Empress declaring her resolution to revenge the outrages committed in Georgia and Armenia, and to give her future protection to the Christians of those countries.

‡ Tarki, Derbend, Baku, Talish, and Shirvan were subdued by the commander of this force, Valerian Zuboff, before he crossed the Araxes and encamped at Chowal Mogham.

§ The nephew of Aga Mahomed Khan.

Captain Malcolm, who was sent by the Governor-General on a mission to Persia in 1799, communicated in a letter * to Lord Mornington, the certain information he had received from Teflis of the near approach of an army to that capital, which intelligence, with other circumstances, made it evident that the Court of St. Petersburg had resolved to occupy Georgia. This event took place in the ensuing year (1801), when, after the Russians were established in that country, to which they had been invited by the sons of Heraclius (who weakly expected they would be continued in power), an imperial ukase proclaimed the annexation of this fruitful and fine country to the Russian empire.

The Persians have since the above period made repeated but vain efforts to arrest the rapid growth of the Russian power. In 1803, Mingrelia, together with a part of the Lesghian territories, acknowledged the authority of the Emperor. In 1804 Ganjeh, Baku, Shemakha, Salian, Sheshah, and in short, the whole of the mountainous region to the west of the Caspian, were progressively reduced; and in 1803 Erivan in Armenia was for some time blockaded by Prince Georgianoff. An attempt to carry the same place by assault, in 1808, was repulsed by the bravery of the garrison. In 1809 the fortress of Poti was taken from the Turks. In 1810 the troops of Abbas Meerza were driven from their intrenched camp at Megree on the banks of the Araxes. In 1811 and 1812 his army was again beaten in several actions, in which his artillery and infantry were commanded by British officers; and at the conclusion of the peace of Goolistan in 1813, the government of Russia was firmly established and vigorously maintained from the mouths of the Phasis to those of the Cyrus.

From late reports made by Major Willock, Russian emissaries have been active in Khorassan. A communication with the discontented chiefs of that great province, which could be easily maintained from a south-eastern port of the Caspian, would, more than any other measure, embarrass a sovereign of Persia who was not favourable to their views. The intercourse established with the Turcoman tribes of the north-eastern shores of the Caspian, and the communication between Astracan and Khiva has been of late greatly increased, as well as that between Orenburg, Khiva and Bokhara. An embassy sent in 1820 from the Emperor Alexander to the sovereign of the latter country was well received.

The report of the surveying officer employed by Paul in 1801 to examine the countries of Songaria and Little Bokhara, which lie between Siberia and India, is in possession of the Foreign Office, and, comparing it with later accounts, we find that those countries, containing many populous towns and rich lands, have long been an object of the earnest attention of Russia, who, on the occurrence of any rupture with China, in whose possession they now are, would no doubt make an effort to conquer part if not the whole of them, and they would, in a commercial as well as a political view, be a valuable accession to that empire.

The Asiatic frontier of Russia is divided into military lines which take their name from adjoining countries, mountains, or rivers. The line of the Caucasus some years ago separated it from Georgia and other countries dependent on Persia. It has now a very undefined frontier with the latter country. The river Aras (Araxes) may be taken as the real frontier,

* Dated 22nd April, 1800.

though some towns and districts on its left bank still belong to Persia. The lines of Astrakhan and Orenburg are on the frontier of the country of the Kirghiz Tartars and some tribes of Turcomans. These petty nations intervene between Russia and the fruitful countries of Khiva and Bokhara. The remaining great military line is in Siberia. On the east it terminates at the post of Ozernoi, situated upon the Obi, a few leagues before the conflux of that river and the Tobol, which forms in this part the frontier of Siberia. This last great military line divides into two parts, which take their names of Ishim and Irtish from the rivers on which they are situated. They are only separated by some Tartar tribes from the provinces of Songaria and Little Bokhara.

The great and rapid advance made within twenty-five years by Russia on the frontier of the Caucasus, from the post of Mozdok to the Araxes, or, in other words, to the plains of Azerbijan, their complete command of the Caspian and occupation of its principal ports, and several of the provinces on its southern shores, combined with the success of their arms against Persia, and the character of the negotiations and intrigues they are carrying on at that Court, leave not the slightest doubt of the views of the Court of St. Petersburg being directed towards establishing its complete influence over the councils of the King of Persia, if it does not prefer the conquest of the north-western territories of that kingdom. It is believed a secret treaty has been entered into between Abbas Meerza and the Governor-General of Georgia to secure the succession of the former to the throne on the death of his father, an event which, from the state of his health, seems likely to occur at an early period. If this engagement leads, as it probably will, to the establishment of a Russian force at Tabriz or Tehran, we must from that moment anticipate great and rapid changes in the whole of that part of Asia. These changes will in their result deeply affect our interest. The periods may be still distant when a serious invasion could be made of our Indian possessions, but they will become liable to many dangers and alarms from which they are now free, and both the expense and embarrassment of governing them will be greatly augmented.

The occurrence of the event supposed will increase the activity of Russia in efforts to establish her power and influence on the north-eastern banks of the Caspian, and eventually over the countries of Khiva, Bokhara, and Samarkand. The same motives will in time lead that nation to use those resources which have been long preparing in Siberia to extend the southern limits of that country to the rich towns * and fertile valleys of Tartary.

The above are not visionary schemes, but apparently part of a plan that is in progress towards accomplishment. Let us now examine how they will affect our interests.

No European nation can derive benefit from the possession of India, nor indeed preserve that country as a conquest without the command of the sea; but this consideration would not prevent Russia, if at war with England, from seeking to wound us by an attempt against our power in that quarter. That, however, would not be attended with success unless

* The cities of Guldsha, Axu, Cashgar, Khoten, Zurkuna, and many others in this country, are rich and flourishing.

the most important parts of the great plan she is conjectured to have in view were completed, and in that event the danger would be serious. There is no obstruction on the route from Persia to India by Cabul, nor in that part from Bokhara or Samarcand; but that from Little Bokhara appears impracticable, and though the possession of this country would bring Russia nearer to our north-western possessions than any other, the result of the survey * made by order of the Emperor Paul, when he meditated an attack on India by that route, proved it could not be marched by a regular army. The ranges of mountains between this country and Nepaul are amazingly high, and their tops are covered with eternal ice, which was found in one range that was passed in July to extend for thirty miles. But, notwithstanding this fact, the possession of this country and the command of its resources and warlike tribes would greatly aid any invasion made from either of the quarters before noticed. Some of the dangers that have been mentioned as likely to affect at a future period the safety of our Eastern territories are proximate, others are remote, but they all merit attention. The one that appears on the point of occurrence is the establishment of the commanding influence or direct power of Russia over the country of Persia. This danger, for such it is, we had once the means of materially obstructing, and we may still perhaps delay its accomplishment without half the hazard of involving ourselves with Russia that we shall incur by remaining quiescent until the connexions and alliances of that nation have advanced her to a position that must inevitably bring her interests and those of Great Britain into early collision.

The progress of our political intercourse with Persia has been unfortunate. The efforts of the first mission under Captain Malcolm were chiefly directed to the object of making a favourable impression of the English nation, which in such a country was deemed (as stated by the envoy) of more consequence than any treaty that could be concluded. He had found difficulties with regard to forms, and recommended that on another mission being sent from India credentials from the Crown should be obtained to give the representative employed by the Indian government more consequence.

A very short mention is necessary of what has since occurred. The mission of Sir Harford Jones, his disobedience to the Indian government, the measures they took to support their character by sending another representative to Persia, the large pecuniary subsidy granted to the King of that country, the deputation of a Persian envoy to England, the appointment of Sir Gore Ousely as ambassador, his mediation of a treaty between Russia and Persia, his written promise to intercede with the Emperor Alexander for a mitigation of the terms and the disappointment of the King at his want of success, the negotiation intrusted to Mr. Morier and Mr. Ellis to modify the treaty negotiated by Sir Gore Ousely, the encouragement given to the formation of a regular army, and the subsequent act of withdrawing almost all the officers, the protracting beyond the period fixed for payment of the subsidy, the deputation to the coast of Tehran of

* It is a curious fact that the point at which the Russian surveyors were compelled to stop, and that to which Mr. Moorcroft has lately gone, are within 70 miles of each other.

successive envoys from the King, and then insisting upon all future communications being made through a representative exclusively accredited by the Governor-General of India, whom the King of Persia had for years been taught to consider as a subordinate authority, form a series of measures so contradictory to each other that, whatever may be the value of any one of them, they could, as a whole, have no effect but that of conveying impressions adverse to our interests, injurious to our reputation, and destructive of that confidence and reliance which the Persian Court was once disposed to place in the English government.

It is highly probable that this confidence, had it been preserved, would have prevented Abbas Meerza from contracting any alliance that could have facilitated the introduction of Russian influence or power into Persia. Whenever he takes a step that will give him security at the price of independence it will be in despair of deriving any benefit from our friendship. Under this view of the case, it appears of great consequence to make every effort to restore his confidence and that of the Persian Court. If this policy is approved, no means should be left untried that are likely to produce the effect.

Russia can attribute no measure we adopt to improve our connexion with Persia to any motive but one of justifiable defensive policy, and the Sovereign of that nation, if not actuated by inordinate ambition, is much more likely to attend to reasonable arguments against his further advance in a quarter which must give us umbrage, than to listen to any we could bring forward to induce him to retreat after he had once committed himself. The Russian Court will also, if it sees us disposed to preserve the independence of Persia, have to calculate difficulties and impediments which do not now present themselves. It is a great error to think we have not the means of aiding Persia to offer considerable resistance to Russia. We completely command the Persian Gulf, which is as great an advantage as the Caspian affords Russia. We have a local credit far beyond that Power as to pecuniary resources, and this would enable us, if matters came to extremes, to marshal tribes and nations in our cause, and not only to carry on through them a predatory war, that would in such a country bring great distress upon a regular army, but to devastate any provinces that might be left defenceless.

These facts are stated because it is presumed our power of opposition to their views would be taken into consideration by the Russian Court, were we to make an amicable overture towards a negotiation that would prevent a future difference between the two States from a collision of their interests in Asia; but it is not contended that should Russia refuse to entertain such a proposition, or even should that State proceed to establish its power in Persia, that we must therefore engage in a war. There are probably reasons of such cogency as would lead us to hazard any danger which such a proceeding could bring to the tranquillity of British India, rather than disturb the peace of Europe, but allowing that of India to be a subordinate and secondary consideration, it is still of a magnitude that requires our best efforts to preserve, and it is presumed that silent acquiescence in any course of measures which threaten it is not politic, inasmuch as it is likely eventually to produce the result it is meant to avert.

JOHN MALCOLM.

[51!

To Lord Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Berlin, 17th February, 1826.

I received your letter of the 8th February, and the papers enclosed, and will make use of the latter if an opportunity should offer.

Excepting in the way of conciliation, which is certainly very desirable at the commencement of a new reign, I don't expect to do much good in my mission. But I don't see how I, who have always been preaching the doctrine of going wherever we are desired to go, who had consented to go and command in Canada, could decline to accept the offer of this mission; more particularly as I believe it will be satisfactory to the young Emperor; and, if it produce no other effect, it will afford the best information and means of judging from facts of his future intentions.

As for the great question at issue, I feel that when I come to close quarters with the Russian ministers they must see very clearly that I have nearly no means of negotiation in my hands. If they are desirous of peace and of keeping things as they are, my instructions may enable me to get them and keep them in our hands. But if war is on any account desirable to them, I don't think I can prevent it. Nevertheless if the chances of success in the negotiation were ten times less than they are, or if there had been nothing to do but to compliment the Emperor and look about me, I don't think I could have declined to accept the mission, particularly thinking as I do that it is fit and proper that I should be sent.

In respect to the object of the negotiation I think it the most important that we have had under our consideration since the year 1815; and it does not appear to me that we are sufficiently sensible of its importance. The Greek insurrection would certainly have occurred at some time or other; but its occurrence was accelerated for the purpose of giving matter of dispute to the two Imperial Courts, and of thus breaking up what is called the Holy Alliance. This insurrection was accelerated by those who occasioned the Neapolitan, and particularly the Piedmontese revolutions; the same persons who were in correspondence with the mutineers in Russia, and who announced in the 'Morning Post,' in December last, the events which occurred at St.

Petersburg in the end of that month, and the facts and intentions of the conspirators which have since come to light in the recent enquiries.

No man can doubt that the Greek insurrection is calculated to produce the effect intended by those who accelerated it. If the Emperor of Russia should go to war, to which he is undoubtedly urged by many weighty considerations, either the Austrians must interfere, and the war will in that case very soon become general, or there must be some agreement of partition of conquests. To this agreement France will become party if the two other Powers will admit her, provided Egypt or Greece should fall to her share. I entertain no doubt that they would admit her to share Egypt.

But I will suppose the case any way; that the Emperor acts alone, or that the Austrians consent to his operations upon the promise of a partition, or that the French participate or don't participate, there will be a general war into which sooner or later we shall be forced to enter as principals, if our essential interests or our honour do not oblige us to commence it.

The question of Greek and Turk is trifling in comparison with the importance of the other. I cannot understand the meaning of the benefit which we are to derive from the establishment in the Mediterranean of an efficient naval Power which is likewise Continental. Is there or can there be any naval Power that is not jealous of and inimical to us? Can naval affairs in the Mediterranean be better for us than they are? The Turks, powerless themselves, close that sea to all who might have the means or the inclination of using it; and we are, in fact, the masters of its navigation.

The Greek insurrection, however, and the state of the war between Greeks and Turks, are facts which we cannot leave out of our consideration. However indifferent I believe the country to be in general to the state of the contest between Greek and Turk, I don't think that our interference to save the Turkish government from the hostility of the Emperor of Russia would be tolerated; or that Parliament would support us through one single campaign, even though it was certain that our interference must be successful. Much less could we support the Turks against the Greeks; and I cannot think that we ought to interfere in favour of the Greeks.

The question then comes to this: What are the chances of a settlement, and what the most desirable settlement?

There is not the smallest chance of the conquest by the Turks, even with the assistance of Mahomed Ali of Egypt. The Greeks have evidently the superiority at sea; there are no seamen on the other side; and those who have this superiority in this contest must ultimately be successful. There can be no termination to the contest excepting in a compromise. The Turks can never acknowledge the independence of their rebellious rajahs in fact, much less in form. Nor, on the other hand, is it reasonable to suppose that the Greeks, having really had great advantages in the contest, having felt their own strength, and knowing that submission would not relieve them from any one of the evils of a continuance of the contest, will submit unconditionally to the government of the Porte; or that Greek and Turk can ever again live together in the same country in their old relation of infidel rajah and true believer.

That to which we must look, then, is an arrangement short of independence; and I confess that I like the measures of the other day because at the same time that they are quite justifiable and practicable they are calculated to lead to such an arrangement. If they do, there is an end to the whole case; and to all our difficulties, whether in that part of the world or in Russia; and in the mean time those measures may assist us to keep the Emperor of Russia quiet for a season if he should be disposed to peace. If our measures should not lead to an arrangement, or if they should not keep the Emperor quiet, they will leave us exactly where we were; and with the same right to take any part we please, or no part, in the contest between Russians and Turks, and those which may and probably will be its consequences.

There is still one view of this case which I have not considered, and that is, the measure of dealing with this subject by the Conference. I know nothing for which the Conference is so little calculated as a mediation, whether to prevent war or to make peace. I had experience of this incapacity in a very interesting case, that of Monte Video; which having been settled in the Conference by the influence of our government, the settlement was defeated by the intrigues of Pozzo di Borgo; and yet the non-execution of that settlement was the cause of

all the unfortunate events that have since occurred; such as the loss to Spain and Portugal of their colonies, and the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Neapolitan, the Piedmontese, and even the Greek insurrection. The Ministers of the five Powers would go into this Conference, not only not with the same or similar views, but with views quite inconsistent with each other; and the result must be failure. Even if the British government, the only one with any real influence upon any part of the question, could bring the others and the contending parties to a reasonable decision, it would be in the power of any one of the parties to the Conference to defeat the whole arrangement.

I confess likewise that I don't think we have been sufficiently well treated in these Conferences to be induced to go into them in cases in which we alone possess influence, to allow others to direct the mode in which that influence shall be exercised; and perhaps after all to have the whole arrangement defeated.

But it will be said that a Conference will gain time, will satisfy the Emperor of Russia for the moment, or would enable the Emperor to satisfy his people and his army and to keep them quiet. I think we ought to make a great sacrifice to attain this object. But this sacrifice ought not to be to the extent of the chance of the attainment of the pacification between Greeks and Turks. In a Conference we shall lose our influence probably with both parties; and at all events I would not lose the opportunity which the existing circumstances certainly afford of trying seriously what we can do alone to settle this question.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 17th February, 1826.

The alarm which I mentioned to you in one of my letters of Friday last, respecting our forces in the House of Commons, has been happily dissipated by the division of Tuesday.

It is but just to the Opposition—to Brougham especially, as well as to Tierney, Wilson, and others—to say, that their cordial support helped very much to discourage a combination of our *friends;* which, if formed upon the basis of an adverse attack from our usual opponents, might, in the

present state of suffering and consequent discontent, have been very formidable.

Things are getting a little better in the City. But I doubt whether we shall get through the crisis without an issue of Exchequer Bills, which, objectionable as it may be, and is, in principle, appears to be the only remedy to which the moneyed world will look with confidence—and confidence is the one thing wanting.

The currency question, which, in principle as well as in fact, was most important, may be considered as decided.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, London, Friday, 17th February, 1826, 4 P.M.

I have only this moment heard that a messenger goes to you to-night.

We carried our measures through the House of Commons very triumphantly. I mean the measures for putting an end to the small notes at the end of three years, and for enabling banks to be established with an unlimited number of partners sixty-five miles from London.

Great surprise was very generally felt at the extent of our majority, for it was supposed that the country bankers had a great influence in the House, and would exert it.

The Opposition supported the measures very fairly, with the exception of Baring and one or two of the commercial Whigs.

Hume will give as much trouble as he can upon the estimates, but I think we have every prospect at present of an easy session. It is quite clear that the Catholic question will not be brought on.

Corn has lately fallen in price, and this will perhaps tend to satisfy people with the delay in the corn question.

We had a night last night on Irish affairs; all passed off with great goodhumour, and I trust we shall hear less than usual about Ireland this session. The House seemed quite satisfied with the assurances which we gave about the measures recommended in the two reports of last year.

The opposition in the House of Commons seems particularly slack. Tierney seems indifferent; Mackintosh is ill; so is Dr. Lushington. What is the matter with Brougham I know not. He seems in very low spirits; has only spoken once, then answered Alexander Baring on the currency question, and in the course of his speech said not a single word in attack of the government.

I hear that he has not been successful at the Bar of late, and this perhaps may account for his low spirits.

The Chancellor is much better; indeed, quite well again. He was at the Recorder's Report the day before yesterday. The King looked very well

yesterday. The Solicitor-General retired from the contest for Oxford, or rather notified his intention not to stand.

You will see that I have no news to send you; still I would not let the messenger go without a few lines.

Ever most truly yours, my dear Duke,

ROBERT PEEL.

Lord Granville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Paris, 17th February, 1826.

General Pozzo di Borgo having obligingly apprized me of his intention to despatch this day a courier to St. Petersburg, I avail myself of the opportunity to send to you some English and French newspapers; they contain all the news of Paris and of London, and will probably reach you by the Russian courier a day or two sooner than by the common course of post.

The ministers are certainly stronger in the two Chambers than was expected before the opening of the session; and, notwithstanding the virulence of their opponents, will in all probability carry their measures with a considerable majority. The first announcement of a new law in favour of primogeniture was very ill received by the public, and it is certainly repugnant to the general feeling of the country; but the ministers modified it by excluding from its operation the smaller proprietors, and the Chambers are likely to modify it still further by confining its effect within still narrower bounds.

The last letters received from Stratford Canning were dated on board the *Revenge* off Smyrna on the 18th of January. We momentarily expect to hear of his arrival at Constantinople. I had a letter from Sir F. Adam of the 23rd, from Corfu; he gives an unfavourable account of the prospects of the Greeks; unless they speedily obtain more money, their fleet, he says, must be dismantled.

I had a letter from Canning last night, in which he says that at one moment apprehensions were entertained that the country bankers, country gentlemen, and merchants, would have beat the government on the resolutions of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that, till the division was near at hand, no one ventured to calculate on such a disparity of numbers; he adds, the question may now be considered as decided.

I need not say that your embassy to Russia excites here much anxious expectation. I hope to hear that you have not suffered from the fatigue and cold of your journey.

Lady Granville desires her kindest remembrances, and

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours ever most truly,

GRANVILLE.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Downing Street, 17th February, 1826.

I send you a copy of a private letter from Sir F. Adam* which I received yesterday. I am quite persuaded that if Russia moves, she has the means of recovering all her influence in Greece which the forbearance of Alexander had lost, and that the ascendancy which she will have in the Morea will absorb any which other European States may flatter themselves they will possess; and I am fully convinced that we shall have in that case much to fear in the Ionian Islands from the activity of the Russian party there.

The accounts which the messenger brought in the despatch for Mr. Canning, and which he is sending you, would be more satisfactory if they had not been founded on communications made by the Greek leaders prior to their having heard of Alexander's death; but at any rate they are good as far as they go.

If, as it appears, the fate of the campaign is to depend upon the capture of Missolonghi, it is not (as well as I collect) likely to end well for Ibrahim Pasha. The place is very strong by nature; having its position surrounded on every side by water, and connected with the main only by a narrow strip of land, so that, unless it surrender for want of provisions, the attacks which Ibrahim is capable of making are not likely to succeed.

There is nothing in the last accounts which support the idea of Ibrahim acting upon the principle of extirpation which is assigned to him. But there is a prevailing opinion of that having been his declaration. In a book lately published by a Captain Leak it is broadly asserted that Ibrahim had made such an assertion: as Mr. Hay was an acquaintance of the author, I desired him to ask for the authority, but Captain Leak said he had it from general report.

Since your departure Sir Robert Wilson told it to Mr. Canning; adding that he would not question Mr. Canning on the subject in the House, as it might be inconvenient. This is very accommodating; but I do not think his authority very conclusive.

Yours ever, my dear Duke, very sincerely,

BATHURST.

I send you the extract of another private letter from Sir F. Adam, as you may like to see it.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Sir Frederick Adam to Earl Bathurst.

MY LORD, Corfu, 22nd January, 1826.

In my private and confidential letter of the 9th November last, I gave your Lordship reason to believe that an intrigue was getting up in the Russian

* Sir Frederick Adam was then Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian States.

interest in Greece; I have within these few last days obtained some further information, but have not yet been able to trace the matter to its full extent, nor will I as yet take upon myself to say whether the channel through which my information is derived may not be doubtful, and the person who gives it playing a double part; all this I shall have pretty certain means of judging of in the course of a few days: in the mean time, I think it right to put your Lordship in possession of what I know, as I have a safe and quiet opportunity.

It appears that Count Viaco Capo d'Istria is the principal agent of the Society established in Russia adverted to in my letter of November, and the principal object as to Greece at this moment is to obtain addresses from the clergy and military leaders to the Emperor of Russia calling upon him, in the name of their common religion, to come forward and aid the Greeks.

I have seen and had explained to me the drafts in Greek of these addresses, and in a few days shall have copies of them. They are well done. Agents have been named to proceed to Missolonghi and the Morea. The Archbishop of Patras is the person on whom Capo d'Istria principally counts for the management of the clergy, and we know he was formerly all Russian and a principal mover in bringing about the insurrection. Colocotroni is to be attempted to manage the military. They do not count on any member of the provisional government except Coletti; all the others being considered, to use my informant's expression, as sold to England. Some agents have already been sent over to Epirus by Viaco Capo d'Istria. But the intrigue is not to be confined to Greece only, but includes these islands. I have the names of one or two of the principal agents to be employed in each. The form this intrigue is to take is that of a petition to be addressed to the Emperor of Russia, calling upon him, as one of the contracting parties to the Treaty of Paris, to interfere, together with the other sovereigns, in order that the Treaty may be observed, which it is asserted has not been the case, for that these States, instead of being "free and independent," are governed by a military plenipotentiary sent by England, and whose will, as the organ of England, is law. This paper is not to be circulated generally, but a few persons of each island are to subscribe it. The person who is at present at Venice, is expected back immediately, and is to have the principal management in the islands, Viaco Capo d'Istria having more immediately the management in Greece.

The several papers were dictated from copies in Capo d'Istria's possession, and I am assured are in better language than he is himself master of. The names of the persons in the island who are the principal agents are certainly those of people most likely to engage in such a scheme. I merely give your Lordship just now a brief outline of what I know, but I shall keep you fully informed, and watch the progress of the thing very carefully.

There is one thing which in some degree influences my belief that it is not all trick (provided always the fact be true), that Viaco Capo d'Istria did not fully open himself to the person he employs till after the news of the Emperor Alexander's death, and the certainty that the Emperor Constantine had succeeded to the throne. Indeed, this person had gone from hence for Zante, but was forced back by contrary winds. The news of the Emperor of Russia's death arrived in the interim, and then only the plan as regards these islands was communicated. My inclination to believe that there is some foundation for all this is strengthened by my having seen the sign by which the agent is to be recognised, and I could almost venture to assert that it is the sort of cypher or flourish which he, Viaco Capo d'Istria, subjoins to his name and signature.

Crude as my information yet is, I have thought it right to advertise your Lordship of what I know.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

FREDERICK ADAM,

II.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR FREDERICK ADAM, Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian States, to EARL BATHURST, dated Corfu, 22nd January, 1826.

"There is not, I am persuaded, the least truth in the French Ambassador at Naples' story of his government having refused the protection of Greece, because I am quite sure it never was offered, and this I stated to Mr. Stratford Canning when he mentioned the French Ambassador's story. The eyes of all the Greeks will now be directed towards Russia, and I have no doubt we shall soon hear of some movement in favour of that Power independent of what I have mentioned to your Lordship elsewhere."

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 17th February, 1826.

I yesterday received from Mr. Stratford Canning the despatch of which the enclosed is a copy.

As it appears probable that I may not hear from him again for some days, I think this despatch alone of sufficient importance, to transmit it by a messenger to your Grace; as it contributes to supply a deficiency which, to a certain degree, necessarily existed in your Grace's instructions, by shewing the extent of confidence which the Greeks will be inclined to repose in our mediation.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Mr. Stratford Canning to the Right Hon. George Canning.

SIR, H.M.S. *Revenge*, at sea, 10th January, 1826.

On our way up the Archipelago we had occasion to cast anchor the night before last near the Island of Hydra. From Captain Hamilton, who was lying at the same anchorage in his Majesty's ship *Cambrian*, I learnt that the provisional government of Greece had appointed a deputation to wait on me with a view to obtaining terms of accommodation from the Ottoman Porte through the mediation of Great Britain.

Prince Mavrocordato, the Greek Secretary of State, and Mr. Zographo, a member of the Greek Legislative Body, were the individuals selected for this

purpose, and considering the probability of their being authorized in the present very critical state of the affairs of Greece to afford an opening for negotiation with the Porte, I determined not to refuse to see them. I was the less averse to receiving their visit, as it was evident from their previous communications with Captain Hamilton, that they were prepared to execute their commission with becoming delicacy, and a due regard for my situation as his Majesty's representative at the Court of the Sultan. Our interview was necessarily short, as besides the inconvenience to be apprehended from any appearance of collusion between the British government and the Greek insurgent provinces, the intelligence which had just reached me of the death of the Emperor of Russia increased my anxiety to arrive at Constantinople without any unnecessary delay.

In the very beginning of the conversation which ensued, I informed Prince Mavrocordato and his colleague that I could not take upon myself to receive them otherwise than as individuals, but that if they were disposed in that capacity to make me acquainted with the wishes of their government, they would find me disposed to listen to their communications. With this understanding they informed me that the Greeks were desirous of terminating their contest with the Porte by means of an amicable arrangement, and that they were charged by their government to solicit the good offices of Great Britain, whose friendly mediation they preferred to that of any other Powers. I told them in reply, that however I might rejoice at finding the thoughts of their countrymen turned towards peace, I could not hold out to them the smallest hope of their obtaining the good offices of England, until I knew on what basis they would be prepared to treat with the Porte, supposing the Porte were on her side to manifest an inclination to treat with them. Prince Mavrocordato answered that the complete independence of Greece was the only basis of negotiation which his government was at liberty to put forward under the terms of the existing constitution; but that the leading men of the country, the individuals, in fact, composing the provisional government of Greece, were of opinion that, as matters then stood, it would be for their interest to accept, if attainable, an arrangement similar to that by which the republic of Ragusa had formerly been placed under the Sovereignty of the Porte. The Greeks, he thought, would be content to pay an annual tribute to the Sultan, and perhaps to indemnify the Turkish land-holders for the loss of their property in the Morea, provided that they enjoyed a separate administration, or rather a total separation from the Turks, together with an adequate security against any encroachments on their newly acquired privileges. He expressed his opinion that to place Turkish garrisons in the fortresses of Greece, or to establish in the Greek provinces a form of government similar to that which prevails in the Principalities on the Danube, would be directly at variance with those essential objects, though he was not prepared to reject altogether the idea of conceding to the Porte some degree of participation in the appointment of the principal authorities. With respect to the extent of territory to be comprized in the denomination of Greece, he seemed to think it could only be regulated by the operations of the war.

The substance of my answer to this overture of the Greek deputies was that the basis of complete independence, which alone their government had authorized them to put forward, could not be proposed to the Porte by any British Minister consistently with the only principle on which Great Britain, after her repeated declarations of neutrality, could be expected to employ her good offices for effecting a pacific arrangement between the contending parties; that, on this account, I was not at liberty to comply with their request, though I

well knew with what anxiety his Majesty's Ministers looked to the restoration of peace in the East, and with what satisfaction they would contribute, within proper and necessary limitations, to the accomplishment of that object. I added that notwithstanding the obstacle which they had themselves presented to the employment of our good offices in their favour, I could not regret the having enjoyed an opportunity of ascertaining their private sentiments on the subject of an arrangement between their countrymen and the Ottoman Porte.

Prince Mavrocordato, before we separated, hinted at the probability of a larger discretion, as to any eventual terms of accommodation with the Porte, being given to the Greek government by the assembly of deputies which he described, though I know not on what grounds, as being likely to meet at an early period in the Morea; and looking to this contingency, he expressed a hope that I should not decline receiving any communications which he might possibly be called upon to address to me at Constantinople. In giving a satisfactory assurance on this point, I thought it right to caution him against the danger of imagining that the mediation of Great Britain was to be obtained at any moment for the mere trouble of requesting it. I told him that any expectation of that kind which I might have held out in the earlier part of our conversation, was only to be understood with respect to the present juncture, though he was not to infer from that remark that his Majesty's government had resolved on withholding its good offices, if no application were made for them within a given time. I begged he would reflect on the extreme difficulty under any circumstances, of engaging the Porte to enter into negotiations with the Greeks; a difficulty which most assuredly was not diminished by the recent successes of Ibrahim Pasha, and which it would be utterly impossible to surmount, unless the Greek government were prepared to surrender a very considerable portion of their pretensions.

An official letter which, before our conversation began, the deputies from Napoli di Romania had transmitted to me in the name of their government, I returned into their hands, on learning from them the nature of the only basis on which they were empowered to apply for the friendly interference of Great Britain.

In the course of the same morning on which I had this interview with Prince Mavrocordato and M. Zographo, I also received a visit from Admiral Miaulis, who is a native of Hydra, and commander of the combined Squadrons of that Island and of Spezzia. Nothing could be more desponding than the language of this intrepid man. He told me that he was on the point of sailing with some of the vessels under his command in order to throw supplies into Missolonghi, that the intended expedition was a last effort on the part of the fleet, which, through want of money and of subordination, could not be kept together more than a few weeks longer, especially if Ibrahim Pasha were to succeed in taking Missolonghi, on the possession of which place he seemed to consider the whole fate of the war to turn. He described the Islands of Hydra and Spezzia as incapable of resisting a regular siege, and stated his apprehension that the sailors, who had already committed several acts of violence, would rise against their officers and the magistrates on shore and rather surrender the islands to the Turks than stand the chance of a serious attack. It was the evident bias of his mind that no time ought to be lost in endeavouring to effect an accommodation with the Porte, through the means of great Britain, that the complete independence of Greece was out of the question, and that if such were not the prevailing sentiments of the government at Napoli di Romania, it

remained for the Islands to consult their own interests by a separate negotiation, if practicable, before the storm burst upon them.

To shew that the apprehensions entertained by Admiral Miaulis are not unfounded, in so far as concerns the intentions of the Pasha of Egypt, I enclose herewith an extract of a letter which I received some days ago from his Majesty's consul at Cairo.

With respect to the siege of Missolonghi, on which the issue of the war is supposed so greatly to depend, it was only known when we left the Ionian Seas that Ibrahim Pasha had crossed over from Patras with a large division of his army to take part in the investment of that place, and it has since been reported that he had failed in his first attack on the garrison.

I think it of so much consequence for you to be apprized without delay of the new dispositions thus manifested by the leading men in Greece, that having the advantage of a direct conveyance for my despatches as far as Corfu, I write to have them sent on to you thence if necessary by express. I cannot but agree with Prince Mavrocordato in apprehending that the Porte will be found but little disposed to enter into a negotiation with the Greeks. Yet should it prove otherwise, and such may perhaps be expected from impressions produced at Constantinople by the decease of the Emperor Alexander, a valuable opportunity might be lost if I were not sufficiently empowered to turn it to account at the moment when it occurred.

I have the honour, &c.,

STRATFORD CANNING.

II.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM MR. SALT TO MR. STRATFORD CANNING, Alexandria, 14th November, 1825.

The Proclamation of his Majesty, under date of the 4th of October, reached us to our great relief a few days back. This declaration of his Majesty's sentiments has given great satisfaction to his Highness the Pasha, and has convinced him that the insinuations thrown out by persons adverse to the British government, of its intention to support the Greek cause, were unfounded. In conversing on this subject I thought it might be important to learn, unofficially, what might be his sentiments with regard to bringing the war to a conclusion, through British intermediation, should it be offered, and his Highness, after some hesitation, opened to me his feelings on the subject.

Should the Porte, he told me, be inclined, after the taking of Missolonghi, which he considers as certain, to offer the Greeks any terms, he shall be happy, he declares, should it be the desire of England, that the Sublime Porte should accord both to Roumelia and the Morea a general and complete amnesty, together with security for the persons and private property of the Greeks, but, as far as concerns the two Islands of Spezzia and Hydra, he trusts that their punishment may be reserved for him.

We shall even be sorry, he says, should they offer to capitulate. After taking Missolonghi he shall direct, he informed me, all his force against those islands, and he entertains the hope that they may resist until taken by storm, in which case his Highness declares it to be his intention not to leave them a single ship.

These islands, he affirms, have been the occasion of all the evil that has befallen the Sublime Porte, and on them it is his wish that the punishment should fall. Besides, he added, they have insulted him even in his ports, and he hopes to be permitted to take satisfaction.

It was in vain that I urged to his Highness, in my private capacity, that the most probable means of bringing over the Greeks would be some concession in favour of their ships when disarmed being left to them as private property. His Highness on this point was not to be moved. Mahomed Ali Pasha has, I may add, staked his honour on bringing this war to an end, and I am convinced he will pursue it, so long as he has either money or men.

He may not complete it this year or the next, but nothing will be left on his part undone, and the whole resources of the country will be turned to that point; should it cost him ten millions of dollars, and fifteen thousand men per annum, the resources of Egypt will not be exhausted.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 17th February, 1826.

As a supplement to Stratford Canning's despatch, I enclose to you a private letter (with its enclosures), which I received from him at the same time.

There can be little doubt, I think, but that the Greeks will be glad enough to acquiesce in whatever we can arrange for them. But I think with Mavrocordato, that absolute separation of the Turkish and Greek populations is the only security for the peaceable continuance of any arrangement; and that such separation would, therefore, be well purchased by tribute.

I presume that this was the footing of Ragusa. But I am not yet enabled to send you any authentic information upon that point. Research is making for it.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—Stratford does not furnish us with any further light as to the imputed project of Ibrahim Pasha, with respect to the interchange of inhabitants between Greece and Egypt.

But Sir Robert Wilson spoke to me the other night in the House of Commons of this project, as a thing perfectly notorious, and would have asked me a question about it, if I had not prevailed upon him to hold his tongue.

G. C.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM MR. STRATFORD CANNING TO MR. CANNING, dated H.M.S. *Revenge*, off Smyrna, 14th January, 1826.

I wrote to you from Corfu of my intention to lay myself open *en passant*, to a communication with some of the leading Greeks. I trust that this communication has taken place in an unexceptionable manner, and though it did not turn out quite so promising as I had been led at one time to expect, and as it might perhaps have proved if the Emperor Alexander's death had not

operated on the sanguine temperament of Mavrocordato, it is at least attended with the advantage of putting me tolerably well in possession of the feelings and views of the principal individuals in Greece.

The probability is that they will soon be forced to reconcile themselves to prospects even less favourable than those to which they have already descended, and I am anxious to be prepared for the crisis, though it is but too likely to come on with a velocity too great for the measured movements of diplomacy.

To put you in possession of the fullest information at the risk of boring you with many idle paragraphs, I enclose the following papers, viz., Three letters from Prince Mavrocordato to Captain Hamilton. Mavrocordato's Memoir on the present prospects of Greece. A Memorandum given by me to Captain Hamilton before I saw the Greek deputies in the Bay of Hydra. An extract of a letter addressed to me by Captain Hamilton, on the 21st of December, but which I did not receive till the 7th instant.

I need not warn you to abstain from believing the whole of Mavrocordato's accounts of Greek successes and Greek preparations. The fact is, that all but he are nearly reduced to despair, and old Miaulis, in speaking to me of his opinions the other day, remarked, that the resolution of a man who had nothing to lose was not very surprising.

If the Sultan and his Egyptian Pasha prevail, and prevail with the forms which usually accompany their successes, I know not how you will continue to keep your new Czar in any tolerable order. On the other hand, if the Greeks are able to maintain themselves in their present position some time longer, with a fair degree of good sense and moderation, you may yet enable me to assist in realizing the hopes which Mavrocordato founds on the alarm which the accession of the Grand Duke Constantine is supposed to inspire at Constantinople. In any instructions which you may give me, pray do not overlook the important point of guarantee.

With respect to my standing at the Porte, it may be satisfactory to you to know that we all abstain from landing in Greece, and that we stayed less than four-and-twenty hours at the anchorage off Hydra. The admiral's communicating with his squadron offers a fair explanation of my movements, and, indeed, if the circumstances of my interview with the Greek deputies were to be stated to the Turkish ministers there is nothing at which they could reasonably take umbrage.

With respect to their disposition towards us, the only indication which I have yet received of it is a fresh complaint addressed to Turner, on the subject of the loans furnished to the Greeks by our merchants. On points connected with my reception, there seems no want of friendliness.

II.

Prince Mavrocordato to Captain Hamilton.

MON CHER AMI, Napoli di Romania, le 14me (26) Décembre, 1825.

Nous avons eu hier deux conférences. Tous sont contre un gouvernement semblable à celui des Principautés Trans-Danubiennes. On a décidé que deux personnes seraient chargées de se présenter à l'ambassadeur. Elles le seront comme particuliers, si sa situation ne lui permet pas de les recevoir autrement. On veut bien espérer que l'Angleterre ne refusera pas sa médiation; mais sur quelles bases? Le gouvernement ne peut pas faire moins que d'insister sur l'indépendance. Ce n'est pas à lui à signer préalablement un acte pour y faire des modifications. Je *crois* cependant qu'un arrangement sur la base que

Tricoupi a déjà prononcée ne trouvera presque pas d'opposition. On n'ose pas signer d'avance des propositions de cette nature; mais on y consentira sans difficulté.

J'ai rédigé quelque chose—je pouvais vous l'envoyer; mais vous restez aujourd'hui, et vous l'aurez demain. Je veux que mon ami Tricoupi le voit avant.

Colocotroni est aux environs de Tripolitza; il espère faire quelque chose.

Les conférences ont empêché Tricoupi de venir hier, et le mauvais temps aujourd'hui; je ne l'ai pas vu aussi de toute la journée.

Les deux personnages Turcs qui vont à St. Pétersbourg sont Hedjib Effendi, agent de Mahmed-Ali, peut-être un des meilleurs diplomats Turcs, et Schakir Effendi, qui a remplacé Habet, comme favori du jour. Jacobaki *Argyropoulo*, et non Ligo, est mon ami; mais il n'aura, je crois, la moindre influence; il ne sera qu'interprète.

Nous avons rejeté toutes propositions aux autres Puissances. M. Canning sera prié de faire tout ce qu'il peut pour la Grèce; mais on désire toujours l'indépendance.

Adieu, mon cher ami.

Votre dévoué,

MAVROCORDATO.

III.

Prince Mavrocordato to Captain Hamilton.

MON CHER COMMODORE, Napoli de Romania, le 15me (27) Décembre, 1825.

Parmi notre conversation vous m'avez plusieurs fois répété que vous désiriez que j'oublie un instant que je suis Grec, pour pouvoir trouver les bases d'un arrangement; eh bien! je l'ai fait autant qu'il était possible; mais je ne vous cache pas que je trouve des difficultés insurmontables de tous les côtés. J'en aurai trouvé moins si je ne connaissais pas les principes qui dirigent la politique de la Porte, ou si je pouvais croire qu'ils ont changé. Dix années de travail qui m'a procuré la connaissance des plus grands secrets mêmes de la politique Turque, ne me laisse aucun doute sur mon opinion. Je désire de tout mon cœur qu'elle soit erronée. Vous trouverez ci-inclus un faible travail que je viens de faire; il n'est pas écrit de ma main, parce que mon intention n'était de lui donner la moindre authenticité. Vous le savez, cela me suffit. Si la Porte pouvait bien peser ses intérêts, il ne serait guères difficile de la persuader que la destruction même des Grecs ne tournerait à son avantage; que l'Egypte est un ennemi qu'elle fait mal de laisser aller sur son train sous la prétexte de la guerre avec les Grecs, qu'elle sera envahie ou par le Nord ou par le Sud, ou de tous les deux côtés ensemble, lorsqu'elle y pensera le moins; mais toutes ces observations seront inutiles pour la Porte; elle n'entendra que lorsque le bruit du canon réveillera le Sultan dans le fond de son harem.

Le billet que vous m'avez adressé hier a donné lieu à des nouvelles conférences; celle qui sera tenue après-midi sera la dernière; son résultat vous sera communiqué.

Nous avons très peu de nouvelles aujourd'hui. À Lamphidia, couvent situé près de Clarence, et dans un endroit de l'Arcadie, les Egyptiens ont eu quelques échecs. Ils ont perdu deux à trois cent hommes.

Votre dévoué,

MAVROCORDATO.

IV.

Prince Mavrocordato to Captain Hamilton.

MON CHER AMI, Hydra, le 4me Janvier, 1826.

Je me suis empressé de vous donner hier les nouvelles importantes que nous avons eues. Nous n'en avons plus eu d'ultérieures aujourd'hui, et le vent fort qui nous en a privé m'a aussi privé du plaisir de vous voir. Je ne sais pas si je l'aurai demain matin, mais ce qui me fait beaucoup plus de peine c'est de voir retarder le départ de la flotte.

Les brulots sont prêts aujourd'hui, et sans le vent contraire ils auraient fait voile. Le retard de l'ambassadeur est également pénible pour vous et pour moi, je suppose; sa présence à Constantinople aurait été d'une grande importance dans les circonstances actuelles. Je vous ai toujours répété que je comptais peu sur un arrangement; mon opinion est toujours le même; mais je ne vous dissimule pas que l'évènement que nous avons appris peut avoir une très grande influence sur la politique de la Porte. Elle avait commencé à se rassurer de l'Empereur Alexandre, et je sais *positivement* qu'elle avait une opinion bien différente de son frère Constantin. Vous savez que ce Prince est peu fait pour dissimuler.

Une grande partie des discours qu'il avait tenu à Vienne et même à Varsovie, et qui furent dans le tems fidèlement rapportés à Constantinople, n'était nullement propre à inspirer de la confiance au Divan; et je sais que celui-ci n'a jamais été autant flatté d'un projet Européen que de celui qui devait préparer la succession du trône des Czars au Grand Duc Nicholas.

Le projet n'ayant pas été mise en exécution, je crois qu'il ne sera plus question de changer l'ordre légitime de la succession, et que Constantin sera sur le trône. Cela suffira pour faire trembler la Porte; elle se croira à la veille d'une guerre (et peut-être elle n'aura pas tort), elle cherchera des amis et des alliés autour d'elle; et c'est sans doute le moment le plus favorable pour M. Canning. Cette occasion serait peut-être la seule où on pourrait la faire entendre qu'il lui conviendrait infiniment mieux d'avoir les Grecs comme alliés que comme sujets.

Je vous vois déjà rire à ce mot d'*alliés;* mais je vous prie d'y penser un peu. Croyez-vous que les Grecs *indépendants* (donnez à ce mot telle extension qu'il vous plaira) préféreraient le voisinage des Russes à celui des Turcs? La raison nous dit que *non.* Les voisins forts ne sont de convenance à aucun état, et encore moins à un état faible et nouveau comme la Grèce. Celle-ci craindra l'envahissement des Russes, elle sera par conséquent l'allié naturelle de la Turquie contre une invasion du Nord. La Grèce et la Turquie seules ne pourront pas l'empêcher; mais je suppose que l'Angleterre ne sera pas indifférente. Je crois que ma thèse est bien solide d'elle-même pour n'avoir pas besoin de raisonnements à l'appui; mais il y a une autre plus générale encore, que tout état qui est à la veille d'une guerre extérieure ne fera jamais trop de sacrifices pour faire cesser celle qu'il aurait à soutenir dans l'intérieure : or la Turquie va se trouver dans cette circonstance, et je ne vois point d'alternative. Je puis même ajouter que la Porte ne devra pas oublier la situation de l'Egypte vis-à-vis d'elle. Le premier coup de canon tiré sur le Danube sera le salut de l'indépendance du Viceroi, salut qui sera peut-être répété en France, et qui amènera plus tard une guerre sanglante entre celle-ci et l'Angleterre. Je ne veux pas trop m'appuyer sur ces dernières conjectures. Je connais peu la diplomatie Européenne, et il est possible que je sois trompé; mais je ne doute pas sur la situation de la Turquie si Constantin est aujourd'hui sur le trône des Czars.

L'ambassadeur Anglais peut jouer le plus grand rôle à Constantinople; il peut prévenir le bouleversement de la Turquie, si ce bouleversement ne convient pas à l'Angleterre; il peut consolider un pouvoir en Grèce, s'il convient à l'Angleterre d'y avoir un pouvoir qui balancerait celui de l'Egypte. Il peut prévenir une guerre Européenne, si l'Angleterre n'en veut pas. Il peut la préparer à l'avantage de la Grande-Bretagne, si celle-ci n'est nullement disposée à l'éviter.

On a découvert aujourd'hui une grosse frégate venant du Lévant, et se dirigeant à Napoli-di-Romania. Je suppose que celle qu'on a vu avant hier est la *Galatée*, et celle d'aujourd'hui la *Sirène*.

Adieu, mon cher ami; si je ne vous vois pas demain, j'espère pouvoir vous envoyer ma lettre par quelqu'un qui ait moins peur des vagues écumantes que moi.

Votre dévoué,

MAVROCORDATO.

5me Janvier.

Je reçois des lettres de Naples, où je trouve aussi d'autres de Missolonghi, en date du 9me (21) Décembre, et d'Athènes en date du 19me (31). Une goëlette Autrichienne était arrivée de Smyrna à Naples pour trois jours. La mort de l'Empereur Alexandre était officiellement communiquée par les ministres à Constantinople aux consuls. Accourtis avait envoyé le capitaine de la goëlette, nommé Bandiera, pour me voir, et me faire plusieurs communications importantes. Je n'y étais pas; il s'est adressé à M. Rhemest, mon secrétaire, pour le prier de m'écrire tout ce qu'il avait ordre de me communiquer verbalement. Le résumé en est, que le commandant Accourtis, comme ami de la cause, et mon ami particulier (et je ne sais pas depuis quand il est devenu l'un et l'autre), croyait le moment actuel comme le plus propre à faire des ouvertures à la Cour de Vienne, dont les dispositions devenaient toujours plus favorables aux Grecs. Il aurait vu avec plaisir quelques lignes de ma part adressées au Prince de Metternich, qui m'a autrefois honoré de son amitié, et que lui, Accourtis, serait charmé de se charger de l'expédition de ma lettre. Qu'il n'ignorait pas tout ce qui était promis par l'Angleterre et la France: mais que nous ne devions pas croire que quelque chose de bon se ferait sans le consentement de l'Autriche, que les Grecs doivent gagner ce consentement, ce qu'il ne croit nullement difficile, si je suis ses conseils, &c. On ne peut voir de premier abord dans tout cela qu'un dévergondage sans exemple, qu'une politique bien grossière, et digne de celui qui veut le mettre en jeu; mais nous ne devons pas oublier en même tems que cette politique date du jour que la mort de l'Empereur Alexandre fut connu à Smyrne.

La garnison de Missolonghi se défendait avec un courage heroïque; tous étaient résolus de mourir l'épée à la main dans une dernière extrémité; mais de ne se rendre jamais. Tehonyas et Keraiskaki devaient occuper la position de Palaokastion, communément nominé Kero-Irini, qui domine le camp de Koutahi, Coste-Rotyari, celle de *Seeli*, entre Missolonghi et Anatolico, et différens autres corps le village d'Hippochori. La garnison était préparée à une sortie générale en même tems que tous ces corps auraient été engagés. Le plan est assez bien combiné; et si nous devons croire à ce qu'on nous écrit de Cerigo et de Gastouni, il aura parfaitement réussi. Voici ce qu'on dit de Cerigo, en date du 14me (26) Décembre: "Un bâtiment de guerre Anglais qui vient d'arriver nous porte la nouvelle d'une grande défaite de Turcs devant Missolonghi; 4000 hommes, dont la plus grande partie des troupes régulières, seraient péris dans cette affaire, qui a eu lieu le 12me (24) Décembre. Nous attendons ici le

Revenge d'un moment à l'autre; il se sera dirigé sur Missolonghi pour en connaître les dernières nouvelles." Les lettres de Gastouni, en date du 18me (30) Décembre, portent "que les corps Turcs et Arabes dispersés dans cette province, ainsi que dans celle de Pyrgos, se retiraient à la hâte sur Patras, ayant reçu l'ordre de passer à Missolonghi, où Ibrahim avait essuyé un grand échec, et perdu beaucoup de monde."

Tout cela ne me rassure pas cependant. Le vent continue à être fort, et le départ de la flotte n'aura lieu qu'après demain selon toutes les apparences. L'organisation des troupes régulières va bien à Athènes. Fabvier demande des fusils. Il manifeste son indignation contre les propositions de Rigny. Cet homme, en un mot, se conduit très bien jusqu'à present. Je ne suis pas encore sûr de trouver un bateau qui risquerait la traversée, et je crains de ne pas finir par être moi-même le porteur de mes lettres.

V.

MEMOIR ON THE PROSPECTS of GREECE, BY PRINCE MAVROCORDATO.

Il faut que j'oublie un instant que je suis Grec; c'est un sacrifice bien dur.

J'éviterai autant qu'il est possible d'entrer dans un examen de la politique et des intérêts des Puissances Européennes. Je suis assurément moins informé qu'un autre là-dessus; je ne puis juger que sur les apparences; si elles ne sont pas trompeuses, elles sont connues de tout le monde. La France ne fait pas un mystère de la protection qu'elle accorde à l'Egypte; son but ne peut pas être masqué. Le projet favori de la Russie est dévoilé depuis un siècle: les hommes peuvent changer, mais les principes de son cabinet restent les mêmes. L'Autriche ne dissimule pas son opposition à toute innovation, et elle a fait connaître à tout le monde la définition qu'elle donne à la légitimité. Mr. Canning en donne une bien différente dans sa Note à M. de Zea; la marche qu'il a suivie vis-à-vis des Républiques de l'Amérique du Sud, et l'affaire du Brésil, font voir le chemin sur lequel le ministère Anglais paraît décidé de marcher. La Grèce en a conçu les espérances les plus flatteuses; je ne la crois pas trompée malgré tout ce qu'on en dise.

L'Angleterre aurait peut-être désiré un autre état de choses en Grèce. Il est inutile d'entrer dans les détails des causes de ses derniers malheurs; les dissensions n'ont jamais procuré le bonheur des nations. La Grèce en a aussi beaucoup souffert, mais malgré elles le sentiment unanime d'une aversion contre la tyrannie Turque en réunissant tous les bras à la présence d'un ennemi commun avait déjà triomphé de tous les efforts de la Porte, et sans les secours de l'Egypte, sans ceux qui sont prodigués à celle-ci par une Puissance chrétienne, les Grecs disputeraient déjà aux Turcs la possession de la Thessalie et de la Macédoine. Les bayonnettes d'Ibrahim ont intercepté la course des Grecs, ils ont dû reculer même devant elles; quelques Puissances profitent de leur situation pour les réduire. Telle est du moins mon opinion. Les conférences ministérielles à St. Pétersbourg ne s'écarteront pas du chemin qui a été tracé à Laybach et à Vérone. S'il est vrai que la Porte y envoye des plénipotentiaires, c'est une raison de plus pour supposer qu'on se servira du prétexte du consentement de la Puissance *légitimement* dominant pour frapper le dernier coup à la liberté Grecque. Lord Strangford y assistera peut-être comme le Duc de Wellington a assisté au Congrès de Vérone. Il est question, dit-on, de donner à la Grèce un gouvernement semblable à celui de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, c'est-à-dire, dans d'autres mots, la mettre dans la liste des provinces Ottomanes, avec quelques privilèges; nous savons combien les privilèges accordés à la Valachie et à la Moldavie ont été respectés, malgré la garantie et

la protection même de la Russie, et cependant quelle différence de circonstances et de relations! Les Turcs n'ont jamais eu des possessions dans les deux Principautés transdanubiennes; aucune passion ne les animait contre la population chrétienne de ces pays; après une guerre assez longue ils avaient obtenu pour récompense leur soumission volontaire et un tribut considérable; que peuvent-ils désirer de plus? Malgré cela, la bonne foi des traités a-t-elle été respectée? L'histoire nous le dit; aujourd'hui même l'exemple en est sous nos yeux. Venons à la Grèce. Les sept-dixièmes de son territoire appartenaient ou à la couronne ou à des individus Turcs; les passions entre ceux-ci et les Grecs sont plus qu'exaltées. Le fils cherchera la vengeance de son père, le frère celle de sa sœur; chaque Turc celle d'un autre vrai-croyant immolé par un Ghiaour, et nous pouvons espérer que le sort de la Valachie peut convenir à la Grèce! Je ne veux pas parler de mon opinion sur cette affaire, il n'y en a qu'une en Grèce, point de parti là-dessus, un cri unanime s'élève pour m'apprendre que la force même ne pourra pas imposer aux Grecs le gouvernement de la Valachie. Leur extermination serait une affaire beaucoup plus facile; ce serait peut-être une extrémité dure, mais infiniment plus digne d'eux.

Mais les Grecs peuvent-ils gagner leur indépendance? peuvent-ils s'y maintenir? sont-ils mûrs pour un gouvernement tel qu'ils paraissent le désirer? J'ai déjà dit que j'oublierai un instant que je suis Grec; je veux, contre les impulsions de mon cœur, me rappeler ma promesse.

Les Grecs ont trop tôt commencé; dix ans plus tard, et leur sort était affermi dès la seconde campagne; c'est une faute qu'on ne peut pas réparer; mais malgré elle la ligne de la liberté Grecque serait déjà établie sans l'opposition des Puissances Européennes; je ne veux pas approfondir leur politique, mais nous avons été culbutés de tous les côtés. Si la France, l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, et la Russie tenaient une ligne de neutralité stricte et parfaite, les Turcs seraient repoussés au-delà de l'Axius et du Pinde. La même chose aurait eu lieu si la faveur de ces Puissances était partagée entre les Grecs et les Turcs, ou si même l'Angleterre seule tenait deux ans plutôt la marche qu'elle a suivie après, et encore a-t-elle jamais fait pour la Grèce ce que la France continue de faire pour l'Egypte?

Sa proclamation nous désespère d'avoir des choses de première nécessité, tandis que canons, armes de toute espèce, munitions, officiers, vaisseaux de guerre, tout est prodigué à l'Egypte par la France; dès lors la lutte devient inégale, nous combattons contre la Turquie, l'Egypte, et tous leurs Alliés, et nous sommes seuls. Si cela continue ainsi, je ne dissimule pas qu'il nous serait difficile, pour ne pas dire impossible, de gagner notre indépendance. Je ne dis pas que nous oublierons rien de ce qui peut nous y conduire. Nous organisons une armée, nous nous préparons à une nouvelle campagne; nous faisons des efforts, le moindre succès peut encore donner un élan nouveau. Si nous succombons enfin, ce ne sera pas sans honneur. Les suites de notre chute peuvent être mieux calculées par des hommes qui sont beaucoup plus versés que moi dans la diplomatie Européenne. Tout ce que je puis prévoir, c'est que *la Turquie n'y gagnera* RIEN.

Lorsque j'ai dit que nous avons trop tôt commencé, je crois avoir en partie déclaré mon opinion sur la question si nous sommes mûrs pour un gouvernement tel que nous paraissons le désirer. Le peuple Grec est actif, laborieux, plein d'esprit et de courage, très propre à être formé à *tout* ce qu'on peut désirer. La classe qui se dit supérieure, et qui est en grande partie imbibée de l'immoralité, fruit de l'ignorance où le gouvernement Turc avait un intérêt de tenir les individus composant cette classe, est sans doute une entrave considerable: il fallait un homme supérieur pour couper ce nœud gordien, il ne s'est pas mal-

heureusement trouvé; mais comme parmi cette classe même on peut trouver des individus qui désirent sincèrement le bien de leur patrie, on les verrait se réunir autour de celui qui aurait la volonté et la capacité en même tems de se mettre à leur tête; l'impulsion donnée, toute la nation le suivrait; il ne s'agit donc que d'avoir cet homme, n'importe Grec ou non, et un gouvernement régulier peut très facilement être établi en Grèce, et prospérer en même tems.

Si on propose un arrangement entre la Porte et la Grèce, je ne dissimule pas que je ne vois presque point la possibilité d'un arrangement quelconque; mais des personnes dont les talens supérieurs sont généralement reconnus en jugent différemment. Cherchons les bases de cet arrangement.

Je ne crois pas qu'on discuterait un seul moment la suivante: qu'il y a impossibilité de mettre dorénavant les Turcs et les Grecs ensemble. Il faudrait donc fixer une ligne de démarcation. Les Turcs céderaient-ils les places fortes qu'ils occupent sur la Morée? Je ne le crois pas. Accepteraient-ils de les démolir et d'en abandonner le territoire aux Grecs, si ceux-ci démolissent également celles qu'ils occupent? Je ne le crois pas de même.

Seraient-ils contents de recevoir une indemnisation pécuniaire pour les terres qui resteraient aux Grecs? Il me paraît doublement difficile, et pour l'opiniâtreté des Turcs à ne pas s'en déposséder, et par la difficulté qui se présentera pour les Grecs de se procurer la somme nécessaire pour cette indemnisation.

Mais toutes ces difficultés levées, et la ligne de démarcation établie, la Porte se contentera-t-elle du titre de suzeraineté, semblable à celui qu'elle avait jadis sur la République de Raguse, et d'un tribut proportionnel payé par la Grèce en conséquence de sa vassalité? J'en doute fort, parce que je crois que la Porte insistera toujours à avoir le droit de se mêler de l'administration intérieure de la Grèce, ce qui serait tout-à-fait incompatible avec la sûreté, la tranquillité, et le bonheur de ce pays. Ces bases sont inséparables de tout arrangement; et quelle garantie pourrait être donnée aux Grecs si l'administration intérieure de leur pays devait être sujette à l'influence de la Porte? L'exemple de la Valachie et de la Moldavie est trop récent pour être oublié, et la dissidence est tellement enracinée qu'en supposant même que tout serait arrangé d'une manière satisfaisante pour eux, les Grecs n'y verraient rien de sûr, sans la garantie d'une ou de plusieurs Puissances étrangères capables d'en imposer aux Turcs.

Je n'espère pas un arrangement; je suis inquiet sur le sort de la Grèce; mais je ne crains pas pour son honneur.

VI.

MEMORANDUM OF COMMUNICATION FROM MR. STRATFORD CANNING TO CAPTAIN HAMILTON; H.M.S. *Revenge*, 9th January, 1826.

Mr. Stratford Canning has no objection to see Prince Mavrocordato and M. Zographo, whom Captain Hamilton has been requested to mention as being appointed by the Provisional Government of Greece to wait on him, with an application for the good offices of Great Britain to effect an accommodation between the Sublime Porte and the Greeks. The Provisional Government of Greece having taken this step of its own accord must be considered as fully aware that any interference at all likely to be employed by Great Britain, after her repeated declarations of neutrality, can rest on no principle but that of good will towards each of the contending parties; both of them manifesting their desire to obtain her good offices; and that any arrangement eventually resulting from such interference must be expected to embrace the interests and honour of both.

VII.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER MARKED PRIVATE FROM CAPTAIN HAMILTON TO MR. STRATFORD CANNING, H.M.S. *Cambrian*, Garden Bay, 21st December, 1825.

Miaulis, Tombasi, and Zonomo (all Hydriots) were on board of me yesterday, and there was several hours conversation, or rather talk. They seemed evidently disappointed, that coming from you, that is, having seen you, I could tell them no more than I did. There is not the smallest resistance to Ibrahim in the heart of the Morea; the population have fled to the mountains, and Colocotroni to the mills opposite Napoli. He will probably come on board here, as I rather make a point of not visiting them (for many reasons). There is not a sous to pay the navy, and it is doubtful whether they will go to sea without money, although to be hoped. They do not express the smallest hopes of final success, and asked whether I thought there would be any advantage in their sending a deputation, to ask you to do anything you could for them consistent with their honour. I replied, that there were so many different opinions as to honour, that it was impossible for me to give mine as to their question; after some time they said, honour as far as consistent with safety. I then said that I had not any reason to suppose you would refuse good offices; indeed that Mr. Canning's letter to Miaulis and Colocotroni, I believed, expressed something of that kind. These letters have not been yet received, and they are anxious to know the contents. I also said, that I would not advise a deputation; but, that if some one or two persons were to accompany me when I waited on the admiral, it was not likely they would be refused permission to go on board, and that I should ask you to see them.

Indeed I wish much you could see Mavrocordato, or at least Tricoupi. I understand a deputation of four will go to-morrow to Napoli, to insist on proposals for an arrangement. I said, and repeated several times when the subject (as to what M. de Rigny had told them) recurred, that England was not likely, indeed, could not (in her strength) have the least jealousy about any application they might choose to make to other Powers. General Roche has been at Athens, but is returned to Napoli; where he will be when I get there. I shall visit Spezzia on my way.

Mr. Planta to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Foreign Office, 17th February, 1826.

I am directed by Mr. Canning to send to your Grace extracts of two treaties *as to Ragusa*, which shew in some degree the relation in which that Republic stood towards the Ottoman Porte.

The first of these extracts is taken from the treaty between Venice and the Porte of 1699, which ceded Ragusa to the Porte.

The second is from the treaty between Russia and the Porte of 1800, by which Russia regulated her protection of the Ionian Islands, "à l'instar" (as the treaty says) of the position of Ragusa towards the Porte. It is therefore fair to conclude that the relations of Ragusa to the Porte were the same, or nearly the same, as those established in 1800 between Russia and the Ionian Islands.

We feel that there is a link wanting in this information, that is, the actual agreement between the Porte and Ragusa; but though we have

searched very much to-day, we cannot yet find it. Perhaps by the next messenger I may be able to supply the deficiency.

Mr. Canning desires me further to say to your Grace that the measure of the Bank purchasing Exchequer Bills has worked so favourably to-day that he hopes a further issue of Exchequer Bills may be now avoided.

Believe me to be ever, my dear Duke,

your Grace's faithful humble servant,

JOSEPH PLANTA.

[ENCLOSURE I.]

EXTRACT OF A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN TURKEY AND VENICE, signed at Carlowitz, 1699.

"ART. IX.

"The territory and dependencies of the Signiory of Ragusa shall be annexed to the territories and cantons of the Sublime Empire; and all obstacles that hinder the union and communication of the lands of the said Signiory with the lands of the said Empire shall be removed."

[ENCLOSURE II.]

"ART. I.

"Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, considérant que les susdites îles ci-devant Vénétiennes, vû leur proximité de la Morée et de l'Albanie, intéressent particulièrement la sûreté et tranquillité des états de la Sublime Porte, il a été convenu que les susdites îles, à l'instar de la République de Raguse, formeraient une République soumise à titre de suzeraineté à la Sublime Porte, et gouvernée par les principaux et notables du pays. Sa Majesté Impériale de toutes les Russies s'engage pour elle et ses successeurs de garantir l'intégrité des états de la dite République, le maintien de sa constitution, qui sera acceptée et ratifiée par les deux hautes parties contractantes, après avoir été soumise à leur approbation, de même que la perpétuité des privilèges qui lui seront accordés. Sa Majesté l'Empereur Ottoman et ses successeurs étant suzerains de la susdite République, c'est-à-dire Seigneurs, Princes, et Protecteurs, et la dite République étant vassale de la Sublime Porte, c'est-à-dire dépendante, soumise et protégée, les devoirs de cette protection seront religieusement observés par la Sublime Porte en faveur de la susdite République."

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL, Berlin, 18th February, 1826.

I thank you for your letter of the 10th, which I received here by the messenger.

Lord Gifford has many defects for a Lord Chancellor, and I am afraid even that of hesitating and doubting about his decisions. But I believe we must have him.

I should think it would be very desirable to endeavour to postpone the appointment of a Chancellor in Ireland till Lord Wellesley's government should be brought to a close.

In respect to the currency, my opinion is that we must persevere in our measure in respect to England, which I am certain is right; but we must proceed very slowly. I think I should extend it to Ireland, and eventually to Scotland; but in neither at the same time as in England, nor previous to a deliberate inquiry.

I should doubt the expediency of making silver as well as gold our standard. Whenever silver and gold are current at the same time in the same country, as at Paris for instance, there is an *agio* upon gold which varies, and therefore cannot depend solely upon the greater convenience of gold to silver. In England the *agio* would vary in proportion as the services of one or other of those metals were productive not only positively, but relatively, with each other.

We must expect that the result of all these mining speculations will be to augment the produce of silver, and that the difference of the value of that metal in relation will increase daily; and if we made silver a part of our currency otherwise than it is, we should soon have a gold and a silver price in our markets. The truth is, what is going on in the world will render silver useless as a measure of value; and I am afraid that for this evil there is no practical remedy. However, I recommend that whatever is determined on this subject may be well considered in Cabinet and elsewhere, and that the determination may be carried into execution slowly.

I am quite well, and have had a very prosperous journey. I proceed on Monday.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Since writing the above I have read Huskisson's paper on the Circulation,* which you will of course have seen. I don't think that the scheme therein proposed would be a remedy for the evil contemplated in this letter. For instance, a man has a receipt from the Mint for 50*l.* He can get from the Mint 50*l.* in silver bullion at 15½ to one of gold. But supposing the dif-

* See page 98.

ference to increase, as it will probably from 15½ to 16, or even to 20, the Mint receipt will circulate upon a discount of from 7 to 8 to 20 and 25 per cent. There is no remedy excepting to fix periodically by proclamation the difference between the two metals, which I believe to be impossible.

W.

.7.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Berlin, 19th February, 1826.

I am glad that Count Lieven did not mention to you the idea entertained by the Emperor of his right to go to war. It proves that he has no notion of what we are doing. I will endeavour to prevent him from stating his impression to me.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

18.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Berlin, 19th February, 1826.

I will attend exactly to what you desire respecting Count Lieven. It is reported here that, although Count Nesselrode still enjoys his Imperial Majesty's confidence, there is but little chance of his remaining in office when his Imperial Majesty will have been relieved from his constant attention to the inquiry into the conspiracy, and will attend a little to foreign affairs.

The intrigues against him are very active. The removal of Count Nesselrode might affect the situation of Count Lieven.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

19.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Berlin, 19th February, 1826.

I certainly should wish not to stay in Russia so long as I must if I am to attend the coronation. You may rely upon my not coming away if I should see the slightest prospect of success

in the important affair with which you have entrusted me; but even if that affair should detain me beyond the period of the coronation, it is best that I should attend it as a private individual, or not attend it. I would therefore recommend to you to appoint the person to attend it soon; as he must send out his carriages and servants, and probably come himself by sea, as soon as the navigation of the Baltic will be opened.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [52

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Berlin, 19th February, 1826.

I have read over Huskisson's Memorandum on the Circulation. I am afraid that it will be very difficult to establish what he proposes. The mining speculations, and the introduction of machinery into the mines of Mexico, must increase the quantity of silver so much (not in the market of England alone) and in such a manner as to increase the difference between the value of gold and silver very materially, and probably very irregularly, so as to deprive silver of its capacity of being the measure of the value of other commodities.

If this were to happen after our measure should have been adopted, the proposed receipts of the Mint would be at a discount, which would be an awkward circumstance.

We must persevere in our measure in relation to one and two pound notes, and must eventually and in time extend its operations first to Ireland, and next to Scotland. But we must not be in a hurry; and I hope that any measure that may be adopted to give greater facility to our circulation, may be very well deliberated upon before it is adopted, and afterwards full time given.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

SIR, Berlin, 19th February, 1826.

I arrived here on Friday morning, having been received with marked attention and respect from all the civil and military authorities throughout my journey through the Prussian territories.

His Prussian Majesty and his Royal Family have received and treated me with their usual kindness and condescension; and the officers of the Court, the general and other officers of the army, and gentlemen and people of the town in general, have done everything in their power to pay me attention and respect.

I have had no conversation with his Prussian Majesty upon public affairs, but I have had two or three with Count Bernstorff, which are not without interest.

It appears that the Comte de St. Priest, who had been sent from hence by the French government to congratulate the Emperor of Russia on his accession, had passed through this town some days ago on his return to make his report to his government.

He is said to have stated that in an interview which he had with his Imperial Majesty, his Imperial Majesty had communicated to him the same sentiment, as it appeared by one of the communications from Lord Strangford that he had to the Comte de la Ferronays, in respect to his desire for peace; with this remarkable addition, that the assistance (*concours*) to be given to his Imperial Majesty to induce him to put his affairs in the hands of his Allies must be that of the whole of them, and not of some.

I observed to Count Bernstorff this addition to the former communication, and stated that I had heard the conversation reported before as having passed with Monsieur de la Ferronays; but he said that the communication to M. de St. Priest was much more full than it had been to M. de la Ferronays, and that M. de St. Priest had come away with the persuasion that the Emperor would go to war, and would think himself at liberty to take all advantages of his operations, if his Allies did not all concur in taking advantage of the promises made by the late Emperor to place his interests in their hands, and did not agree in some common line of conduct which should bring the Porte to reason.

I have confined my answers very much to going over the reasons which had induced his Majesty's government to think that they could not be parties to the measures heretofore adopted on this subject, and that they could do no good now in a conference of ministers of Powers no two of which agreed in their views.

That it appeared to his Majesty's government that to belong to such a conference would only tend to deprive us of the influence we possessed on this question without increasing that of the Allies in general.

From thence the conversation went to the nature of that influence and the want of it by Austria and France. The want of influence by Austria was admitted; but in respect to France, Count Bernstorff stated a fact of which I had not been aware, viz., that the Greeks had offered to the King of France to submit themselves to his protection before they had offered themselves to his Majesty, I believe, through the French admiral in the Levant, and that they were again seeking the same protection.

I told Count Bernstorff that we had never heard of such offers in England; but that we had of a French Greek committee seeking to have the offer of the crown of Greece to the Duc de Nemours* through the means of General Roche and others, which however rather tended to deteriorate the influence of France in Greece as far as the government of France might be supposed to be interested in them and in Turkey, and at all events placed the government of France in a relation to both Greeks and Turks very different from that in which his Majesty's government stood.

In respect to the question whether it was probable that the Emperor of Russia wished for peace or war, the general opinion here is that the only remedy for the existing evils is war.

Count Bernstorff appears to think that the conspiracy in the Russian army has extended very far, and he says that there is scarcely a great family in Russia of which some member is not more or less involved in it. He thinks it doubtful that war would be a remedy for the evil, but he admits that the probable inclination of the Emperor's mind to military operations would

* See vol. ii. of this Series, page 503.

induce him to decide in favour of war. He considers it certain that the late Emperor would before now have declared himself if he had lived, and would probably have commenced his operations early in spring, and that his successor will probably follow his example if not prevented by some prospect of settling the question between Greeks and Turks.

In answer to his inquiries whether we were disposed to do anything, I told him that he must be aware that we had always been ready to come forward and to exert our influence to reconcile contending parties, and to remove the causes of war.

That in this very case we had done everything in our power; and, if occasion should again offer, we should not be found backward; but it must not be expected from us that we should either go to war ourselves, or countenance the justice of war by others, in order to produce a reconciliation between Greeks and Turks.

The conversation then turned upon the chance that our influence, which Count Bernstorff states that he is convinced is supreme in this case, could produce an arrangement between Greeks and Turks unassisted by the menace or fear of war; in the course of which he told me that a courier had passed yesterday from Paris, with despatches for M. de la Ferronays, from which it appears that General Guilleminot had had some conversation with the Capitan Pasha upon the subject of an arrangement, and that the Capitan Pasha had stated that the Porte was disposed, upon the submission of the Greeks, to give them a general amnesty, and to put everything in Greece on its ancient footing, and to bury in oblivion all that had passed; and that seeing that it was impossible for the Greeks and Turks to live together in the same country after what had passed, the government of the Porte would consent to occupy Greece, &c., with Egyptian rather than with Turkish troops.

Count Bernstorff says that he observed to the French chargé-d'affaires that this change could not be any great inducement to the Greeks to submit. But that the French chargé-d'affaires appeared to think that the discipline of the Egyptian troops would make a great difference in their favour.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Vienna, 22nd February, 1826.

I avail myself of the departure of an Austrian courier for St. Petersburg to write you a few lines. I received last night a despatch from Mr. Canning by a courier going to Constantinople, in which he authorizes me "to assure the Austrian ministers that, although retaining the opinion which his Majesty's government have always held of the inexpediency and the probable fruitlessness of any formal conference on the subject of the unfortunate and alarming complication of affairs in Eastern Europe (an opinion justified and confirmed by the result of the steps taken last year by the three allied continental Powers at Constantinople), his Majesty's government are nevertheless desirous of forwarding to the utmost of their power that which they believe to be the object of the Allies (and especially that of Austria), the prevention of a declaration of war on the part of the Emperor Nicholas, and the solution by other means of the difficult and embarrassing question which has so long excited the anxiety and menaced the repose of Europe."

I communicated the contents of this despatch to Prince Metternich, and although he still thinks that the united co-operation of the five Powers would afford the best chance of bringing the Greek question to a satisfactory issue, yet he has desired me to say that such is his confidence in you, that he is quite prepared to enlist himself under your banners, and to leave the interests of Europe in your hands, satisfied that they cannot be placed in better. He has desired Count Lebzeltern to communicate with you in the most unreserved manner upon all subjects.

Mr. Canning seems to be very impatient to receive intelligence from Mr. Stratford Canning. It appears, however, by letters received from Constantinople of the 3rd instant, that he had not reached the Turkish capital at that date, and that there were conjectures that he had returned to Hydra, to hold further conferences with the Greek government. I can hardly believe this to be true. It is more likely that he has been delayed by contrary winds. We are all very well.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [5

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Riga, 26th February, 1826.

As I understand that the post goes to England to-morrow, I write you one line to tell you that I have got thus far on my journey prosperously, and am quite well.

I enclose letters which I have received from Count Nesselrode and Lord Strangford.

I expect to be at Petersburg early on the fourth day from hence.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

] *To Count Nesselrode.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, St. Pétersbourg, ce 2me Mars, 1826.

Le Roi mon maître m'a chargé de deux lettres à présenter à sa Majesté l'Empereur, dont le Secrétaire d'Etat m'a envoyé des copies.* J'ai l'honneur d'en faire part à votre Excellence.

Acceptez l'assurance de la considération très distinguée avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur, &c.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Downing Street, 2nd March, 1826.

I cannot sufficiently thank you for your long and interesting letter from Berlin.† Knowing your undivided devotion to the public service, I was not surprised at your accepting the proposal for you to go to Petersburg, and I believe that if the personal influence of any one from hence could ensure success, you were the only person to whom we could have looked with confidence. But I am very much afraid that you have not gone out with the means of success, though I should be sorry to be thought by that to say that it was in the power of the government to have given you greater.

I quite agree with you in thinking that the position of our naval power in the Mediterranean is so good, that I should be very sorry to see it changed; and changed it will be if Greece fall into any other hands than those of the Turks. We should, however, do much to avoid a war, and one would not be borne in this country if it were to support the Turks against the Greeks. Our interest is therefore clearly to prevent Russia going to war with the Turks, as that would sooner or later involve us in the scrape. Your mission may allay the Emperor's ardour, and Mr. Stratford Canning will assist, if he can prevail upon the Porte (which I very much doubt) to make any proposition which would be listened to with regard to Greece. It is, however, desirable to try what can be done in that particular: if he fail in the attempt, the attempt will have done no harm, and may even have a good effect; but my doubt (I tell you fairly) is this, —whether, if he should not fail, that is to say, whether if a proposition which could be called reasonable were to be extorted from the Porte, the having taken this step singly, without any communication with those who formed the Grand Alliance, and, indeed, with the avowed intention of avoiding it, was the best course to pursue to bring the negotiation, which might be founded on these eventual propositions from the Porte, to a favourable conclusion. We must expect that this conduct will irritate both Austria and France, and probably Prussia; and they will exert their influence to prevent our success. The influence of Austria at the Porte will be exerted one way, the influence of France, both at the Porte and in Greece, will be exerted both ways to spoil our game. Acting jointly in Turkey, they will soon be able so to excite the jealousy of the Porte as to make that

* See page 83. † See page 113.

Court unmanageable in the progress of the business: and there is much too strong a party in Greece for independence not to be easily led by France to resist any proposition to which we could think of asking the Porte to consent. My fear therefore is, that even if the Porte were in the first instance to agree to make an advance, there is no hope of bringing matters to a favourable issue. And if not, is it worth while to have made it in a way which at once breaks up and dissolves entirely the Grand Alliance? I do not mean to say that the other Powers would have dealt fairly by us if we had proposed acting in concert; and if I thought that our acting singly gave us a better chance of success, I should be more decidedly for the measure. But my fear is that the chance is so little improved by this separation, that I cannot help doubting the policy of having made it. I know that we had, in fact, separated before; but what passed hitherto was the negative measure of declining to act with the Alliance; and this is acting without the Allies, and without asking them to act with us. If, however, your influence, and Mr. Stratford Canning's appeal to the Porte, should prevent matters coming to a crisis this year, much good will have been done; for a year saved is a great thing in eventful times.

As long as Greece maintains her superiority at sea she is safe; but the Egyptian navy, and the divisions in that of Greece, may change the scales.

Yours ever, my dear Duke, very sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Whitehall, 3rd March, 1826.
Friday, 3 o'clock.

MY DEAR DUKE,

The two principal events that have occurred since I last wrote to you are the discussion on the state of the silk trade, and that on the issue of Exchequer Bills for the relief of commercial distress.

On the first, which, from the course the debate took, involved the question of free trade generally, Huskisson made a very powerful and successful speech. I believe it converted many who meant to vote against the government; and when we came to the division we had an immense majority, there not being more than forty against us.

Little Williams the lawyer, who married Davenport's daughter, took quite a new line on this occasion, attacked Huskisson as a theorist, and condemned his experiments in trade as unsafe and injurious to the home manufactures.

Canning took up Huskisson's defence very warmly, was bitterly severe on Williams, and covered him with ridicule.

We have been placed in a very unpleasant predicament on the other question—the issue of Exchequer Bills by government. The feeling of the City, of many of our friends, of some of the Opposition, was decidedly in favour of the issue of Exchequer Bills to relieve the merchants and manufacturers.

It was said in favour of the issue, that the same measure had been tried and succeeded in 1793 and 1811. Our friends whispered about that we

were acting quite in a different manner from that in which Mr. Pitt did act, and would have acted had he been alive.

We felt satisfied that, however plausible were the reasons urged in favour of the issue of Exchequer Bills, yet that the measure was a dangerous one, and ought to be resisted by the government.

There are thirty millions of Exchequer Bills outstanding. The purchases lately made by the Bank can hardly maintain them at par. If there were a new issue to such an amount as that contemplated—viz., five millions—there would be a great danger that the whole mass of Exchequer Bills would be at a discount, and would be paid into the revenue. If the new Exchequer Bills were to be issued at a different rate of interest from the outstanding ones—say bearing an interest of five per cent.—the old ones would be immediately at a great discount unless the interest were raised. If the interest were raised the charge on the revenue would be of course proportionate to the increase of the rate of interest. We found that the Bank had the power to lend money on deposit of goods. As our issue of Exchequer Bills would have been useless unless the Bank cashed them, as therefore the intervention of the Bank was in any event absolutely necessary, and as its intervention would be chiefly useful by the effect which it would have in increasing the circulating medium, we advised the Bank to take the whole affair into their own hands at once, to issue their notes on the security of goods, instead of issuing them on Exchequer Bills, such bills being themselves issued on that security.

They reluctantly consented, and rescued us from a very embarrassing predicament.

Their consent was notified to the House of Commons on Tuesday last.

A few days preceding, Canning declared in the House that the government had made up their mind not to issue the Exchequer Bills; and he added, that if the House resolved upon the issue, they must find other instruments than the present ministers to carry their views into effect. This declaration certainly caused great surprise among our friends.

When the declaration was made by Canning, there seemed little chance that the Bank would give way. If they had not given way—that is, if they had not consented to lend money on the deposit of goods—I firmly believe that a motion which Wilson, the member for the City of London, would have made, would have been carried. We must in that case have acted on Canning's declaration, and retired from office.

Canning was mainly induced, I apprehend, to make that declaration by the language held by Lord Liverpool. Lord Liverpool said that he not only felt the issue of Exchequer Bills by the government to be wrong, but he was personally pledged against such a measure, and observed in conversation with more persons than one, that the best mode of solving the difficulty was for him (Lord Liverpool) to retire from office, the rest of the members of the government retaining their offices.

He said this to me in the presence of two other persons, and seemed seriously to think of resigning.

I went to him when he was alone, told him I thought him very wrong in using such language, that if he resigned when the country was in a crisis of financial difficulty—he, the minister who presided over the finances of the country—that he would lose all the credit he had gained by long and

successful service; that the country would right itself in two or three months; that the man who might succeed to him would get all the credit, and he personally all the blame.

I added also, that what he proposed to do—namely, to retire singly—should not take place; that I should feel it dishonourable to allow one member of the government—and that member the head of it—to make himself a sacrifice; and if he retired (though I should feel deeply the necessity of throwing up my share of the government at a moment of danger) yet I could not but consider that his retirement under such circumstances would be a dissolution of the government.

However, from all these difficulties we have been for the present relieved by the concession made by the Bank.

I think I have now written enough to prove to you that the public interest requires that you should not delay your return a single day beyond absolute necessity. The King has not been well.

Halford's account to Lord Liverpool was that he had pain in the lower part of the stomach, that copious bleeding was resorted to, and that this immediately brought on gout.

I do not suppose that we shall have much trouble in the House before Easter.

I think the prevailing feeling among our friends still is that we ought to have issued the Exchequer Bills. My firm opinion is that we were right in refusing, and that had we consented we should have defeated our other measures, and not impossibly have had to answer for another Bank restriction.

There is a great flame in Scotland; violent opposition to the withdrawal of small notes at any period; Walter Scott encouraging the opposition by every appeal to national pride and national feeling.

Ever, my dear Duke, most truly yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 4th March, 1826.

Your Grace's Despatch No. 1, from Berlin,* has been received and laid before the King.

His Majesty has been made acquainted from other quarters with the very flattering reception which your Grace has met with, as well on your journey through the Prussian dominions as from the King of Prussia, and from all the members of his family and government. This reception has been highly gratifying to the King, and I have received his Majesty's commands to express, through Lord Clanwilliam, to his Prussian Majesty and to his government the sense which his Majesty entertains of it.

I have to thank your Grace for the detailed accounts which you have given me of your conversation with the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

There seems to be very little new in what Count Bernstorff stated to

* See page 138.

your Grace, except the remarkable addition which you point out, to the sentiments said to have been uttered by the Emperor Nicholas relative to his Imperial Majesty's position with respect to the affairs of the East, "that the assistance to be given to his Imperial Majesty to induce him to put his affairs in the hands of his Allies must be that of the whole of them, and not of some."

With respect to this addition, I can only state to your Grace that no such sentiment has been expressed to me in the communications which I have received from the Russian government, either through his Majesty's ambassador at St. Petersburg, or through the Russian ambassador in this country. It certainly did not form part of the language held by the Emperor of Russia to the Count de la Ferronays shortly after his Imperial Majesty's accession (as reported by Lord Strangford), and considering the quarters from which alone we hear of it, I cannot help suspecting that it comes rather from the Allies themselves than from his Imperial Majesty.

I am sorry that it is not yet in my power to acquaint your Grace with the arrival of Mr. Stratford Canning at Constantinople. I have had no further intelligence from that gentleman since the despatch, a copy of which I sent to your Grace in my No. 4. But I have seen in the public newspapers letters dated as late as the 25th of January, in which he is said not to have then reached his destination.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,
your Grace's most obedient, humble servant,
GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 4th March, 1826.

I send off this messenger, though I have nothing of official importance to send by him; partly that I may keep you well furnished with the means of communication, and partly that you may be prepared for Count Lieven's arrival.

Count Lieven received about ten days ago a summons from the Emperor to repair to St. Petersburg; leaving it, however, to his discretion to choose the time of his visit. He could not do otherwise than choose the earliest time: and there could not be one more convenient than the present, when I am absorbed by the House of Commons, and when your mission supersedes all necessary communication between Count Lieven and me on public business. He will arrive at Petersburg before your first despatches can reach London.

I only hope that, when at St. Petersburg, he will not be detained there to replace Count Nesselrode. I should be sorry for the change of Count Nesselrode; but Count Lieven could not be replaced here with advantage.

Nothing can be more satisfactory than your reception at Berlin, except, indeed, that which we have reason to know awaits you at St. Petersburg.

The enclosed extract of a letter which I have just received from Sir William Knighton will put you in possession of all that I have to say to you from the King; and of all that I have to tell you of his Majesty.

His Majesty has been very ill, I fear; but now that the malady is settled into a regular fit of gout, the danger I trust, though not the suffering, is over.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 4th March, 1826.

We have avoided the issue of Exchequer Bills, and the consequences (whatever they might have been) of refusing to issue them, by persuading the Bank to lend three millions upon goods. The Bank were very reluctant to take this step; and nothing would have overcome that reluctance, except the knowledge that, strongly as Lord Liverpool was pledged against the Exchequer Bills, and decidedly as the opinion of the City, and perhaps of the country, was pronounced in favour of them, the existence of the government would have been put to hazard by a longer struggle.

The loans by the Bank have begun to work well. Manchester, Glasgow, and Liverpool, have been relieved. London is still sulky. *Perhaps* the persons looking for assistance there are rather great capitalists wanting large and long credits, than possessors of merchandize who want only a few months of accommodation. Things, therefore, are mending upon the whole. But there is still much suffering, and more, I am afraid, is to come before we shall have weathered the crisis.

This general state and temper are felt in our business in the House of Commons, where Estimates get on but slowly; though, as yet, with sufficient majorities. This week has been a wearisome one, and I look for another fortnight of the same character.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 4th March, 1826.

You will greatly oblige me if you will find an opportunity of ascertaining from Count Nesselrode whether what is stated in the enclosed extract is exactly true. Count Lieven's messenger arrived at St. Petersburg on the 4th, or at farthest the 5th of February. That Count Nesselrode should have detained my despatch to Lord Strangford (of which Count Lieven took charge) five or six whole days, communicating with Lord Strangford (as he did) upon your appointment in the mean time, seems so unaccountable, if not incredible, that I confess I shall be uneasy until I obtain some explanation of a circumstance which, if true, and if not accounted for, must preclude any future use of the occasion of a Russian courier, even for the most unimportant despatches.

I ought perhaps to mention, that Lord Strangford had previously

written a querulous sort of a despatch upon hearing of your appointment from other quarters, while he had himself no information of it.

I could wish, therefore, that you would inquire into the delay without bringing him forward in the inquiry.

It is exceedingly important for me to know *where* the mistake lies.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

EXTRACT OF A DESPATCH FROM LORD STRANGFORD, dated St. Petersburg, 11th February (January 30), 1826.

In consequence of some delay in the Foreign Department here (which appears to have been entirely accidental) I did not receive your Despatch, No. 1, until yesterday evening, although the Russian courier by whom it was brought arrived on Saturday last, the 5th instant.

24.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR, St. Petersburg, 5th March (21st February), 1826.

I arrived here on the 2nd, in the middle of the day, and Count Nesselrode called upon me in the evening. I was introduced and delivered my credentials to the Emperor on the morning of the 3rd, and was received by his Imperial Majesty with the utmost kindness and cordiality. His Imperial Majesty was pleased to state that his Majesty could not have done anything more agreeable to him than to send me upon the mission with which I have been charged; and he expressed in the strongest terms his gratitude for the interest which his Majesty had expressed for the loss which his Imperial Majesty has sustained, and for the events which had occurred here in the course of the month of December.

A conversation then ensued with his Imperial Majesty which lasted nearly two hours, of which I will report the important points in another part of this despatch; but which has certainly left upon my mind a very high opinion of his Imperial Majesty's talents.

I will begin, however, with what passed with Count Nesselrode. He commenced by disclaiming any desire on the part of the Emperor to go to war, or any interest in going to war; and these declarations were so strong and so frequently repeated, however little called for by anything I said, that I cannot but believe that he had heard from Berlin of the inquiry which I had made there respecting the Emperor's probable inclinations

and intentions. I confined my replies merely to tell Count Nesselrode that his Majesty's government were sincerely desirous of assisting his Imperial Majesty out of his difficulties with the Porte; that I could prove to him in the clearest manner our sincerity; and that I hoped that if they would have confidence in us we might be able to get the better of all those difficulties. I declined to enter at that moment more at large into the subject, as my papers were not all come up; and in truth I wished to converse a little with others before I should open to this government what I had to say to them. Count Nesselrode then asked me what language he should hold to the ministers of the Allies, who would certainly inquire from him what I had to say. I answered, tell them the truth; that his Majesty's government are disposed to do everything in their power to get the better of these difficulties. I added that when we came to discuss the details of what I should have to communicate to him, he would judge whether secresy would not be necessary in order to enable us to carry into execution the plan which should be agreed upon. Count Nesselrode begged me to say to the Emperor what I had said to him.

When I came to converse with the Emperor upon these same subjects he expressed himself with the utmost frankness as being much disinclined to war, and conscious of all its risks and evil consequences, but he declared that he did not see how he could avoid it with honour. He complains particularly of the conduct of the government of the Porte under the Treaty of Bucharest, and likewise in the Principalities, in which he declares that they continue to violate their treaties, notwithstanding their promises to his Majesty's ambassadors and to the Internuncio;* and in contradiction to the statements of Prince Metternich to the contrary.

His Imperial Majesty is more than indifferent about the Greeks, for he says that he does not see how he can with propriety interfere with the government of the Porte in favour of rebellious subjects. He wishes to know what the notion of his Majesty's government is upon this point, and in what form we shall bring the case under his view, before he will finally decide; but he feels strong objections upon principle to such an interference.

You will observe that this idea of the Greek case is quite

* See vol. ii. of this Series, page 588.

new, and different from that of the Emperor Alexander; and notwithstanding that his Imperial Majesty expressed himself very clearly, I confess I should have doubted that I had perfectly understood him if I had not found that he had expressed the same sentiment to the Archduke Ferdinand and to the French ambassador. So that it appears his Imperial Majesty is adverse to war, but thinks it will be difficult for him to avoid it, not on account of the contest in Greece, but on account of the conduct of the Turkish government towards Russian interests.

There exists no feeling here in favour of the Greeks; nor is there any at present in Germany. The Greeks are considered in Germany as having conducted themselves with great cruelty towards those who went from that country to their assistance; and although I could not trace any such feelings in his Imperial Majesty's mind, it is not impossible that he may not consider the Greek cause as worthy his attention. However, Count Nesselrode did not take the same view of the case as his Imperial Majesty did; and notwithstanding what his Imperial Majesty said, it is not impossible that Russian grievances against the Porte may be laid aside, and that the case of the Greeks may be that to be relied upon.

Upon other points his Imperial Majesty was quite clear and decided. He declared that he considered it a point of honour to have nothing more to do with his continental Allies upon this subject in the way of consultation. The late Emperor, his Imperial Majesty said, had conceived that he had not been treated handsomely, and had determined that he would consult with no one. He should therefore follow his example; and should inform his Allies of his determinations after consulting with his Majesty's government, who appeared better able and disposed to assist him.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

525] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR, St. Petersburg, 5th March (21st February), 1826.

Upon reference to your despatch marked separate and secret, of the 10th February, I have to inform you that in the conversations which I have had with the Emperor of Russia and his minister, both have assured me that the Greeks had

lately sought the protection of the King of France in the same form as they had heretofore that of his Majesty; and that the King of France had declined the proposition, and had given the deputies who brought it nearly the same answer as had been given to the Greek deputies by his Majesty's command.

Monsieur de la Ferronays had given this information to Lord Strangford; and I don't doubt would give the same to me if I were to seek it.

I don't think the paper enclosed in your despatch above referred to contains any proof that the French government had anything to say to the acts of the French Greek committee, or their agents in Greece, or that I could venture to found upon its contents any reasoning to prove that the French government stood upon the Greek question on different ground from that of his Majesty.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [526

SIR, St. Petersburg, 6th March, 1826.

Although I had a good deal of conversation with the Emperor in my interview with his Imperial Majesty on Friday regarding the occurrences here on the 14th (26th) December, I don't think I am enabled to give you any information upon the subject which has not already reached you from Lord Strangford or Lord Clanwilliam.

The general conduct and intentions of the conspirators at different periods were communicated to the public in a newspaper about three weeks ago, of which Lord Clanwilliam sent you a copy.

The Emperor says that the Emperor Alexander certainly was informed of this conspiracy on his late tour by an Englishman, an officer in his service on duty at one of the military colonies.

It is indeed stated that the impression which this information made upon his mind was the cause of his death; as he was ashamed and even alarmed at the consequences of taking steps to arrest those whom he knew were concerned in the conspiracy; and his nerves were so much affected that his medical attendants could not prevail upon him to take medicine or to feel confidence in any chance of recovery. But these facts were not stated to me by the Emperor.

The Emperor says that he thinks he knows the extent of what was intended; but not yet all the persons concerned; nor exactly whether they had any connection with any foreign society or association of conspirators. They certainly had with a similar association in Poland; and through that association and a Polish general residing at Dresden he thinks they had with secret societies at Paris and in London.

There is likewise at present in London a person of some note and rank in the Russian civil service who is known to have belonged to the conspiracy here, and is supposed to have communications with the secret societies in London and Paris. But the Emperor says that he does not consider that he has any proofs of such communications; although he thinks the publications in the 'Morning Post' of December and January last contain some very extraordinary information which could have been communicated only by a person in possession of the most intimate secrets of the conspirators in Russia.

An inquiry is now going on at Warsaw of the same description with that carrying on here under the presidency of the Grand Duke Michel, and the Emperor says that although he is pressed by some to close all these proceedings, he considers it much better to get to the bottom of the affair, and to know the truth, than it is to put an end to all discussions upon the subject among the public a few days earlier than he will be able to do by continuing the inquiries.

I have not discovered much more of the causes and circumstances of the Grand Duke Constantine's abdication than is already known to his Majesty's government, and people are very unwilling to talk upon the subject.

I am informed that ever since the death of the Emperor Paul an apprehension has existed of a similar catastrophe; and that the whole family have been impressed with an apprehension of an attack which was to cut them all off.

The Grand Duke Constantine, although respected on account of his talents and other qualities, is not very mild in his temper or manners; and it is supposed that it was a family object to set him aside, as the risk of the misfortune would be greater during his reign than if any of the other brothers should be upon the throne. His consciousness of the truth of these reasons induced him to make no objection.

Then it must be observed that although the law of the family,

as established by the Emperor Paul, required that the male heir of the family should succeed to the throne, the oath of allegiance had never been altered; and the people had sworn allegiance to the Emperor Alexander, and to the successor to be named by him according to the ancient law of the country; and it is supposed that this fact was urged upon the consideration of the Grand Duke. The Grand Duke's marriage with a Polish lady of the Roman Catholic persuasion was made the condition, or the pretence, for the concession on his part; which however was certainly under consideration long before the period of that marriage; although the Act itself bears date at the same period with the marriage.

The Emperor is sensible of the deficiency among the papers published of that containing the Grand Duke's confirmation (after he had been proclaimed Emperor and allegiance had been sworn to him) of his Act of Abdication agreed upon with the Emperor Alexander; and he admits that the want of this paper might have given reason for the belief that all was not clear and fair between him and his brother. He says that he has that document in his possession; but could not publish it because it contains remonstrances, complaints, and charges drawn in not very moderate terms, against the Senate and authorities of St. Petersburg, who, having sworn allegiance to Alexander and the successor to be named by him, had presumed, in breach of law, order, and the obligation of their oaths, to swear allegiance to him Constantine, instead of to the Emperor Nicholas, appointed by the late Emperor Alexander to be his successor.

The brothers, however, are upon the best terms; and the Emperor expresses himself as entirely satisfied with the conduct of the Grand Duke.

I must do the Emperor Nicholas the justice to state that he appears to have perfect confidence in his officers, soldiers, and people. His conduct on the 14th (26th) December has acquired for him general respect and confidence; and has certainly tended to diminish the feeling for the loss of the Emperor Alexander.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

7.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR, 6th March, 1826.

Since writing my despatch, No. 2, I have had a conversation with Count Nesselrode, in which I informed him of the opinions of the Emperor regarding the Greeks, as detailed. He could not account for these opinions in any manner; but he said that the Emperor had as yet given but little attention to foreign affairs.

The Grand Duke Constantine is stated to be very adverse to the Greeks; and Monsieur de la Ferronays has informed me that his Imperial Majesty stated to him last summer at Carlsbad the very opinions regarding the Greeks and regarding a war with the Porte, which the Emperor had expressed to him as well as to the Archduke and to me. It is supposed, therefore, that the Emperor has received these opinions from the Grand Duke Constantine.

I think his Imperial Majesty is not likely to commence a war with the Porte with the view of re-establishing Russian influence at Constantinople, and that it would be found much more easy to prevail upon the Porte to satisfy his Imperial Majesty in the Principalities than it will be found to induce the government of the Porte to come to a reasonable arrangement with the Greeks.

In the mean time, however, I have thought it best to open to Count Nesselrode what I had to communicate to him; and he listened with much interest to what I said, and those parts of your instructions to Mr. Stratford Canning which I read to him. He gave me no answer; indeed he said that he must take some days to consider of so much important matter; but he appeared well satisfied, and desired me to see the Emperor and speak to his Imperial Majesty. I intend to do so, if possible, to-morrow; and in order to draw his Imperial Majesty's mind to the points of the case I have prepared a Memorandum which contains the purport of what I said to Count Nesselrode; which I will send you by the first messenger.

Count Nesselrode settled with me that he should tell the ministers of the Allies here that his Imperial Majesty's government had some reason to believe that they had discovered the means of promoting an accommodation between Turks and Greeks; upon which they had founded their application to them to depart from their supposed intention of commencing war.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [5

SIR, 7th March (23rd February), 1826.

Having this morning received a note from Count Nesselrode, in which he informed me that the Emperor wished to see me on Thursday, and in the mean time to read any papers which I might have to communicate to his Imperial Majesty, I sent him the enclosed as a confidential communication.

I wrote this paper in as few words as possible, in order to draw the Emperor's attention to the material facts of the case, of which it was obvious to me that he had no knowledge when he spoke to me on Friday last.

It contains those parts of your instructions to Mr. Stratford Canning which I read to Count Nesselrode, and what I said to him; and, besides, a general account of what had passed between his Majesty's government and the late Emperor up to the present period, avoiding as much as possible any more than reference to points of former discussion.

I have not seen Count Nesselrode since yesterday. But the Austrian and French ambassadors are very anxious to have some explanation of the Emperor's notion about the Greeks, as explained to the Archduke and to Count Nesselrode, as well as to me; which notion I am inclined to attribute either to the want of knowledge of the real state of the case, or to the desire to follow the advice and opinions of the Grand Duke Constantine.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

To Count Nesselrode.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, St. Pétersbourg, ce 7me Mars, 1826.

J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer le Memorandum confidentiel que j'avais préparé pour S.M. l'Empereur, pour lui montrer exactement où nous nous sommes trouvés placés dans les questions de l'Orient depuis leur origine, et ce que nous avons à lui proposer à présent. Je prie V.E. de considérer cette communication comme entièrement confidentielle, et pour la connaissance de S.M.I. seule.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM.

7th March, 1826.

After the insurrection had been quelled in the Principalities and Prince Ipsilanti had been driven out, the following were the objects stated by the late Emperor as necessary to be settled by his Allies, previous to his Imperial Majesty resuming his diplomatic relations with the Porte:—

1. The evacuation of the Principalities; and the nomination of the Hospodars.

2. The assurance to the Greek subjects of the Porte of the free exercise of their religion.

3. The reconstruction of the Greek churches which had suffered in the late disturbances.

4. The making a due discrimination in the exercise of the sovereign power between those peaceable and innocent Greeks who adhered to their allegiance and submitted themselves to the law, and those who bore arms or were in revolt against the State; and for the securing as far as possible to the former effectual protection against all arbitrary and oppressive acts whatever, and especially against persecutions on account of their religion.

In the month of November of the year 1822, his Imperial Majesty stated to the Congress of Verona the following points as those which his Imperial Majesty required should be settled with the Ottoman Porte.

[Here enter the note of Monsieur Tatistcheff.] *

The Allies, particularly the British government, undertook to settle these points, as appears by the annexed note and instructions to Lord Strangford. To these points others were subsequently added; and in the month of December, 1823, his Imperial Majesty promised Sir Charles Bagot, then his Majesty's ambassador at St. Petersburg, that as soon as the Turkish government should, by the removal of its troops, have replaced the Principalities in the situation in which they were prior to the late troubles, his Imperial Majesty would re-establish his diplomatic relations with the Porte.†

[illegible]r a long and difficult negotiation, his Imperial Majesty

* See vol. i. of this Series, page 525.

† See vol. ii. of this Series, page 476.

was so far satisfied respecting the arrangement of all the points stated by his Imperial Majesty, as well early in 1822 as in the ultimatum at Verona and subsequently, as that his Imperial Majesty appointed Monsieur de Minciacky to be his chargé-d'affaires at Constantinople; who, towards the end of 1824, presented his credentials.

It is not intended and it is useless now to enter into the discussion whether the appointment of Monsieur de Minciacky ought to have been satisfactory to the British government. The performance by the Porte of the conditions stated at different times by his Imperial Majesty was the only ground on which his Imperial Majesty's Allies could claim from his Imperial Majesty the restoration of his diplomatic relations with the Porte; and his Imperial Majesty's government always contended that the mode in which these relations were re-established ought to have been satisfactory.

This matter is adverted to here thus shortly in order to show the ground his Majesty's government had, and still have, for the belief that the case of the Principalities and all the other matters stated at Verona and subsequently, were settled to his Imperial Majesty's satisfaction; and that nothing remained excepting the pacification between Greeks and Turks.

His Imperial Majesty, considering himself as placed upon the same ground as his Allies at Constantinople as a friendly power in consequence of the settlement of the points above referred to, and by the appointment of Monsieur de Minciacky as chargé-d'affaires, applied to his Allies to join him in conference at St. Petersburg, with a view to consider of the means of inducing the Porte to come to a settlement with the Greeks in revolt; and to put an end to the war in the Levant. His Majesty's government declined to become a party to these conferences, because they did not consider the appointment of Monsieur de Minciacky to be chargé d'affaires as the re-establishment of the diplomatic relations between his Imperial Majesty and the Porte; because both Greeks and Turks objected to the mediation of all or any of the Allied Powers; and because his Majesty's government could not be parties to an interference by menace or arms.

The plenipotentiaries of the Emperor of Austria, the Kings of France and Prussia, attended the conferences at St. Petersburg, and a certain common line of conduct was agreed upon; I am ignorant whether it was strictly carried into execution or not, but

of this I am certain, that from the termination of the conferences at St. Petersburg his Imperial Majesty had no communication with his continental Allies upon the subject which had been in discussion at these conferences. In the month of October last Count Lieven had a confidential communication with his Majesty's Secretary of State, in which he informed Mr. Canning of this state of the question, after a silence upon it ordered by his Imperial Majesty for the duration of nearly nine months. Mr. Canning had at that time despatched Mr. Stratford Canning as his Majesty's ambassador at the Porte; and had already given him the following instruction,* by his Majesty's command, before he had had this communication from Count Lieven.

This instruction must show his Imperial Majesty the anxiety of his Majesty's government to accomplish the views of the late Emperor in respect to the pacification between the Greeks and Turks, notwithstanding that his Imperial Majesty's communications with his Majesty's government were at that moment discontinued. The result of this instruction was not known when I quitted England, nor have I yet learnt it.

Besides the communication made by Count Lieven of the late Emperor's anxiety respecting the state of the war between Greeks and Turks, Count Lieven stated that enquiry was made regarding the foundation of this information; and the result of that enquiry having tended to establish the fact that a belief was entertained in the Ionian Islands and in Greece of the existence in the mind of Ibrahim Pasha of the intention stated, instruction has been given to Mr. Stratford Canning as applicable to that case; and he has been instructed to renew his efforts to obtain the consent of the Porte to accept a mediation for the pacification of Greece. His Imperial Majesty will therefore see that his Majesty's government have not been backward in their efforts to promote the views of the late Emperor; and on the ground of their conduct in the case of the Principalities, and of that in this case, as thus brought under his Imperial Majesty's view, they call for his Imperial Majesty's confidence in the sincerity of the King's wish to forward the views of the late Emperor and to maintain peace.

His Majesty considers his Imperial Majesty entitled to expect from the Porte that the Porte should bring the war with the

* See vol. ii. of this Series, page 530.

Greeks to a conclusion in some manner or other; and his Majesty offers his Imperial Majesty his assistance to attain that object; and to act in concert with his Imperial Majesty to obtain it provided the means to be used are confined to those of remonstrance. His Majesty cannot consider that the refusal of the Porte to attend to the recommendations of the Emperor of Russia will afford justifiable ground of war with the Porte.

His Majesty's government, however, consider that the state of the war in Greece is now such as that the Porte will be disposed to listen to the advice which his Majesty has given, and will hereafter give that government. First, they must see that his Majesty will not suffer any violation of the laws of nations or of the ordinary rules of war in carrying on the contest. Secondly, the interest of the Porte in the final decision of the contest is very remote; as the Porte have certainly made over the Morea to Mahomed Ali, the Pasha of Egypt. Thirdly, his Majesty's government consider themselves as authorised to make such offers of accommodation to the Porte on the part of the Greeks as are calculated to induce the government of the Porte to agree to a settlement; more particularly considering that the Morea has been made over to Mahomed Ali.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [52

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, St. Petersburg, 7th March, 1826.

I am very much obliged to you for the letters from Sir Frederick Adam; and I entertain no doubt that the consequence of war will be that all the European provinces of the Turkish empire will be in insurrection, and under the Russian influence. In what manner the Emperor of Russia is to use that influence, or how he is afterwards to establish order in these provinces, I don't know; nor do I believe anybody here knows it better than I do. That is one of the arguments I have already used successfully I believe with the Emperor of Russia. He talks of stopping at a particular point; and not taking a village for himself, nor increasing his influence or power. But I have told him that he can fix the moment when, and the point at which the first shot will be fired; but that he may as well talk of stopping the course of the Neva as of fixing the limits of his operations if once he goes to war.

In respect to the Ionian Islands, the Russian *employés* abroad think they have the same right that all his Majesty's subjects exercise of plotting and contriving against and revolutionising every country which they approach. I am not quite certain that some of our Liberal diplomatic servants have not an eye to revolutions in some of the countries in which they are placed. Some of them I know have. But I believe the Russian government have as little to say to such schemes at present as we have.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Vienna, 7th March, 1826.

Since I last wrote to you, despatches have been received from Constantinople of the 11th February, at which time Mr. Stratford Canning had not reached Constantinople. He was at anchor off Tenedos, and was delayed by contrary winds. The Internuncio writes that he (Mr. S. Canning) had heard of the ill-humour of the Turkish government at his having had conferences with members of the Greek provisional government, and that he had in consequence desired Mr. Turner to assure the Reis Effendi that he had been driven into Hydra by stress of weather, and that his interview with Mavrocordato, &c., was purely accidental. The Internuncio further states, that the conference was very unsatisfactory; that the Greeks positively refused to treat with the Porte upon any basis but that of their independence; that the conference, however, might be productive of good effects, since the language of Mr. S. Canning had shown the Greeks that they were to expect no support from the great Powers of Europe, and that this might in the end induce them to listen to reasonable terms of accommodation.

Such is the report of the Internuncio, who adds, that he is informed from good authority, that notwithstanding the firmness displayed by Mavrocordato and his colleagues in their conference with Mr. S. Canning, they were afterwards very much depressed at the little encouragement which he gave them to persevere in their efforts, and at the gloomy prospect before them. I should observe, however, that Mr. Turner in his despatches of the same date says not one word in confirmation of the Internuncio's report, either with respect to the instructions given to himself, or to any other part of the statement.

Prince Metternich by no means approves of Mr. Stratford Canning's interview with Mavrocordato, and thinks it is likely to involve him in difficulties at Constantinople. He is of opinion, however, that it may be attended with some advantage with reference to the common object of the Allies.

Believe me ever, my dear Arthur,

most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

M. de Bombelles, who is going to Petersburg as Chargé des Affaires, is the bearer of this letter. I believe he is already known to you, but he has requested me to mention his name to you. I believe him to be in every way worthy of any confidence you may choose to repose in him.

H. W.

Mr. Stratford Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My Lord Duke, Constantinople, 9th March, 1826.

I avail myself of the earliest opportunity to address your Grace.

Owing to the vexatious continuance of north-easterly winds, which have prevailed, with the exception of a few hours, during the last fifty-three days, I did not arrive here till late on the 27th ultimo.

The messenger, who was despatched to me from the Foreign Office a few days after your Grace's departure from London, arrived here yesterday.

I shall lose no time in communicating further with your Grace in as expeditious a manner as the season and state of quarantine on the frontier will allow.

The formalities incidental to my arrival at this ceremonious Court are cruel obstacles in the way of an early commencement of business, to say nothing of more serious difficulties.

The wind, which detained me so long in the Archipelago and at the Dardanelles, and which still keeps my family and baggage on board the *Medina* at Gallipoli, is necessarily unfavourable to the arrival of news from the south. Missolonghi was still holding out against the combined Egyptian and Turkish forces when the latest intelligence came away; and it appears that the Greeks were taking measures for holding the National Assembly, which had been originally convoked for Christmas Day.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

Stratford Canning.

Lord Granville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Paris, 9th March, 1826.

Having been informed that a courier will be despatched this day to St. Petersburg by the Russian ambassador, I avail myself of the opportunity merely to say, that during the last fortnight Canning has been so occupied with the House of Commons, and with the commercial and financial questions now before Parliament, that I have scarcely received a line from him upon foreign politics. St. Petersburg and Constantinople are the points from whence we look for interesting information. The last accounts from Madrid give reason to believe that the Duc de l'Infantado will not long remain minister; he feels most uncomfortable in his present tottering condition, and will most likely resign soon, rather than wait the

result of the intrigues which are now directed against him by the very same party which elevated him to power. Mr. Everett, the American minister, has been plying the Duc de l'Infantado with lengthy memorials on the recognition of South America. France has cogent reasons for wishing that these representations had produced effect; and as we also wish to preserve Cuba to the mother country, and as its preservation depends very much upon the early adoption of Mr. Everett's advice, Lamb very naturally expresses regret at the influence of M. D'Onbril having been exerted to produce hesitation and delay in the decision of his Catholic Majesty. At a moment when we are endeavouring to establish a concert between England and Russia upon the affairs of Eastern Europe, it is to be lamented that upon the Spanish American question, where, in fact, there can be no clashing of interests, the two Courts should appear in opposition to each other. If circumstances were stationary, and that Cuba six months hence would not be in greater danger than at present, there might be some justification of the delay which M. D'Onbril has counselled; but it is these delays which have lost South America to Spain. If the King of Spain upon his restoration could have adopted a liberal commercial policy with regard to his colonies, he might have preserved them. If, not very long ago, he would have recognised the independence of the different republics, he might have obtained from them probably great pecuniary sacrifices for his recognition; if he would recognise now, he may save Cuba and Porto Rico; but if he delays still further this recognition, he may perhaps be able to obtain by it no more than relieving the coasts of Old Spain from blockade and insult.

The discussions here in the Chambers proceed very slowly. The primogeniture law will probably be debated next week in the Peers. The ministers believe the law will pass, but its opponents are very numerous, and it is without doubt very unpopular in the country. The St. Domingo question is debated with much warmth, but the ministers will certainly have a majority.

I am, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

MEMORANDUM.—[Translation.]

M. de Sarratea to the Right Hon. George Canning.

Grosvenor Street, 11th March, 18

Though the military events which took place on the eastern ba
the Uruguay obliged the government of the United Provinces to ex
evacuation of the territory in a more peremptory manner than bef
the communications addressed on that account to the Brazilian
were accompanied by overtures to treat for the mode of ob
ject peaceably, and of thus saving the interests and pret
rties concerned.

rtunately the councils of his Imperial Majesty
d by a similar spirit; notwithstanding this, howe
Provinces is willing to flatter itself that

in its endeavours for accommodating its differences with the Court of Brazil, by means of an amicable negotiation, since it has not been able to avoid a rupture, it shall at least succeed in sparing fresh and mutual sacrifices by accelerating the termination of the war.

It has afforded particular satisfaction to the government of Buenos Ayres to have coincided on this point with the desires of his Britannic Majesty's government, and it perceived with no small pleasure that it had anticipated them by instructing the undersigned to apply himself, first and foremost, to the promoting of the adjustment of its differences with the Court of Brazil under the auspices of the government of his Britannic Majesty, as the latter possessed the confidence of both the parties interested. Prepared for this, the undersigned is once more authorised to repeat the declarations which he had the honour to address to his Excellency Mr. George Canning, his Britannic Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the 6th of December of last year, and on the 28th of January of the present, informing his Excellency of the sincere disposition of his government to negotiate the evacuation of the eastern bank of the Uruguay upon the basis proposed on that occasion. The same government will consider it as a fortunate event if the compliance of the Brazilian Cabinet with the method proposed of accommodating the subsisting differences remove every contingency in which the vicissitudes of war frequently implicate affairs beyond what human prudence is capable of foreseeing, so that those engaged in it are hurried to extremes mutually ruinous and destructive.

The undersigned would not miss the present opportunity to observe that some governments of the European continent have not contented themselves with permitting the supply and transmission of troops, officers, arms and ammunition, to the ports of Brazil and Montevideo, an assistance which the government of the United Provinces could not desire with the least probability of success, but have gone the length of providing the agents of Brazil and of Paraguay with articles of that description from the public arsenals; and there is reason to apprehend that this foreign interference may occasion some deviation from the line of conduct which the government of the United Provinces has proposed to itself to pursue in this business, if the intervention of the government of his Britannic Majesty do not meet in the councils of his Imperial Majesty with the corresponding reception which is expected. The undersigned also hastens to put his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs on his guard against the effect of some suggestions, alike unjust and devoid of any plausible foundation, that would attribute to the government of the United Provinces the design of assailing the stability of the Imperial government of Brazil, by insidious and exceptionable means, as if the existence of that government were incompatible with its own. On this subject the undersigned hesitates not to affirm, that no fact can be produced in support of that assertion, and that the government of the United Provinces will not cease to observe with the same scrupulosity as heretofore the principle which it avows, of respecting the integrity and independence of other governments, whatever their form may be. The territory which is actually contested has at no period been an integral part of Brazil; the Court of Brazil has on various occasions declared that the occupation was merely

temporary, and before the course of events compelled the United Provinces to commit the justice of its cause to the fate of arms, it vainly employed the means suggested to it by the spirit of concord, and by the desire of preserving amity and good intelligence with a neighbouring State.

But this new order of things by no means precludes the return to former expedients, provided the government of Brazil be animated with the same spirit, in which case the undersigned is willing to flatter himself that the mutual desire of maintaining peace and good harmony, so necessary to infant States, will, after removing the object of the present dispute, suggest reciprocal guarantees for the time to come, and that the government of the United Provinces will not refuse acceding to any terms compatible with its honour and independence.

The undersigned, in making the above observations, with the view of his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of his Britannic Majesty being pleased to recommend them to the attention of whoever may be interested in them, and that they may be taken into consideration at the proper period, has the honour, &c.,

MANUEL DE SARRATEA.

530.] *To Count Nesselrode.*

MEMORANDUM ON THE NOTE TO BE PRESENTED BY M. DE MINCIACKY TO THE PORTE.

St. Petersburg, (11th March) 27th February, 1826.

I have perused with the utmost attention the Note intended to be presented to the Porte by Monsieur de Minciacky, which his Imperial Majesty was pleased to communicate to me on Thursday night, upon which I beg leave to submit the following observations.

The Note refers to some points not adverted to in the late Emperor's protestation of the 1st (13th) October, 1825,* which refers only to the Principalities.

In regard to the Principalities, the enclosed copy of a report from the Internuncio, which I believe his Imperial Majesty has not seen, will show his Imperial Majesty what the result has been of the enquiries made by the Internuncio regarding the mode of appointment of the Bash-Beshli-Agas heretofore in practice, and that recently adopted of appointing these officers. If there should still remain any doubt of the facts, it would probably be desirable to send officers on the spot to ascertain and report upon them.

I would likewise beg leave to submit to his Imperial Majesty

* See page 191.

that according to the information which I have received, there are no Servian deputies detained in the prisons of the Bostangi Bashi.

There have at all times been Servian hostages at Constantinople, as I understand, but these are stated as not being in confinement; and these of course can have no relation with the Treaty of Bucharest.

If Servian deputies have been brought to Constantinople under pretence of discussing an arrangement for the government of their country promised by treaty, and such Servian deputies have been put in the prisons of the Bostangi Bashi by the government of the Porte, no man can doubt of the right of his Imperial Majesty to insist upon the release of those deputies. It is much to be regretted that this demand was never made before.

I would likewise again beg leave to submit to his Imperial Majesty, as I before submitted in conversation, how doubtful it is that the government of the Porte will be able to find individuals to whom that government can give its confidence and full powers to act as plenipotentiaries to treat with those of his Imperial Majesty in the arrangements of the Treaty of Bucharest on the frontiers of his Imperial Majesty's empire; how little probable that any individuals would consent to be so employed; and the extreme probability that those so employed would be destroyed on their return to Constantinople.

If, however, his Imperial Majesty should determine that these demands shall be made, I beg leave to submit for his Imperial Majesty's consideration the alterations in the Note proposed in the annexed draft of the Note.

The omission of the name of Lord Strangford is proposed because in fact that ambassador did not obtain a promise, as is understood by his Majesty's government, regarding any matter connected with the civil arrangements of the Principalities.

It is not the less necessary that those arrangements, if not already executed, should be carried into effect. But his Lordship considered that their execution would have been the result of the arrival of the Russian consuls in the Principalities.

It is desirable to omit in the first part of the paper all reference to the Treaty of Bucharest.

I understand the Note to be presented by Monsieur de Min-

ciacky to mean this. The Porte must strictly execute the treaties regarding the Principalities; must release the Servian deputies imprisoned by the Bostangi Bashi; and must send plenipotentiaries to the frontier to treat respecting the arrangements of the Treaty of Bucharest in one month or Monsieur de Minciacky must come away.

But his Imperial Majesty cannot intend that the Porte should carry into execution one Article, the 8th of the Treaty of Bucharest, regarding the constitution for the Servians, in one month, all the other Articles of the Treaty remaining unexecuted; much less can his Imperial Majesty expect that the plenipotentiaries shall in that space of time be named at Constantinople, arrive upon the frontier, and conclude and sign the arrangements for executing the Treaty of Bucharest.

The alterations which I have proposed to the intended Note make what I suppose to be his Imperial Majesty's intention apparent. Accordingly, I have proposed to omit all reference to the Treaty of Bucharest till his Imperial Majesty's decided determination is stated. The arrangements of the Treaty of Bucharest are then proposed to become matter of contestation and negotiation; some on the frontier of his Imperial Majesty's dominions, that regarding the government of the Servians at Constantinople.

The Note would require greater alteration than I have ventured to suggest to make its meaning quite clear; and yet the more clear and precise the expression of its meaning, the more likely it is to attain his Imperial Majesty's object.

WELLINGTON.

Count Nesselrode to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

St. Pétersbourg, ce 12me Mars, 1826.

J'ai l'honneur, Monsieur le Duc, de vous envoyer une lettre que j'ai reçue cette nuit par un courier de Vienne. Ce courier nous apporte les nouvelles les plus alarmantes de la santé de l'Empereur d'Autriche. Vous verrez par les détails contenus dans la dépêche ci-jointe de M. de Tatistcheff, que je vous prierai de me restituer, lecture faite, par le porteur, qu'il était à toute extrémité. Dieu préserve l'Europe de ce nouveau malheur!

Je regrette beaucoup de ne vous avoir pas vu depuis deux jours, mais avant hier j'ai passé 24 heures à l'Eglise de Casure, et hier j'ai été si mal à mon aise à la suite d'une si triste et fatigante journée, que j'ai été hors d'état de m'occuper de la moindre affaire. Mais aujourd'hui je suis prêt à reprendre nos conversations, j'espère qu'elles serviront à éclaircir le point

sur lequel vous m'avez témoigné quelque sollicitude avant hier, et que nous parviendrons à nous entendre sur une question qui, pour ne laisser aucun germe d'inquiétude en Europe, demande surtout à être réglée d'une manière honorable pour la dignité de l'Empereur comme pour les intérêts de la Russie.

J'aurai donc l'honneur de passer chez votre Excellence à 2½ heures, si cela lui convient, et le prie d'agréer tous mes hommages.

NESSELRODE.

To Count Nesselrode.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, St. Petersburg, (13th) 1st March, 1826.

In submitting to his Imperial Majesty's consideration the Memorandum which I put into your Excellency's hands this day, I beg that your Excellency will lay before his Imperial Majesty my earnest request, that he will delay to transmit to Constantinople the Note which his Imperial Majesty proposes to order Monsieur de Minciacky to present to the government of the Porte, till his Imperial Majesty shall have given me time to communicate with his Majesty's government, in order that they may have an opportunity of taking his Majesty's commands upon the exercise of his Majesty's good offices to induce the Porte to comply with his Imperial Majesty's demands.

I would likewise request your Excellency to submit to his Imperial Majesty that it would be very desirable, if his Imperial Majesty would give the Porte more time for consideration and its arrangements than a month from the period of the delivery of the Note.

His Imperial Majesty has upon more than one occasion expressed to me his magnanimous determination not to add even a village to his dominions, or to augment his influence by any political arrangement in case military operations should be the result of the discussions into which his Imperial Majesty is now about to enter with the Porte, in conformity with the determination heretofore expressed to his Allies by the late Emperor Alexander.

It would certainly be very satisfactory to the King's government to be enabled to remove all uneasiness on this subject by receiving in writing a declaration to the same purport as that which his Imperial Majesty has more than once been graciously pleased to make to me verbally.

There is likewise one other point which I have been par-

ticularly directed to urge upon the attention of his Imperial Majesty's government, and that is, the necessity that when the three points stated in the Note to be presented by Monsieur de Minciacky shall have been conceded, his Imperial Majesty should re-establish his diplomatic relations with the Porte on that footing which is suitable to the dignity of the Sovereign to be represented, and to the nature of the relations existing between the two States.

It is not the wish of his Majesty's government to revive former discussions, or even to advert to them; but there is no doubt that the late Emperor authorised Sir Charles Bagot, the late ambassador from his Majesty at his Imperial Majesty's Court in the month of December, 1823, to declare his intention of re-establishing his usual diplomatic relations with the Porte, as soon as his Imperial Majesty should be satisfied on all the points of which he had entrusted the negotiation to Lord Strangford; and I would beg leave to observe that, exclusive of the advantage which may be derived from being able to hold out the hope of such a conclusion in the negotiation now to be opened, his Imperial Majesty's government will derive the greatest advantage from the restoration of his Imperial Majesty's usual diplomatic relations, as well in the negotiations to be hereafter carried on with the plenipotentiaries of the Porte on the Russian frontier as in other respects.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

32.] *To Count Nesselrode.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, St. Petersburg, (13th) 1st March, 1826.

I send you the draft of the letter * which I propose to write to Mr. Stratford Canning, if his Imperial Majesty should not consent to defer to despatch the proposed Note to M. de Minciacky until I shall have communicated it to the government of the King my master.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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* See page 255.

To Count Nesselrode. [53

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, St. Petersburg, (13th) 1st March, 1826.

I have the honour to inform you that in a conversation which Mr. Stratford Canning had with certain leading persons in Greece upon his passage through the Archipelago,* they stated that the Greeks were desirous of terminating their contest with the Porte by means of an amicable arrangement, and that they were charged by their government to solicit the good offices of Great Britain.

The terms which the persons above referred to stated that the leading men of the country were of opinion that it would be for their interest to accept were, if attainable, an arrangement similar to that by which the republic of Ragusa had formerly been placed under the sovereignty of the Porte. It was considered that the Greeks would be content to pay an annual tribute to the Sultan; and perhaps to indemnify the Turkish land-holders for the loss of their property in the Morea, provided that they enjoyed a total separation from the Turks.

Objections were stated to a form of government similar to that which prevails in the Principalities on the Danube; although those who made this communication were not disposed to reject altogether the idea of conceding to the Porte some degree of participation in the appointment of the principal authorities.

In respect to the extent of territory to be included in the denomination *Greece*, these gentlemen appeared to think that that point must depend upon the state of the operations of the war.

Acceptez, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir H. Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Vienna, 13th March, 1826. 4 P.M.

I have just heard that a courier is going to St. Petersburg, and I write you a line to say that the Emperor is ill of an inflammation on his chest. He was taken ill on Friday morning at four o'clock, was blooded twice on that day, and on the following morning had leeches applied to his shoulder, where he had a rheumatic pain. He was blooded again yesterday, and passed a tolerably quiet night, but had a good deal of fever this morning.

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* See page 121.

However, I have just heard from Prince Metternich that he is quiet and in a violent perspiration, and that the physicians say that at present he is going on as well as the nature of the disorder will admit. Public prayers have been ordered for him, but the theatres are not shut; and I hope that all danger (if there ever has been any) is over.

This attack was very sudden. I was with the Emperor on Thursday morning, having had a letter to deliver to him from the King, and I thought I had never seen him in better looks or spirits.

I write in great haste, in order not to miss Tatistcheff's courier.

Ever most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I have written to you by M. de Bombelles, who is to set out for St. Petersburg in a day or two.

Count Nesselrode to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

St. Pétersbourg, ce (14) 2me Mars, 1826.

Je supplie votre Excellence de vouloir bien parcourir les deux pièces ci-jointes. La première lui prouvera que c'est bien effectivement sur le *status quo* avant les troubles de 1821 que portaient les promesses données à Lord Strangford par la Porte. La seconde, qui est le Protocole de la dernière conférence de M. de Minciacky, vous convaincra, Monsieur le Duc, que les *Serviens* arrêtés et détenus à Constantinople sont ceux qui composaient la députation envoyée par leur pays pour traiter sous notre médiation des privilèges stipulés par l'Article VIII. du Traité de Boucarest.

Veuillez, lecture faite, me restituer ces pièces, et agréer mes hommages les plus empressés.

NESSELRODE.

1.] *To Count Nesselrode.*

St. Pétersbourg, ce (14) 2me Mars, 1826, à onze heures.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

Je viens d'avoir l'honneur de recevoir la note de votre Excellence de ce matin; et il n'y a pas le moindre doute que la dépêche de Lord Strangford du 29me Juin, 1824, adressée à votre Excellence, autorise le gouvernement de sa Majesté Impériale à dire dans la Note, que la Porte avait promis à son Excellence que le *status* du temps antérieur aux troubles dans les Principautés serait entièrement rétabli; et que cette promesse se référait nommément aux *Beshlis*.

Pour ce qui regarde l'affaire des Serviens, il est clair, d'après ce qui s'est passé à la conférence du 1er (13me) Octobre, que la députation Servienne ayant été amenée à Constantinople pour

traiter avec la Porte sur le gouvernement de la Servie, d'après les stipulations de l'Article VIII. du Traité de Boucarest, a été convertie par la Porte en sécurité pour la fidélité de la nation Servienne pendant l'insurrection Grecque, et ses membres en otages; et qu'ils ont été détenus en prison, jusqu'au moment actuel.

La Porte peut avoir le droit de demander des otages de la fidélité à la nation Servienne. Elle peut même avoir agi avec prudence en donnant de la sécurité à la députation de cette nation qui se trouvait à Constantinople au moment où les troubles ont éclaté, et que les massacres ont eu lieu. Mais je m'assure qu'il n'y a personne qui ne prononce que des députés attirés à Constantinople pour arranger l'exécution d'un article de traité n'aient pas dû être convertis en otages, ni mis en prison, et surtout n'aient pas dû y être détenus.

Je prierais V.E. d'avoir la bonté de me faire tenir confidentiellement une copie du Protocole de la Conférence du 1er (13me) Octobre.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, M. le Comte, avec la considération la plus distinguée, de V.E. le très obéissant serviteur,

WELLINGTON.

M. de Sarratea to Lord Howard de Walden.

[Translation.]

Grosvenor Street, 14th March, 1826.

In reply to your Lordship's note, which I have received this moment I do myself the honour to state, that it was doubtless by a slip of the pen that the date of the 7th of November found its way into my letter instead of that of the 6th of December, the day on which I had the honour to address myself, for the first time, to his Excellency the Secretary of State.

The basis proposed at that time, and reproduced on the 28th of January last, is the same that was admitted by the Court of Portugal, in consequence of the reclamations of Spain, and communicated by the Court of Portugal to the government of Buenos Ayres on the 23rd July, 1823; and though that basis does not expressly specify any pecuniary compensation, I have understood, and it has always been believed, "that it includes a compensation for the expenses incurred by the Court of Portugal."

In proposing the basis in question, I adhered to the letter of my instructions, with the addition, to which they also refer, that the object of the United Provinces is, that they, as well as Brazil, have substituted themselves for Portugal and Spain; that neither of them lays claim to more rights than those of the governments to which they antecedently belonged; and that the United Provinces adopt the conditions upon which Portugal

consented to restore to Spain the east bank of the Uruguay. Among these conditions, as observed above, I have understood the compensation to be included.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

MANUEL DE SARRATEA.

35.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.**

SIR, (16th) 4th March, 1826.

I did not see the Emperor till the afternoon of the 10th, when I had a long conversation with his Imperial Majesty. After expressing his satisfaction with the communication which I had made to him by the King's command, and his gratitude to his Majesty for the interest which his Majesty had manifested for the welfare and peace of his Imperial Majesty's government, his Imperial Majesty began by making some observations upon the paper which I had communicated to him, the most important of which referred to his own feelings and intentions respecting the Greeks.

Upon this point his Imperial Majesty said that it was quite a mistake to suppose that there was any feeling in the Russian nation in favour of the Greeks in a state of revolt; and that neither the late Emperor nor his Imperial Majesty himself had any such inducement to interfere in their favour.

His Imperial Majesty afterwards went more at large into the subject. He said that he was so situated in relation to the Porte as not to be able to approach that government with any proposition which should not be accompanied by a menace; and that he did not think he could with propriety menace the Porte in order to induce that government to come to an arrangement with its revolted subjects. His Imperial Majesty said that if he did take such steps he should think that he gave the Porte just ground for exciting his Mahomedan subjects against his own authority.

His Imperial Majesty afterwards stated that his quarrel with the Porte was not about the Greeks, but for his own just rights under treaties which the Porte had violated, and which they still delayed and refused to carry into execution; and his Imperial Majesty felt that he must menace them in very strong language in order to obtain for himself even an answer, much more justice.

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* This letter is given although it is little more than a *précis* of the Memorandum that follows at page 179, as some of the points are most graphically put.—ED.

I observed to his Imperial Majesty that a menace not carried into execution, was not calculated to be of much use; and that it appeared to me that it was impossible to carry the menace into execution on any of the alleged grounds that had ever come under my view.

His Imperial Majesty replied, You menace and expect to attain your object, and why should not I? A discussion then ensued, into the detail of which I will not enter at present, in order to avoid to lengthen this despatch; in which I pointed out the difference in all respects between the menace by his Majesty's government and that of his Imperial Majesty; which was ended by his Imperial Majesty saying that he had no intention to make war; that his intention was to occupy the Principalities till the Porte should do him justice, and defray a part, at least, of the expense of his operation; and he should then retire within his own frontier without demanding for himself even a village.

A discussion then ensued upon the military part of the case, in which I endeavoured to prove to his Imperial Majesty that the line of action which he proposed was impracticable; and that he could not remain within the line of the Danube, but must advance and carry on the war in earnest, or retire; and that, at all events, he must be embarrassed by the renewed rebellion of the Greeks, the rising of the Servians and others, upon his entering the Principalities; which nations would remain with claims upon his Imperial Majesty which would greatly embarrass him.

The Emperor did not admit the necessity of quitting the Principalities; or that he could not keep the Servians, &c., in order; and ended this part of the discussion by saying that, considering that his Majesty was likely to be carrying on an operation by sea at the same time, it was not very probable that the Porte would refuse to attend to his just demands, stated in a forcible manner.

I explained to his Imperial Majesty how little chance there was that such operations would be carried on at all; and, on the contrary, the great probability that even the discussion of the subject was over by this time. At all events I entreated his Imperial Majesty to consider well whether the objects in view were worthy of the risk and certain expense of money and men in their attainment.

His Imperial Majesty then said that he was the successor of

his brother, the late Emperor, by his will; and that he considered himself bound to carry into execution his last wishes and intentions.

His Imperial Majesty then produced a Note, of which I have since got a copy, which I enclose*, which he intended that Monsieur de Minciacky should present to the Porte, and read it and commented upon it as he went on. The object of this Note is, first, to claim the execution of the treaties respecting the Principalities and the *status quo* anterior to the disturbances; particularly regarding the appointment of the Beshlis and the Bash-Beshli-Agas; secondly, the release of certain Servian deputies confined in the prisons of the Bostangi Bashi; thirdly, that plenipotentiaries shall be sent to the Russian frontier to settle the arrangements for the execution of the Treaty of Bucharest.

I will not now trouble you with the detail of the conversation which passed upon this Note, particularly as the principal points of it are stated in a Memorandum † which I sent to his Imperial Majesty on the 13th instant, of which I enclose a copy, objecting to all the demands proposed to be made in the Note.

In case, however, his Imperial Majesty should persist in making these demands, I entreated his Imperial Majesty to be pleased to alter the Note, as suggested in a copy which I sent to his Imperial Majesty, which I likewise enclose.‡ Besides the topics of the discussion with his Imperial Majesty, adverted to in the Memorandum, there was a good deal of discussion upon the Treaty of Bucharest, upon which I told his Imperial Majesty that his Majesty's government had always avoided to have any discussion with the Porte; and I did not conceal from his Imperial Majesty that we really believed that in the conflicting pretensions on this Treaty the Russian government were in the wrong; and we wished to avoid to consider a question in which it was probable that we might have to decide against their pretensions; and I earnestly entreated his Imperial Majesty not to press a point, of the justice of which his Imperial Majesty was not quite certain. His Imperial Majesty went to Czarskoe Zelo on the day after I had the interview with him, and I have not seen him since. But I have had some communications with Count Nesselrode. I repeated to him all the objections which I stated to his Imperial Majesty to the course of proceeding

* See page 233. † See page 164. ‡ See page 233.

proposed; and I wrote him the enclosed letter * to entreat that the transmission of the Note might be delayed till the sentiments of his Majesty's government might be known; that a longer period might be given to the Porte to perform the conditions required; and that the Emperor's promise, made to me verbally, that he would not extend his frontier, might be given in writing; and that his Imperial Majesty might likewise promise in writing, for the satisfaction of my government, that if the objects of the intended proceeding were attained, his Imperial Majesty would immediately re-establish his diplomatic relations with the Porte on the footing which suited his dignity and the importance of the relations between the two Powers.

I had communicated all these papers to Count Nesselrode before I sent them to him to be delivered to the Emperor, and found him particularly warm upon the subject of Lord Strangford's name being omitted in the Note; and upon that of the Servian deputies, respecting whom he insisted that I had been misinformed. I had, however, received my information from Lord Strangford, who had declared that the Servians in question were not deputies, but hostages; and that they were not in confinement, as he had himself seen them coursing in the neighbourhood of Constantinople.

I received, however, a letter from Count Nesselrode,† on the morning of the 14th, including an original despatch from Lord Strangford to Count Nesselrode, dated the 29th June, 1824, which contains the following passages, as being what the Reis Effendi said to his Lordship:—

"En raison de la teneur de ces réponses, nous avons résolu de retirer immédiatement la moitié des Beshlis stationnés dans les deux provinces, ou bien en d'autres mots, d'acquiescer à la proposition que notre ami l'ambassadeur nous a faite au nom et de la part de notre bon voisin l'Empereur de Russie, en rendant le nombre des Beshlis qui devront y rester égal à celui qui s'y trouvait autrefois en tems de paix."

"Mais ce n'est pas seulement à l'égard de la diminution des Beshlis que la Sublime Porte acquiesce aux propositions contenues dans la Note de l'ambassadeur. Elle a encore l'intention de rétablir sur tous les points aussitôt, et en tant que les circonstances le permettront, l'ancien ordre de choses dans les deux Principautés, dont elle ne s'est écartée qu'en raison des évènemens imprévus qui sont survenus dans ces provinces. Et pour ce qui regarde les Beshlis en particulier, on trouvera la Sublime Porte sincèrement disposée à consentir à telle autre réduction ultérieure que les Hospodars jugeront nécessaire, du moment où le rétablissement de la tranquillité et l'absence des dangers qui aujourd'hui encore ne sont que trop imminens, permettront de

* See page 167. † See page 170.

procéder à cette réduction. L'ambassadeur, et les Cours au nom desquelles il parle, ne tarderont pas à se convaincre que la Sublime Porte fait plus encore qu'elle ne promet."

In this letter from Count Nesselrode was likewise enclosed the Protocol of the Conference between the Reis Effendi and Monsieur de Minciacky on the 1st (13th) of October,* in which the former distinctly admits that the Porte had seized the Servian deputies brought to Constantinople in order to negotiate the settlement of the government of their country under the 8th Article of the Treaty of Bucharest; had converted them into hostages for the fidelity of the Servians; had imprisoned them under pretence that their persons were not in safety in Constantinople, and still retained them in prison. Whatever Lord Strangford might urge regarding the meaning of the expressions in his despatch, and although he might allege that as the late Emperor had demanded only the military *status quo*, the promise of the Reis Effendi could not be supposed to refer to the civil state of the Principalities, I could not deny that the terms of his Lordship's despatch gave the Russian government a right to say that the Reis Effendi had promised his Lordship the restoration of the *status quo* in the Principalities, without limitation, particularly in relation to the *Beshlis;* nor could I deny that it was the Servian deputies that were taken as hostages for the fidelity of the Servians and confined, and still confined, in the prisons of the Bostangi Bashi; nor could I deny that the Emperor had a right to complain of this undenied breach of the law of nations. I accordingly wrote the enclosed note to Count Nesselrode.† Count Nesselrode has promised to send me the Protocol of the Conference between Monsieur de Minciacky and the Reis Effendi of the 1st (13th) October, 1825; but in the mean time I send you that part of it which relates to the Servian deputies of which I have procured a copy.

I have endeavoured to ascertain exactly what it is of which the Russian government complain in the Principalities; and it is this. The Beshlis are Turkish police appointed to keep order among Turks resorting to the Principalities; and the Bash-Beshli-Agas their officers. It is difficult to say that the Beshlis formerly employed were not soldiers; because all Turks are, more or less, of the military profession. But they were hired by the Princes themselves, or by the Bash-Beshli-Agas, who although

* See vol. ii. of this Series, page 536. † See page 170.

they received some kind of appointment from the Grand Seignor, were recommended by the Princes, and received from them respectively the confirmation of their appointment and the authority to act within the Principalities. This is the state to which the Russian government wish to bring the arrangement.

The following is the state in which it stood on the 1st (13th) October, 1825 and in which it stands at present, unless the Internuncio has effected an alteration, as he states he has in the enclosed letter. Upon Ipsilanti's rebellion the Turks sent into the Principalities an army of 30,000 men, which of course destroyed everything. After much time, difficulty and negotiation, this army was by degrees withdrawn, with the exception of a small detachment, commanded by officers of this army left in each of these Principalities as Beshlis, or police; the officers and Beshlis being nominated by the Porte or the Pasha of Silistria, instead of by the Princes.

These officers and troops, being accustomed to plunder, of course continue the practice; and are, as stated by the Russian government, the terror of the government and of the people of the Principalities. This is what the Russian government complain of, and with great reason in my opinion, as I know enough of irregular troops, particularly of those of the East, to be very certain that no delegated government, whose duration is limited in point of time, can go on with such a body existing in the country, not under the control of the government, but under that of another Power interested in creating confusion instead of preserving peace and good order.

If the Internuncio has effected an alteration since October last, as he says he has, the cause of complaint is at an end; but still it is but fair to admit that the Emperor, having his chargé-d'affaires at Constantinople, has cause of complaint that the Porte should have refused to attend to the complaint and protestation of the late Emperor upon this subject, should have given no answer to that protestation, and should afterwards have attended and yielded to the remonstrance of the Internuncio; but still should have been silent upon the late Emperor's complaint up to this day. This conduct of the Porte, the system of disrespect and in some instances of insult to this government which they have pursued since the commencement of these negotiations, have created a degree of irritation here which it is impossible to describe. There is scarcely a Russian who does

not think himself humiliated. The success of the other Powers in obtaining justice for the demands of the Russians rather increases than diminishes the irritation, and many of them think that the late Emperor was cajoled by the Allies to sacrifice the true interests of his empire in order to attend to their interests in other parts of the world.

I don't think there is any desire for war anywhere. In the conversation which I had with the Emperor, it was quite obvious that he not only did not wish for war, but that he had never considered the subject much. He had thought of no more than of occupying the Principalities; which is an operation likely to be attended by all the expense, loss, and disagreeable consequences of war, without its honour or advantages. Then the Emperor thought so little of these operations, that, however desirous of establishing a military reputation, he did not think of joining the army unless the army should be obliged to cross the Danube, of the possibility of which he had never thought.

It is quite obvious then to me that none of them wish for war; but that they wish to get out of the difficulty in which they are placed, very much by their own mistakes, with as much honour as possible.

It is my opinion that there can be no difficulty in the case of the Principalities or that of the Servian deputies. The Porte have now gone so near the strict performance of their engagements in the first case, that they cannot refuse to perform what may remain; nor do I think they can persist in keeping in prison as hostages, deputies brought to Constantinople under pretence of arranging the execution of the 8th Article of the Treaty of Bucharest.

But I am apprehensive that these concessions will not be sufficient; there remains behind still the satisfaction of the national honour, and likewise the desire of having the advantage of settling the Treaty of Bucharest with plenipotentiaries brought to Odessa instead of with the ministers at the Porte. If the Porte were wise they would agree to all that will be proposed to them; as the most important point to the Porte would be to finish all questions with Russia. But unfortunately such wisdom is not to be expected.

The Emperor is not yet returned from Czarskoe Zelo, and the Court will be for some days occupied with the ceremonies of the funeral. But I will make another attempt to prevent the

demand that the plenipotentiaries should be sent, on the ground of the probability that the Porte would comply with all other demands; would declare its readiness to carry into execution all the provisions of the Treaty of Bucharest, provided his Imperial Majesty would do the same; and of the impossibility of executing the menace only because it declines to send plenipotentiaries to the frontier.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [536

SIR, (16th) 4th March, 1826.

On the morning after the interview which I had with the Emperor of Russia I wrote down everything that occurred, as far as I could recollect; and as the conversation referred to written documents, I don't think I have omitted or misstated anything material.

I enclose a copy of this Memorandum, which I hope will be considered as confidential.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

11th March, 1826.

I had a conversation with his Imperial Majesty last night, of which what follows is the purport, and in some parts the detail.

His Imperial Majesty began by asking whether he was to speak to me *en diplomate* or *en ami;* and I answered that as I considered his interests and those of the King my master so much the same on the subject to which his Imperial Majesty was about to talk to me, and as I had already informed his Imperial Majesty of the acts and intentions of the King's government, I hoped his Imperial Majesty would talk to me freely, and would allow me likewise to give him my opinion with freedom.

His Imperial Majesty then expressed his satisfaction with the communication which I had made to him by the King's command; and his gratitude to his Majesty for the interest which

his Majesty had manifested for the welfare and peace of his Imperial Majesty's government. His Imperial Majesty then told me that he had made some memoranda of observations upon the paper which I had sent him, which he would look over; and talk to me upon each of them.

The first point on which his Imperial Majesty spoke to me was the mission of Monsieur de Minciacky. His Imperial Majesty said that the late Emperor had selected the person to represent him at the Porte, and had appointed Monsieur de Minciacky to be his chargé-d'affaires, because his Imperial Majesty had imagined from Lord Strangford's representations that the Porte had consented to place all the establishments and arrangements in the Principalities *in statu quo*, as referable to the period prior to the late troubles; and he promised to send Monsieur de la Ribeaupierre when all the troops should be removed, under the impression that the other arrangements had been or would be carried into execution. But that nothing had been done. That at this moment the treaty with Russia was grossly violated; that the country was oppressed and plundered by the Turkish troops, called *Beshlis*, under Turkish officers, called *Bash-Beshli-Agas*, and likewise by others proceeding from a fort not named by his Imperial Majesty, which he said the Turks ought not to occupy.

I reminded his Imperial Majesty that not only Monsieur de Minciacky had presented his credentials, but that the late Emperor had sent Count Jarowski to thank the King for the successful conclusion of the negotiation by Lord Strangford; and I mentioned to his Imperial Majesty that I had in my possession a report from the Internuncio upon the subject of the Beshlis and Bash-Beshli-Agas, stating that, as far as circumstances would permit, the appointment of this description of officer and troops was made in the Principalities in the same manner in which such appointments had been made prior to the late disturbances.

His Imperial Majesty said, They say so, but it is a trick; *ils nous jouent et se moquent de nous!* Instead of having very few Beshlis or police officers in each province, they have some thousand Turkish soldiers under that name commanded by Turkish officers, who overrule the government of the Princes and plunder the country.

The next point to which his Imperial Majesty referred in the Memorandum which I had given him, was the paragraph of Mr. Canning's instructions to Mr. Stratford Canning, in

which Mr. Canning refers to the opinion of the Russian nation in regard to the contest with the Greeks. His Imperial Majesty declared his conviction that no number of persons in Russia, or any party excepting Greek residents, for the moment felt or ever had felt any interest about the Greeks. It was true, he said, that the Turks were not much liked; and that there were certain treaties between Russia and the Porte which gave his Imperial Majesty the right of protection of the Greek religion in the Morea and the Islands, of which right his Imperial Majesty said he should claim the exercise as soon as the government of the Porte should be re-established in the Morea. But his Imperial Majesty said there was no feeling in Russia for the Greeks in a state of revolt. It was not true that the servants of the Russian government had excited that revolt; or that there had been any inducement to the late Emperor of the description supposed, to engage in war on account of the Greeks.

I stated that I certainly could not recollect any official document in which the opinion of the people of Russia was mentioned, but that it certainly had been frequently in conversation; and that if his Imperial Majesty would be pleased to look no farther back than a few leaves in the same Memorandum, he would see the strong interest expressed by the Bailli de Tatistcheff by order of the late Emperor to the Congress of Verona, amounting to this, that the pacification and good treatment of Greece by the Porte was at that time the *sine quâ non* of his Imperial Majesty's reconciliation with the Porte.*

I observed likewise that his Imperial Majesty must see that this statement, even if not borne out to the full extent by official documents, was made with the view of inducing the Porte to come to an agreement with the Greeks, and thus to do that which his Majesty's government considered most likely to satisfy the late Emperor and to enable his Imperial Majesty to preserve peace.

The next question which his Imperial Majesty asked was, to what Powers reference was made as being in the Western hemisphere? I answered, all. His Imperial Majesty said that he had understood that the Americans were disposed to interfere in favour of the Greeks; and he inquired whether we had any recent accounts of such intentions? I answered, none.

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* See vol. i. of this Series, page 527.

His Imperial Majesty then adverted to the instructions given to Mr. Stratford Canning, in consequence of the supposed conduct and intended measures of Ibrahim Pasha, and said that his Majesty's government were quite right to treat these Pashas as independent, and to punish their infractions of treaty; but his Imperial Majesty observed that his Majesty's government must be aware of the consequences of their conduct, which might possibly be war with the Porte. I stated to his Imperial Majesty that we hoped not: but that, if such were the consequence, his Majesty's government were of opinion that the occasion would justify their measures, which, after all, would be limited by the case itself. I said that we were aware, and the instruction directed Mr. Stratford Canning to observe to the Porte, that the consequence of our measures, if we should be obliged to carry them into execution, might be to put an end to the war in Greece by the Egyptian troops. But that that was not our object, nor would such a consequence be imputable to us as matter of blame.

His Imperial Majesty then asked, supposing the Porte not to attend to our requisition, and still to continue the war in Greece by other troops, should we consider ourselves at war with the Turks? I answered, that I thought it very improbable that they would continue the war in Greece by other troops, or without maritime means; and that I had not been instructed on that point.

His Imperial Majesty then came to the proposition contained in the conclusion of the Memorandum which I had given him that his Imperial Majesty should act in concert with his Majesty in an endeavour to prevail upon the Porte to come to accommodation with the Greeks; upon which his Imperial Majesty said that he was so situated in relation to the government of the Porte as to be unable to make any proposition to them which should not be attended by a menace; and that his Imperial Majesty did not think he would be justified in menacing the Porte to obtain a favourable arrangement for the Greeks. His Imperial Majesty said that he considered the Greeks as revolted subjects, to whom he could not extend his protection, and in whose favour, consistently with his principles, he could take no step. That if he did take such steps his Imperial Majesty said he should think that he gave the Porte just ground for exciting his Mahomedan subjects to rebel against his authority. If, indeed, his Imperial Majesty said, it is intended to establish

in Europe an Egyptian State, the case was different; and he would readily co-operate with his Majesty to prevent such an establishment.

I here interrupted the Emperor, and told his Imperial Majesty that we believed that the Porte had made over the government of the Morea to Mahomed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, as they might to any other Pasha; and to that arrangement we did not consider ourselves entitled to state any objection. That to which we objected was the removal of the Greeks from the Morea to Egypt, to be replaced in Greece by colonies of Arabs or other Mahomedans from Asia or Africa. The Emperor said he understood the case perfectly as I had stated it; and that he would not think himself justified in interfering in Greece excepting in the case last specified.

His Imperial Majesty then continued, that his quarrel with the Porte was not about the Greeks, but for his own rights under treaties which the Porte had violated, and which they still delayed and refused to carry into execution; and his Imperial Majesty said that he must menace them in very strong language in order to obtain for himself even an answer, much more justice. I observed to his Imperial Majesty that a menace, not carried into execution, was not calculated to be of much use; and that it appeared to me that it was impossible to carry the menace into execution upon any of the alleged grounds that had ever come under my view.

His Imperial Majesty replied, You menace and expect to attain your object, why should not I? I answered, the situations are quite different. We complain with justice of a specified act, for which we are under the necessity of requiring redress, in which act the Porte has no concern and but a remote interest. We desire redress, and menace the use of force which the Porte is aware we have at our disposition on the spot, and which they are likewise aware we shall use to the satisfaction probably of, and at all events unopposed by, any Power in Europe; as the use of the force, if necessary, will lead to no change of possession, to no acquirement of influence by his Majesty at the expense of other Powers, and will be limited by the necessity of the case. Whereas the menace of his Imperial Majesty is for an undefined object, and not very necessary in order to obtain that object; and such menace must, if carried into execution, have consequences very different from those resulting from the measure of

his Majesty's government. The Turks are perfectly aware of the expense, inconvenience, and difficulty of carrying the menace into execution; they are aware that its execution must excite the jealousy of all Europe; they know it can have no limit; and they take their chance of its consequences. His Imperial Majesty said that he had no intention to make war. His intention was to occupy with his troops the Principalities till the Porte should do him justice, and defray a part at least of the expense of his operation; and he should then withdraw within his own frontier without demanding for himself even a village.

A discussion then followed upon the military part of the question, in which I submitted to his Imperial Majesty that it would be impossible for him to expect a good result from an operation limited as that which his Imperial Majesty proposed for himself.

I submitted the hypothesis that the Turks did not pass the Danube; but left his Imperial Majesty's troops in undisturbed possession of the Principalities. His Imperial Majesty could not keep his armies in those unhealthy countries. If the health and efficiency of the troops did not suffer, the expense would be enormous; and the necessities of the troops and of the service, and the reports which his Imperial Majesty would receive daily, would show the necessity of either advancing and making war in earnest, or of retiring. That to retire would only place his Imperial Majesty in a more disagreeable situation than that of which he at present complained; and to advance would excite the jealousy of all Europe; and that, sooner or later, some of the Powers must interfere, if all were not involved.

But I entreated his Imperial Majesty to observe that even the most trifling movement on his part would involve his Imperial Majesty to a greater degree than he then contemplated. His Imperial Majesty might rely upon it that he could not move without not only putting in motion again the Greeks, but the Servians, Bulgarians, and other tributaries or subjects of the Porte, all ready to rebel, and whose rising alone would give them claims upon his Imperial Majesty for protection, which his Imperial Majesty could neither refuse with honour nor grant without altering materially the state of power and strength in that part of Europe, and greatly annoying and exciting the jealousy of his Imperial Majesty's neighbours and allies.

I then told his Imperial Majesty that to obtain money from

the Grand Seignor was quite out of the question. I said that it was true that we had got money from Ali Pasha in payment for the property of the Parganiots when Parga was delivered over to that chief; but that there was a great deal of difference between Ali Pasha and the Grand Seignor. The Emperor was very strenuous in denying that the murmurs of the troops would ever have any effect upon his conduct; and without entering into the reasoning which I had detailed he denied the necessity of either advancing or retiring. He then said that of course his advancing must depend upon circumstances; and that if the army should pass the Danube he would go and command it himself. He also denied that he would not have it in his power to restrain the Servians and others; and ended by saying, that considering that his Majesty was likely to be carrying on an operation by sea at the same time, it was not very probable that the Porte would refuse to attend to his just demands, stated in a forcible manner.

I reminded his Imperial Majesty that it was most probable that the Porte would not expose Mahomed Ali to the supposed operation of his Majesty's fleet; and that the discussion of that subject was most probably by this time terminated; but that at all events, whether it should be so or not, his Imperial Majesty ought to consider well whether the objects in view were worthy of the risk and certain expense of men and money in their attainment. His Imperial Majesty then said that he had by the will of the late Emperor succeeded to his power, and that he considered himself bound to carry into execution his last wishes and intentions.

His Imperial Majesty then read to me a Note which he intended should be immediately presented by Monsieur de Minciacky to the Porte, upon which his Imperial Majesty commented as he proceeded, and he allowed me to discuss its contents with him. The commencement of the Note recites that in May, 1825, Monsieur de Minciacky had presented to the Porte a Note complaining of the still existing abuses in the Principalities, to which Note at this moment no answer had been returned. That the late Emperor Alexander had, in October, 1825, transmitted an order to Monsieur de Minciacky to present another Note in his Imperial Majesty's name, protesting against the conduct of the Porte in refraining from answering the preceding Note, and in continuing the oppressive conduct in the Principalities

contrary to treaty; and for still keeping in confinement at Constantinople a deputation of Servians who had gone there in the year 1820 at the suggestion of his Imperial Majesty, by virtue of the 8th Article of the Treaty of Bucharest, and had been confined in 1821 and ever since.

[This is a mistake. His Imperial Majesty certainly mentioned these articles as contained in the protest of October; but it appears from the protest itself that they are not there mentioned.] *

The Note then proceeds to require from the Porte to carry into execution the treaties and their promises to Lord Strangford in relation to the Principalities, to release the Servian deputies, and to receive another deputation from the same people for the purpose of carrying into execution the 8th Article of the Treaty of Bucharest; and, lastly, that the Porte shall send to his Imperial Majesty's frontier, plenipotentiaries who shall declare themselves duly authorised with full powers to carry into execution the arrangements under the Treaty of Bucharest discussed at Constantinople by Count Stroganoff, the whole to be done in one month after the presentation of this note; in failure of which Monsieur de Minciacky is to give notice that he is to retire.

I stated to his Imperial Majesty over again that I had the means of proving to his satisfaction that the arrangements in the Principalities were such as he had a right to require; to which his Imperial Majesty answered, *Ils nous trompent;* those people are commanded by persons appointed by the Porte instead of by the Princes; they are Turkish soldiers instead of police; they are independent of the Princes, more numerous and powerful than they ought to be, and plunder the country, of which we receive daily complaints. But, said his Imperial Majesty, if all is right, why is Monsieur de Minciacky to remain since May last without an answer? Why is the late Emperor my brother's protest to remain unanswered since October last? It is impossible to bear this any longer.

I told his Imperial Majesty that his Majesty's government had imagined that all these questions were settled to the satisfaction of the late Emperor, and that the promises made to Lord Strangford had been performed; but that if there was any difference of opinion regarding the meaning of the expressions

* See page 191.

used in conveying those promises, his Majesty's government would have no objection to have the arrangements in the Principalities settled according to treaties, provided that his Imperial Majesty's servants would make all the exertions in their power to attain these objects; that the further interference of his Majesty's government was to lead to solid peace and the restoration of the Russian ambassador at Constantinople. This last measure I told him would do much more for him than his army in the Principalities.

A conversation then followed upon the nature of the Russian influence at the Porte, and the state of it at the present moment. I said that his Imperial Majesty must look to some other channel of settling his concerns at the Porte than the Greeks of the Fanar, who were exterminated, or had fled and would never be allowed to return. His Imperial Majesty said he was well aware of it; and he had determined to alter the whole Russian system at the Porte, to settle every question now, and to endeavour to go on in future as good neighbours. His Imperial Majesty said that he would willingly place himself at the head of a *croisade* to drive the Turks into Asia. But to that the other Powers of Europe would not agree; and that he must endeavour to be on the best terms with them that was possible by settling now every question that remained unsettled.

The discussion then reverted back to the Note, which I stated to his Imperial Majesty contained as positive preliminary demands two other points, which I thought it impossible to expect that the Porte would comply with. The one related to the 8th Article of the Treaty of Bucharest. I told his Imperial Majesty that I had positive orders not to enter into discussion upon this point; and that, in fact, I had never even read the Treaty, and knew nothing about it. That the Porte had made more than one attempt to prevail upon his Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople to interfere to obtain the execution of the Treaty of Bucharest by the late Emperor, but that he had invariably refused even to consider the subject; and that I would not conceal from his Imperial Majesty that the reason for which we were desirous of avoiding to discuss that subject was that we believed that the Porte was in the right; and that as his Majesty's government could not urge upon the government of the Porte anything which his Imperial Majesty could not with justice demand, they were unwilling to enter upon the discussion

of a subject in which their decision must have been, as they believed, against the claim of the Emperor.

The other point was the mission of a plenipotentiary to the frontier.

I told his Imperial Majesty that however desirable to him the compliance of the Porte with this demand, I thought it quite hopeless. First, there was no man, respecting whom it might be predicated that he was fit to send upon such a mission, who would accept it. Secondly, there was no one whom the Porte could trust. In truth, whatever might be the result of the negotiation, it was quite certain that the negotiators would be beheaded upon their return.

To this the Emperor answered, that in his unfortunate position he did not think he could resume his place at Constantinople without such a mark of the desire of the Porte to be on good terms with him.

Throughout the perusal of the Note by his Imperial Majesty and his comments upon it, I took various opportunities of urging him to leave out of the case altogether the mention of the Treaty of Bucharest. I pointed out to his Imperial Majesty the injustice of calling upon the Porte to execute one Article, while all the others, particularly those in favour of the Porte, should remain unexecuted; and I entreated his Imperial Majesty not to do himself the injury at the commencement of his reign of putting the question of peace or war upon a point, of which the justice was not even doubtful, but decidedly against him. The Emperor contended that he did not call for the execution of the 8th Article of the Treaty in the Note; but only that the Servian deputies now in prison should be released and others received. I told his Imperial Majesty that this idea was not clearly expressed; and that upon the perusal of the Note any impartial person would imagine that his Imperial Majesty had wished that the 8th Article of the Treaty should within the month be carried into execution; while the others were left to the result of the discussions of the frontier.

In the course of these discussions his Imperial Majesty admitted that there was one point on which the Porte had the right on their side. It related to a seaport in Mingrelia, taken by the late Emperor in the last war, which ought to have been restored to the Porte under the Treaty of Bucharest, but which the Russian government had kept, as being absolutely necessary for

their communications with their troops in Mount Caucasus, and rendered necessary by the intrigues of the Porte to excite to rebellion and war with them their Mussulman subjects and the hordes on their Asiatic frontier. His Imperial Majesty entered in some detail into the recital of the difficulties of this warfare, which he said occupied 75,000 men and cost him large sums of money.

I said to his Imperial Majesty, give the Porte for this point compensation ten times over, attach to its cession any conditions your Imperial Majesty may think proper to prevent the government of the Porte from taking advantage of that position to excite war against you, or the rebellion of your Imperial Majesty's subjects; but don't commence your reign by an attempt to keep possession of that port, contrary to treaty, whatever may be the inconvenience of seeing it in the possession of the Turks; and, above all, don't commence your Imperial Majesty's reign by an unjust war, or by placing the question of peace or war upon a point, of which the justice is, in your Imperial Majesty's opinion, not in your favour.

The Emperor renewed his complaints of the Turkish authorities, and gave no decisive answer; and I told his Imperial Majesty that if he would allow me to have the Note I would take the liberty of writing to him upon it in detail.

His Imperial Majesty pressed me to lose no time, as he wished to send off this Note, and to bring the subject under the consideration of the Porte at the same moment, or nearly so, that the government of the Porte should have under its consideration the proposition of his Majesty's government in respect to the conduct of Ibrahim Pasha in the Morea.

I again told his Imperial Majesty that I thought he was mistaken regarding the effect of that proposition; and that he would find that it would give him but little support; and that his Imperial Majesty would do much better to wait till I could make known to his Majesty's government the view of these questions which his Imperial Majesty now took; and that they might have an opportunity of considering them and of seeing whether it was possible to do anything more to preserve peace.

The Emperor said that this was impossible, as the season was advancing fast. A discussion then ensued upon the shortness of the time which his Imperial Majesty proposed to allow the

government of the Porte to consider of his propositions; which, however, he did not appear inclined to lengthen.

At this time the discussion having lasted above two hours and a half, and a servant having come into the room, I offered to go, requesting his Imperial Majesty to send me the proposed Note, when he stopped me and requested that I would stay a little longer, in order that he might make me acquainted with the nature and extent of the reductions which his Imperial Majesty proposed to make in his army.

His Imperial Majesty then told me that the effective strength of his army was 1,004,000 men, whom he paid, clothed, and fed. Of these, 84,000 were children in the colonies and military schools and establishments. He then detailed part of the distribution, such as 75,000 men in Mount Caucasus; 15,000 in Finland; about 50,000 Guards and others in the neighbourhood of Petersburg; 40,000 the Polish army and others in Poland; and about 40,000 in garrisons and fixed stations in the interior of Russia. His Imperial Majesty did not go into further detail, but said that he had between 600,000 and 700,000 men disposable for service in the field.

He stated the difficulty, expense, and hardship of recruiting this body of troops by the ordinary mode; and the time which elapsed between the requisition for the man and the period of his joining his corps and being fit for a soldier; and the impossibility of discharging the men from the service when once enlisted. He had determined, therefore, that he would not call for more recruits from the country; and that he should reform the 5th Corps d'Armée, and put the regiments of which it was composed *en cadre;* that is, leaving them with officers and non-commissioned officers but without soldiers, and should transfer the soldiers to the regiments serving in the other corps d'armée.

It must be observed that this is, in fact, no reduction either of numbers or establishment; and the measure which his Imperial Majesty told me he was about to adopt was to reduce two squadrons of each regiment of cavalry, which having till now consisted of six squadrons for service and of one in depôt, would in future consist of four squadrons for service and one in depôt; and to transfer all the horses and men to the four squadrons. Neither is this measure any reduction of numbers, although it is of the establishment of the cavalry to the amount of nearly one-third. But it must be observed that the establishment of

the regular cavalry of the Russian army amounted to about 100,000 men: the reduced numbers will make the regular cavalry about 70,000 men. Both measures render the active army more efficient than it was.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [53

SIR, St. Petersburg (16th), 4th March, 1826.

I beg to draw your attention particularly to the enclosed copy of the last communication from the late Emperor of Russia to the Porte, which certainly was intended to be final. You will see that it does not contain one word about or the most distant allusion to the Greeks.

The conclusion which I draw from this paper is, that his Imperial Majesty did not choose to avow himself as the protector of the Greeks in revolt. But I entertain no doubt that he would have declared war, or at all events have moved his army into the Principalities before this time, and would have made the arrangement with the Greeks a part of the terms of his peace with the Porte.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

PROTESTATION REMISE AU PROTOCOLE DE LA CONFÉRENCE DU 1 (13me) OCTOBRE, 1825.

Dans l'époque fatale où des évènemens à jamais déplorables forcèrent la Cour Impériale de Russie d'interrompre ses relations d'amitié avec le gouvernement Ottoman, elle n'a opposé à l'infraction de ses traités, et la violation de ses droits, que le calme de la raison, et une générosité peut-être sans exemple.

Toujours également disposée à prêter la main à un rapprochement sincère, elle a donné des preuves éclatantes de ses sentimens pacifiques toutes les fois que la Porte a manifesté des intentions analogues.

Tant de modération et de longanimité aurait dû imprimer à la marche de la politique du Divan cet esprit de conciliation et ce respect pour des droits acquis, dont la Russie avait fait elle-même la base de sa politique. Forte de la justice de ses réclamations et connaissant les embarras où se trouve placé l'empire Ottoman, elle ne voulut point les augmenter en insistant trop vivement sur la réparation de tant de griefs qu'elle avait à articuler, et profitant des premiers progrès qu'avait fait l'œuvre de la conciliation,

elle se borna, *à exiger l'évacuation des Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie par les troupes Ottomanes et le rétablissement de l'ancien ordre de choses dans ces provinces, tel qu'il avait existé au commencement de* 1821. Elle y ajouta l'assurance positive qu'aussitôt que cette condition serait remplie elle rétablirait ses anciennes relations diplomatiques avec l'empire Ottoman. Elle donnait ainsi des preuves d'une bienveillance sans bornes.

On était fondé à en espérer le succès, et à voir accueillir la demande de la Russie avec sincérité et bonne foi. Elle était juste et légitime, elle était commandée par des devoirs sacrés et des droits positifs ; le gouvernement Ottoman ne pouvait se soustraire à l'obligation qu'il avait de l'accueillir, et en effet il reconnut cette obligation en principe, dans une conférence qui eut lieu le 27 Avril, 1824, avec l'ambassadeur de sa Majesté Britannique, et en promit formellement l'exécution le 23 Juin de la même année.

C'est sur la foi d'engagemens si solennellement contractés que le chargé-d'affaires de Russie remit sa lettre de créance ; elle était fondée sur ces engagemens, et leur exécution complète était la condition *sine quâ non* du rétablissement des relations entre les deux empires.

Il était donc permis de s'abandonner à l'espoir que la Porte s'empresserait de les remplir dans toute leur teneur, et de rasseoir ainsi sur des bases durables ses nouveaux rapports avec la Russie. Cependant il ne fut reconnu que trop tôt que ces promesses d'abord éludées par des délais, étaient revoquées et dénaturées par quelques concessions matérielles sur le nombre des troupes. Le chargé-d'affaires pouvait au moins se flatter que sa démarche qui faisait voir jusqu'à quel point était conciliante la politique de sa Cour serait appréciée par la Porte et amènerait à la fin l'accomplissement des engagemens contractés officiellement avec l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre.

Il n'en a malheureusement pas été ainsi ; les Principautés sont encore dans ce moment occupées militairement, et les chefs des troupes y exercent une influence qui est incompatible avec les privilèges des Valaques et des Moldaves.

Un tel état de choses, un tel mépris de toutes les obligations, n'a pu que donner lieu aux plus justes comme aux plus vives réclamations. Après des délais sans exemple qui n'ont eu d'autre résultat que d'amener la déclaration qui vient d'être faite, que tout est rétabli comme autrefois, que les troupes qui se trouvent dans les Principautés ne sont que de simples Beshlis et qu'elles y sont nécessaires pour la sûreté du pays ; enfin, que les commandans militaires actuels sont remplacés par des officiers d'un rang inférieur, c'est-à-dire que le même régime sera maintenu sous un autre individu, et par l'influence de la Porte qui lui donnera l'investiture.

Un changement aussi évidemment illusoire, aussi peu d'accord avec les stipulations, et qui ne concerne qu'une seule partie de ses réclamations, ne saurait satisfaire la Cour Impériale de Russie.

Elle a prouvé à maintes reprises que s'il a existé de tout tems en Valachie et Moldavie une garde Musulmane sous le nom de Beshlis, chargée de maintenir la police parmi les Turcs qui se rendaient dans les Principautés pour des affaires commerciales, cette troupe n'était composée que de mercenaires au choix et à la solde des Hospodars ; que les chefs qui étaient à la nomination des princes ne dépendaient que d'eux, ne

jouissaient d'aucune influence, même d'aucune considération, n'étaient point installés par des firmans de sa Hautesse, n'étaient par conséquent jamais regardés comme fonctionnaires de la Porte, ne correspondaient point avec elle, ne recevaient point ses ordres ni ceux des Pashas voisins; qu'ils n'exécutaient que ceux des Princes; qu'ils pouvaient être destitués par eux à volonté; et enfin qu'ils ne commandaient pas des troupes Ottomanes, mais des simples Beshlis.

Qu'aujourd'hui au contraire les Bash-Beshlis sont nommés par la Porte et institués par des firmans, ne dépendent que d'elle; qu'ils commandent non pas quelques Musulmans soldés par eux sur l'autorisation des Princes, mais de véritables troupes Ottomanes dont le nombre est hors de toute proportion avec celui des anciens Beshlis; que bien loin d'être dans la dépendance et sous les ordres des Hospodars, ce sont ces chefs militaires qui exercent, de l'aveu même de la Porte, sur leur conduite et sur leur administration, l'influence la plus pernicieuse; et sont investis d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire ainsi qu'il n'y a que trop d'exemples.

Les mêmes motifs de réclamation subsistent donc encore aujourd'hui dans toute leur force.

Des troupes Ottomanes occupent les deux Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie.

Leur présence est fatale et onéreuse; elle cause la ruine du pays.

Elle est une infraction manifeste des privilèges de ces provinces et des traités qui les ont garantis.

Elle est une violation des engagemens contractés par la Porte vis-à-vis de l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre par lesquels les ministres Ottomans avaient officiellement promis, "*Que les troupes seraient retirées, qu'il n'y aurait dans les Principautés à l'avenir que de simples Beshlis, et que l'ancien status quo serait rétabli.*"

Ainsi, lorsque la Cour Impériale de Russie exige que les Principautés soient remises *sous tous les rapports dans la même condition où elles étaient antérieurement aux troubles de* 1821, *que le mode de nomination, les attributions et l'autorité des Bash-Beshlis-Agas, ainsi que le nombre et les fonctions des Beshlis, soient absolument tels qu'ils étaient avant cette époque; en un mot que l'état des choses voulu par les traités soit parfaitement rétabli dans ces provinces*, elle ne fait qu'user des droits que lui assurent ces traités et les déclarations récentes de la Porte.

Elle n'a donc demandé qu'une chose juste et légitime; elle la demande encore.

Tout ce qu'il était possible de faire pour engager la Sublime Porte par des ouvertures franches et amicales, par le langage le plus bienveillant, à reconnaître ses obligations et l'évidence des droits de la Russie, a été tenté sans réserve par la Cour Impériale de Russie. Les négociations se sont terminées sans succès, mais d'une part elles ont mis dans tout leur jour la longanimité de sa Majesté Impériale, et la pureté et la droiture de ses intentions généreuses; de l'autre, elles ont constaté solennellement la marche suivie jusqu'à ce jour par la Porte, ses réponses toujours évasives et illusoires, et un systême attentatoire aux traités les plus positifs.

Sa conduite depuis cinq ans n'a offert que trop de preuves de cette disposition; elle y persévère.

Ainsi n'ayant point reçu de la Sublime Porte de réponse telle que les

demandes de la Russie la réclamaient, il ne reste plus au chargé-d'affaires de Russie que de remplir un triste et pénible devoir; celui de protester formellement contre les conséquences qui pourraient être tirées de la conduite de la Porte, en déclarant:

Que la Cour Impériale, pénétrée de ce qu'elle doit à la conservation de ses droits et à la protection qui lui est dévolue sur les Valaques et les Moldaves, lesquels par une longue suite de malheurs ont par là même acquis de nouveaux titres à sa sollicitude, ne se désistera jamais d'une demande, de la justice de laquelle elle est convaincue.

Qu'elle n'adhérera à aucun acte ou innovation quelconque que la Porte aurait fait ou ferait à l'avenir contraire aux prérogatives des provinces et des traités qui les ont confirmés, et en suite des évènemens qui ont contraint la Russie d'abandonner provisoirement l'exercice de sa protection et de sa surveillance tutélaire.

Qu'elle se réserve à cet effet d'employer tous les moyens qu'elle estimerait convenables pour assurer l'inviolabilité de ses droits, et enfin—

Qu'elle invite la Porte pour la dernière fois à faire de sérieuses réflexions sur les suites de la politique qu'elle adopte envers la Russie.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

SIR, St. Petersburg, (16th) 4th March, 1826.

In the course of my discussions with this government, I have discovered that the influence of Count Nesselrode is, for the present at least, entirely gone. I can't yet tell who it is that advises the Emperor upon his foreign affairs; but I am certain it is not Count Nesselrode, who did not know what the Emperor thought about the Greek question, and who at this moment laments the line of policy adopted.

It is most probable that the Emperor follows the dictates of his own judgment, excited probably by the Grand Duke Constantine.

But somebody (I believe not Count Nesselrode) must have written for his Imperial Majesty the Note which he read to me on Thursday night last, and I cannot discover who it was.

I have seen Count Nesselrode since his return from Czarskoe Zelo, but he does not know what the Emperor will decide upon any of the points which I have urged upon his Imperial Majesty's consideration.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [539.

SIR, St. Petersburg, (16th) 4th March, 1826.

It is my intention to do everything in my power to prevail upon his Imperial Majesty to delay sending his proposed Note to Constantinople, till the opinion of his Majesty's government can be known; but as I may not succeed, it appears to me that it will be my duty to inform Mr. Stratford Canning that the Emperor is not inclined to make war upon the Porte to support the cause of the revolted Greeks, or to interfere in any manner in their favour.

If the Porte should have been inclined to listen to the remonstrances of his Majesty's government, and that this conduct should be founded upon their own view of their own interests in the settlement of Greece, this information will make no difference in their conduct. But, if they should be inclined to listen to the statement of the claims of the Greeks only because they are likely to be attacked by the Emperor of Russia, it is but fair towards the Porte to inform them, as soon as possible, of what has been found to be the truth.

But to give this information to the Porte, as soon as possible, is not only fair towards that government, but is likewise fair towards the Emperor of Russia, who has other demands to make upon the government of the Porte; and it would not be just towards the Emperor to leave the Porte under the impression, founded upon the authority of the opinion of his Majesty's government, that there was still behind an intention of interfering in favour of the Greeks.

I propose, therefore, to suggest to Mr. Stratford Canning the expediency of his giving the Porte the information that the Emperor does not propose to interfere, in any manner, in favour of the Greeks, if I should find that the Emperor insists upon sending his Note without waiting for the opinion of his Majesty's government.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [540

SIR, St. Petersburg, (16th) 4th March, 1826.

I enclose an extract of the Protocol of the Conference of the 1st (13th) October, 1825, between the Reis Effendi and

M. de Minciacky, relating to the affairs of Wallachia and Moldavia.*

The extract No. 7, enclosed in my despatch No. 6 of this date, will complete this paper.†

I particularly request your perusal of the enclosed paper, as it shows precisely the nature of the pretensions in this question of the Principalities, as stated by the best authorities on both sides.

Having already communicated to you my opinion on the case in my despatch of this date, No. 6,‡ it is not necessary that I should trouble you farther.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

541.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR, St. Petersburg, (16th) 4th March, 1826.

You will be anxious to receive some information respecting the period fixed for the coronation of the Emperor of Russia, which, however, is still kept secret. The period talked of is the Greek 1st of June; but as the funeral of the late Emperor will not take place till the Greek 14th of March, and the Emperor has in the following week a great review, I don't think the Guards could be sent from St. Petersburg till the first days of April; and they would be at least two months marching to Moscow from St. Petersburg.

It is also said that the Emperor is anxious to finish the inquiries into the recent disturbances, and the trials of those who are to be tried, previous to the coronation, which will probably delay that ceremony till the month of August, which some persons consider as the most probable time.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. Stratford Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Constantinople, 16th March, 1826.

By a vessel which is now under weigh for Odessa with the first southerly wind that we have had since my arrival here on the 27th ultimo, I write to apprise your Grace that at an interview which I had with the Reis

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* See vol. ii. of this Series, page 536. † See page 175.
‡ See page 172.

Effendi yesterday, I brought forward the propositions with which I have been charged by his Majesty's government for the purpose of averting, if possible, the imminent danger of a rupture between Russia and Turkey.

The unfortunate delays which I experienced in my voyage hither, from the constant prevalence of adverse winds, and my long detention from the same cause at the Dardanelles, have so come in aid of the natural slowness of the Turkish government as to make it impossible for me to have procured an audience of the Reis Effendi at an earlier period. Even the interview which I had with his Excellency yesterday was not a formal conference, though, according to his assurances, and as I am led to believe, calculated to answer the immediate object of conveying my communications in a distinct and authentic shape to the knowledge of the Sultan, and enabling the Porte to come to a deliberate decision on my proposals. This interview is represented by the Reis Effendi as having been granted to me by special favour, it being, as he maintains, a rule of Turkish etiquette that the members of the Divan should hold no conference with a foreign minister before the day of his public audience at the Porte.

The result, whatever it may be, of this first step, and of such others as I may find it advisable to take in support of it during the next few days, I shall hasten to communicate to your Grace by the messenger Clewes, whom I detain for this particular purpose, and whom I shall despatch to St. Petersburg by the route of Hermanstadt and Czernowitz in order to avoid the long quarantine established at Skulieni, where the direct road between Petersburg and Constantinople crosses the Russian frontier. I must, however, prepare your Grace for additional delays. I am assured by those who have had the best opportunities of estimating the rate at which Turkish deliberations ordinarily travel, that I have no chance of obtaining an answer from the Divan in less than eight days. The probabilities are that I shall not succeed in obtaining one so soon.

In the meanwhile I conceive it to be of some importance that your Grace should know at what point of the business I am, though it is quite impossible for me to offer any settled opinion as to the probable determination of the Porte, in consequence of anything which was stated by the Reis Effendi in the course of my communications with him yesterday. All that I said was received by him with the most earnest attention, but taken, as matter of course, entirely *ad referendum*.

If I were to hazard a mere guess at what is likely to prove the issue of the overture which I have made from the expressions thrown out by the Reis Effendi in referring to the negotiations carried on by Lord Strangford, and to the proposals addressed last spring to the Porte by the representatives of the four great continental Powers, it would not be of a favourable nature. But forbidding as present appearances may be, I will not allow myself to be discouraged, considering that the Turkish government must naturally have the strongest repugnance to enter upon the course proposed to them; and that before they can be forced, even by their apprehensions, to enter upon it, many a rooted prejudice and many a cherished feeling must be torn from their hearts.

In addition to this general statement, there are two points on which I think it of consequence to trouble your Grace, even by this occasion, with a few words.

First. In the course of our conversation yesterday the Reis Effendi spoke, or rather affected to speak (for I cannot believe it to be a serious opinion), of the presentation of M. de Minciacky's credentials as the complement of the promises made to this government by Russia through Lord Strangford.

Second. The manner in which the Reis Effendi received my communications on the subject of the Morea, and Ibrahim Pasha's intended treatment of that country, inclines me to trust that the Porte is no party to any engagement of the atrocious and extensive nature supposed in Mr. Canning's instruction to me, and to hope that the Turkish ministers will enable me in the end to satisfy his Majesty's government in that respect.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most faithful and obedient servant,

STRATFORD CANNING.

Sir Henry Hardinge to Sir Herbert Taylor.

MY DEAR SIR HERBERT, Grosvenor Place, 16th March, 1826.

It was my intention to have seen you the morning following the debate on the Mutiny Bill, because I thought it right you should be apprised, for the information of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, of the growing feeling in the House of Commons against corporal punishment.

I was not in the House last night when Mr. Hobhouse gave notice of his intention to bring the question forward after the recess, by moving for returns of the number of punishments during the last year, but as I am convinced some decided line must be adopted, I have determined to write to you on the subject.

I do not form my opinion of the growing unpopularity of the system entirely on the decreasing majorities in the House each year, nor on the prevailing fashion of the day to advocate philanthropic principles, nor on the expressed opinions of some excellent officers, who openly avow that they are converts to the propriety of a total abolition.

I form my opinion in a great degree on the language of the friends and supporters of government in the House, who, as in the slave-trade question, are urged forward beyond their judgment of what is strictly prudent.

Seeing what is going forward on the slave-trade question, the increased vigour with which the abolition of military flogging is advocated, and the lax defence it meets with except from military men, I am satisfied some decisive course must be adopted, and that without loss of time.

My own conviction of the indispensable necessity of corporal punishment remains unshaken, and you will perhaps excuse me for stating it.

Supposing that any of the substitutions for corporal punishment, such as confinement, hard labour, and transportation, had answered in Great Britain in peace time, it would not, in my humble opinion, overcome the difficulty of finding and applying practical remedies for a state of active warfare in the field, which is, after all, the great end and chief object of military discipline. The principal substitution is pronounced to be solitary

confinement, but this species of correction is not applicable to the field or bivouac, to the line of march, or on board ship, and even may be said hitherto to have failed in Great Britain, for well-founded objections exist to the construction of solitary cells in every barrack; still greater objections to the sending soldiers to gaol or the tread-mill; and as to the plan of a correctional depôt at Chatham, admitting it may answer, as being a preferable measure to the common gaols, it must be limited to home service.

Any system not capable of being generally adopted in the field, and in other situations peculiar to our service in the colonies, would be essentially defective and dangerous; and as to the idea of two codes, one for peace and the other for war, or one for home service and the other for foreign service, it would be most impolitic in an army where means of rapid augmentation in war must depend on the militia volunteers, to flog by law those only who leave their country to fight its battles—for if corporal punishments were declared illegal in England and only allowed abroad, a stigma would be affixed to the inflicting it abroad, not only very prejudicial to the service, but in reality not answering the object aimed at, as three-fourths of the army are constantly abroad.

As to the notion of limiting the discretion vested in regimental courts martial by a further diminution of the number of lashes which can now be awarded,* I conceive that it would have a bad effect, not only by weakening the commanding officer's authority, but that the punishment ought not to be trifled with, for if flogging is to be resorted to at all it should be sufficiently severe to deter by the example, and any concession of this sort leaves the main objection where it was before, the objection now-a-days not attaching to the quantum of punishment, but to the practice in itself.

I therefore conceive that until some substitution for corporal punishment be devised by which offences may be instantly repressed in the field, the greatest disorders and crimes would grow out of the abolition. The superiority of British discipline over that of other armies is more decidedly marked in the difficult and desperate circumstances of active war than it is in peace or in barracks, and to give up the power by which this state of discipline is enforced would, in all probability, produce a degeneracy very fatal to that admitted superiority.

In my view, as the chief objection to relinquish the power of corporal punishment attaches to field and colonial service rather than to home service, I might be met by the question, "How do foreign armies preserve their discipline in similar situations in war?" I should answer, very badly compared with British armies, notwithstanding the great advantages of the composition of the foreign armies taken by conscription from the agricultural classes, over the lawless materials of the British army; indeed, it is this decided proof of our superiority under disadvantageous circumstances which justifies an adherence to the means by which it is obtained.

Then, as to the means resorted to being more cruel in our system, I imagine the punishments in other armies, take the French for instance, are in reality more severe, without the benefit of instant example of which our system admits.

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* Palmerston wants to limit regimental courts martial to 200 lashes instead of 300.

For desertion, the punishment is three years of the "boulet," the culprit dragging an 8 lb. ball by a chain, working ten hours in summer and eight in winter; when not working, kept chained in his cell.

Ten years of the boulet for a second desertion, and if he deserted on duty, two years in addition; and if he mutinies, the double boulet.

If in peace time an inferior disobeys a superior, six months in prison.

If he threatens his superior without striking him, one year in irons; if with an arm in his hand, two years.

If he actually strikes his superior or mutinies, death or ten years in irons.

If he sells or pawns his arms and equipments, two years in irons; five years if he sells military stores.

Without going into more detail, it is evident that the foreign system is more severe than ours.

The Prussian system has been very much relaxed in severity from the circumstance of their army being composed in a great measure of a *levée en masse*, where no man is exempt from serving in the regular army for three years, and of course corporal punishment would not be tolerated under such a state of things. But as I have seen their punishment of the cage, which, in addition to solitary confinement, is a species of torture, I am convinced it would not suit our English ideas to adopt it. Having resided for nearly three years with the Prussian Army of Occupation in France, and as my attention was naturally drawn to a military system so different from our own, I took pains to investigate the subject; and in 1817 I was so struck with one part of their system, that I wrote a memorandum on their system of having *two* classes of soldiers; the first of which is not liable to corporal punishment unless degraded into the second class, when he is liable to the cane and every species of severe punishment.

The soldier can only be degraded into the second class by sentence of a court-martial, approved by the General Officer, and confirmed by the Minister at War or King; and the class of crimes for which degradation can be awarded are strictly laid down — such as desertion, mutiny, striking a non-commissioned officer, &c. The national cockade is taken from him, and he wears a grey cockade and grey facings as the badge of degradation.

That the degraded man may be excited to amendment, after one or two years, according to the sentence, a court of inquiry examines into his conduct, recommends his restoration to his former class, when the King pardons the offender, and he is publicly admonished, &c.

Now, the practical effect of this system was certainly very extraordinary; during two years in a garrison of 1500 men, there were never more than three degraded men, one of whom blew his brains out the morning the King reviewed the regiment.

In the whole of the Prussian Army of Occupation of 16,000 men, the numbers of degraded men did not exceed twenty at any one time.

The circumstances under which this system was practically carried into effect were those of an army occupying cantonments in a late enemy's country, the French and Prussians mutually hating each other; with a regular supply of provisions, and regular peace duties to perform, nothing could exceed the regularity and discipline of the whole corps.

Having, however, seen the same army in the field before the enemy and

on the line of march, the comparison is so entirely in favour of British discipline, that I had frequent discussions with General Zieten and other Prussian officers as to the means they resorted to in the field. They admitted the difficulty of doing without corporal punishment in bivouac—that in a war where hatred of the French was systematically resorted to as a means of calling into action the population of Prussia, they were obliged to remind the people in order to exasperate them, of the exactions and violences which the French had committed in Prussia—so that their discipline in the field, without a military chest and with no great inclination to prevent retaliation, was the most lawless imaginable from necessity and system,—fit for the occasion of a march upon Paris, but full of risk and danger in any protracted operations.

His (General Zieten's) opinion was, that, in any future war, when in all probability there would not exist the same national excitement, the discipline must return back again to a system of corporal punishment; but that the system of *two* classes had been found to work well both in peace and war, and on any great occasion of indiscipline, such as mutiny &c., could be resorted to with the safest effect.

In alluding to this system of two classes, I wish, before I venture to express any opinion upon it, to repeat that I should prefer the British system to remain as it is, or as it was, after the triumphant proofs it has given of the soundness of its system of discipline for all the difficult circumstances in which British soldiers are placed; but if we are pressed on all sides, and by a gradual withdrawing of supporters are threatened with a loss of the question in the House of Commons, it may become (if it has not already become) an important consideration how far the difficulty may be parried, so as to retain this indispensable power on which the British discipline rests.

I may therefore be influenced by undue partiality for that part of the Prussian system of two classes which I have practically witnessed to work well, when I venture to hazard the opinion that it may, under certain modifications (which I do not enter into), be applied to the British army, not as a means of improving so much as a measure of safety whenever the question of corporal punishment is in danger, and as a means of reconciling many adversaries and doubtful friends to the retaining of the power of corporal punishment.

I think it would exonerate the system from much of the obloquy which is now attempted to be fixed upon the British army, as being the only army in Europe which resorts to what is termed a degrading and ferocious system, whilst it would in reality reserve the power of inflicting corporal punishment on individuals irreclaimable without it.

In situations, such as service in the field, insubordination and plunder would, on direct proof of the fact, be made liable to the instant infliction of corporal punishment as at present by a drum-head court-martial, and, above all, by leaving to the Provost-marshal the power of punishing men at once on the spot when taken in a flagrant act of indiscipline, according to the custom of the army, rather than according to any established or recorded law.

I am, &c.,

HENRY HARDINGE.

The Right Hon. George Canning to the Right Hon. Lord Ponsonby.

MY LORD, Foreign Office, 18th March, 1826.

The intelligence of the actual breaking out of hostilities between the empire of Brazil and the State of Buenos Ayres, received after my despatch No. 2 was written, induced me to delay your Lordship's departure for your destination, in the expectation that M. de Sarratea might speedily receive some communication from his government, which might enable me to furnish your Lordship with more precise instructions with respect to the unfortunate and ill-timed dissension between Buenos Ayres and the empire of Brazil, than are contained in that despatch.

That expectation has not been disappointed. I have received from M. de Sarratea within these few days, a Memorandum with an explanatory Note thereupon (copies of both which papers are enclosed),* repeating (in obedience to fresh instructions from his government) what he had before expressed to me less officially, the anxious desire of the government of Buenos Ayres for the intervention of his Majesty's good offices with the Cabinet of Rio Janeiro.

The basis upon which the government of Buenos Ayres are prepared to come to an accommodation is, as M. de Sarratea has now distinctly explained to me, that which was established by the decision of the Allied Powers for the settlement of the same dispute between Spain and Portugal, and which has been already more than once put forward in the despatches to Sir Charles Stuart and to Mr. Parish, which have been submitted to your Lordship's perusal—viz., the payment by Buenos Ayres to Brazil of a sum of money, in reimbursement of the expenses incurred, first, by the King of Portugal, and subsequently by the Emperor of Brazil, in the occupation of Monte Video and the Banda Oriental, and as the price of the relinquishment of that town and territory to Buenos Ayres.

Whatever may be the chance of success to this proposition, it is highly expedient that it should be submitted to the Emperor of Brazil. There cannot be a more favourable opportunity for this purpose than is afforded by your Lordship's departure for America.

I am, therefore, to signify to your Lordship the King's pleasure, that in your way to the River Plate, you should touch at Rio de Janeiro, where your Lordship will obtain a conference with the Brazilian ministers, for the purpose of laying before them the proposition of the Buenos Ayres government and learning from them, how far they may be disposed to enter into negotiation with Buenos Ayres upon the basis therein laid down, and of offering yourself as the medium, either of their acceptance of that proposition, or of any counter-proposition which they may wish to submit to the government of Buenos Ayres.

The desire of the Brazilian government for his Majesty's aid and counsel for the adjustment of their quarrel with Buenos Ayres, has been expressed so strongly in the correspondence with which your Lordship is already acquainted, and the substance of which is enclosed in my former despatch, that his Majesty is entitled to expect that the step which is now taken will be duly appreciated by his Imperial Majesty. His Majesty trusts that the Brazilian government will avail themselves, to the fullest extent, of the facility which your Lordship's visit to Rio de Janeiro will afford, for bringing

* See pages 162 and 171.

to a termination hostilities so inconvenient to all the New States of America, and so peculiarly hazardous to the stability of the present form of government in Brazil.

But though, on these grounds, I cannot anticipate any other than a favourable reception of the overture with which your Lordship is charged at Rio de Janeiro, I am by no means unaware that, if the events of the war shall have been, up to the period of your arrival there, not unpropitious to the Brazilian arms, there may perhaps be no very ready disposition to take advantage of that overture, for the purpose of entering into a serious and sincere negotiation for peace.

So far as I am enabled to calculate the grounds on which the Brazilian ministry may possibly decline a negotiation on the proposed basis, they are principally these two :—

First—The power which Buenos Ayres would derive from the possession of both banks of the river Plate, of controlling the navigation of that river.

Secondly—A denial of the claim of Buenos Ayres to that inheritance of the rights of Spain to the town and territory of Monte Video, on the assumption of which claim of inheritance alone, it must be confessed, the proposition to open or rather to resume the negotiation on the basis heretofore established between Spain and Portugal, is founded.

In treating of the latter of these two objections, your Lordship will observe to the Brazilian ministers that unless by a general tacit agreement, the States of the New World be admitted to stand towards each other, in respect to geographical rights and limits, exactly as they stood when colonies, questions of the utmost perplexity will infallibly arise out of their rival and conflicting pretensions; and the whole continent of America, whether Spanish or Portuguese, will ultimately be laid open to the designs of any enterprising adventurers, who may think fit to carve out for themselves new dominions.

If Buenos Ayres has no title to Monte Video as an ancient possession of Spain, can Brazil lay claim thereto from a comparatively recent occupation of it by Portugal; an occupation which, for many years after it first took place, was represented not only to Spain, but to all the allies of Spain and Portugal, as a most unwilling act of self-defence on the part of Portugal, and one altogether provisional and temporary?

If it is denied that, in assuming an independent political existence, Buenos Ayres stept into the place of Spain, as with respect to foreign powers, can it be maintained that the Emperor of Brazil inherits from Portugal any other claim to Monte Video than that by which Portugal held it?

Now Portugal held Monte Video subject to a liability to make restitution to Spain, upon the fulfilment by Spain of certain specified conditions.

Does the Emperor of Brazil mean to avow that he holds the possession of Monte Video subject to the same liability? That he would still restore that town and territory; but that he will restore them only to Spain, whenever Spain shall be in a condition to reclaim it? If so his Imperial Majesty may, indeed, without inconsistency refuse to make cession to Buenos Ayres as an insurgent colony, of that which he reserves for restitution to the parent State.

But is it possible that the Emperor of Brazil should not apprehend the consequences of thus proclaiming to all Spanish America, that he recognises

in one portion of that continent, the unextinguished rights of Spain? Does he not see with what jealousy such a declaration will be received by all the other provinces which, like Buenos Ayres, have thrown off the yoke of the mother country?

On the other hand, if not maintaining the right of Spain to receive back Monte Video at his hands, he still denies the existence of that right in Buenos Ayres, for the purpose of keeping Monte Video to himself, what would this be but to change a defensive occupation into absolute conquest, thus setting an example to the other States of the New World, which may lead to endless violence, strife, and confusion?

In either case, whether he pretends to hold Monte Video for Spain, or denying the rights alike of Spain and Buenos Ayres, declares his determination to hold it for himself, the Emperor of Brazil would afford an occasion and furnish an inducement to the New States of Spanish America, to unite themselves sooner or later in a common cause against Brazil; in the first case, as against a Power upholding in principle the rejected supremacy of their metropolis; and in the second case, as against an invading and conquering Power regardless of her neighbour's rights, and seeking pretexts for wars of ambition and aggrandisement.

With these arguments I trust your Lordship will not find it difficult to succeed in diverting the Brazilian ministers from any attempt to change the practical question at issue between Brazil and Buenos Ayres, into one of abstract legitimate right, affecting, in common with Buenos Ayres, all the New States of America which have separated themselves from Spain.

Important as the question of Monte Video may be to the Brazilian government, it is scarcely less important, that the discussion of that question should not be conducted on such principles, or supported on their side by such arguments, as to array against the monarchy of Brazil the common feelings and common interests of all the republican States of Spanish America.

I have had occasion formerly to give warning to the Brazilian minister of the incitements held out to General Bolivar from Europe to undertake a war against Brazil (on whatever pretext) for the express purpose of overturning a monarchy which stands alone on the vast continent of America, and which is considered, by those who are enamoured of democratical forms of government, as essentially inconsistent with the secure existence of the American republics.

General Bolivar, there is every reason to believe, has as yet turned a deaf ear to these suggestions. His conduct in the affair of Chiquitos affords a tolerably satisfactory proof that he is not desirous of finding a pretext for an attack on Brazil; but it would perhaps be trying him too high, if Brazil were again to throw in his way a direct provocation to war, by a proceeding which would hold out the Empire of Brazil to the general suspicion and enmity of Spanish America, either as the champion of the rights of the mother country, or as the invader of those of one of the New States.

[illegible] the other more practical objection, which I anticipate on the part of [illegible]rnment of Rio de Janeiro, to the leaving of Monte Video on any [illegible]e hands of Buenos Ayres, it cannot be denied that there is con[illegible]ce.

[illegible]e difficulty of the whole question lies in this, that the value of

Monte Video to each party consists less perhaps in the positive benefit which they may expect to derive from it themselves, than in the detriment which they apprehend from its being in possession of the opposite party.

It cannot be denied, therefore, that supposing the transfer of it to Buenos Ayres, upon receipt of a pecuniary compensation to be agreed to by Brazil, it would still be reasonable, that every just precaution should be taken by precise stipulations in the treaty of arrangement, to secure to Brazil an uninterrupted enjoyment of the navigation of the river Plate. His Majesty would, if required, not refuse to lend his guarantee for the observance of such stipulations.

The British government would indeed rather, on the general principle of avoiding as much as possible engagements of this character, that the treaty could be adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties without the necessity of such guarantee, but if it were required by both parties his Majesty would consent to give it, in this instance, rather than the treaty should not be concluded.

If the proposition of the Buenos Ayres government is not acceptable to that of Rio de Janeiro, it is for the Brazilian ministers, unless they are prepared to risk everything—even the existence of the Brazilian monarchy itself, upon the chance of war—to suggest either some modification of that proposition, or some other basis on which the negotiation for the settlement of the points in dispute, may proceed.

It is not for the British government to suggest a specific counter-proposition. But your Lordship will undertake to lay before the Buenos Ayres government any project which may be framed by the Brazilian government, and which may appear to your Lordship calculated in any degree to lead to a termination of the existing hostilities.

Your discretion in this respect is to be exercised, with a strong leaning to the receiving for communication to Buenos Ayres of any proposition not absolutely offensive in its character.

It has been suggested, as your Lordship is already aware, that Monte Video itself or the whole Banda Oriental with Monte Video for its capital, might be erected into a separate and independent State. We have not the means of judging here, how far such an arrangement would be practicable, and how far the territory and population of such new State might be fitted for acquiring, and capable of exercising an independent political existence. With respect to this arrangement, however, your Lordship is *not* to offer his Majesty's guarantee, nor to give any encouragement to a demand for it.

Nothing can be more important to Brazil than that its disputes with Buenos Ayres should be in a state of settlement before the general congress of States at Panama shall be called upon (as it might be by an appeal from Buenos Ayres) to take it into its own hands.

In an assembly so composed there can be little doubt that the decision would be unfavourable to the empire of Brazil.

If, nevertheless, the discussion should be transferred to Panama, his Majesty's commissioner at the congress will be instructed to lend his good offices, for its amicable and satisfactory adjustment.

I can hardly imagine the case of an absolute refusal by the Brazilian ministers, either to listen to the proposition with which your Lordship is

charged on behalf of Buenos Ayres, or to come forward with any proposition from themselves.

In that case, however, if it should unfortunately occur, your Lordship can only be instructed to take leave of the Brazilian ministers, expressing a deep and sincere regret for the difficulty, and even peril, in which the Emperor and empire of Brazil will be placed, by violent and unreasonable counsels; and rejecting all responsibility, on the part of the British government, for the consequences of a course which we have endeavoured to arrest in vain.

Your Lordship will repeat the assurances already given by me to the Baron d'Itabayana that Great Britain will observe during this unhappy war a scrupulous neutrality; expecting, however, that the acknowledged rights of war shall not be pushed by either belligerent beyond the limit prescribed by the law of nations.

You will at the same time not disguise that, while scrupulously neutral in conduct, the wishes of the British government cannot fail to be in favour of that belligerent who shall have shewn the readiest disposition to bring the dispute to a friendly termination; but you will add that whenever the counsels of the Cabinet of Rio de Janeiro shall assume a more pacific character, your Lordship is instructed to hold yourself in readiness to renew (if the Brazilian government shall desire it) the discussion now fruitlessly begun, and to be the willing and zealous instrument of any overture, which the Emperor of Brazil may think fit to make, through your Lordship, to the government of Buenos Ayres.

Your Lordship will avail yourself of any opportunity to transmit to Mr. Dawkins, his Majesty's commissioner at Panama, an account of the result of your conferences at Rio de Janeiro.

I am, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

Mr. Stratford Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Constantinople, 19th March, 1826.

Having failed in my hopes of forwarding by Odessa the despatch which I addressed to your Grace on the 16th instant,* and fearing from the present state of the weather that I have but little chance of being able to forward it to your Grace by that channel within a reasonable time, I have come to the determination of sending it overland to Petersburg by the messenger Waring.

That the Sultan and his ministers are engaged in deliberating on the proposals submitted to them at my interview with the Reis Effendi, I cannot doubt; but according to present appearances it is highly probable that I shall receive no communication from them in answer to those proposals till after my public audiences, which are respectively fixed for the 25th and 28th of this month.

Considering the particularly temporary nature of your Grace's embassy to Petersburg, as far as its object is ostensible, the circumstance which I

* See page 196.

have just mentioned appears in my mind to furnish a decisive reason for sending an express to apprize your Grace of the position in which I am placed, though it be not yet in my power to state the result of my application to the Porte.

I cannot conceal from myself that the chances of success are materially affected by the lateness of my arrival here, and the consequent necessity which has devolved upon me of entering at once and without any preparatory steps on such important business.

The apprehensions which I am forced to entertain on this account are not diminished by the arrival of intelligence from Missolonghi that Fort Vassiladhi, which is represented as the key of that place, has recently fallen into the hands of the besieging army. It has just been stated to me, though I cannot yet vouch for the correctness of the statement, that information to this purport reached the Turkish government to-day, together with a hamper or two of ears and noses, sent up by Ibrahim Pasha and the Pasha of Roumelia in testimony of their achievements.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most faithful and obedient servant,

STRATFORD CANNING.

P.S. I enclose a memorandum of the intelligence from Missolonghi, which has been put in circulation at the Porte to-day.

S. C.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Pera, le 20me Mars, 1826.

Ces nouvelles sont consignées dans les dépêches que les Pashas *Rechid* et Ibrahim ont adressé à la Porte de devant Missolonghi, et elles portent en substance :

"Que le fort de Vassiladhi, défendu par environ 1500 Grecs, l'élite de la garnison de Missolonghi, a été pris de vive force.

"Un corps de troupes Musulmanes, d'environ 2000 hommes de l'armée de Ibrahim Pasha, et sous les ordres d'un de ses officiers, de nom *Hussein*, a passé l'eau, fusil au col, et sabre dans la bouche, et malgré le feu le plus vif de l'ennemi, s'est rendu maître de Vassiladhi dans quelques heures de tems.

"A l'exception d'un très petit nombre de Grecs, qui ont pu se réfugier à Missolonghi dans deux bateaux, tout ce qui défendait cette place à été passé au fil de l'épée.

"Le nombre des braves Musulmans qui ont eu la gloire du martyr est de *seize* seulement; le nombre des blessés est 35.

"On allait attaquer avec succès Missolonghi, et Anatolicò; et l'on espère donner la nouvelle de la reddition de ces places incessamment.

"Un autre corps d'Ibrahim Pasha a eu aussi un avantage signalé dans les plaines de Gastouni. Plusieurs sacs de têtes et d'oreilles sont envoyés à la Sublime Porte."

En rendant compte à votre Excellence de tout ce qui a été reçu par ce gouvernement, je dois ajouter que ces nouvelles ont mis tous les ministres de bonne humeur; mais j'ai appris, de bonne source, que leur contentement est de beaucoup mitigé par l'avis qu'ils ont reçu, et dont ils ne parlent pas, de l'extrême pénurie de vivres dans leur armée, à cause de la prise faite par les Grecs de plusieurs bâtimens chargés de blé, destinés pour cette armée.

TRADUCTION D'UN BULLETIN AFFICHÉ À LA PORTE DU SÉRAIL LE 21me MARS, 1826.

Son Excellence le Gouverneur-Général de la Morée et Généralissime Ibrahim Pasha a fait attaquer l'Ile de Vassiladhi, qui est, pour ainsi dire, la clef de Missolonghi, par une expédition qu'il avait préparé, composée de chaloupes, de barques, et de radeaux. Les troupes valeureuses ont cerné l'île de tout côté, et l'ont emportée de vive force. Une partie des maudites gens qui se trouvaient dedans a été tués; les autres ont péri en se jetant dans la mer.

Indépendamment de cela, Ahmed Pasha, Gouverneur du Sandjak de Foroum, lequel avait été chargé en dernier lieu par le Gouverneur-Général de la Morée de faire des excursions dans la Plaine de Gastouni, a fait mordre la poussière aux infidèles qu'il y a rencontrés.

Cent dix pairs d'oreilles prises dans ces rencontres ayant été envoyées à Constantinople, elles ont été ignominieusement jetées à terre.

To Count Nesselrode.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, March, 1826.

Depuis mon retour chez moi j'ai lu la copie de la Note que vous m'avez donnée, que vous m'avez annoncé avoir été envoyée à Monsieur de Minciacky. Je regrette beaucoup que votre Excellence ait dépêché cette Note sans me l'avoir communiquée, parce que, entre autres observations que je vous aurais soumis, elle ne se limite pas aux trois demandes que j'avais raison de croire étaient l'objet de la démarche que sa Majesté Impériale voulait faire à la Porte. J'ai cru que la seconde demande était que les députés Serviens détenus à la Porte seraient relâchés; demande tout-à-fait juste en mon opinion, sur laquelle la Porte n'aurait pas dû hésiter. Mais je vois que la seconde demande est non-seulement "que la Porte remettrait en pleine liberté les députés Serviens sans aucun délai," mais il y est ajouté, "et pour reconnaître la fidélité de la nation Servienne, la Porte conviendrait du principe de régler, de concert avec elle, les privilèges dont la jouissance lui a été promise."

La Porte a indubitablement fait cet engagement par un des articles du Traité de Bucharest. Mais, ainsi que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de représenter à votre Excellence, dans une explication que j'ai eu avec vous à ce sujet, non seulement les ambassadeurs de sa Majesté n'ont jamais dit un mot à la Porte sur ce traité, mais il leur en est défendu de parler.

Ainsi donc il est impossible pour aucun des serviteurs de sa Majesté d'en faire des représentations à la Porte.

Mais je prie votre Excellence de considérer que le principe de "régler, de concert avec la nation Servienne, les privilèges

dont la jouissance lui a été promise," est une des stipulations d'un acte dont il y a plusieurs articles à régler et à mettre en exécution des deux côtés; et il nous serait impossible même de suggérer à la Porte de reconnaître un seul des principes auxquels cet acte engage les deux Hautes Parties contractantes, les autres principes du Traité restant méconnus et pas exécutés.

J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de parler à votre Excellence, et même de lui écrire à ce sujet.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. Croker to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Admiralty, 20th March, 1826.

I was delighted to receive your long letter from Berlin, as a proof that you were well and in good spirits; for, although I know you are a good traveller, I was not without apprehension that a journey of such length, over such roads, and in such a season might have incommoded you. That fear is happily dissipated; I wish all the other objections which I felt to your journey may also prove unfounded. You cannot forget, and if you did, we have common friends who would remind you of my *croaking* prophesies of what would happen in your absence. You will particularly remember that, knowing that you had saved us from *one* scrape with *the Bank*, I said that before you could reach St. Petersburg we should be in another—and so we were! and more surprising still, the government was on the point of being dissolved by this ridiculous wrangle. I dare say you have heard the whole story, from day to day, by better informants, yet you may like to see my view of it. I need not tell *you* all the reasons (very good ones) why the government did not like originally to undertake an issue of exchequer bills, but, as soon as the whole mercantile body, as soon as old Tierney at the head of the Opposition, and as soon as every man of the old Pitt party expressed a unanimous concurrence in that measure, we all thought that it would do no great harm to adopt it, as a *special* remedy, in a *special case*. But Lord Liverpool, influenced, as the world said, by his pledge and prophecy of last year relative to the evils of overtrading, would not listen to it, and on the evening on which the petition of the London merchants for the advance of exchequer bills was to be presented, he at *half-past four* sent for Canning, and told him, as Canning himself told me, that he would resign if such a measure was forced upon the administration, and he not only authorised, but desired Canning to say so. Canning, a good deal surprised and taken on the sudden, still felt that he could not leave Lord Liverpool in the lurch, and he accordingly came down resolved to pledge (as I suppose he was authorised to do) the whole government to make common cause with Lord Liverpool. I heard, in the house, that the government was resolved to abide by its decision, though I did not know that they intended to place the *existence* of the administration on that narrow question, and during the debate on the petition I went up to Canning and

said, "for God's sake take care what you say about this issue of exchequer bills, for the whole house is against us, and our best friends are mutinying at our backs." He replied, with considerable nervous excitement, "So much the better! it will bring matters to a point the sooner." I really at the moment did not understand the whole meaning of this phrase, but he soon cleared it up by declaring on his legs in a very bold and uncompromising tone, that if the house chose to adopt the proposed measure, they must also be prepared *to find ministers to execute it*, for that they *would not*, and this he repeated very steadily and to the ears of some of the country gentlemen *offensively*. I know not why or how the Opposition failed to take advantage of this pledge, for if they had driven us to a vote on the point *that night* (which they might easily and even fairly have done) they would have beaten us by about 140 to 80, or, if the whole numbers were smaller (as they probably would have been, as people would have slunk off on one side and rallied on the other) in a still greater proportion. Canning has since told me that he acted in this matter under Lord Liverpool's immediate impulse, and from a sense of a *colleague's duty* towards him. I could not help saying that the difference between the advance of the money from the exchequer and from the Bank *guaranteed by the exchequer*, was so trivial that if we went out upon *that*, we should be like the poor lady shown in Westminster Abbey, who died of pricking her finger with a needle. This device of calling in the Bank was Canning told me his own. Liverpool was pledged not to advance the money directly, but he was not pledged it seems to prevent the Bank's doing it, and an obsolete clause of their charter being discovered which afforded a pretence for this arrangement, a negotiation was commenced, which, after a deal of squabbling both in private and in public between the Bank and the government, was arranged, and we all keep our places a little longer. This was altogether the most ridiculous political intrigue, if it may be so called, I ever saw; and indeed all that is *visible* of it to me is so very absurd, that I cannot but suspect that there were some better, or at least more important, reasons at bottom—there was a moment, I am convinced, in which the government was on the point of dissolution, and I could collect that Mr. Canning (as certainly was very natural) was considering how it should be *recomposed*. If you had been here this could not have happened, and whatever cabinet secrets there may be at the bottom of the affair, which of course I do not pretend to guess, I can assure you that the government was only saved by the supineness, *connivance*, or ignorance (I know not which) of the Opposition, and finally by the reluctance of the Bank to go to extremities with us, and take on themselves the responsibility of turning out the ministers. It is not very comfortable to think, nor very creditable to have it known, that the administration were for four or five days at the mere mercy of the Opposition and the Bank.

Ever since that time things have gone very smoothly, at least to the public eye, but I know not what rumours and suspicions of changes amongst ourselves are propagated from day to day. I believe nothing of them, but the people in the streets talk of government's receiving an *accession of strength*, which is one of those cant phrases which generally forerun those sort of changes in which a ministry receives an *accession of weakness*; but, I repeat, I am ignorant and confiding enough not to believe in any

change at all, unless it be that, as Huskisson is to have a salary attached to his office in the Board of Trade, Lord Liverpool will have the treasurership of the navy to give away, and it is thought that Charles Long is to be a peer, and therefore the pay-office will also be in the market.

We had hardly got out of our scrape with the Bank, when all Scotland, with the spirit of the ancient Caledonians, rose upon us in defence of their *one pound notes;* Walter Scott who, poor fellow, was ruined by dealings with his booksellers, and who had received courtesy and indulgence from the Scotch bankers, thought himself bound in gratitude to take the field for them, which he did in a series of clever but violent and mischievous letters. As he attacked with great violence and injustice the administration of Lord Melville, and indeed of our party in general, I was easily induced to take up my pen against him, and I scribbled away a reply to Sir Walter, in the same style (as far as I could imitate so superior a genius) which he had used. They tell me that I have made some stand against the great chieftain. I think I have the better in the *argument*—at some dull inn in Poland you may have half an hour to spare, and I therefore send you Scott's letter and my reply. That matter is, however, fast subsiding, and I will only add, that from the best information I can collect, I am led to fear that my suspicions of the *hollowness* of the Scotch banks are but too well founded—it is thought that they were already in difficulties before they began this discussion, and such a discussion was certainly not likely to make their position more comfortable. It would not surprise me if you were to find us in very serious financial difficulties on your return, and though I have fought the government battle against Walter Scott, and though I honestly believe that whatever is done in *England* must be ultimately done in *Scotland*, yet I have very serious doubts whether we are quite right *here*. We have a debt, and of course a fictitious income so much greater than we had, when we had cash payments before, that I cannot think that the same quantity of gold currency will suffice for the transaction of business; for every purpose of life we now carry about twice as much cash as we used to do thirty or forty years ago, and of course I think that we shall require near twice as much circulating medium, and if so, I doubt whether we shall be able *at any reasonable expense* to keep a sufficient quantity of gold for our domestic uses, but this is a subject on which I am a very bad judge.

In the midst of all these political and financial troubles, we have had a fright about the King. He had had gout for some time, but on Monday (this day week) he had, what they tell us was, an inflammation of the neck of the bladder. On Tuesday he was worse, on Wednesday *in danger*, but he has since mended, and is now thought, or at least stated to be, convalescent; but the matter is still precarious enough to be alarming. I have seen the Duke of York twice since the King's danger, and I should say that his *conduct* is perfect, if I could think it was *conduct* at all, for his behaviour is so natural, so easy, that it seems as if it *never occurred* to him that the King is mortal. I had a long chat with him at one of the moments when his Majesty was supposed to be worse, and I cannot adequately describe to you the unaffected, habitual, dogged confidence with which his mind rejected anything like a thought of the King's danger. I never was more struck by anything in my life.

I think you will now be glad to be released from the "*tediousness*" of my, probably, "*twice-told tale.*" I should not have ventured to indite such a volume, but that I know that it sometimes happens that correspondents trust to one another too much, and that nobody tells what everybody is supposed to know.

I shall make use of the Greek information you have been so good as to give me, if I can *find* or *make* an opportunity, but there is no real interest on that subject in England; the cause itself was never very popular, and the people who have taken it up have rendered it still less so: the only feeling which now exists in England about it, is curiosity as to how you may be able to settle it.

Ever, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

J. W. CROKER.

PROJET OF A LETTER FROM COUNT NESSELRODE to FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, respecting the designs of the Emperor as to the Porte.

MONSIEUR LE DUC, St. Pétersbourg, le 23me Mars, 1826.

Par sa lettre du 1er (13me)* Mars, votre Excellence m'a exprimé le vœu de recevoir par écrit l'assurance qui vous avait été donnée verbalement par l'Empereur, que si sa Majesté Impériale se voyait dans la nécessité de recourir à la force des armes dans ses différends avec la Porte, elle n'aurait, en lui déclarant la guerre, aucune vue de conquête, aucune intention d'aggrandir ses domaines en Europe.

Ayant porté ce vœu à la connaissance de l'Empereur, j'ai le plaisir de vous annoncer, Monsieur le Duc, que sa Majesté Impériale l'a parfaitement accueilli, et que par conséquent elle m'a autorisé à vous déclarer, que si la Porte Ottomane se refusait à faire droit aux réclamations qui vont lui être présentées d'ordre de l'Empereur, sa Majesté Impériale, qui dans ce cas se verrait forcée, à son plus vif regret, d'adopter contre elle des mesures coërcitives, n'hésite point à assurer, qu'en déclarant alors la guerre à la Porte elle ne nourrirait ni des vues de conquête, ni l'intention de mettre au rétablissement de la paix avec l'empire Ottoman des conditions dont le résultat dût être d'accroître les possessions de la Russie en Europe.

A la suite des explications que votre Excellence a eues tant avec l'Empereur lui-même qu'avec son ministère, il serait inutile de rien ajouter à cette assurance, et mon auguste Souverain se flatte qu'elle sera suivie d'un juste retour de confiance et d'amitié de la part du gouvernement de S.M. Britannique, qu'elle sera même une garantie nouvelle de l'union qui existe si heureusement entre la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne, de cette union dont le maintien est si nécessaire au repos de l'Europe, que sa Majesté Impériale ne cessera d'apprécier, et que vous avez eu, Monsieur le Duc, le mérite d'affermir par une mission qui a encore augmenté, s'il était possible, la haute estime et l'affection particulière que vous avez de tout temps inspirées à l'Empereur.

C'est avec un vrai plaisir que je saisis, &c.

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* See page 167.

Count Nesselrode to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

St. Pétersbourg, ce 24me Mars, 1826.

Voici, Monsieur le Duc, la copie de la lettre de l'Empereur au Roi. J'y joins la petite note en faveur du frère de M. Mobere, que je recommande, par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale, à vos soins obligeants; et en vous souhaitant un heureux voyage, je vous prie de me conserver toujours une place dans votre souvenir. Je crois en être digne par tous les sentiments d'estime et d'attachement que je vous ai invariablement voués.

NESSELRODE.

Lord Westmorland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

DEAR DUKE, London, 24th March, 1826.

I understand a messenger goes to-morrow, so I shall give you a few lines. Public matters have kept very quiet, the bullionists supporting the government measures, there has been no parliamentary difficulty; credit begins to revive, but slowly. The distress in the manufacturing districts has not at least increased, as far as reports have reached government, and I suppose the effect of the importations of foreign articles will be tried. The funds have not materially altered, nor is there a chance of much alteration, until the terms upon which the nine millions are to be funded come out. In the mean time I am told, but I do not speak from my own knowledge, that the exchanges are much in our favour, and gold is coming in. In the midst of other matters, the King's health has been again seriously affected.

Monday was se'nnight Mr. H. told me the King was well the day before, and that judging of the effect of medicine the day before, he was as potent in constitution as any man, but when he returned on that Monday there had been a relapse, and you have seen the bulletins. The inflammation was in the lower part of the body—I believe, scientifically, the perinæum; bleeding relieved it, and they now say he is well again; but from what I picked up yesterday there is still gout about him, so you can judge what sort of state it is. Comparing the different stories that come to me, I do not think the bleeding or anything else has really affected the constitution, however fearful they may be for such a purpose; but the relapse of inflammation is to be apprehended. The Duke of York's health has improved to appearance considerably. There is no account arrived of the death of the King of Portugal or its effects but through Paris. Beresford says the Regency is ill-formed, as the Princess is made only an equal in authority with the ministers that control the Regency, and therefore of no authority, and that such a position of one of the Royal family will not be borne, and that either she must be put at the head with authority or the arrangement will be overset. I have not read the despatches, if any are come, but I believe not. By account here the Emperor of Austria is in imminent danger, but that you know better. The parliamentary business is almost entirely gone through, and I think the session may close from the 20th to 25th or 30th of May. What is to be then done is to be considered, and I trust you will be home before that. Burghersh, after a most unaccountable correspondence from Canning, means to set out for Florence the beginning

of April. By all accounts that come from Corfu the Greek affairs seem in a weaker and weaker state, and, if no money be sent from England, which they deem hopeless, they cannot support their fleet or troops. We are expecting a messenger from you, to which, as we are all going out of town, you will probably have no answer till Wednesday or Thursday s'ennight. I am very happy to hear that your health has improved on your journey.

Yours very sincerely,

WESTMORLAND.

The Chancellor seems quite well and re-established in his usual strength.

I think Lord Liverpool seems better, and his nerves more composed.

The Scotch and Irish small note bill will probably be postponed till next year. All Scotland violent in resistance.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 24th March, 1826.

I will no longer defer despatching a messenger to your Grace, although the week's postponement of his departure has not produced any arrival from Mr. Stratford Canning.

I am happy to have this opportunity of congratulating your Grace on his Majesty's established convalescence.

The enclosed despatches from Sir Henry Wellesley have excited great alarm here, respecting the health of the Emperor of Austria.

The death of the King of Portugal creates a new crisis in Portuguese and Brazilian affairs, the result of which is matter of great anxiety.

I enclose to your Grace a copy of the instructions given on this subject to Lord Ponsonby, who was on the point of sailing for Rio de Janeiro, on his way to Buenos Ayres, when the intelligence of the fatal issue of his Most Faithful Majesty's illness arrived.

This instruction has been communicated by me to the Portuguese Ambassador, to the Minister of Brazil, and to the Prince Esterhazy, and will be transmitted this day by a messenger to Sir Henry Wellesley, to be imparted by him to Prince Metternich.

As we have not been in the habit of communicating with the Court of St. Petersburg upon Portuguese and Brazilian affairs, I do not transmit these papers to Lord Strangford.

There is, however, not the slightest objection to making Count Nesselrode acquainted with our views on this subject—if any wish to that effect should be expressed by the Russian Minister, or if your Grace should conceive that any good would result therefrom.

The deviation which has taken place from the strict line of succession in the Russian Empire, will necessarily have qualified those rigid and unbending doctrines, which have hitherto precluded any interchange and concurrence of opinions between the British and Russian governments, upon the perplexing questions which have arisen respecting the crown of Portugal and Brazil.

Should your Grace find it expedient to enter upon this matter with the

Russian government you will, in that case, give to Lord Strangford a copy of this despatch, to be placed in the Archives of the Embassy.

I think it, in any case, due to your Grace's station in his Majesty's government, to keep your Grace informed of the current transactions during your absence. For the same reason, I transmit, for your Grace's information, a copy of the instructions furnished to Lord Ponsonby upon (what is referred to in the enclosed despatch to his Lordship as the important commission with which he is already charged) the negotiation of a peace between the Court of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Ayres.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Right Hon. George Canning to the Right Hon. Lord Ponsonby.

MY LORD, Foreign Office, 24th March, 1826.

Since your Lordship left town to embark for your destination, intelligence has been received here, first, of the illness, and subsequently of the death, of his Imperial and Royal Majesty the King of Portugal.

As your Lordship is already charged with one very important commission at Rio de Janeiro, I take advantage of the opportunity, which your Lordship's intercourse with the Brazilian government will afford, to convey confidentially to the Ministers of his Imperial Majesty, and to his Imperial Majesty himself, the view which his Majesty's government take of the consequences of this melancholy and unexpected event, and of the position in which it places his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil.

I must, in the first place, put your Lordship in possession of the exact state of our information upon this subject.

The fact of the King of Portugal's death is known to us only through the French newspapers.

Our latest accounts from Sir William A'Court are contained in the enclosed despatches, which detail the particulars of the King of Portugal's illness: and of H. M. F. Majesty's appointment of a Regency.

What impression may have been produced at Lisbon by H. M. F. Majesty's decease (the apprehension whereof appeared to have in a great degree subsided when Sir William A'Court's despatch came away), and how far the general satisfaction which Sir William A'Court describes as having been produced by the appointment and composition of the Regency, may have continued to prevail after it was found that the functions of that Regency would be of a more permanent character, can only be matter of conjecture.

There seems, however, to be every reason to believe that the same considerations which rendered this arrangement so satisfactory to the Portuguese people, at its first publication, will not have lost their influence in consequence of an event which would have made some arrangement of the sort, if this Regency had not been established beforehand, at once more necessary and more difficult.

Nothing, indeed, could be more fortunate since that sad event was to take place, than that the establishment of a Regency should have preceded it.

It may be right to premise also what is the present state of our knowledge as to affairs at Rio de Janeiro.

Mr. Chamberlain's despatch (No. 11) of the 9th January is the last intelligence

that we have received from that Capital. By that despatch it appears that the arrival of the ratifications of the Treaty of 29th August, with the accompanying *Charta de Lei*, &c., had produced considerable dissatisfaction at Rio de Janeiro, as we know, from other sources, it had done in other parts of the Brazilian dominions. Recollecting how strong a disposition the Emperor Don Pedro had shewn in the earlier part of Sir Charles Stuart's negotiation to cut short the difficulties connected with the question of his Imperial Majesty's succession to the crown of Portugal, by at once renouncing his right to that succession, we are not without apprehension that his Imperial Majesty may have resorted to the same expedient for allaying the discontent and escaping from the embarrassment arising out of the ill-advised accompaniments of H. M. F. Majesty's ratification.

In that case, the Emperor Don Pedro may have abdicated the crown of Portugal at the very moment when it was on the point of descending upon his head.

Should such an abdication have taken place, and should it have been absolute and unconditional, there is nothing more to be said. Don Pedro cannot retract that decision; and it will therefore remain exclusively for Portugal to consider in what manner the vacant throne shall be filled.

The opinions of the British government are tendered for his Imperial Majesty's consideration only on the supposition that no such abdication has taken place, and that the intelligence of his Royal father's death will find the Emperor free to exercise an unprejudiced discretion as to the acceptance or renunciation of his lawful inheritance.

I am aware that it is very difficult indeed for any foreign government, however closely connected by the ties of friendship, to take upon itself to offer advice as to the exercise of so important and delicate a discretion. But the knowledge of the opinions of a friendly government cannot be indifferent to a Sovereign placed in a situation of so much difficulty, and one in which so many interests depend upon his decision.

That Brazil after being so long used to the presence of its Sovereign, and so recently after the successful assertion of its independence, could not submit to be governed by a delegated authority, may be assumed as certain. Would Portugal now be contented with such a mode of government?

This is a question which can only be answered from Portugal itself. We do not venture to anticipate what the answer would be; but the Emperor of Brazil may perhaps have collected it from the communications transmitted to Brazil, as we know, immediately upon the illness, and probably also after the death, of H. M. F. Majesty.

But it may, we think, be assumed as pretty certain that if Portugal is prepared to dispense with the presence of a Sovereign, and to submit a second time to be governed by a Regency, the Portuguese nation would expect that the authority of that Regency should be in all essential points entirely independent of Brazil.

Would not such an arrangement, even if acquiesced in at the beginning, tend eventually, and in no long process of time, to stir all those questions and to excite all those feelings in Portugal, which led in Brazil to the impatient desire for total separation?

Independently of what may be the general sentiment of the Portuguese nation, can it be expected that the Infante Don Miguel would yield patient and permanent submission to a Regency, at the head of which is placed a sister his junior in the order of succession to the throne? If, to cure this difficulty, Don Miguel should himself be added to that Regency, constituting the permanent government of Portugal, would not that addition be hazardous in the extreme?

would it not in effect, place the crown so nearly within the reach of Don Miguel that the temptation to seize it at a favourable opportunity would become almost irresistible?

That Portugal and Brazil should continue for a series of generations under a common sovereign, residing constantly in Brazil, was never perhaps very confidently to be believed. The only chance of such continued union would have been in the alternate residence of successive sovereigns in Brazil and Portugal.

Had the life of his late M. F. Majesty been spared until the heir of the empire of Brazil had attained to years of discretion, the young prince might then have been sent to reside in Portugal during the lifetime of his grandfather, and would then have been ready to succeed at H. M. F. Majesty's death to the Regency of Portugal, and at the death of the Emperor, his father, to the crowns both of Portugal and Brazil.

The sudden demise of H. M. F. Majesty has destroyed the means of such a combination; and although it is *possible* that the present Emperor of Brazil might wear both crowns during his life, it is hardly within reasonable expectation that they should not be separated in the next generation.

It cannot be supposed that the Portuguese nation, even if it should pay willing obedience to a Regency representing the Emperor Don Pedro, whom it knows, would continue that obedience, after his death, to a sovereign a stranger to Portugal, as well by birth and education, as by constant residence in a distant quarter of the globe.

The Emperor of Brazil therefore, in the decision which he is now to take, has in fact only to provide for what shall be the lot of Portugal, at most during the remainder of his own reign.

Upon the mode in which he shall make this decision will in all human probability depend whether the crown of Portugal shall, or shall not, be worn by his descendants.

The birth of a son affords a great facility for the solution of this difficult problem. An inheritor of the Empire of Brazil being thus in existence, the Emperor may, without offence to the Brazilians, devolve the crown of Portugal upon his eldest daughter. Whether this should be done by immediately abdicating in her favour, or by solemnly designating her as his successor in the crown of Portugal, is a question (practically the only question) which Don Pedro has to decide; and it is one which might perhaps be decided indifferently either way, if there were no such person as the Infante Don Miguel in existence.

But looking to Don Miguel's position in Portugal, either as a member of a Regency established for the life of his Imperial brother, or as excluded from it, and considering that *certainty* as to the destination of the crown of Portugal is the one thing necessary for tranquillizing all fears, allaying all jealousies and curbing all ambitions in that kingdom, we cannot help thinking that a frank and immediate abdication in favour of his daughter is the course whereby Don Pedro would most effectually attain the objects which he must be presumed to have at heart.

There would still remain to be considered the disposal of the young princess, destined to be Queen of Portugal, for the period that is to elapse before she will be of an age to assume and exercise the government. Upon this point, less than upon any other, can foreign suggestion be confidently hazarded. It does appear to us, however, upon all general principles, and with a view to all probable contingencies, that she could not too soon be transferred to Portugal, to complete her education under the eyes of that people, over whom she would be destined to reign.

In that case, whether Don Miguel were associated in the Regency administering the government during her minority, or not, his ambition would probably be directed, not to the crown itself, but to the accomplishment of that union with the lawful possessor of the crown, of which it is understood that the Emperor of Brazil has sometime held out to him a contingent expectation.

In thus stating to the Emperor of Brazil what occurs to the British government upon this momentous question, we are aware that while we point out the difficulties which he has to solve, and presume to indicate what appears to us the most likely mode of so doing, we have no pretension to prescribe his decision, nor any authority to answer for the consequences of it.

The points upon which we entertain confident opinions are, 1st, That the Emperor cannot hope to retain the Empire of Brazil, if he returns to Portugal. 2dly, That residing in Brazil, and resolving to govern Portugal by a Regency, he cannot expect permanent tranquillity in Portugal, if the succession to the crown remains unsettled. 3dly, That it is out of all reasonable probability that the crowns of Portugal and Brazil should by any contrivance continue united on the same head beyond the life of the Emperor Don Pedro.

From these, which appear to us uncontrovertible propositions, the only inference which we venture to deduce as equally uncontrovertible is that the Emperor, in the decision to which he is now compelled to come, is bound to consult, not so much what may be for his own personal and present convenience or gratification, as what the future peace and happiness of the different branches of his own family and of the two nations whose destinies are now in his hands may require.

Your Lordship will communicate the substance of this despatch to the Brazilian ministers, and will, if desired, read it to his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil.

You may also communicate it to Baron Mareschal, the Austrian chargé-d'affaires, of whose advice and assistance you will avail yourself in your intercourse with the Emperor and his Ministers.

You will, however, give no copy of this despatch. But Mr. Chamberlain, to whom, of course, you will shew it in the first instance, will take a copy to be preserved in the Archives of the British Mission at Rio de Janeiro.

I am, with great truth and regard, my Lord,

your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 25th March, 1826.

I will not let the messenger go without a few lines from me, to say how much I am satisfied with your report of your first conversations with the Emperor and with Count Nesselrode.*

How fortunate it is that we determined to approach them *alone*, and not in a body with the Allies.

Mr. Gordon, who is just arrived from Vienna, is charged with messages from Prince Metternich, importing that he (Prince M.) is not jealous of our separate intercourse with Russia; and that Austria will be ready to act

* See page 148.

whatever part we may assign to her, for the purpose of co-operating with us for the preservation of peace.

France is a little more jealous and curious; but not (to do her justice) in any very inordinate degree.

By the way, I am a little at a loss to reconcile your entire confidence that she has not been playing tricks about Greece, with a despatch from Lord Strangford, reporting, on La Ferronays' authority, certain overtures to the French government from Greece, which La Ferronays says were communicated to us at the time; but which I do not recollect, and cannot find to have been so communicated to Granville.

The King gains ground daily. The attack was a very alarming one.

We have got through the supply (with the exception of one or two Irish votes), and have not more business in the House of Commons than will carry us on to the end of May.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—An account received last night from Vienna has relieved our apprehensions for the life of the Emperor of Austria.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD, Foreign Office, 25th March, 1826.

At the moment of sending off the messenger with my other despatch, No. 7, I received your Grace's despatches, Nos. 2 to 5, by Sir A. Malet, which I have lost no time in laying before the King.

The accounts of your Grace's reception will, I am sure, be highly satisfactory to his Majesty, and your Grace's first communications with his Imperial Majesty and his minister appear to be as favourable as could be expected to our great object of maintaining peace; and to justify entirely the course which we have pursued for that object.

There is nothing in your Grace's despatches to induce me to detain the messenger, whom, as I state to your Grace in another despatch, I had already kept back a week, in the hopes of arrivals from Constantinople. We are still without such arrivals. I will despatch another messenger to your Grace with the first intelligence which I receive from Mr. Stratford Canning.

I am, with great truth and respect,
my Lord, your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

To Sir Henry Wellesley. [543

MY DEAR HENRY, St. Petersburg, 26th March, 1826.

I have received three letters from you; the last two upon the Emperor of Austria's illness, and upon what is supposed to

have passed in Mr. Stratford Canning's interview with certain Greeks at Hydra.

I sincerely hope that the Emperor may recover his health entirely. He would indeed be a great loss.

I cannot enter into the details of news from hence without stating matters that ought at present to be secret; and nothing is secret that passes one's lips, or from one's hand to paper. I hope however that matters will turn out better than their appearance would warrant the belief of, and, at all events, that bad consequences are guarded against effectually.

It is difficult to judge of matters here, and whether there is any Minister or not, and who is the adviser. We have some great diplomatic characters here, but I believe they are all as much in the dark as I am.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I will write to you by the first opportunity.

To Lord Granville.

MY DEAR LORD GRANVILLE, St. Petersburg, 27th March, 1826.

I am very much obliged to you for your letters, which I have received, the latter being dated the *

I have taken an opportunity of talking to Count Nesselrode respecting the Island of Cuba. This government were already aware of the danger to which that Island was exposed; as the Emperor himself mentioned the subject to me some days ago.

I have not for some time had an opportunity of knowing what had passed between our government and that of Spain. The last transaction that I knew of was a discussion in the Cabinet upon a despatch, recommending to Spain to agree to a truce with the revolted colonies for a term of years, which I think took place in June or July last. I don't know whether the Spanish government ever took any notice of that proposition. I informed Count Nesselrode that we had made it, and pointed out to him the absurdity of the objection of the Spaniards to agree to it, viz., that it would deprive them of the benefits likely to result from partial insurrections in their favour, and would

* Blank in MS.

prevent them from assisting those insurrections, by shewing him how incapable they were of doing anything for themselves, since they could not relieve so small a port, but one so important to Spain to hold, as St. Juan d'Ulloa. But I will take an opportunity of speaking to the Emperor on the subject.

All the politicians here are very busy and anxious for news, and messengers are going in all directions.

Matters are, however, not so bad as they appear to my colleagues to be. Indeed, the worst of them is their appearance, as I hope we shall have no war; and I am certain that if we should have war it will be upon purely Russian and Turkish grounds, and that no power in Europe will have any reason to interfere, or to be apprehensive of its consequences.

This will be quite clear to you when you know all the circumstances.

I hope to send home a messenger in the middle of the week, and to follow myself on Sunday.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Clanwilliam. [545

MY DEAR CLANWILLIAM, St. Petersburg, 31st March, 1826.

My journey, which I hoped to commence on Sunday the 2nd of April, is put off till Thursday the 6th of April. If any messenger, therefore, should be at Berlin before the 8th, send him to Mittau, and desire him, if I should have passed, to follow me to Warsaw by Kowno.

After the 8th, and till the 11th, send to Warsaw by Posen any messenger who may come. That, I believe, will be the road by which I will go from Warsaw to Berlin, but I will write you more hereafter upon that subject.

Do not send my letters which may reach you by post excepting by a messenger.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Emperor of Russia to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

[Traduction.]

St. Pétersbourg, le 19me (31st) Mars, 1826.

À notre Feldmaréchal, Général le Duc de Wellington.

Afin de vous donner un témoignage de mon estime particulière pour vos hautes qualités et les services éminents que vous avez rendus à toute l'Europe, il me sera très-agréable qu'un des régiments de mon armée porte votre nom. En conséquence, ce jour même, 19 Mars, qui fut signalé il y a douze ans par la prise de Paris et la fin d'une lutte à jamais mémorable, où la bonne cause vous dut de si brillants succès, j'ai ordonné que le régiment d'infanterie de Smolensk, formé par Pierre le Grand, et l'un des plus distingués de mon armée, qui déjà s'est trouvé sous vos ordres, fut dorénavant nommé Régiment du Duc de Wellington, désirant par là vous donner une preuve de ma constante et sincère bienveillance.

Nicolas.

[*From the Empress Mother of Russia.*]

April, 1826.

SYSTEM OF EDUCATION AT THE CONVENT.

Plan d'Études.

1. Demoiselles Nobles.

(a) *Classe brune (inférieure).*

1. Religion—le petit catéchisme, et un abrégé de l'histoire sainte.
2. Langues—le russe, le français, l'allemand, lecture grammaire élémentaire, exercices pratiques.
3. Arithmétique—les quatre règles d'arithmétique en nombres incomplexes, puis en nombres complexes, enfin les quatre règles en fraction.
4. Géographie—les premiers élémens de la géographie mathématique, avec les figures les plus indispensables; élémens de la géographie physique, avec les contours des quatre parties du monde; élémens de la géographie politique.
5. Histoire—les canevas des quatre tableaux synchronistiques de l'histoire.

(b) *Classe bleue (mitoyenne) en quatre divisions.*

1. Religion—le grand catéchisme, l'histoire sainte, et la morale.
2. Les trois langues—la grammaire finie, élémens de rhétorique, compositions, traductions.
3. Arithmétique est finie, élémens du calcul de tête.
4. La géographie est achevée.
5. L'histoire finie.

(3) *Classe blanche (supérieure) en deux divisions, subdivisées en deux parties.*

1. Religion—le grande catéchisme dans tous ses développements; l'histoire sainte jusqu'au quatrième siècle après la naissance de Jesus Christ; la morale, la liturgie.

2. Les trois langues—leur littérature, composition dans le genre épistolaire, didactique, descriptif, et historique.
3. Elémens de la géographie.
4. La physique et l'histoire naturelle.
5. La géographie avec les données statistiques.
6. L'histoire développée synchronistiquement.

DIVISION DES ÉLÈVES BOURGEOISES.

Classe brune (inférieure), trois divisions.

Tout comme la classe brune des demoiselles nobles.

Classe blanche (supérieure), deux divisions.

La seconde division toute comme la première division de la classe bleue des demoiselles nobles.

La première toute comme la première division noble, excepté la géometrie, la physique, et l'histoire naturelle, toute comme la division blanche.

[The system of education in the convent of St Petersburg. Keep among my papers.—W.]

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [54

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, St. Petersburg, April 3, 1826.

I have not written to you by the post, as I could not think it desirable to bring to the knowledge of the inferior agents of the post-offices of this government, Prussia, &c., that upon which I should have to write to you. My despatches by this occasion will tell you everything; and I hope that I shall be found to have done the best for the cause of peace, in the unforeseen circumstances in which I have found myself, and that I have forwarded the views of government as nearly according to my instructions as I could bring them to bear upon the state of the case.

In answer to your private letter, I have to inform you that I have ascertained that Lord Strangford's letter from you was delayed. Any enquiry upon the cause of the delay of the delivery of a letter here is a matter of delicacy. But in this case I believe the letter was put up in London in a case which contained some article for Madame de Lieven (la Mère). This case was sealed at the custom-house on the frontier, and was taken to the custom-house here to be opened; and the letter was, in fact, found by old Madame de Lieven, and I should imagine

that, although delayed, did, contrary to the usual practice, reach Lord Strangford without having been opened.

I am quite well, and I hope to reach London by the end of the month.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

47.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR, St. Petersburg, 4th April (23rd March), 1826.

According to the intention which I announced to you, in the conclusion of my despatch, of the 16th of March,* I made other attempts, both verbally and in writing, to prevail upon the Emperor to desist from urging his pretension that the Porte should send to the Russian frontier, plenipotentiaries with full powers, to negotiate the arrangements under the Treaty of Bucharest. It is not necessary that I should enter into the detail of the reasoning which I urged upon Count Nesselrode, upon the different occasions on which I spoke to him, as it will be found in the enclosed copy of a Memorandum which I gave him on the 7th (19th) March,† and which I requested him to give to the Emperor, as I thought that the Count might not have repeated to his Imperial Majesty exactly what I had urged upon the Count's consideration.

In neither of the interviews which I had with the Count did he give any answer to the reasoning contained in the enclosed paper. His reply was confined to the assertion that it was absolutely necessary for his Imperial Majesty to settle all the questions pending with the Turks in a manner consistent with his dignity, and which should be satisfactory to this nation; and that they must claim the advantage of knowing the Turks as well as the ministers of any other Power, and the right to decide for themselves; and that they were persuaded that this demand, if acceded to, would enable them to settle everything; and that the Porte would prefer acceding to it to war with Russia.

In the course of these discussions Count Nesselrode informed me that the Emperor had, to gratify me, consented to enlarge

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* See page 172. † See page 231.

the time, which Monsieur de Minciacky had been directed to give to the Porte for consideration, from one month to six weeks; and had made some trifling alteration in the Note to be presented, which you will see in the copy I now enclose. (No. 2.)

I did not, however, learn the determination of the Emperor to hear no more upon the subject, and to let the case stand upon the three demands contained in the Note, till the 21st of March.

I had on that day an interview with Count Nesselrode, in which he informed me of the Emperor's final determination; but that his Imperial Majesty was so desirous of preserving peace, that he had desired the Count to inform Monsieur de Minciacky that his Imperial Majesty's object was peace, and direct Monsieur de Minciacky to carry on the whole proceeding in the most conciliatory manner, and not to consider the compliance with the demand for the plenipotentiaries as a *sine quâ non*, if he should find the Porte disposed to carry into execution the other demands; and that the Turkish government had not at their disposal persons who could be employed as plenipotentiaries at a distance from Constantinople.

I enclose a copy of this instruction. (No. 3.)

I pointed out to Count Nesselrode the degree to which this mode of proceeding tended to lower the dignity of, and to diminish the respect of, the Porte for his Imperial Majesty; and I requested Count Nesselrode to observe that there was still one argument unanswered, and no provision made to remedy the evils which the truth of that argument left in the case, viz., the apprehension of the Porte that war would be the consequence of the refusal to send the plenipotentiaries; and that the release of the Servian hostages would in that case give the Emperor the assistance of the Servians, and that this apprehension would induce the Porte to refuse to release the deputies.

The Count said that, in respect to this point, as well as upon a demand not intended to be a *sine quâ non*, but which is stated as such in the Note (viz., that another deputation of Servians should be received), that such minor points must be left to the discretion of Monsieur de Minciacky, whose talents and conciliatory manners and disposition were well known; and who, besides, was fully instructed of the Emperor's wish to preserve peace.

The demand of the Emperor, therefore, stands upon the three points: the Beshlis in the Principalities, the Servian

deputies, and the plenipotentiaries; the last not to be made a *sine quâ non;* but the fact that it is not so considered is a secret.

Upon this state of the case, although I think it likely that war will be avoided, I saw the probability that there would be an alarm throughout Europe as extensive, and probably nearly as mischievous for the moment, as war itself, against which alarm I thought it desirable to guard; and I stated my sense of this probability to Count Nesselrode, and requested him to give me in some shape in writing the assurances which his Imperial Majesty had given me verbally in the conversation which I had had with him on the 10th March, for which I had asked in my letter to his Excellency of the 13th March, transmitted in my despatch, of the 13th inst.*

The Count promised he would, and that he would concert with me the paper which he should draw up.

In the mean time Count Lieven arrived on the 21st at night, and on the following days I observed, as well in Count Nesselrode as in Count Lieven, an increasing anxiety respecting the Greek question. They regretted that that question had been left out of the discussion and of their representations to the Porte; and they said that the Emperor had been misunderstood, that he could not but feel an interest for the Greeks, although upon principle he could not make war upon the Porte in support of their revolt.

I besides found that there was a very general alarm among the foreign ministers here, to whom Count Nesselrode had communicated his note to the Porte, respecting the probability of war. The natural consequence of war with the Porte, whatever might have been the Emperor's feeling respecting the Greek cause while at peace, would be to throw the Greeks into his hands. The Greeks would become his allies, and as his allies his Imperial Majesty must upon a peace protect them. I felt strongly the force of this reasoning, and, although I confess that I did not nor do not expect that war will be the consequence of the late proceedings of this government, I did not think I ought to trust to my own speculations upon this point; and I considered that, as the object of my mission here was not only to prevent war, but if war could not be prevented to limit

* See page 167.

the extent and duration of its operation as much as possible, I conceived that I ought to avail myself of the spirit of his Majesty's instructions, and of those which I received from you in conversation, not only not to express any disinclination to allow the Greek case to become a part of the final arrangement which I was to make with Count Nesselrode, but rather to encourage its becoming a part of it; taking care, however, that the Emperor should be bound under no circumstances to go farther in favour of the Greeks than his Majesty's government were disposed to go.

I had already communicated to Count Nesselrode in confidence the general nature and extent of the communication which Mr. Stratford Canning had had with certain of the Greek deputies at Hydra, without letting him know their names.*

In this view of an arrangement, Count Nesselrode gave me on the 25th March the paper of which the enclosed, No. 4, is a copy, to which I gave on the 26th March the answers contained in Nos. 5 and 6.

I did not hear any more upon the subject till the night of the 31st March, when I saw Count Nesselrode and Count Lieven, who delivered me the enclosed papers, Nos. 7 and 8.

I did not understand exactly for what reason the two subjects were to be divided. I did not object, but proposed a different draft of papers, as in Nos. 9 and 10.

Upon all these occasions strong objections were made to enter into the engagement to send the ambassador to Constantinople, in case the Porte should comply with the Emperor's demand; which, however, the Emperor's ministers declared it to be his Imperial Majesty's intention to do, but that his Imperial Majesty could not enter into a formal engagement upon the subject. I declared that, according to the instructions under which I acted, I could not engage that his Majesty's good offices would be afforded, whether to prevent war or to limit the duration and extent of hostilities, unless I should receive a positive assurance that the compliance with specific terms would be followed by the restoration of peace and its usual relations.

I am sorry to say that a variety of schemes were then proposed by Count Lieven and Count Nesselrode, the object of which was to weaken the declaration made by the Emperor, that, in case of war, he would demand nothing from the Porte;

* See page 121.

of which one was a clause to be added to the engagement, that he would ask nothing unless the supposed war should be of long duration.

I told the Emperor's ministers that I could accept of nothing in writing which should weaken what the Emperor had said to me; and I proposed to them to omit everything which should relate to good offices on the one hand, and to the restoration of diplomatic relations on the other; and that the communication between us on the Russian question should be confined to giving me in writing the assurance which the Emperor had given me verbally, and since to others, that in case of war his Imperial Majesty would not ask for a village.

In answer to this proposal, great apprehension was expressed that, if the war commenced, it was not very probable that it would be speedily terminated; and that in that case the expense would be enormous, and that it would be a little hard to bind the Emperor to ask for no compensation in Europe to defray his expenses; and that, in fact, he could not avow to his nation that he had entered into such an engagement, without being able to show that his Imperial Majesty had derived some corresponding advantage.

To this reasoning I replied, by observing that his Imperial Majesty's ministers ought to have considered these circumstances when they were making their demands upon the Porte; that the verbal declaration of the Emperor, of which I asked for the written confirmation, was consistent with the offers and engagements of the late Emperor; and for the specific and just demands of his Imperial Majesty upon the Porte I was authorised to offer his Majesty's good offices, as well to prevent war, as to shorten its duration and limit its extent if war should unfortunately occur, by endeavouring to prevail upon the Porte to satisfy his Imperial Majesty's just demands, provided that the satisfaction of those demands led to real peace with all its consequent relations.

The Russian ministers then proposed as an expedient that his Majesty should make a corresponding declaration that, in case of war with the Porte, his Majesty would make no claim of territory or increase his influence; and various modes were proposed of effecting this object.

It did not occur to me at the time that this proposal could refer to the communications ordered to be made by Mr. Stratford

Canning to the Porte, and by the officer commanding his Majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean to Ibrahim Pasha, regarding the conduct of the latter in the Morea; nor did the Russian ministers, in that meeting, refer to that transaction; and I pointed out to them that such a declaration on our part would render the whole proceeding ridiculous.

We separated without coming to any conclusion, and on the following day, the 2nd of April, I dined with the Emperor. His Imperial Majesty took me aside, and told me that he was very anxious that I should endeavour to discover some mode of giving to his written engagement that he would claim nothing in case of war, at least the appearance of being a measure of reciprocity. I told his Imperial Majesty that I really thought he was mistaken in thinking that such an engagement on his part could be blamed by anybody. That its objects were to show that, if he should go to war, it was because the conduct of the Porte forced him to take that course; and that he had no views of aggrandisement or ambition; and to calm the jealousies and uneasiness of the neighbouring powers, his Allies, and of all Europe.

I told him that when I had talked with his Imperial Majesty's ministers the night before, it had not occurred to me that his Majesty might be considered as in a state of discussion with the Porte. That I must admit that, strictly speaking, his Majesty was so probably at that moment; and that his Imperial Majesty might fairly claim a reciprocal disclaimer on his Majesty's part of any views of aggrandisement. But that his Imperial Majesty would find it impossible to use such disclaimer in the manner he intended. That I could not give such disclaimer without showing precisely what was the nature of the discussion between his Majesty's government on the one hand, and the Porte and Ibrahim Pasha on the other; and there was nobody who would not see that this disclaimer was given solely as a pretence to cover that of his Imperial Majesty's.

The Emperor, however, persisted in asking that I would endeavour to draw a letter, which would satisfy his mind upon this point; and I wrote the enclosed, No. 11; but when I met his ministers on Monday, they told me that they could not think this letter sufficient, and that they could give his Imperial Majesty's confirmation in writing of his verbal assurance only in return for his Majesty's good offices. I told them that I

was aware that the letter for which the Emperor had asked would do no good; and that as to his Majesty's good offices I could not promise them, as I had repeatedly told them, as well verbally as in writing, unless they should give me an assurance in writing that the diplomatic relations of Russia would be restored to their ancient state, as soon as the Porte should have satisfied their specific demands.

Count Nesselrode was very warm upon this subject; and we broke up, settling that we should meet again in the evening, after he should have seen the Emperor.

When he and Count Lieven came, they told me that his Imperial Majesty had determined to write nothing about the restoration of the diplomatic relations; that he adhered firmly to his determination, in respect to demands upon the Porte, as stated to me in conversation; but that he could not give such assurance in writing, unless I could assure him in the same manner that his Majesty's good offices should be used to obtain from the Porte justice to his demands, in order to prevent war; or, if war should unfortunately take place, just satisfaction from the Porte for the injuries done to him. I said that the Russian ministers knew that I could not, under the circumstances, give these assurances; and that we had better proceed to discuss the Greek arrangement, which we did, and settled it.

Upon taking leave of Count Lieven and Count Nesselrode, I stated my regret at the determination of the Emperor, as communicated to me, as I feared it would produce a bad impression in England, as well as elsewhere; and I offered again to take the whole case *ad referendum*. Count Nesselrode was very violent, as indeed was Count Lieven; but the former said that Count Lieven was going to England, and might settle the whole case, if his Majesty's government would think proper to grant their good offices to prevent war, or to restore peace.

I did not think it proper to allow the failure in obtaining this document to prevent me from concluding an arrangement respecting the Greeks, which I enclose with a translation, No. 12. You will see that the 3rd article binds the Emperor not in any case to force an arrangement upon the Porte, in favour of the Greeks, beyond that which was proposed by the Greek government themselves to Mr. Stratford Canning. The case then now stands thus:—The Emperor has demanded from the Porte the three points referred to, of which the third is not to be a *sine quâ*

non; he has promised, verbally, that he will not require any territory or additional influence for himself in any treaty of peace with the Porte, in case he should be obliged to have recourse to hostilities; and that in no case will he require more for the Greeks than the Greeks have now asked for themselves.

The Emperor has certainly made to others the same verbal declaration as he did to myself, and I think I should have obtained his confirmation in writing of that declaration, if I had consented to assure his Imperial Majesty of his Majesty's good offices without saying anything of the ambassador to be sent to the Porte. But I considered the instructions to myself and to Lord Strangford, of October, 1825, quite clear upon this point, and I could not venture to depart from them.

At all events, I believe the peace of Europe will not be disturbed; and, if it is at all, the war will be confined to the original belligerents, and that no other Power will have any cause to feel uneasiness respecting it.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

MEMORANDUM UPON THE THREE DEMANDS IN THE PROPOSED NOTE, VIZ., 1—PRINCIPALITIES; 2—SERVIAN DEPUTIES; 3—PLENIPOTENTIARIES.

A clear distinction ought to be drawn between rights and pretensions; however well founded the latter may be in consequence of the circumstances which have occurred.

Rights are founded upon prescription, the laws of nations, treaties, engagements, &c.; pretensions are created by circumstances.

For instance, the execution of the arrangements in the Principalities as required by Monsieur de Minciacky in the conference of the 1st (13th) October, 1825, in as far as they may not have been carried into execution, and the release of the Servian deputies detained by the Porte as hostages, are rights. But the demand that plenipotentiaries should be sent to the frontier to treat respecting another arrangement is only a claim or pretension, however justifiable by the circumstances.

The rights of any Power may be demanded *sine quâ non* in a discussion between two Powers standing upon a political equality. A pretension however justifiable cannot be so without the semblance at least of an equivalent. But it is desirable to examine the circumstances attending this particular pretension.

First. There is no instance in modern times of the Porte having employed plenipotentiaries at a distance from Constantinople, excepting to make peace after an unsuccessful war, when, of course, forced by the circumstances of the case to consent; and in this particular negotiation they have already refused to send a plenipotentiary to a distance.

Secondly. It will be very difficult to find such persons whom they could trust, who would be willing to undertake the charge.

Thirdly. The Porte might decline to comply with this condition on the ground above stated; or,

Fourthly. The Porte might deprive the government of his Imperial Majesty of the ground for the pretension by solemnly declaring that they are ready to carry into execution all the articles of the treaty within a limited period of time, provided his Imperial Majesty will do the same.

The question then comes to this, in the hypothesis that the Porte should state what has been above supposed in the third or fourth instances, and supposing them likewise to have carried into execution the demand of right on the part of his Imperial Majesty regarding the Principalities and the Servian deputies, could his Imperial Majesty commence measures of war against the Porte?

If his Imperial Majesty cannot, it is clear that the third demand of the Porte being only of the nature of a pretension ought not to be mixed up with the other two demands of rights; as it would be impossible, consistently with the principle of his Imperial Majesty and his late august brother, to carry into execution the menace which the Note contains, in case the pretension in question should not be complied with by the Porte.

But this is not the only view to be taken of this case. The Porte will refuse to attend to this pretension; and will expect the recall of Monsieur de Minciacky and war as the consequence.

The hopes of permanent peace with his Imperial Majesty would be the inducement to the Porte to release the Servian

deputies upon his Imperial Majesty's demand; but the demand of plenipotentiaries, under a menace, as a *sine quâ non* with which neither their policy, nor their practice, nor the means at their disposition would enable them to comply, must induce them to refuse to release the deputies.

It cannot be denied that the Porte have detained the Servian deputies, contrary to the law of nations, as hostages for the good conduct of the Servians.

Their reasoning then will be this. The release of the Servian deputies will deprive us of our security for the fidelity of the Servians. We shall have war if we do not send the plenipotentiaries, even though we release the deputies. It is better that in a war with his Imperial Majesty the Servians should not be against us; we will not therefore release the deputies. The foundation for this reasoning or the reasoning itself may be good or bad; but still it will be that of the Porte —and if that is true the consequence of urging the third demand as a *sine quâ non* will be that the second demand will be refused.

WELLINGTON.

II.

PROJET DE NOTE À REMETTRE PAR MONSIEUR DE MINCIACKY À LA PORTE OTTOMANE.

Le soussigné, &c., a reçu de l'Empereur son maître l'ordre de faire à la Porte Ottomane la communication suivante.

Dans la conférence du 1er (13me) Octobre, 1825, après avoir démontré encore une fois aux ministres de S.H. combien l'état actuel de la Valachie et de la Moldavie est différent de celui qui a précédé dans ces provinces les troubles de 1821, et qui devait y être rétabli complètement, suivant les promesses données par la Porte Ottomane à l'ambassadeur de S.M.B., après avoir prouvé combien le système adopté par le gouvernement Turc envers les Principautés est dérogatoire à leurs privilèges, comme aux traités par lesquels la Russie en est constituée garante, après avoir enfin signalé d'un côté les inévitables résultats de la conduite du Divan envers le peuple et les députés Serviens; de l'autre, le droit que possède la Russie de réclamer en faveur de cette nation l'exécution des clauses de l'Article VIII. du Traité de Boucarest; le soussigné a remis aux ministres de S.H., d'ordre exprès de l'Empereur Alexandre de glorieuse mémoire, une protestation formelle contre toutes les mesures que la Porte Ottomane persistait à prendre en contravention aux traités et à ses propres engagemens.

Dès son avènement au trône, un des premiers soins de sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas a été d'examiner avec la plus scrupuleuse attention, tous les motifs des différends qui se sont élevés entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane, et nommément toutes les circonstances des discussions

qui ont amené de la part de l'Empereur Alexandre la protestation dont il s'agit.

C'est avec un profond regret que sa Majesté Impériale vient d'acquérir la conviction, qu'elle n'avait été que trop justifiée par les actes du gouvernement Turc; que depuis l'époque où elle se trouve entre ses mains, elle n'a provoqué aucune détermination que puisse faire espérer à la Russie le redressement de ses légitimes griefs, et que par une déplorable fatalité, la noble modération du monarque dont l'Europe entière déplore la perte, sa politique à l'égard de la Porte Ottomane, et tous les droits que lui donnaient des traités solennels et des promesses positives, sont également méconnus.

Nul doute, que dans cette position, après cinq années d'une longanimité sans exemple, sa Majesté ne fût pleinement autorisée à l'adoption immédiate des mesures que faisait prévoir la protestation de son auguste prédecesseur; mais héritier des principes de l'Empereur Alexandre, l'Empereur Nicolas veut comme lui donner à la Porte Ottomane la preuve de ses intentions pacifiques; il veut ajouter une occasion de plus à toutes celles qu'a déjà eues le Divan de satisfaire aux justes réclamations de la Russie, il veut même que tout motif de discussion ultérieure entre les deux empires disparaisse, que désormais leurs mutuels rapports soient dégagés de toutes les questions qui dès l'année 1816 les ont rendu précaires et pénibles, que les liens de paix et d'amitié qui les uniront à l'avenir, offrent des garanties réelles d'une longue durée, qu'en un mot la Porte Ottomane trouve dans la franchise de sa Majesté, le meilleur témoignage des dispositions conciliantes qui l'animent.

Espérant que S.H. saura apprécier des vues aussi loyales, l'Empereur charge le soussigné de déclarer par la présente Note à S.E. le Reis Effendi, que malgré la protestation qui lui a été remise le 1er (13me) Octobre, 1825, et qui devait être la dernière démarche de persuasion faite par la Russie auprès de la Porte Ottomane, sa Majesté Impériale invite encore une fois le gouvernement Turc à prendre en mûre considération les argumens sur lesquels le soussigné a fondé ses réclamations contre l'état de choses qui continue à exister dans les Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie, contre l'inexécution des promesses faites par la Porte elle-même au Vicomte de Strangford, contre le pouvoir et la mode de nomination des Bash-Beshli-Agas, contre la présence des troupes, qu'ils commandent dans les Principautés, contre la détention des députés Serviens et le refus du gouvernement Turc de reconnaître la fidélité de la nation qu'ils représentent, par la réforme des abus dont elle se plaint et la concession immédiate des privilèges qui lui ont été garantis.

A ces demandes, dont la justice a été si souvent démontrée qu'elle n'a pas besoin de développemens nouveaux, s'associe encore un double grief non moins juste, non moins essentiel à rédresser, et que chaque jour fortifie et aggrave.

La note officielle présentée par le soussigné à la Porte Ottomane le 24 Juin (3 Juillet) 1825, relativement à la position de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, demeure jusqu'à présent sans réponse, et nulle réponse non plus n'a été faite par le Divan à la protestation du soussigné en date du 1er (13me) Octobre suivant.

Plus se prolonge l'intervalle qui sépare le moment actuel des époques où

le soussigné a effectué ces deux démarches, plus l'Empereur est en droit d'exiger la réparation éclatante d'un silence contraire à tous les usages comme aux égards que commande la dignité de la Russie, et plus la Porte elle-même doit sentir la nécessité d'effacer de penibles impressions par un irréfragable témoignage de ses vrais sentimens.

Mais, ainsi qu'il a été observé plus haut, ce n'est pas seulement le présent qui motive la sollicitude amicale que l'Empereur manifeste à la Porte Ottomane, c'est aussi l'avenir que sa Majesté Impériale embrasse dans sa prévoyance ; et ce n'est pas vers une réconciliation momentanée qu'elle croît utile de tendre, c'est sur les moyens d'établir et de consolider entre les deux gouvernemens des rapports stables, des rapports sans nuage et sans discussion ultérieure, qu'elle appelle aujourd'hui l'attention de S.H. et de ses ministres.

Or la Porte ne peut se dissimuler, que tant que subsisteront entre la Russie et l'empire Ottoman les questions que le Baron de Stroganoff a travaillé à résoudre pendant sa résidence à Constantinople, tant qu'une transaction complète et définitive, en satisfaisant à tous les droits et à tous les intérêts qu'il avait ordre de soutenir, n'aura mis un terme aux réclamations qu'il a été dans le cas d'énoncer ou de combattre, le cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et le Divan se trouveront toujours dans des relations qui, loin de cementer entre eux des liens solides, ne feront que produire de perpetuels débats, d'inévitables ressentimens, et un état de choses constamment voisin des plus fâcheuses extrémités.

L'Empereur se flatte que la Porte sera frappée des inconvéniens d'une telle situation. Il se flatte qu'elle n'aura pas de peine à calculer la bienfaisante influence d'une combinaison qui, aussi facile à réaliser qu'à comprendre, détruirait tous les motifs de plainte que la conduite du gouvernement Turc a donnés en dernier lieu à la Russie ; qui ferait évanouir le danger d'une complication imminente, et qui en préviendrait le rétour ; qui offrirait à sa Majesté Impériale le témoignage de déférence qu'elle doit nécessairement attendre après tant de refus et de délais, et qui autoriserait l'espoir des salutaires résultats attachés à un rapprochement durable.

C'est dans cette persuasion, c'est afin d'assurer à la Porte tous les avantages dont l'aperçu précède et dont l'évidence n'exige pas de preuves, que l'Empereur a confié au soussigné le soin de signaler à S.E. le Reis Effendi l'utilité, la nécessité même, des mesures suivantes.

Pour exécuter les traités qui ont garanti les privilèges de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, la Porte Ottomane satisferait aux demandes rappelées par le soussigné dans sa protestation du 1er (13me) Octobre, 1825. Conséquemment les Principautés seraient remises sous tous les rapports dans la même position où elles étaient avant les troubles de 1821, la mode de nomination, les attributions, et l'autorité des Bash-Beshli-Agas, ainsi que le nombre, les fonctions et la nature des Beshlis, seraient absolument tels qu'avant cette époque ; en un mot, l'état de choses voulu par les traités serait parfaitement rétabli dans ces provinces.

Pour témoigner de justes égards au caractère dont les députés Serviens sont revêtus, la Porte les remettra en pleine liberté sans aucun délai, et pour reconnaître la fidélité de la nation Servienne la Porte conviendra

du principe de régler avec elle les privilèges dont la jouissance lui a été promise.

Pour réparer ses procédés hostiles envers la Cour de St. Pétersbourg, la longue inexécution des promesses faites au Vicomte de Strangford, et le silence opposé aux représentations du Cabinet Impérial; pour anéantir tout sujet de différend dans les rélations futures des deux Etats; la Porte, en adoptant à l'égard des Principautés et de la Servie les déterminations mentionnées ci-dessus, chargerait des plénipotentiaires de se rendre sur les frontières de Russie et de déclarer qu'ils sont autorisés à entrer en négociation avec des plénipotentiaires de sa Majesté Impériale sur toutes les questions qui ont été discutées à Constantinople depuis l'année 1816 jusqu'à l'année 1821 par le Baron de Stroganoff, en vertu du Traité de Boucarest, et à faire de ces questions la matière d'une transaction complète d'autant plus désirable que seule elle peut établir entre la Russie et le Divan de vrais rapports de paix, d'amitié, et de bon voisinage.

Les mesures qui viennent d'être indiquées seraient non-seulement toutes consenties, mais toutes complètement exécutées par la Porte Ottomane dans le terme de six semaines, à compter du jour où la présente Note lui est adressée.

Telles sont les demandes définitives que l'Empereur ordonne au soussigné de porter à la connaissance du gouvernement de S.H.

Il n'aurait dépendu que de sa Majesté Impériale de regarder comme terminée toute négociation ultérieure avec lui, par le résultat de la conférence du 1er (13me) Octobre, 1825. Il n'aurait tenu qu'à l'Empereur d'employer dès ce moment les moyens les plus efficaces de faire respecter ses droits et ses traités.

Mais dans cette grave conjoncture, sa Majesté Impériale n'a encore écouté que ses dispositions pacifiques, ainsi que sa modération, et elle croit incontestable, qu'en exprimant à la Porte Ottomane le désir de voir disparaître simultanément tous les griefs de la Russie, et jusqu'au germe d'une discussion nouvelle, elle donne au Sultan la plus forte preuve d'amitié qu'elle puisse lui fournir, le plus réel motif de confiance et de sincérité.

Le soussigné terminera la tâche que lui imposent les instructions de son auguste Souverain, en prévenant la Porte Ottomane que si contre la légitime attente de l'Empereur les mesures indiquées dans les trois demandes que renferme le présent office n'avaient pas été mises complètement à exécution dans le délai de six semaines, il quitterait aussitôt Constantinople, et qu'il serait facile aux ministres de S.H. de prévoir les conséquences immédiates de cet évènement.

Le soussigné, &c.

III.

[No copy of the secret Instruction said to have been written by Count Nesselrode to M. de Minciacky has been found among the Duke of Wellington's papers, and on the cover of the *brouillon* of the despatch of the 4th April (No. 13) it is stated that one of the enclosures enumerated is not there.—ED.]

IV.

Points Sommaires d'un Arrangement éventuel à proposer au Duc de Wellington.

Assurance à donner par le Cabinet Impérial que si la Porte, en repoussant les réclamations que va lui présenter M. de Minciacky, forçait l'Empereur à adopter des mesures coercitives, sa Majesté ne serait animée d'aucune vue d'ambition, d'aucun désir d'étendre en l'Europe l'influence et les possessions de la Russie ; mais qu'à ses réclamations antérieures, et aux arrangemens qu'exigent les autres questions ouvertes entre les deux empires depuis l'année 1815, sa Majesté joindrait la demande d'une indemnité pour les frais de guerre.

Par une juste réciprocité dans le cours de la guerre, la Grande-Bretagne s'engagerait, non-seulement à continuer de reconnaître, comme elle l'a fait aujourd'hui, par l'organe de son Excellence le Duc de Wellington, la justice des réclamations et de la demande d'indemnité dont il s'agit, mais à hâter de ses bons offices le moment où la Porte adhérerait sur tous ces points aux désirs de sa Majesté Impériale.

La Russie et la Grande-Bretagne conviendraient en outre des principes suivans :

Si la Porte rejetterait les demandes de l'Empereur, et si conséquemment la guerre éclaterait entre la Russie et cette Puissance, la Cour de St. Pétersbourg s'engagerait à profiter de la position où elle se trouverait alors, pour faire adopter par le Divan, de concert avec la Grande-Bretagne, les arrangemens les plus propres à assurer entre la Turquie, la Grèce de terre ferme, et les Iles de l'Archipel, une paix heureuse et solide.

Si la Porte se prêterait aux demandes de sa Majesté Impériale, et si par là même la guerre imminente serait évitée, la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne, ayant ainsi une première preuve de la possibilité d'inspirer au Divan de bonnes dispositions, uniraient leur influence afin d'engager la Porte à réaliser, au moyen de leur médiation, les arrangemens ci-dessus mentionnés avec la Grèce.

La Russie et la Grande-Bretagne les représenteront à cet effet au Divan, comme la suite naturelle de la saine politique qu'il aurait adoptée envers le Cabinet Impérial comme le complément nécessaire des relations d'amitié et de bonne intelligence qu'il manifesterait le dessein d'entretenir avec les principales Cours de l'Europe.

La Russie ferait en outre, comme l'Angleterre, la déclaration que l'Empereur n'admettrait pas plus que sa Majesté Britannique l'établissement d'une nouvelle Puissance Musulmane au sein de la Méditerranée, soit qu'effectivement Ibrahim Pasha eût mission de dépeupler la Grèce de ses habitans chrétiens, soit que *malgré les ordres du Sultan* il continuât les mesures qui ont non-seulement fait croire à l'existence de ce projet, mais qui en ont déjà commencé l'exécution.

Si le principe d'une médiation à interposer entre la Turquie et la Grèce avait été admis par la Porte à la suite des démarches ordonnées à Monsieur Stratford Canning, la Russie ferait servir de même ses opérations militaires en cas de rupture, et son influence en cas de reconciliation avec la Porte, au succès de cette médiation à laquelle elle s'empresserait de s'associer.

Quant aux arrangemens à négocier relativement à la Grèce et aux Iles de l'Archipel, la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne pourraient convenir provisoirement de leur donner pour bases les ouvertures faites à M. Stratford Canning par les chefs Grecs avec lesquels ce ministre vient d'avoir une entrevue. En conséquence la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne seraient d'opinion :—que les Grecs pourraient payer à la Porte un tribut annuel ; qu'ils feraient l'acquisition des propriétés Musulmanes qui se trouveraient dans la Grèce ; qu'ils pourraient jouir en revanche d'une entière liberté de conscience, d'administration intérieure et de commerce ; qu'en général les Cours médiatrices pourraient s'efforcer de placer les Grecs dans les rapports où se trouvait à l'égard de la Porte la ci-devant république de Raguse ; que pour tous les arrangemens dont on vient de tracer l'idée première, pour fixer les limites du territoire à comprendre sous le nom de Grèce, et les îles qui jouiraient des bienfaits de ces mêmes arrangemens, pour déterminer dans ses détails la mode d'existence et d'administration intérieure à assurer aux Grecs, pour conduire enfin, tant avec eux qu'avec les Turcs, les négociations nécessaires, la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne se reserveraient d'adopter ultérieurement les mesures les plus convenables.

Les présentes clauses éventuelles seraient portées par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et par celui de Londres à la connaissance des autres Cabinets Alliés, qui seraient invités à les revêtir de leur approbation, et ceux d'entr'eux qui y accéderaient participeraient à la garantie de la transaction définitive dont la pacification de la Grèce deviendrait l'objet.

V.

MEMORANDUM.

St. Petersburg, 26th (14th) March, 1826.

His Britannic Majesty's government had considered as settled the arrangements regarding the Principalities of which the negotiations had been entrusted to his Majesty's ambassador at the Porte ; and the case of the Servian deputies had never been in any manner to my knowledge mentioned ; and had certainly never been considered by his Majesty's government.

The instructions from his Majesty's government authorise the engagement, to bring forward, by means of his Majesty's ambassador at the Porte, any specific demand to complete the arrangement in the Principalities to his Imperial Majesty's satisfaction, provided that the demand is specified in sufficient detail ; and provided the satisfaction of that demand is followed immediately by the mission of the Russian agents to the Principalities in order to superintend the execution of the measures specified ; and that the peaceful relations of his Imperial Majesty with the Porte are restored by the appointment of a gentleman to represent his Imperial Majesty of that rank, character, and station,

which is suitable to the dignity of the two Powers, and to the nature of the relations between them.

This point is not brought forward with a view to the renewal of the former discussion; but as a point essential to be attended to by his Imperial Majesty's government, and without the concession of which neither the Porte nor the other Powers of Europe will ever consider the question of peace satisfactorily settled or secured.

It does not appear to me that the case of the Servian deputies can admit of any doubt; and I think myself authorised in assuring his Imperial Majesty's government of the good offices of his Majesty's government upon that point.

In respect to the third point, that of the plenipotentiaries, I have already stated to his Imperial Majesty and his government the reasons which induced me to think that however justifiable the demand under the circumstances of the conduct of the Porte, it was not one which ought to have been put on the same ground with the others as a *sine quâ non*. I will not repeat those arguments; but it is impossible to pledge his Majesty's government even to use its good offices to obtain the concession of it on the part of the Porte.

Possibly his Majesty's government might be disposed to use his Majesty's good offices to obtain the concession of this demand as well as of the others; but I cannot answer for it.

I would likewise beg to remind his Imperial Majesty's government that I have always, as well to his Imperial Majesty as to them, deprecated war upon these points.

His Imperial Majesty has wisely determined to speak for himself through his own minister at the Porte, and it is certainly possible that the refusal to comply with his just demands may compel his Imperial Majesty to have recourse to measures of extremity. But having already expressed my opinion of the Note in which these demands were conveyed, and my wish that they had been more particularly specified, and separated from others to be considered and decided upon hereafter in negotiations with the Porte, it is impossible for me to pledge my government to interpose its good offices for more than what is clearly specified, and for that of which I could clearly understand the meaning, and of which I could myself approve.

In case war should unfortunately be the consequence of these

measures, I can safely assure his Imperial Majesty's government that his Majesty will do everything in his power by using his good offices to limit its duration, and to induce the Porte to give his Imperial Majesty satisfaction.

It would not be proper at this time to discuss the terms on which his Imperial Majesty will be disposed to make peace in case of war, which all hope will be avoided. But I must advert to one point in which I must have been misunderstood. I never had but one occasion of hearing of the intention of demanding compensation in money from the Porte for the expenses of the war; on which occasion I stated as well as I recollect, that there was not the smallest chance of obtaining such compensation; and that the example of the money received by his Majesty's government from Ali Pasha for compensation for the property of the Parganiots upon the delivery of the town of Parga to that chief ought not to be relied upon.

I should conceive then that the paper now to be delivered should contain only a disclaimer of his Imperial Majesty's intentions to extend either his dominions or his influence in Europe in consequence of any hostile operation which may be the result of the discussions upon which his Imperial Majesty is about to enter with the Porte. I must add that this formal disclaimer is not only consistent with all that his late Imperial Majesty invariably stated to his Allies, and with what his Imperial Majesty has himself stated verbally to others as well as to myself, but is calculated to soothe the jealousy and apprehension of many Powers, his Imperial Majesty's neighbours and Allies, to limit the operations of any hostility which may take place and possibly their duration, and to afford security throughout Europe that the general tranquillity will not be disturbed; and such a declaration will at once save his Imperial Majesty the pain of listening to and answering remonstrances from other Powers.

It must be observed likewise that such a disclaimer is quite distinct and different from a previous statement of what will be the terms of peace in the event of hostilities which all parties deprecate and desire to avoid.

In respect to the Greek case, I have been authorised to assure his Imperial Majesty of the willingness of his Majesty to concert with his Imperial Majesty all the measures of his govern-

ment in respect to the mediation between Greeks and Turks which his Majesty had been requested by the former to undertake.

Considering the relation in which his Imperial Majesty now stands towards the Ottoman Porte, it is a question of prudence whether it is desirable now to propose to the Porte that his Imperial Majesty should be joined with his Majesty in the mediation between the Porte and its revolted subjects; or even to the Greeks on account of the necessity of avoiding to give the Porte any unnecessary alarm upon this question. But his Majesty's government will be disposed to consider in concert with that of his Imperial Majesty the time and mode in which the formal admission of his Imperial Majesty into the mediation shall take place; and in the mean time to concert all its measures with his Imperial Majesty.

In case of the refusal of the Porte to accept the proffered mediation of his Majesty upon this occasion, it appears to me that the two governments might agree that they would, whether jointly or separately, renew the offer whenever a favourable opportunity should occur; invariably upon the basis proposed by the Greeks themselves, that they should continue subjects, *sous la suzeraineté*, of the Porte; that the Greeks should pay to the Porte a tribute; that they should pay a reasonable value for Turkish property in Greece and the Islands; that they should govern themselves, the Porte having some share in the nomination of the government.

This arrangement might be under the guarantee of his Imperial Majesty, Austria, France, and Prussia. His Majesty could not undertake this guarantee.

It would be desirable that this arrangement should be communicated to the Allied Powers, and they will see that in every part of it, it is calculated to conciliate their confidence as well in respect to the conduct of his Majesty in the mediation between Greeks and Turks, as in the consequences upon the future relation between Greeks and Turks of the operations of the possible hostilities between his Imperial Majesty and the Porte.

In respect to the affair of Ibrahim Pasha, I beg leave to submit to his Imperial Majesty, as I did before, that the interference of his Imperial Majesty in that case is very different from that of his Majesty.

The Pasha of Egypt stands in a relation towards his Majesty similar to that of the Dey of Algiers, the Pasha of Tripoli, the Bey of Tunis, &c. Towards his Imperial Majesty these chiefs stand in the relation of officers of the Porte; and his Imperial Majesty could not now interfere in this case without greatly complicating all the difficulties of his situation at the Porte. It must besides be observed that the interference of his Majesty, supposing it to become necessary, is limited to the precise object; and can occasion no jealousy to or uneasiness in other Powers. That of his Imperial Majesty must occasion all the jealousy and uneasiness which a war directly in the Greek cause would occasion.

All that his Majesty has done hitherto has been to inquire and to desire that the conduct complained of may be disclaimed; or if adopted that it may be discontinued. But his Majesty would not think it proper to take measures to prevent the execution of the designs of Ibrahim Pasha, although these measures would be exactly of the same description with those which his Majesty heretofore adopted to prevent an infraction of treaty by the Bey of Tunis during the existence of this same war, without notice to his Allies.

It appears that it would be desirable that the paper to be written should contain nothing regarding the conduct of Ibrahim Pasha at present.

From the considerations stated in this paper, his Imperial Majesty's government will see that the annexed Memorandum contains what it is possible for his Majesty's government to do; and that considering the nature of the Note transmitted to Monsieur de Minciacky, I can sign it only liable to the future approbation of his Majesty's government.

WELLINGTON.

VI.

MEMORANDUM.

[To be adopted in case the copy of Instructions to Monsieur de Minciacky regarding the Plenipotentiaries from the Porte should be confidentially communicated.]

St. Petersburg, 26th (14th) March, 1826.

His Imperial Majesty assures his Britannic Majesty that in e the Porte should refuse to attend to his claims as presented the consideration of the Ottoman government by Monsieur de

Minciacky, and should thus oblige his Imperial Majesty to have recourse to measures of extremity, his Imperial Majesty would, in the adoption of those measures, have no views of ambition, and would make no demands upon the Ottoman Porte, as the price of the discontinuance of those measures, or of the restoration of the relations of amity and peace, which are calculated to augment either his Imperial Majesty's influence, or the dominions of Russia in Europe.

His Imperial Majesty likewise assures his Britannic Majesty that in case the Ottoman Porte should consent to satisfy his Imperial Majesty's just demands, his Imperial Majesty will send his agents into the Principalities; and in order to satisfy the Ottoman Porte, as well as the other Powers of Europe, of his Imperial Majesty's desire to conciliate the friendship and confidence of the Porte, his Imperial Majesty will place his diplomatic relations with the Porte on a footing which is suitable to the dignity of the two governments, and consistent with the nature of the political relations existing between them.

His Britannic Majesty will use his good offices and persuasions, and every amicable means in his power, to induce the Porte to comply with the just demands of his Imperial Majesty, and in general to preserve peace between the two governments.

In case of the occurrence of the measures of extremity above adverted to, his Britannic Majesty will exert his good offices to limit their extent and duration as much as possible.

His Britannic Majesty having been requested by the Greeks to interpose his good offices with the Ottoman Porte to reconcile that government to its Greek subjects, and having offered his mediation to the Porte, has been and is still desirous of concerting his measures upon that subject with his Imperial Majesty.

In consequence of the relation in which his Imperial Majesty stands towards the government of the Porte, the question whether it will be prudent or otherwise that his Imperial Majesty should be formally proposed to be recognised by the Porte as joint mediator with his Majesty in these disputes, in what manner and at what time, will be considered hereafter by the two governments.

In the mean time his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty agree, that under any circumstances in which either, or both, may think proper to propose an arrangement between

Greeks and Turks it shall be founded upon the basis of the proposal conveyed to Mr. Stratford Canning in the island of Hydra; that the Greeks although governing themselves internally, and having an entire freedom of commerce, shall continue subjects of the Porte *en suzeraineté;* that they shall pay a tribute to the Porte; that they shall pay a reasonable purchase money for the property in Greece and the islands belonging to Mussulmen, and that the Porte shall have some share in the nomination of the government to be established in Greece.

This Memorandum is to be communicated to the Allied Powers, and in case it should he possible to settle any arrangement between Turks and Greeks, it must be guaranteed by Russia, Austria, France, and Prussia.

His Majesty cannot give such a guarantee.

WELLINGTON.

VII.

PROJET DE PROTOCOLE. (BY COUNTS NESSELRODE AND LIEVEN.)

March 20 (April 1).

Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et celui de Londres, également animés du désir de faire cesser, par un arrangement conforme aux vœux de la religion, de la justice, et de l'humanité, la lutte dont la Grèce et l'Archipel sont aujourd'hui le théâtre, ont discuté et arrêté les points suivans :—

§ 1. Dans la vue de mettre un terme aux malheurs qui désolent une partie du Levant, la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne uniront leurs efforts pour travailler de concert au rétablissement d'une paix solide entre la Turquie, la Grèce de terre ferme, et les îles de l'Archipel.

§ 2. A cet effet la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne conviennent d'adopter provisoirement pour principe de l'arrangement au moyen duquel cette pacification pourrait s'accomplir :—

Que les Grecs payeraient un tribut annuel à la Porte.

Qu'ils jouiraient sous la suzeraineté de la Porte d'une parfaite liberté de conscience, d'administration intérieure, et de commerce.

Qu'ils se gouverneraient eux-mêmes sous l'influence d'autorités nationales à la nomination desquelles la Porte aurait néanmoins une certaine part.

Que pour être entièrement séparés des Turcs, et pour prévenir des collisions inévitables dans toute autre hypothèse, ils feraient l'acquisition des propriétés Musulmanes qui pourraient se trouver, soit dans la Grèce de terre ferme, soit dans l'Archipel.

§ 3. Comme d'une part la médiation de sa Majesté Britannique vient d'être offerte à la Porte, dans le but d'amener entre les Turcs et les Grecs un arrangement semblable à celui qui a été indiqué ci-dessus, que néanmoins le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et celui de Londres ignorent encore si cette offre a été acceptée ou rejetée par le gouvernement Ottoman; et comme d'un autre côté la Russie a fait à Constantinople des démarches qui pour-

raient avoir une guerre pour résultat si elles n'étaient pas accueillies, les deux Cours voulant que leur union se maintienne dans tous les cas qui pourront se présenter, arrêtent les clauses éventuelles dont l'énoncé va suivre.

§ 4. Si le principe d'une médiation à interposer entre la Turquie et la Grèce avait été admis par la Porte à la suite des négociations actuelles de M. Stratford Canning, la Russie ferait servir son influence au succès de la dite médiation. La mode d'après laquelle elle s'associerait aux négociations que cette médiation ferait naître alors, et l'époque où elle y prendrait part, seraient déterminées ultérieurement d'un commun accord entre le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et celui de Londres.

§ 5. Si la médiation offerte aujourd'hui à la Porte par l'ambassadeur de sa Majesté Britannique était rejetée, dans ce cas les deux Cabinets s'engagent, soit que la paix puisse se maintenir entre la Russie et l'empire Ottoman au gré des vœux de sa Majesté l'Empereur, soit que la guerre éclate, à saisir, conjointement ou séparément, toutes les occasions favorables pour amener entre les Turcs et les Grecs l'arrangement dont les bases ont été mentionnées au § 2.

§ 6. Dans toutes les hypothèses les deux Cabinets se réservent d'adopter par la suite toutes les mesures nécessaires pour fixer dans leurs détails, tant avec la Turquie qu'avec la Grèce, les termes définitifs de l'arrangement en question, et les îles de l'Archipel ainsi que les limites du territoire auxquels il se trouverait applicable.

§ 7. Pareillement dans toutes les hypothèses, en s'efforçant d'accomplir cette œuvre de paix, la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne ne poursuivront ni l'une ni l'autre aucun avantage particulier. Elles n'augmenteront ni l'une ni l'autre leurs possessions présentes.

§ 8. La Russie et la Grande-Bretagne désirant que leurs Alliés puissent participer aux arrangemens dont le présent Protocole renferme une première esquisse, porteront le dit Protocole à la connaissance des Cours de Vienne, de Paris, et de Berlin, les inviteront à en adopter les principes, à unir leurs bons offices à ceux de la Russie et de l'Angleterre afin d'atteindre le but salutaire qu'elles ont en vue, et à garantir, de concert avec la Russie, la transaction finale qui rétablira la paix entre la Turquie et la Grèce, cette transaction ne pouvant en aucun cas être garantie par la Grande-Bretagne.

VIII.

PROJET DE PROTOCOLE. (BY COUNTS NESSELRODE AND LIEVEN.)

Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et celui de Londres, dans la prévoyance des évènemens qui peuvent survenir, et dans l'intention d'assurer une nouvelle garantie à l'union qui existe si heureusement entre eux, et dont la conservation est si essentielle au repos de l'Europe, sont convenus des points suivans:

§ 1. Si la Porte Ottomane se refusait à faire droit aux réclamations qui vont lui être présentées d'ordre de sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, sa Majesté Impériale, qui dans ce cas se verrait à un plus vif regret forcée de prendre contre elle des mesures coercitives, donne l'assurance qu'en déclarant alors la guerre à la Porte, elle ne nourrirait ni des vues de conquête ni l'intention de mettre au rétablissement de la paix avec l'Empire

Ottoman des conditions dont le résultat dût être d'accroître les possessions de la Russie en Europe.

§ 2. Par réciprocité sa Majesté Britannique déclare à sa Majesté Impériale que dans le cours de cette guerre, si elle avait lieu, la Grande-Bretagne n'userait de son influence à Constantinople que pour abréger la durée des hostilités, en engageant la Porte Ottomane à accepter les conditions de paix que lui proposerait sa Majesté l'Empereur dans l'esprit des assurances qui précèdent, pour obtenir d'elle une juste et complète satisfaction, et pour opérer entre la Russie et l'empire Ottoman une réconciliation durable.

IX.

PROTOCOL PROPOSED BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Petersburg, April 4 (March 23), 1826.

His Britannic Majesty having been requested by the Greeks to interpose his good offices in order to obtain their reconciliation with the Ottoman Porte; having in consequence offered his mediation to that Power, and being desirous of concerting the measures of his government upon this subject with his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias; and his Imperial Majesty, on the other hand, being equally animated by the desire of putting an end to the contest of which Greece and the Archipelago are the theatre, by an arrangement which shall be consistent with the principles of religion, justice, and humanity; the undersigned have agreed:

Section 1. That the arrangement to be proposed to the Porte, if that government should accept the proffered mediation, should have for its object to place the Greeks towards the Ottoman Porte in the relation hereafter mentioned:

Greece should be a dependency of that empire, and the Greeks should pay to the Porte an annual tribute, the amount of which should be permanently fixed by common consent.

They should be exclusively governed by authorities to be chosen and named by themselves; but in the nomination of which authority the Porte should have a certain influence. In this state the Greeks should enjoy a complete liberty of conscience, entire freedom of commerce, and should exclusively conduct their own internal government.

Section 2. In order to effect a complete separation between individuals of the two nations, and to prevent the collisions which must be the necessary consequences of a contest of such duration, the Greeks should purchase the property of Turks, whether situated on the continent of Greece or in the islands.

Section 3. In case the principle of a mediation between Turks and Greeks should have been admitted in consequence of the steps taken with that view by his Britannic Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople, his Imperial Majesty would exert in every case his influence to forward the object of that mediation. The mode in which and the time at which his Imperial Majesty should take part in the ulterior negotiations with the Ottoman Porte, which may be the consequence of that mediation, should be determined hereafter by the common consent of the governments of his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty.

Section 4. If the mediation offered by his Britannic Majesty should not have been accepted by the Porte, and whatever may be the nature of the relations between his Imperial Majesty and the Turkish government, his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty will still consider the terms of the arrangement specified in Section 1 of this Protocol as the basis of any reconciliation to be effected by their intervention, whether in concert or separately, between the Porte and the Greeks, and they will avail themselves of every favourable opportunity to exert their influence with both parties, in order to effect this reconciliation on the above-mentioned basis.

Section 5. That his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty should reserve to themselves to adopt, hereafter, the measures necessary for the settlement of the details of the arrangement in question, as well as the limits of the territory and the names of the islands of the Archipelago to which it shall be applicable, and which it shall be proposed to the Porte to comprise under the denomination of Greece.

Section 6. That moreover his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty will not seek in this arrangement any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence nor advantage in commerce for their subjects which shall not be equally attainable by all other nations.

Section 7. That his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty, being desirous that their Allies should become parties to the definitive arrangements of which this Protocol contains the outline, will communicate this instrument confidentially to the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin, and will propose to them that they should, in concert with the Emperor of Russia,

guarantee the treaty by which the reconciliation of Turks and Greeks shall be effected, as his Britannic Majesty cannot guarantee such a treaty.

WELLINGTON.

X.

PROTOCOL PROPOSED BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

St. Petersburg, April 1 (March 20), 1826.

His Imperial Majesty having represented to his Britannic Majesty the necessity that his Imperial Majesty should put an end to the existing state of his relations with the Ottoman Porte by calling upon that government to satisfy, within a limited period, his Imperial Majesty's just demands still remaining unsatisfied notwithstanding the repeated efforts of his Imperial Majesty's Allies to obtain satisfaction for his Imperial Majesty, and that the refusal of the Porte must lead to measures of extremity on the part of his Imperial Majesty:—

His Britannic Majesty promises to repeat his endeavours and to use every means in his power to prevail upon the Porte to perform the stipulations of treaties, and to satisfy his Imperial Majesty's just demands, and thus to prevent the necessity of recourse to measures of extremity. But if unfortunately his Imperial Majesty should find himself under the necessity of having recourse to such measures, his Britannic Majesty will continue his efforts to limit their extent and duration by persuading the Porte to give his Imperial Majesty satisfaction.

His Imperial Majesty declares that if the Porte should comply with his Imperial Majesty's just demands, it is his firm determination to restore as soon as possible to the state in which they were previous to the year 1821, all the arrangements of his (the Russian) government for the conduct of its relations with the Principalities of Wallachia, and Moldavia, as well as all those of friendship and intimacy with the Porte.

If, however, the Porte should oblige his Imperial Majesty to have recourse to measures of extremity, his Imperial Majesty, declares that he entertains no views of conquest, nor any intention of imposing upon the Porte conditions which should have for their object the increase of his Imperial Majesty's influence or the augmentation of the possessions of Russia in Europe.

WELLINGTON.

XI.

PROPOSED NOTE TO COUNT NESSELRODE.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, April 2, 1826.

I have already had the honour of explaining to you the circumstances under which his Majesty's government had thought proper to call upon the Porte and Ibrahim Pasha, to disavow and renounce the intention of committing certain acts understood to have been in the contemplation of the latter in the operations of the war in Greece, which are contrary to the usual and permitted laws of war, and which were calculated to establish on the shores of the Mediterranean and in Europe a new Mahomedan State.

These measures have as yet gone no farther than a demand of explanation and of disclaimer, and will in any event be carried no farther than circumstances will require; and his Majesty will of course explain his intentions to his Allies before he will proceed farther if such proceeding should be necessary.

In such case I can venture to assure your Excellency that his Majesty will not endeavour to obtain any increase of influence or territory in the Mediterranean in consequence of the measures which he may think it necessary to adopt upon this occasion.

WELLINGTON.

XII.

PROJET DE PROTOCOLE. (Arrangement respecting the Greeks.)

Sa Majesté Britannique ayant été invitée par les Grecs à interposer ses bons offices afin de les reconcilier avec la Porte Ottomane, ayant conséquemment offert sa médiation à cette Puissance, et désirant se concerter à cet égard avec sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies;

D'un autre côté, sa Majesté Impériale étant également animée du désir de faire cesser par un arrangement conforme aux vœux de la religion, de la justice, et de l'humanité, la lutte dont la Grèce et l'Archipel sont aujourd'hui le théâtre;

Les soussignés sont convenus:

§ 1. Que l'arrangement à proposer à la Porte, si elle accepte la médiation qui lui a été offerte, placerait les Grecs dans les relations suivantes envers l'empire Ottoman:—

Les Grecs relèveraient de cet empire, et lui payeraient un tribut annuel dont le montant serait fixé une fois pour toutes d'un commun accord.

Ils seraient gouvernés par des autorités qu'ils choisiraient et nommeraient eux-mêmes, mais à la nomination desquels la Porte aurait une certaine part.

Dans ce mode d'existence ils jouiraient d'une entière liberté de conscience et commerce, et géreraient exclusivement eux-mêmes leur administration intérieure.

Pour opérer une séparation entière entre les individus des deux nations, et pour prévenir des collisions, suite nécessaire d'une lutte aussi longue, les Grecs feraient l'acquisition des propriétés Turques, qui pourraient être situées ou sur le Continent ou dans les Iles de la Grèce.

§ 2. Que si le principe d'une médiation à interposer entre la Turquie et la Grèce avait été admis à la suite des démarches déjà faites dans cette vue par l'ambassadeur de sa Majesté Britannique à Constantinople, la Russie ferait dans tous les cas servir son influence au succès de la dite médiation. La mode d'après laquelle elle s'associerait aux négociations ultérieures que cette médiation amènerait avec la Porte Ottomane, et l'époque où elle y prendrait part, seraient déterminées ultérieurement d'un commun accord entre le Cabinet de Londres et celui de St. Pétersbourg.

§ 3. Que dans le cas où la médiation offerte par sa Majesté Britannique à la Porte Ottomane, n'aurait pas été acceptée par cette Puissance, et quel que soit d'ailleurs l'état des relations de sa Majesté Impériale avec le gouvernement Turc, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie regarderont toujours les termes de l'arrangement mentionné au § 1 du présent Protocole, comme la base de la reconciliation à effectuer par leur entremise, soit en commun, soit séparément, entre la Porte et les Grecs, et ils saisiront toutes les occasions favorables de faire valoir leur influence auprès des deux parties, afin d'opérer cette même reconciliation sur la dite base.

§ 4. Que la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie se réservent d'adopter par la suite les mesures nécessaires pour déterminer les détails de l'arrangement en question, ainsi que les limites du territoire et les noms des îles de l'Archipel auxquelles il sera applicable, et qu'il sera proposé à la Porte de comprendre sous la dénomination de "Grèce."

§ 5. Que de plus dans ce même arrangement sa Majesté Britannique et sa Majesté Impériale ne chercheront ni l'une ni l'autre aucune augmentation de territoire, aucune influence exclusive, aucun avantage de commerce pour leurs sujets, que ceux de toute autre nation ne puissent également obtenir.

§ 6. Que sa Majesté Britannique et sa Majesté Impériale, désirant que leurs Alliés puissent participer aux arrangemens définitifs dont le présent Protocole renferme une première esquisse, porteront le dit Protocole confidentiellement à la connaissance des Cours de Vienne, de Paris, et de Berlin, et leur proposèrent de garantir, de concert avec la Russie, la transaction finale qui réconciliera la Turquie et la Grèce, cette transaction ne pouvant être garantie par sa Majesté Britannique.

Fait à St. Pétersbourg, le Mars (Avril), 1826.

548.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR, April 4th.

You will see in the several papers drawn by me enclosed in my despatch No. 13 of this date, in the discussion relating to the Emperor's declaration, that I have always stated that it refers

only to territories and political influence *in Europe*. His Imperial Majesty's declaration was certainly of the largest description, and disclaimed the wish for even a village. But I must say that in the same conversation his Imperial Majesty told me that he had objects in Asia, though he certainly admitted that the right was on the side of the Turks.

The declaration of his Imperial Majesty was referable to a state of war with the Turks, which war would have been occasioned by the refusal of the Turks to do his Imperial Majesty justice, and I don't think it would be quite fair to claim from his Imperial Majesty a confirmation in writing of that declaration, without admitting in the confirmation a limit which it appears from the tenor of the conversation itself that the emperor would have made if he had been upon his guard when he spoke to me. Therefore, although the Emperor certainly said that he would not ask for a village, and that more than once, I don't think that I ought to ask for more than a declaration in writing that he would not ask for increase of territory or of influence in Europe.

It is an increase of territory or influence to Russia in Europe, which would produce jealousies and apprehensions to the other Powers.

You will observe likewise that the Russian ministers in their papers in the same discussion invariably omitted the mention of influence.

The reason of this omission is that if they go to war they wish to increase their influence over the Servians, which would occasion a good deal of jealousy and uneasiness to the Emperor of Austria.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

SIR, St. Petersburg, April 4th (March 23rd), 1826.

You will have seen in my report No. 6, of the 16th March,* that his Imperial Majesty had discussed with me the Note to be delivered to the Porte by Monsieur Minciacky, that he had afterwards sent me a copy of that Note, that I had written a

* See page 172.

Memorandum upon it to be submitted to his Imperial Majesty, and had proposed certain alterations, and was still engaged in discussion with his ministers upon it when I had the interview with Count Nesselrode on the 21st March, related in my despatch, No. 13, of this date.* In this interview Count Nesselrode informed me to my great surprise, that the Note had been sent off that morning to Monsieur de Minciacky by order of his Imperial Majesty.

I was certainly very much surprised at this proceeding, and felt all its impropriety. But I saw that Count Nesselrode was equally aware of it, and that in the choice which I had to make immediately, whether to notice this impropriety and to break off all discussion upon the Russian case at Constantinople, or to take no notice of the impropriety and to continue the discussion, I should by pursuing the latter course acquire all the advantages which his sense of the temper which I should shew could give me.

Feeling therefore that the best chance for the peace of Europe was not to notice the stated transmission of the Note, excepting as an unfortunate circumstance, I continued the discussion, as I hope with advantage.

I am inclined to think that the Emperor was tired of the importunity with which I urged arguments, the truth of which neither he nor his ministers could deny or answer; and therefore that he directed that I should be told that the Note had been sent off, which I have reason to believe, and indeed suspected at the time, was not true, and that neither Count Nesselrode nor any of his ministers had the courage to tell him that this proceeding would not be very civil towards me. The uniform civility, and indeed kindness and deference, with which I have been treated by his Imperial Majesty and the whole Imperial Family, forbid my imagining for a moment that his Imperial Majesty intended to do anything that was otherwise than civil by me. But I blame his minister, who ought to have told him that he might discontinue the discussion and then send the Note, but that he could not with propriety send off the Note without giving me notice.

The state of the foreign department here, at present, is very extraordinary. It is impossible to know who is the adviser, or who performs the business.

* See page 224.

It is quite certain that his Imperial Majesty declared to the Archduke Ferdinand, previous to my arrival, the unwillingness which he felt to interfere in favour of the Greeks; as the Archduke left St. Petersburg on the morning of my arrival. Yet Count Nesselrode was not aware of this feeling in his Imperial Majesty's mind for some days subsequent to that period. Then Count Nesselrode has declared to me, and his Imperial Majesty has declared to Monsieur de La Ferronays that his Imperial Majesty had settled his plan, and that the Note was drawn before I arrived, and that he had delayed the execution and to transmit the Note only till he should see me. Count Nesselrode was not aware of this plan. It then becomes a question who drew the Note?

Upon the whole I am convinced that there is some secret adviser, but who he is neither I nor any of the foreign ministers here have been able to discover.

I have, &c.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

SIR, St. Petersburg, April 4th (March 23rd), 1826.

Since the Note which I have transmitted in my despatch No. 13 of this date has been despatched, there has been a strong report of war and of orders for preparations, assembly of troops, &c., which in my opinion, instead of proving that war is really intended or thought probable, would rather tend to prove the contrary.

The Emperor has, as you will see by my former reports, plenty of men at his command; and I have reason to believe a treasure, of which the largest amount stated is four millions sterling. They talk of the treasure as sufficient to pay the expense of two years of war, but the Emperor told me himself that war would be very distressing to him, and would prevent the execution of many plans absolutely necessary for the country.

It is inconceivable at how small expense to the State the army is maintained. You will have seen that the Emperor called it above a million of men, of which 100,000 are effective regular cavalry. The chief of the Staff told me that it was

1,200,000 men. Yet I am informed, and believe, that the whole expense of this army to the State is only one hundred and fifty millions of roubles, or about six millions sterling.

There exist many abuses in the management of the details of this army which increase the burthens of that part of the country in which its detachments are stationed. But the cure of these abuses would remove these burthens.

The march of any part of the army beyond the frontier would immediately augment that part of the expense of such detachments, occasioned by the pay of the officers and troops, about fivefold, as in that case they must be paid in bullion instead of in paper, and with whatever rigour the system of requisition may be enforced, there are certain expenses of every army, such as the establishment of hospitals and magazines, the communications by water, &c., which must be paid for.

These expenses, and those of the immense establishments of all descriptions in the country, military as well as others, render the question of peace or war in this country as critical as it is in others, and as you will see in my dispatch, No. 13, there are many indications that those who look a little farther into the consequences of their acts than merely their external appearance, are somewhat apprehensive of the consequences of the proceedings which are now in progress.

I have, &c.

WELLINGTON.

551.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR, March 27th (15th), 1826.*

Since I wrote my letter No. 10 of the 16th inst.,† I have considered well the intention which I therein told you that I had in contemplation; namely, to inform the government of the Porte that the Emperor of Russia did not consider the cause of the Greeks as a ground for hostile intervention on his part, and the result has been a conviction upon my mind not only that it

* The *brouillon* of this letter with its enclosures forms No. 17 of the series despatched to Mr. Canning from St. Petersburg, and takes its place between two despatches both dated 4th April, 1826. The concluding paragraph at page 255 explains the reason of the delay in the transmission of the letter.—ED.

† See page 195.

was right and proper to give this information, but that the information given at the proper time might have the effect of inducing the Porte to listen to the Emperor's just demands, and that I ought to write, although without orders from his Majesty's government. I therefore wrote the enclosed letters to Mr. Stratford Canning, in which I have entered upon all the questions; but, as you will see, I have taken care to apprise the Porte that I have no authority for writing; and I give them only information, and my own individual advice and opinion.

I have likewise informed Mr. Stratford Canning of the secret instruction to Monsieur de Minciacky regarding the third point in the Emperor of Russia's Note, viz., the plenipotentiaries; and have given him some further information respecting the Servians. The desire of the Russian government to keep the Servians quiet has been confirmed to me from other quarters.

I was the more induced to write this letter because, at the same time that it gives the Porte information of the real state of affairs here, and warning of the consequence of the refusal or delay to do justice to the Emperor, there is no reason why his Majesty's government should not, if they think proper, take any other line they please upon all the questions to which the letter relates.

Although I wrote these letters some time ago, I delayed to send them till I should have in my possession the copy of the instruction to Monsieur de Minciacky not to make the third point regarding the plenipotentiaries a *sine quâ non*. I have shewn to Count Nesselrode the letter to Mr. Canning of the 27th March, explaining to him that he must understand it as my own act, and that it did not bind the government in any manner.

I remain, &c.

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

To Mr. Stratford Canning.

SIR, St. Petersburg, March 27th (15th), 1826.

Mr. Secretary Canning will have informed you of my mission to this place and its object, and that he had communicated to me copies of the instructions which, by his Majesty's com-

mands, he gave to you on the 12th October,* and on the 10th of February last.†

The foundation of those instructions was the apprehension entertained by his Majesty's government that the late and the present Emperor of Russia would have declared war against the Porte with a view to enforce some arrangement between the Greeks and Turks. Since my arrival at this court, however, I have found that although his Imperial Majesty is very sensible of the friendship of the King, our master, in making known to his Imperial Majesty the communications which you had been directed to make to the Porte relative to the Greeks, and notwithstanding that his Imperial Majesty is sincerely desirous that the Porte should attend favourably to the propositions which you have been directed to submit to that government, and that the good offices of his Majesty may be successful in putting an end to the contest between the Porte and its subjects in a state of revolt, a result which his Imperial Majesty would view with satisfaction, and in which his Imperial Majesty would willingly co-operate if his Imperial Majesty's own relations with the Porte were in a more satisfactory state, still his Imperial Majesty cannot consider the contest between the Porte and its revolted subjects a justifiable ground on his part of hostile complaint or of war against the Porte.

It is my opinion then that justice to his Imperial Majesty, as well as to the Porte, should induce you to communicate to that government, without loss of time, the information which I have above given you; more particularly as you will see from what follows in this letter, that the Emperor considers that he has just grounds of complaint against the Turks.

Of course the information which I have above requested you to give to the Porte will not alter the situation of his Majesty's government as mediator between the Porte and its revolted subjects, supposing the mediation to have been admitted by the government of the Porte.

I have now to inform you that his Imperial Majesty has ordered Monsieur de Minciacky to withdraw from Constantinople within a limited period of time unless satisfaction should be given to his Imperial Majesty on the following points:—

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* See vol. ii. of this Series, page 530. † See page 104.

First; all the arrangements in the Principalities to be carried into execution according to treaty, and to be settled *in statu quo* of the period anterior to the disturbances which occasioned the occupation of those Principalities by the Ottoman troops.

Secondly; certain Servian deputies, stated to have been brought to Constantinople under pretence of settling an arrangement for their government under the 8th Article of the Treaty of Bucharest, have been arrested. These persons must be released and sent home.

Thirdly; plenipotentiaries must be appointed by the government of the Porte to meet those of his Imperial Majesty on the frontiers of Russia with full powers to treat upon and settle the arrangements for the execution of the Treaty of Bucharest. I can have no authority from the King my master, to say one word to the government of the Porte upon this subject; but as a friend to peace I cannot be aware of what will certainly occur without warning the government of the Porte of its danger and without urging them to take measures to give his Imperial Majesty that satisfaction to which he is justly entitled.

The two first of these demands are positive rights: the first under treaty, the second founded upon a manifest breach by the Porte of the laws admitted by all civilised nations for the government of their mutual intercourse.

Upon the point first mentioned, regarding the Principalities, there is no doubt. The government of the Porte have long professed to intend to carry into execution the treaties with his Imperial Majesty; and the period is now arrived at which they must prove the truth of those professions or incur the consequences which have long been foretold.

I enclose herewith the extract of a despatch which I addressed to Mr. Secretary Canning on the 4th March, in which I have explained to him my view of the state of the question of the Principalities as existing between his Imperial Majesty and the Porte. I am quite certain that the facts stated in this extract are correct, and if they are there is nobody who will deny the inference drawn from them.

The Porte ought immediately to give orders that every Turkish officer and soldier should quit the Principalities, whether heretofore employed in the army against Ipsilanti or not, or however employed at present. They should order the Hospodars respectively to recommend to His Highness the persons whom they

wish his Highness to name as Bash-Beshli-Agas, to whom the Hospodars respectively should give the authority to act within the Principalities, and the Hospodars and these officers should take into the service of the princes respectively the number of persons of the Mussulman religion whom it may be necessary to employ as Beshlis in each of the Principalities.

Till this system shall be adopted, a *statu quo* anterior to the disturbances will not have been carried into execution.

In respect to the second demand, I would beg to observe that the government of the Porte are bound by treaty with the Emperor of Russia to settle with the Servians the mode in which the government of that nation shall be carried on; and it appears that a deputation of Servians had been brought to Constantinople for the purpose of arranging the terms of this settlement, and that this deputation had been imprisoned under pretence of providing for their safety at the moment of the disturbances at Constantinople, and have since been detained as hostages for the good conduct of the Servians.

The Porte may have a right to demand hostages for the good conduct of the Servians, but no government can have a right to detain in confinement on any account deputies brought to the seat of government to make an arrangement under a treaty with another Power; and there can be no doubt of the right of the Emperor of Russia to insist upon the release of these deputies.

In respect to the third demand it appears that Monsieur de Minciacky, the Russian chargé-d'affaires, presented a Note in May 1825 in the name of the late Emperor of Russia on the subject of the Principalities, and afterwards a protestation on the part of his Imperial Majesty on the 13th of October last,* on the same subject and against the conduct of the government of the Porte in giving no answer to the former Note.

Both Notes have to this moment remained unanswered, notwithstanding the acknowledged right of his Imperial Majesty to remonstrate upon and to have an explanation of the nature of the arrangements made for the government of the Principalities. The government of the Porte must not be surprised if the Emperor of Russia should not be inclined to submit to such treatment, and that as there still exists matter for negotiation between his Imperial Majesty and the Porte, his Impe-

* See page 191.

rial Majesty should insist that plenipotentiaries should be sent to him to settle that which must be settled by negotiation, since his Imperial Majesty finds that his plenipotentiary, after ten months' delay in one case and five months' delay in another, has not succeeded in obtaining an answer.

I would not deceive the government of the Porte on any subject, and I beg you to inform them from me, that they may rely upon it that unless they shall satisfy the just demands of his Imperial Majesty upon these points, Monsieur de Minciacky will withdraw within a limited time, and the consequences will follow.

I must at the same time inform you that my residence here has convinced me that his Imperial Majesty and his government are sincerely desirous of maintaining peace with the Porte, and even of putting an end to all the hostile discussions with that government which have for such a length of time threatened to disturb the general tranquillity.

But the Emperor feels that his late brother and predecessor had not been well treated by the Porte, that advantage had been taken by that government of his Imperial Majesty's desire to maintain peace, and of his deference to the wishes of his Allies, to infringe all treaties and engagements with Russia, and to treat his Imperial Majesty in a manner unbecoming the relation existing between two independent and friendly Powers; and his Imperial Majesty is determined, as he ought to be, that those engagements shall be strictly performed.

If satisfaction should be given to his Imperial Majesty on the points to which I have above referred, I really and firmly believe that the relations between his government and the Porte will become more cordial than they have ever been.

Under these circumstances I earnestly recommend to the Porte to reflect seriously on its situation, and to adopt that line of conduct manifestly dictated by its engagements, by justice, and by good policy.

War with Russia at the present moment would manifestly give fresh encouragement to the Greeks, and would in fact put in a state of revolt nearly the whole of the European subjects of the Porte.

Justice to his Imperial Majesty will place the relations of the Porte with Russia in a better situation than has existed for years.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

II.

EXTRACT OF A DESPATCH FROM THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON TO MR. SECRETARY CANNING.

[See pages 176-177, from the words "I have endeavoured" to "that of another Power."]

III.

To Mr. Stratford Canning.

MY DEAR SIR,

Matters are not quite so bad as they appear in the official letter which accompanies this. Minciacky is informed of the Emperor's anxious desire to continue at peace if possible, and he is instructed to be very mild and conciliating, and not to consider the demand of plenipotentiaries as a *sine quâ non*, if he should find that the Porte cannot comply with the third demand and will not comply with the second demand on account of their apprehension that the refusal of the third demand will occasion war, and that the release of the Servian hostages would give the Emperor in that case the assistance of the Servians.

I would not write to you at all upon this subject without telling you everything; but you must not breathe that you know what is contained in this letter, even to Minciacky. If you should think proper to say anything, advise the Porte strictly to comply with all the demands. If matters come to the last extremity, that is to the last days, and the Porte should prove clearly that they cannot send the plenipotentiaries, advise them to proceed frankly to carry into execution everything in the Principalities, and to dismiss handsomely the Servian deputies; and, at all events, advise them to be very civil and friendly in their language and manner to Monsieur de Minciacky from the beginning to the end of this negotiation. I really believe him to be a mild and well-meaning man.

I will send you the instruction to that chargé d'affaires if I should get it before I send off the messenger.

I remain, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—I write in cypher because of the possibility of the messenger being plundered in the Turkish States.

I think it right to caution you about the use of this cypher in your communications to Petersburg, for it is said here that the Russian government are in possession of it, and that they obtained it by opening your boxes at Warsaw last year.

WELLINGTON.

IV.

To Mr. Stratford Canning.

SIR,

Since I closed my other letters Count Nesselrode has informed me that upon the intelligence of the death of the late Emperor Alexander arriving in Servia, a variety of reports had been circulated regarding the state of affairs in Russia, and the intentions of the Emperor who had succeeded to the throne, and that men's minds had been a good deal disturbed, the result of which had been that the primates of what is called the Russian party in the country had assembled in a church, and had bound themselves by an oath to adhere to each other, and to be faithful to the Emperor. I have not seen the report of this transaction, but the above is the account of it given to me verbally by Count Nesselrode.

The Count read to me at the same time the letter which he had written by the Emperor's commands to *Milosch Obrenovitch*, the chief of the Servian primates, of which I enclose you a copy.

I immediately urged Count Nesselrode to make the government of the Porte acquainted with this transaction, but he objected to take the initiative upon the subject, principally because as the Emperor thought it was just possible that the Porte might not have received the information from any other quarter, his Imperial Majesty was unwilling to expose the parties to punishment.

But the Count promised me to send to Monsieur de Minciacky the information received from Servia, and a copy of the enclosed letter, with directions to communicate the letter to the government of the Porte if Monsieur de Minciacky should find that they have information of the transaction which has occasioned its being written.

I think it proper to communicate to you these circumstances, and to send you the enclosed copy of Count Nesselrode's letter

to Milosch Obrenovitch in case you should find that you can make use of the latter discreetly for the purpose of tranquillizing the minds of the Turkish ministers in respect to the designs of the Emperor's government in Servia.

They may rely upon it that the Emperor is sincere in his wish to discourage the Servians from any act inconsistent with their duty to the Porte.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

552.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR, St. Petersburg, 4th April (March 23rd), 1826.

In case you should think it proper to take any steps to exert his Majesty's influence at the Porte to induce the Porte to comply with his Imperial Majesty's demands and to prevent the war, which is possible, though I hope not probable, I think it proper to mention to you that the despatch to Monsieur de Minciacky, conveying the note referred to in my despatch, No. 13,* will probably have arrived at Constantinople about the 14th of this month. Supposing it to be presented immediately, the six weeks would not have expired till the 26th May. But the most probable circumstance is that the Reis Effendi will not grant the conference upon the first demand, and then not for ten days.

The messenger who left London with your despatches for Mr. Stratford Canning, on the 10th of February, left Vienna on the 22nd and arrived at Constantinople on the 17th of March, that is in twenty-five days.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

553.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR, St. Petersburg, 4th April (March 23rd), 1826.

As I have concluded everything here which I think I can do to preserve the peace of Europe, I propose to set out on my return to England on Thursday the 6th instant. I propose to

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* See page 172.

go by Warsaw and Berlin; and I have given Lord Clanwilliam notice respecting the direction to be taken by the messengers.

I propose to desire Lord Strangford to send forward to the Foreign Office by messenger any letters directed to me by Mr. Stratford Canning or by the officer commanding at Corfu, and to have no communication with this government upon Turkey or Greece till he shall receive your directions.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Prince de Wrede to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

St. Petersbourg, ce 4me Avril, 1826.

En me référant, mon cher Duc, à ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous exposer avant hier verbalement, par rapport aux intérêts particuliers du Roi mon maître, et des droits indélébiles reservés à la Bavière pour le cas échéant de la mort du Grand Duc actuel de Bade, j'ai l'honneur de vous joindre ici *confidentiellement* copie de la note que j'ai remise, en date du 15me Mars, au Comte de Nesselrode. Elle est, ainsi que vous en jugerez vous-même, basée sur des droits incontestables.

Si feu Lord Castlereagh a co-opéré par sa signature au Protocole d'Aix-la-Chapelle du 20me Novembre, 1818, vous ne vous souviendrez pas moins, mon cher Duc, qu'à cette époque vous m'exprimâtes par vos lettres d'Aix-la-Chapelle les regrets que vous éprouviez de ce que l'empire des circonstances n'avait permis aux Puissances de satisfaire aux droits que la Bavière avait acquis à titre onéreux.

Vous demandiez alors ma co-opération afin de faire concéder feu le Roi mon Souverain aux dispositions du Protocole précité.

Le Roi alla aussi loin qu'il pouvait pour témoigner sa déférence aux Puissances. Consentant à laisser pendants ses titres, il a renoncé à les faire valoir à la charge de l'héritage du Duc Charles de Bade régnant alors; mais il a légué à son successeur, le Roi Louis, les droits, qu'il s'est formellement reservé par la protestation remise au Protocole de Francfort. Ces droits auront leur plein et entier effet à la mort du Grand Duc de Bade actuellement régnant. Je ne doute pas que le Roi n'en prendra incessamment motif pour faire faire une communication directe au ministère de sa Majesté Britannique.

En attendant, la présente n'a d'autre but que celui de servir, mon cher Duc, à votre information personnelle, afin de fixer votre attention sur les faits, et afin de concilier votre suffrage dans le conseil de sa Majesté le Roi votre Souverain à la *juste cause* de la Bavière, que des arguments captieux ont fait méconnaître.

Agréez, je vous prie, mon cher Duc, l'expression des sentiments d'attachement et haute considération que je vous ai voués.

Le Feldmaréchal Prince de Wrede.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Note Confidentielle.

St. Pétersbourg, ce 15me (3) Mars, 1826.

Le soussigné, répondant au vœu que lui a manifesté son Excellence Monsieur le Comte de Nesselrode, Conseiller Privé actuel dirigeant le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, s'empresse de lui communiquer confidentiellement les détails concernants le droit de succession éventuelle dévolu à la Bavière sur le comté de Sponheim. Ce comté se compose de deux parties distinctes ;—

1°, de la partie citérieure, dite : *vordere Grafschaft.*

2°, de la partie ultérieure, dite : *hintere Grafschaft.*

La partie citérieure fut possédée autrefois en commun par les Comtes Palatins de Simmern et par les Margraves de Bade.

En 1707 on enfit le partage à raison de $\frac{3}{5}$ pour les Comtes Palatins, comprenant environ 18,000 âmes ; et de $\frac{2}{5}$ pour les Margraves de Bade, équivalents à une population de 12,000 âmes.

La partie ultérieure, possédée en commun entre les Ducs des Deux-ponts et les Margraves de Bade, fut partagée en 1776 en deux parts égales, montant environ à 12,000 âmes chacune.

Dans les deux partages il demeura convenu, qu'à l'extinction de l'une des deux maisons copartageantes, celle qui lui survivrait succéderait dans les droits de l'autre.

L'article 45 du recès de l'Empire de l'année 1803, confirmé en quelque sorte par l'article 34 de l'acte de la fédération du Rhin, contient la disposition, que les droits de succession éventuels qui reposaient sur les pays cédés à la rive gauche du Rhin sont transportés sur les portions de territoires acquises sur la rive droite de ce fleuve, et c'est en exécution de cette stipulation que la Bavière négocia depuis 1804 jusqu'en 1808 avec la Cour de Bade pour déterminer plus particulièrement les portions de territoire à surroger aux deux parties du comté de Sponheim cédées à la France. La Cour de Carlsruhe proposa à cette fin les Principautés de Constance et de Lindau avec la réserve de les faire évaluer ultérieurement sous le point de vue de leur population.

En résumé, la part acquise par la maison de Bade au moyen des deux partages du comté citérieur et ultérieur de Sponheim peut être évaluée à 24,000 âmes.

L'indemnité qu'elle en a obtenue par le recès de l'Empire de 1803 a été calculée sur cette proportion, et le surrogat à fournir par le Cour de Carlsruhe pour servir d'objet à l'exercice des droits de succession reservés à la maison de Bavière doit représenter la même population.

Les droits de la maison de Bavière s'étendent *en sus* sur les fiefs relevant de la Cour féodale de Sponheim. Ces derniers ont continué à être possédés en commun, même après le partage, et ils ont été conférés alternativement par celui des deux Souverains qu'appellait à ces fonctions le droit d'aînesse.

Il résulte de cet exposé, qu'à l'époque du décès de son Altesse Royale le Grand Duc de Bade actuellement régnant—auquel la Providence veuille accorder encore de longues années—le droit de succession de la maison de Bavière dans les deux parties du comté de Sponheim—c'est-à-dire dans la partie de territoire à leur surroger—aura son plein et entier effet. Il se liera alors à des titres non moins sacrés, sanctionnés par les Traités de Ried, de Paris, les Protocoles de Vienne, et le Traité de Munich. Si le concours de circonstances le plus inoui a pu faire méconnaître pendant des momens, les clauses onéreuses auxquelles ces titres ont été acquis, les intentions claires et précises dans lesquelles ils ont été stipulés, et le droit indélébile qu'ils constituent, il faut en accuser, non la jus-

tice des Puissances signataires du Protocole d'Aix-la-Chapelle, mais cette fatalité qui souvent fait prévaloir dans les conseils des considérations du moment aux règles éternelles de l'équité. La Bavière a pu rendre le plus grand hommage à l'Empereur Alexandre de glorieuse mémoire, en déférant au vœu énoncé dans sa lettre particulière du 9me (21) Novembre, 1818: de ne pas troubler le maintien de la paix générale.

Des considérations aussi majeures présentées dans le style de l'amitié par un parent revéré, ont pu engager feu sa Majesté le Roi Maximilien Joseph de laisser pendants ses titres, et de se borner à la déclaration, que son honneur et celui de son peuple lui interdisaient la transaction pécuniaire qui lui avait été proposée. Mais en se reservant au Protocole de Francfort la protestation que ce sentiment d'honneur joint à ses devoirs de Souverain lui dictaient, le Roi en a agi dans l'intérêt même des Puissances, qui ne peuvent vouloir l'injustice, il a manifesté son respect pour la sainteté des traités, et il a conservé à la Bavière des titres auxquels elle n'a pu, ni voulu, renoncer en aucun tems.

Le soussigné saisit en même tems cette occasion pour renouveler à son Excellence les assurances de sa haute considération.

WREDE.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

On the Road from St. Petersburg to Riga,
6th April, 1826.

SIR,

Since I wrote to you on the 4th instant I have had frequent opportunities of conversing with his Imperial Majesty, upon all of which occasions he expressed his satisfaction with what had passed since my arrival.

His Imperial Majesty called upon me last night and repeatedly declared his intention of performing all he had promised. After he had left me I learnt that he had intended to repeat over again what he had said to me in the audience which he gave me on the 10th of March. If I had known of this intention I might have led the conversation to the subject. But I had previously determined not to do so, because no fresh verbal assurance could add strength to what was undenied. Secondly, Because I did not think it could be very fair to get him to repeat this promise in a visit to myself; and lastly, because I had just received some intelligence, which I am about to give you, which gave me reason to apprehend that the Emperor's promise, if drawn from him at all, would not be so frank and unlimited as that which his Imperial Majesty had given me before.

Count Nesselrode and Count Lieven had called before the Emperor. The object of their visit was to settle the future mode of communication with his Majesty's government on these

subjects, and the period of the communication of the Protocol to the Allies, into which subjects I will enter presently.

In the course of the interview Count Nesselrode gave me the enclosed paper, which is a copy of a despatch dated 17th (29th) March, written by the Count to the Emperor's ministers at Berlin, Vienna, and Paris.

I had heard of such a paper before, and believed it to be nothing more than a reference to the Note transmitted to Monsieur de Minciacky, and I did not read it till this morning.

You will see that a qualified promise not to demand territory in Europe from the Porte is repeated in this despatch. But that to which I particularly refer is a despatch from General Pozzo di Borgo, which Count Nesselrode gave me to read, from which it appears that Prince Metternich had lately been endeavouring to persuade the Court of France to agree with that of Austria in requiring from the Emperor some such official assurance as I had required, that his Imperial Majesty, in case of war with the Porte, would not seek to extend his dominion or his influence in Europe.

The Court of France declined to come to any separate understanding with the Court of Vienna upon the subject, and communicated the Austrian propositions and the answer to General Pozzo di Borgo.

The date of this despatch is the 14th March; it was probably received at St. Petersburg by the 28th March, and I think it not improbable that it might have occasioned a suspicion that I was acting in concert with Prince Metternich. At all events, having had this paper before me, and as Count Nesselrode, upon whose mind I am convinced no suspicion remained, if it had ever existed, could not have had an opportunity of seeing the Emperor previous to his Imperial Majesty's visit, the perusal of the letter tended to confirm the disinclination which I felt to draw the conversation to his Imperial Majesty's promise.

In the course of the conversation at this interview, his Imperial Majesty repeatedly expressed his satisfaction that I had been sent to him, and that a good understanding with his Majesty was established; and he entreated me, upon leaving him, to represent him in favourable terms to his Majesty and his government.

In respect to the future communication, I have settled that

till Count Lieven will return to England he is to write to you himself anything on the subject of the Porte, or facts which he may have to communicate. He will not quit St. Petersburg till the first report from Monsieur de Minciacky after the receipt of the Note will have reached Count Nesselrode.

In respect to the Protocol, it is to be communicated direct to the governments. No measures will be taken to communicate it till Count Lieven will return to England.

Count Nesselrode said that it would be impossible for them to keep from the other governments for any length of time the knowledge of what had taken place; and this consideration, and that it is much more easy to regulate and keep secret a communication confidentially and officially made than one whispered into every ear, and that as Austria, France, and Prussia were to be with Russia the guarantees of the arrangement it would not be very civil to proceed to the conclusion of the arrangement without making to these governments any communication, were the inducements to me to allow this point to be inserted in the Protocol.

The Russian minister hinted that the guaranteeing Powers should be called upon to approve, and had so drawn the Article; but I got the better of the proposition by asking what was to be done in the hypothesis that they or any of them should disapprove?

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

COPIE d'une DÉPÊCHE à M. de TATISTCHEFF, au Général POZZO DI BORGO, et au Comte D'ALOPEUS, en date de St. Pétersbourg, du 17me Mars, 1826.

Après avoir satisfait aux obligations qu'imposaient à sa Majesté les circonstances extraordinaires qui ont marqué son avènement au trône, l'Empereur a porté l'attention la plus sérieuse sur les questions de politique extérieure, que la mort de l'Empereur Alexandre avait laissées indécises.

A leur tête se présentait naturellement la question Orientale.

Il n'en est en effet aucune qui dans ses principes comme dans ses conséquences soit plus intimement liée aux intérêts essentiels de la Russie, aucune qui se rattache plus évidemment aux droits positifs et à la dignité de l'empire, et par suite, aucune qui dût exciter au même degré la sollicitude de sa Majesté Impériale.

Notre auguste maître fit placer sous ses yeux un aperçu détaillé de cette question importante, depuis son origine jusqu'au moment actuel, et bientôt il reconnut qu'elle se divisait en deux parties distinctes.

A la première appartenaient des griefs directs, lesquels, malgré le rétablissement de nos relations diplomatiques avec la Porte, n'avaient jamais été complètement redressés, et avaient motivé d'inutiles réclamations de la part du chargé-d'affaires de sa Majesté à Constantinople.

A la seconde se rapportait une affaire qui n'embrassait pas les intérêts seuls de la Russie, mais dont le dénouement devait, d'après les opinions de l'Empereur Alexandre, et d'après la force même des choses, exercer une grande influence sur tout le reste de l'Europe.

Les griefs directs ci-dessus mentionnés sont connus des ambassadeurs et ministres de sa Majesté Impériale, comme de ses Alliés. Vous avez été informé en Août, 1824, des promesses que le Vicomte de Strangford avait transmises à l'Empereur Alexandre au nom de la Porte Ottomane; promesses qui consistaient dans l'évacuation complète des Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie, et dans le rétablissement de l'état de choses antérieur aux troubles de 1821 dans ces provinces. Mes dépêches du 4me Avril, du 6me Août, et du 4me Septembre, 1825, vous ont instruit en outre de la manière dont les mêmes promesses ont été éludées par la Porte, des mesures au moyen desquelles il est resté dans les Principautés des troupes Turques sous le nom de Beshlis, et des commandans Turcs sous le nom de Beshli-Agas, de la conduite du Divan envers les députés Serviens qui étaient venus se concerter avec lui sur l'exécution du Traité de Bucarest, des motifs que nous avions d'appréhender un mouvement général en Servie, des avertissemens que l'Empereur avait fait adresser à la Porte sous ce rapport, des représentations par lesquelles il l'avait engagée à reconnaître la fidélité de la nation Servienne en lui accordant les privilèges qui lui ont été garantis, de toutes les démarches préscrites à M. de Minciacky dans le but d'obtenir l'accomplissement des justes demandes de l'Empereur relativement à ce pays et aux Principautés, enfin du peu de succès des efforts de cet agent, malgré les talents et le zèle qu'il a déployés dans les négociations confiées à ses soins.

Par une dépêche du 4me Septembre, 1825, surtout j'ai annoncé à votre Excellence que les notes officielles qu'il avait remises concernant les objets dont l'énumération précède, n'ayant non-seulement pas produit l'effet désiré, mais étant même restées sans réponse, sa Majesté Impériale avait donné ordre à Monsieur de Minciacky de demander au Reis-Effendi une conférence en forme, d'y récapituler tous les actes de la Porte qui violaient à la fois ses traités avec l'empire, les privilèges de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, et les engagemens contractés envers le Vicomte de Strangford; d'ajouter à ces griefs un nouvel exposé des graves considérations, sur lesquelles se fondaient les vœux exprimés par sa Majesté Impériale à l'égard de la nation Servienne ainsi que de ses députés; et si cette conférence n'amenait encore que de nouveaux refus, de remettre au ministère Ottoman une protestation contre la marche qu'il suivait envers la Russie, et de l'avertir *pour la dernière fois* des conséquences inévitables d'une telle politique.

Au moment où M. de Minciacky allait s'acquitter de ces ordres, M. l'Internonce eut celui de représenter avec force à la Porte la nécessité de donner une satisfaction complète à l'Empereur Alexandre. Ce ministre insista en conséquence sur le rétablissement du status quo antérieur aux troubles de 1821 dans les Principautés. Il se crut même certain selon les communications qui nous ont été faites par M. le Comte de Lebzeltern, d'avoir inspiré

au Divan des dispositions conciliantes ; mais nous le disons à regret, dans sa conférence avec le Reis-Effendi, M. de Minciacky ne tarda point à se convaincre que la condescendance de la Porte se bornerait à la nomination de Bash-Beshli-Agas d'un grade inférieur, et que cet acte était loin de faire disparaître nos motifs de plainte, puisque la Porte persistait évidemment à s'attribuer et à exercer un droit de nomination qui ne lui avait jamais appartenu, un droit contraire à l'autorité des Hospodars et attentatoire aux privilèges des Principautés, comme aux transactions qui en sont garantes.

Dans cette position fâcheuse, M. de Minciacky, après avoir réitéré en vain les plus pressantes remontrances, après avoir inutilement essayé de faire adopter au ministère Ottoman d'autres déterminations, se vit forcé, le 1er (13me) Octobre, 1825, de remplir les instructions qu'il avait reçues d'ordre de l'Empereur Alexandre, et de déposer au Protocole des Conférences la Protestation formelle dont nous avons parlé plus haut. Cette démarche n'a été suivie d'aucune mesure satisfaisante de la part du Divan ; nos notes officielles du mois de Juin, et notre protestation du 1er (13me) Octobre, 1825, demeurent également sans réponse, des troupes Turques continuent de séjourner dans les Principautés, de nouveaux commandans Turcs se trouvent à leur tête, et suivant nos derniers rapports on s'y attendait même à une nouvelle entrée des troupes Ottomanes : d'autre part les députés Serviens sont détenus à Constantinople ; des lettres de Milosch nous apprennent qu'il nourrit les plus vives inquiétudes pour l'année 1826, et la Porte s'est péremptoirement refusée à l'adoption des seules mesures qui, selon l'avis de ce chef et la pensée de l'Empereur Alexandre, fussent capables de conjurer en Servie le danger d'une explosion prochaine.

Tel est en peu de mots l'état dans lequel l'Empereur a trouvé cette partie des affaires d'Orient.

Pour mieux vous faire connaître et apprécier une situation aussi délicate, ainsi que tous les détails de nos griefs directs contre la Porte Ottomane, je vous communique ci-joint des copies du Protocole de la dernière conférence de M. de Minciacky avec le Reis-Effendi, et de la Protestation qu'il lui a remise le 1er (13me) Octobre, 1825.

Il vous suffira de lire ces documens pour juger les importantes questions dont la solution devait occuper sa Majesté Impériale.

L'Empereur pouvait-il admettre que par l'occupation prolongée des Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie la Porte violât impunément la condition même sous laquelle l'Empereur Alexandre avait rétabli ses relations diplomatiques avec l'empire Ottoman, une condition qui était solennellement exprimée dans la lettre de créance de M. de Minciacky, et le décrêt par lequel M. de Ribeaupierre avait été nommé ministre de Russie à Constantinople, une condition que l'Empereur Alexandre avait toujours regardée comme indispensable, qu'il avait cru remplie en 1824 sur la foi des plus positives promesses, et dont, néanmoins dix-huit mois de négociations et d'attente n'ont point encore procuré l'accomplissement ?

L'Empereur pouvait-il admettre qu'une protestation formelle, présentée au nom et par ordre de son auguste et glorieux prédécesseur, restât sans réponse et sans effet ?

Pouvait-il admettre qu'un peuple qui depuis cinq ans montre à la Porte un dévouement exemplaire, ne recueille pour prix de sa fidélité que l'emprisonnement de la députation qu'il avait envoyée à Constantinople, et le

refus de satisfaire aux engagemens pris à son égard dans un traité stipulé par la Russie?

Pouvait-il admettre que la Russie, qui a généreusement et puissamment contribué à maintenir les Serviens dans cette obéissance, et qui n'a pu opérer ce résultat que par la promesse de réaliser leurs vœux légitimes, fût d'une part réduite à la nécessité de leur déclarer qu'elle ne pouvait leur tenir parole, et exposée de l'autre à toutes les conséquences d'une explosion dès lors inévitable qu'elle ne pourrait ni diriger ni arrêter, dont néanmoins la Porte ferait encore peut-être retomber sur elle tout l'odieux, et qui allumerait en Turquie une conflagration générale?

Dans de telles conjonctures, ou l'Empereur devait soutenir les demandes articulées relativement à la Valachie, à la Moldavie, et à la Servie par l'Empereur Alexandre, ou il devait les retirer.

S'il les retirait, n'était-ce pas enseigner aux Turcs, qu'il leur suffirait de repousser les réclamations que la Russie représenterait comme les plus justes, pour que la Russie fût contrainte de les regarder comme non-avenues? N'était-ce pas leur déclarer à eux et à l'Europe que l'Empereur Alexandre avait persisté à soutenir des droits que son successeur ne reconnaissait ni pour réels ni pour nécessaires? n'était-ce pas jeter le plus faux jour sur la politique de ce grand monarque? n'était-ce pas renoncer à tous les titres de protection que la Russie a acquis sur diverses provinces chrétiennes de l'empire Ottoman depuis le Traité de Kaynardgé jusqu'au Traité de Boucarest? répudier en quelque façon l'héritage des ancêtres du souverain qui nous gouverne, et anéantir tous les principes que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg n'a cessé de suivre pendant un demi-siècle dans ses relations avec la Porte?

Nous n'examinerons pas si l'Empereur pourrait faire un pareil sacrifice, mais si, en le faisant, il se serait au moins procuré l'avantage d'une paix durable. Or, nous le demandons, cinq années d'une triste expérience n'ont-elles pas prouvé que des concessions incessamment renouvelées, qu'une longanimité sans exemple, que des démarches toujours accompagnées des formes de la sollicitude la plus amicale, loin d'être payées d'un juste retour par le Divan, n'avaient fait qu'accroître ses prétentions, qu'elles ne lui avaient inspiré que la résolution de rétracter ses promesses ou de les éluder, qu'elles avaient même exalté son orgueil au point de lui faire garder le silence sur des réclamations exprimées dans les termes les plus instans, et revêtus d'un caractère officiel?

Il faudrait vouloir rester dans une dangereuse illusion, il faudrait fermer les yeux à l'évidence et récuser les leçons des évènemens où nous avons été nous-mêmes à la fois témoins et acteurs, pour ne pas reconnaître que si dans des circonstances difficiles le Divan manifeste de telles dispositions, nous le trouverions bien plus présomptueux encore et plus inflexible lorsqu'il aurait vu sa politique couronnée de succès, lorsqu'il se serait convaincu qu'elle l'aurait affranchi de l'obligation de remplir ses traités avec la Russie, de respecter les privilèges qu'ils consacrent, et de satisfaire aux demandes qu'ils avaient provoquées. Ce serait alors que bientôt la Russie ne pourrait continuer ni ses relations politiques ni ses relations commerciales avec l'empire Ottoman. Et nos appréhensions à cet égard ne sont pas de vaines hypothèses. Elles ne se trouvent que trop justifiées par l'irrécusable témoignage des faits et par l'expérience même de nos Alliés. Combien de fois dans le cours des négociations qu'ils ont conduites avec la Porte depuis

l'année 1821, n'ont-ils pas eu à repousser des prétentions absolument étrangères aux questions qu'il s'agissait de résoudre. Combien de fois la Porte n'a-t-elle pas pris les mesures les plus hostiles envers le commerce de la Mer Noire, et malgré les engagemens qu'elle a contractés envers le Vicomte de Strangford, malgré les sacrifices offerts par la Cour de Copenhague, le pavillon Danois a-t-il pu jusqu'à présent obtenir le passage du Bosphore?

Ainsi, M. ———, en abandonnant le terrain que l'Empereur Alexandre a toujours défendu dans ses différends directs avec la Porte Ottomane, en retirant les demandes qui lui ont été présentées jusqu'à l'année 1825, en ne donnant aucune suite à la Protestation du 1er (13me) Octobre, 1825, l'Empereur accréditerait l'opinion que cette protestation et ces demandes faites d'ordre d'un souverain dont il vénère la mémoire, étaient autant d'actes injustes ou irréfléchis; et pour fruit d'un pareil système, il se retrouverait, suivant toutes les probabilités, suivant tous les calculs d'un immanquable avenir, dans le cas d'entamer de nouvelles discussions, et dans la nécessité d'en venir à une nouvelle rupture.

Ce serait méconnaître les sentimens que la Cour de ——— professait pour le monarque dont nous pleurons la perte, que d'insister davantage sur ces considérations, et il aura suffi, sans nul doute, d'indiquer de tels motifs, afin de convaincre le Cabinet de ——— qu'au fond dans la partie de la question Orientale que nous traitons, l'Empereur n'avait pas d'alternative, et que ses plus saints devoirs lui commandaient de soutenir des demandes qui forment une portion de son héritage.

Il ne nous reste donc qu'à examiner comment elles devaient être soutenues, et quelles ont été les déterminations de sa Majesté Impériale à cet égard.

Vous aurez observé que nos réclamations directes à la charge de la Porte, telles qu'elles existent aujourd'hui, se divisent en trois chefs principaux:

1. Inexécution des promesses faites au Vicomte de Strangford, ou en d'autres termes, occupation des Principautés, et refus de rétablir le status quo antérieur aux troubles de 1821 dans ces provinces.

2. Détention des députés Serviens, et refus de promettre l'accomplissement des stipulations du Traité de Boucarest en faveur de la Servie.

3. Réparation que la Porte doit à la Russie pour avoir laissé sans réponse écrite et officielle, tant la Note de M. de Minciacky en date du 21me Juin (3me Juillet), 1825, relative à la position de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, que sa Protestation du 1er (13me) Octobre.

Pour offrir à la Porte une occasion de redresser ces trois griefs, l'Empereur a résolu de rompre le silence envers le Divan, et de lui faire remettre par M. de Minciacky une Note dont vous recevez ci-jointe la minute. Sa Majesté Impériale y fait inviter le gouvernement Turc à prendre enfin, touchant les Principautés et la Servie, les décisions réclamées par l'Empereur Alexandre, et à ce témoignage de sollicitude elle en associe un plus marquant encore dans ce qui concerne le troisième des griefs ci-dessus énumérés. Comme moyen de le faire disparaître, sa Majesté Impériale se contente de signaler une mesure essentiellement utile aux deux empires, essentiellement propre à leur assurer de longues années de paix et de concorde. Cette mesure consisterait dans un envoi de plénipotentiaires Ottomans, qui se rendraient sur les frontières de Russie, chargés d'aplanir avec les plénipotentiaires de sa Majesté Impériale toutes les questions ouvertes depuis 1816

entre le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et la Porte, toutes les questions que le Baron de Stroganoff a discutées pendant son séjour à Constantinople, sur lesquelles le ministère Turc s'est si souvent efforcé de revenir dans ses négociations avec nos Alliés, et qui demandent à être terminées pour qu'il nous soit *possible* d'entretenir des rapports satisfaisans avec la Turquie. Tant qu'elles subsisteront en effet, des discussions seront inévitables, et ces discussions pourront sans cesse prendre le caractère le plus grave, elles pourront sans cesse nous placer dans une situation extrême, et la paix que nous désirons conserver avec la Turquie, loin d'être solide, courra d'un moment à l'autre un imminent danger.

Articuler la proposition que l'Empereur fait aujourd'hui à la Porte, n'exiger comme satisfaction due pour une politique malveillante que les moyens d'ajuster tout différend entre les deux états et d'étouffer jusqu'au germe de toute guerre, c'est donc manifester une visible modération, c'est montrer pour l'avenir comme pour le présent les intentions les plus pacifiques.

A ces remarques nous joindrons celle que M. de Minciacky est chargé de déclarer au Divan : que son adhésion à nos ouvertures, et nommément à un envoi del pénipotentiaires, lui garantirait de la part de l'Empereur des vues conciliatrices dans tous les arrangemens que sollicitent les questions ouvertes depuis l'année 1816.

Du reste, sa Majesté Impériale a profité dans cette négociation des avertissemens qu'offrent celles qui l'ont précédées ; et afin de prévenir les délais qu'elle ne saurait désormais admettre, afin de bien convaincre le Divan, qu'autant elle désire la paix, autant elle est résolue de faire respecter les droits et les traités de la Russie, elle a préscrit à son chargé-d'affaires de témoigner à la Porte que toutes les demandes renfermées dans la Note qu'il va lui remettre doivent être acceptées dans un terme de six semaines ; que si la Porte exprimait un refus, ou laissait écouler ce terme sans faire de réponse favorable, il quitterait aussitôt Constantinople, et que dès lors des mesures coërcitives seraient nécessairement et immédiatement adoptées par sa Majesté Impériale.

Ses vœux les plus sincères appellent un dénouement qui ne la place point dans l'obligation de recourir aux armes ; mais comme encore, dans cette dernière hypothèse, l'Empereur aurait la conscience d'avoir mis tout en œuvre pour opérer un rapprochement durable entre la Russie et la Porte, comme aucune idée d'ambition ni le dirigera jamais, comme il ne poursuivra toujours qu'un seul et unique but, comme alors même qu'il serait contraint d'user de force, il ne cherchera qu'à conclure les arrangemens par lesquels la Porte peut dès aujourd'hui cimenter une paix solide avec le gouvernement Russe, comme enfin aux réclamations qu'il vient de faire énoncer et à une transaction générale, que les discussions pendantes entre les deux empires depuis l'année 1816 ont rendue indispensable, il n'a l'intention d'ajouter qu'une juste compensation pour les frais de guerre, l'Empereur se flatte que ses déterminations seront appréciées par tous les Cours de l'Europe ; il se flatte que, vû les liens qui les unissent à la Russie, et les dispositions qu'elles lui ont constamment témoignées, il peut compter avec une légitime confiance, et sur leur suffrage et sur leur désir de voir se terminer, le plutôt possible, à sa satisfaction complète, la crise que l'aveuglement des Turcs aurait amenée.

Nous observerons encore que dans les circonstances actuelles la Russie ne réclame pas l'assistance de ses alliés à Constantinople parce qu'elle soutient des droits qui lui sont propres, qu'elle a toujours regardé cette partie de ses différends avec la Porte comme spécialement Russe, et que d'ailleurs en présentant des demandes directes, c'est aussi une réponse directe qu'elle exige.

Si néanmoins les Alliés jugeraient utile d'appuyer nos demarches, *en représentant à la Porte qu'il est urgent qu'elle accepte, sans délai et sans réserve,* les propositions de sa Majesté Impériale, l'Empereur ne pourra que leur en avoir une réelle gratitude; et nous vous informons que M. Stratford Canning a déjà été invité par le Duc de Wellington à ne point laisser ignorer au Divan les conséquences d'un refus prolongé.

Quant à la seconde partie de la question Orientale, c'est-à-dire, aux mesures qui concerne la pacification de la Grèce, sa Majesté Impériale espère que ses Alliés rendront justice aux motifs qui l'ont portée à ne point aborder pour le moment ce sujet si délicat dans ses discussions avec la Porte.

Dans toutes les phases des négociations qui ont eu rapport à l'intervention dont l'Empereur Alexandre avait sans cesse signalé la nécessité pour rendre la paix à la Grèce, le vœu unanime des Alliés a été que la Russie pût être placée à Constantinople sur la même ligne que les autres Cours intervenantes, et qu'elle pût y exercer une utile influence.

L'Empereur a eu égard à ce désire, et les Alliés reconnaîtront aisément que le système qu'il a adopté offrira tous les moyens de parvenir sous ce rapport au résultat que sollicitent la réligion, l'humanité, et les intérêts de l'Europe.

Si le Divan, comme nous l'espérons, accède à nos demandes, nul doute que la politique Ottomane n'ait alors complètement changé, et qu'en unissant ses efforts à ceux des Puissances qui s'occuperaient à pacifier la partie de la Turquie Européenne livrée en cet instant au fléau d'une guerre d'extermination, la Russie n'ait occasion d'accélérer le succès de cette noble entreprise par l'ascendant même dont la ferait jouir auprès de la Porte, la satisfaction éclatante qu'elle en aurait obtenue.

Si, au contraire, le Divan force l'Empereur d'avoir recours à des mesures coercitives, ce sera aussi à la pacification de la Grèce que sa Majesté Impériale fera efficacement concourir les résolutions qu'elle sera obligée de prendre.

Cette question pourra donc toujours être résolue d'après les vœux de l'Empereur Alexandre; elle pourra l'être, soit par une intervention sagement combinée, soit à la faveur même des déterminations énergiques que d'autres motifs auront fait adopter à la Russie.

Mais ce qui ne pouvait souffrir de retard, ce que l'Empereur regardait comme plus urgent encore, c'était de fixer la position particulière de la Russie envers l'empire Ottoman. Tant qu'elle serait restée incertaine, toute autre négociation définitive eût été impossible aux yeux de sa Majesté Impériale, et d'ailleurs s'il entre dans les décrêts de la Divine Providence que la Russie soit obligée de décider par la voie des armes ses différends avec la Porte, l'Empereur veut que l'Europe acquière non-seulement la conviction qu'il n'était point en son pouvoir d'abandonner les griefs directs dont il demande le redressement, que ses réclamations ont été justes et basées sur des promesses incontestables comme sur des traités solennels, que ses

propositions présentaient la certitude d'anéantir tout sujet de discussion ultérieure entre le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et le Divan, mais encore que jamais la malveillance ne puisse accuser ce Cabinet d'avoir fait servir à des réclamations dont une guerre pouvait être la conséquence, des titres nés d'une insurrection, et que le jour où marcheraient les armées de sa Majesté Impériale, la nature des droits dont l'Empereur aurait pris la défense, et la teneur même de la Note qu'il aurait fait remettre à la Porte, détruisent le criminel espoir que les hommes de troubles et de désordre auraient fondé sur cet évènement.

Vous voudrez bien, M. ————, donner lecture de cette dépêche au Cabinet de ————. Vous l'informerez, en outre, qu'aussitôt que les résolutions de la Porte nous seront connues, nous ne manquerons pas de développer le système qui nous paraîtra le plus propre à opérer d'utiles résultats quant à la pacification de la Grèce. Vous observerez finalement que dans sa position actuelle, après les garanties qu'offre la longanimité dont le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a fourni tant de preuves, et après les déclarations consignées dans la présente, l'Empereur croit avoir lieu d'espérer un accueille favorable pour les explications qu'elle renferme.

Recevez, etc.

NESSELRODE.

Mr. Stratford Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Constantinople, 6th April, 1826.

Untoward circumstances have prevented my despatching a second messenger to your Grace, and being now suddenly called upon to send the only one I have with me to London, I avail myself of the Russian post to state that my proposals of mediation, as well with respect to Russia as with respect to Greece, have been decidedly—indeed, I may say, disdainfully—rejected by the Porte. My demand concerning the plan imputed to Ibrahim Pasha has hitherto met with no better success. I have thought it necessary to give in a Note on that subject, agreeing with the terms of my instruction from the Foreign Office; but no answer is yet returned to it, and I am left to hope that either the imputed plan never existed, or that the Sultan will silently take measures to prevent its execution, though he did not choose to give a formal or positive assurance to that effect.

That I should have succeeded under any circumstances in obtaining the consent of the Porte to the proposal which I was instructed to make, is extremely questionable; but it is true, at the same time, that I have had extraordinary difficulty to encounter, in addition to the disadvantage arising from my long detention at the Dardanelles, and the consequent necessity of submitting those proposals to the Reis Effendi, without being able to prepare the ground for their reception. Of these difficulties, the three most important are an impression of the Porte that Russia is paralysed by the disaffection of her army; a high opinion of some accounts of successes recently obtained near Missolonghi by the Turkish troops; and a belief, suggested by other Powers, that the Emperor Nicholas is wholly bent on the preservation of peace.

This latter illusion is probably dispelled by this time.

On the 2nd instant a Russian who left St. Petersburg on the 17th of last month arrived here, with despatches for M. de Minciacky. Yesterday M. de Minciacky had an interview of the Reis Effendi, on which occasion he gave in an official Note received verbatim from St. Petersburg, stating in distinct terms that, unless certain specified conditions were accepted and executed by the Porte within six weeks from the delivery of it, that he should infallibly leave this capital, in company with all the individuals in the service of his government, and that the immediate consequences of this step would be such as the Porte might easily conceive.

The three conditions specified in M. de Minciacky's Note, are—first, The complete restoration of the *status quo* of Moldavia and Wallachia, as before the breaking out of the troubles in 1821; secondly, The release of the Servian deputies, with an agreement to grant to the Servians certain privileges which they claim; thirdly, the sending of plenipotentiaries to the Russian frontier to settle definitively all differences which formed the subject of Baron Stroganoff's discussions with the Porte between the years 1816 and 1821.

The first intimation which I received of this Note, was from M. de Minciacky himself, who called upon me this morning and read it over to me. He added that he had no power to make the slightest modification in the demands; that he intended communicating the Note to the Austrian, Prussian, and French missions, in the course of the day; and that if the Porte should apply for our advice, the Emperor of Russia would feel grateful to us for affording such counsels as might dispose the Divan to a satisfactory and pacific decision.

He finally stated that the Reis Effendi had taken his communication ad referendum, remarking, however, though not officially, that the demands which he had brought forward could hardly be complied with, inasmuch as there was nothing left to be arranged in the Principalities, nothing concerning the Provinces * withheld, which Russia had a right to mediate, and no necessity for sending plenipotentiaries to the frontier.

I leave your Grace to judge what is most likely to be the result of this proceeding.

For my part I send off a courier this night to England with this most important intelligence; and I trust, though I have not as yet sufficient means of forming an opinion on the subject, that the Porte will take counsel of its interests to avert the danger which seems to menace so immediately the peace of Europe.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

STRATFORD CANNING.

Lord Amherst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD, Calcutta, 6th April, 1826.

The information communicated to me by the last arrival from England that your Grace had expressed your approbation of the conduct of the

* Qy. Servians.

last campaign against the Burmese, has occasioned to me a feeling of satisfaction such as it has not been my lot to experience since I assumed the government of India.

Under any circumstances I should have considered your Grace's approbation as a high reward; but it has been peculiarly gratifying to me to be honoured with your favourable opinion at a moment when I had to struggle against severe, and, I trust it will be found, unmerited censure.

I look forward to nothing with greater pleasure than to the hope that your Grace will be able to continue the expression of your approbation to a series of measures which have led to the dictation of an honourable and advantageous peace within four marches of the enemy's capital.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,

your Grace's most faithful and most obedient servant,

AMHERST.

MILITARY PUNISHMENTS.

8th April, 1826.

Military punishments have a two-fold object; the improvement and reformation of the offenders themselves, and the prevention of crime in others.

This view divides the kinds of punishment into two classes, the first of which consists more in a state of restraint, and the second is of a severer and of a degrading character, such as may inspire terror and shame. The first belongs to the minor and common offences of irregularity, and the second to those which are more important, such as offences on duty, insubordination, and theft, and the other crimes of a disgraceful character.

The punishments at present in use are—

1. Drill;
2. Confinement to barracks;
3. Standing under arms:

and by sentence of a regimental court-martial—

1. Imprisonment, with or without hard labour;
2. Confinement (solitary) where the commanding officer may direct;
3. Corporal punishment to the extent of 300 lashes:

and by general, or general regimental, courts-martial—

1. Increased degree of corporal punishment;
2. Imprisonment of either kind:

and for desertion—

1. Loss of benefit of former service (in addition to punishment of prison or other);
2. General service as a soldier for life;
3. Transportation for a term of years or for life.

To most of these punishments objections of some kind may be found. For instance, against *drill*, it may be alleged that a soldier should not be taught to look upon his exercise as a punishment, but no other perhaps could be conveniently substituted where the offence is of slight importance.

Confinement to barracks, or, as it is termed in the Guards, "billing up," carries with it the objection that when extended to many weeks the soldier has a large accumulation of pay, which as soon as he regains his liberty, frequently occasions a repetition of the irregularity before committed, drunkenness and absence.*

Standing under arms consists in remaining with arms shouldered, fully accoutred in marching order, with knapsack packed, &c., for a certain time. This punishment, when carried to an extreme, as for three or four hours in the day and two hours at a time, is objectionable on the score of health, and also as productive of a bad posture under arms. One hour, or at most two, in a day (and never more than one hour at a time) may serve occasionally, in addition to billing up, to mark a stronger shade of offence, or any impropriety of conduct superadded to it.

Solitary confinement, which is only given by sentence of a court-martial, is, in my humble opinion, the best and most efficacious punishment now in use, when it can be duly put in force by means of a proper place.

I have heard it alleged that men are sometimes indifferent to it, and that the idleness to which he is left gratifies an indolent soldier; but observation convinces me of the contrary, and I am certain that it is not only found an irksome punishment, but one which tends more than any other to the reformation of an offender. To be left day after day to his own reflections, without any intercourse with his comrades, and with a reduced diet, will generally occasion a state of mind favourable to amendment. Under proper regulations, exercise during an hour in the day, and such a supply of food as may be suitable without lowering his strength, a man's health does not appear to suffer from this sort of confinement. He is visited daily by the surgeon and by the orderly officer. There is no accumulation of pay, sixpence a day only being allowed for nourishment, and the remainder being forfeited.

Imprisonment in public jails, whether with or without hard labour, has the great objection of putting the soldier in communication with vagabonds and criminals of the worst description, and is therefore only fit for the incorrigible offender and that class of soldier whose character is no longer worth considering. Upon such, however, it produces (particularly the hard labour) a good deal of effect, and is a better punishment than flogging when time and circumstances allow the option. It is of a degrading character, and belongs therefore to the second class of punishments.

Corporal punishment is principally useful for inspiring fear in others, when a prompt and marked example is wanted; and for such occasions the power of inflicting it seems (at the present period, at least) indispensably necessary. On marches, and on foreign service, and for overt acts of insubordination anywhere, as well as for some offences on duty, it is often the only punishment (short of death) which can be resorted to with sufficient effect.

The power therefore of enforcing this punishment is necessary, and the

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* N.B. The petty sutlers or venders of provisions are very useful on this account, as well as on many others: the "billed up" men, who are never permitted to go into the canteen, purchase such things as these people are allowed to sell in the barrack-yard.

total abolition of it at once would place the soldier in a situation so new that the effect of such a plan could not at present be fairly appreciated. It is, however, certain that under ordinary circumstances it can very seldom be necessary or expedient to have recourse to flogging, and there is very little doubt that a *practical* abolition of it may be carried into effect, provided *the power* be still retained as a check which it would hardly be safe to relinquish altogether and suddenly. It is a degrading punishment, and fit therefore, like the jail and treadmill, only for incorrigible offenders and men who have no character to lose. It is universally allowed to be an inexpedient punishment for soldiers of whose reformation by other means there is any hope, for it affixes a lasting stigma; and its effect on the hardened offender is very doubtful, as many men of that description would rather suffer it than undergo a lengthened imprisonment. It is soon over and the soldier feels a certain pride in bearing it well, and the unshrinking firmness which he makes a point of exhibiting under the infliction in great measure redeems the disgrace of it in the eyes of his comrades. Its efficacy therefore may be doubted, and its general inexpediency, except on occasions of positive necessity, can hardly be questioned. Practical proof may be found in many regiments that it can be, during long periods, entirely dispensed with, and the discipline and conduct of the troops is probably better now than many years ago when flogging was the common and daily punishment. Admitting, therefore, that it may almost be disused, but cannot safely be entirely abolished by law (at least for the present), the plan suggested (by Sir Henry Hardinge) of having two classes in a regiment, one of which shall be exempted from corporal punishment (except, as I conceive, for the crime of insubordination only), seems admirably adapted to effect the purpose of a partial abolition, and it will have further the incalculable advantage of fostering the principle of honour in the soldier, and of exciting that sort of pride and ambition which commanding officers at present are deprived of all means of encouraging, except by their own admonition and personal endeavours.

The mode to be adopted in the management of soldiers, in a moral sense, is the great and most difficult problem which a commanding officer has to solve, because it involves the multiplicity of considerations arising out of the different characters of men, and depending on the various motives which rule the human mind.

To abridge the labour, study of character, and observation which this subject requires, the short maxim is frequently adopted that punishment alone is to effect all that is necessary, and that soldiers are not fit to be treated with consideration, but must be kept in order solely by fear, and any system formed on a more favourable view of what soldiers may become, is liable to be misconstrued as one of mistaken lenity. This is carried so far in some regiments that a fixed scale is established, a sort of regular tariff, assigning to each offence its unalterable punishment, so that character and previous conduct are completely shut out of view, and the man who is in liquor and absent from barracks once in the year is treated with the same severity as another who offends every month.

If those officers are appealed to who have had the inclination and the opportunity of governing their men on a plan contrary to that of debasing the soldier, I am sure they will support the assertion that soldiers are far

from being insensible to good treatment, and that much may be effected by a system of consideration towards them individually in matters which relate to their welfare, their interest, and their reasonable wishes. The soldier thus learns to think well of himself; and to raise him in his own estimation is to obtain an additional security against misconduct. This sort of treatment is completely distinct from anything like false indulgence or relaxation of military restraint, and is perfectly compatible with the strictest discipline; and if the causes of insubordination are traced they will never be found to spring from such a system as this, but generally from a want of that discrimination which distinguishes what conduces to true discipline from all that is uselessly vexatious. Soldiers will never resist, or complain of, whatever is necessary for the former, because utility is the criterion by which they judge, and those who are treated with habitual consideration will not be prone to doubt the necessity or expediency of anything which is required from them. Having confidence in their officers, they will look up to them as their protectors, and soldiers so governed may be relied upon under any circumstances.

Such a system is derived from the principle that the military character should be exalted instead of being degraded: it tends to the same end as the classification proposed, but the latter will contribute to produce a much more decided effect, by giving to the soldier himself the satisfactory assurance that nothing but his own misconduct, proved before a court-martial, can deprive him of the privileges of his class. It will more effectually provide for that which now depends solely on the attention of a commanding officer to the character of individuals, the shielding from corporal punishment all but the hardened and disgraceful offender. It will at once ameliorate the condition of the soldier, and thereby assist the recruiting and diminish the great number of desertions which at present take place, and which can only be ascribed to a system that renders the soldier discontented and unhappy, whereas his situation is decidedly a good one considered relatively to that of others of his class in life. He is well paid, well clothed, well taken care of in sickness, and is discharged when about forty years of age with a pension for life, which gives him an obvious advantage over the common labourer; and, in addition to all this, a plan which shall put him above the fear of corporal punishment cannot fail to improve materially the composition of the army, and to give to English soldiers at home a character in the eyes of the country corresponding to that which they are sure to obtain in the field. It will be a full and fair trial of the question involving the possibility of abolishing in part or entirely the practice of flogging; a trial by the army itself. The result, under proper attention to the object of the plan, may be such, in my humble opinion, as even to exceed all expectation. But officers must co-operate in giving it due effect, and be cautious not to diminish the degree of obloquy which will attach to degradation from the first to the second class by carelessly sanctioning the idea sometimes entertained, but which experience does not confirm, that English soldiers are not influenced by the distinctions of honour and of shame. On the contrary, I can venture to affirm that men are sometimes checked in a course of misconduct by a casual remark which awakens a sense of pride; and why, indeed, should it be supposed that soldiers are uninfluenced by the same motives and feelings which actuate mankind in

general? It is true that those feelings which may be rendered so useful, and be turned to so much profit by proper encouragement, may be, and constantly are, completely extinguished by a system which confounds the meritorious and the worthless man, and lowers the soldier in his own opinion, as a being who must be kept in a perpetual state of coercion, undeserving of confidence, and scarcely to be trusted out of sight. Good treatment makes men better, and the way to have bad solders is to treat them all as if they were so.

It is certain that they often commit offences out of pique and resentment against their superiors, and equally so that they are led to improve in their conduct from contrary feelings. General Lloyd, an Englishman, but acknowledged as a high military authority throughout Europe, recommends that, "instead of depressing that class of men called soldiers as we do at present, every method possible should be used to raise and exalt it." The spirit of the measure now proposed is in conformity to such a view, of which it will at once promote the end and serve as the test. It is a safe and satisfactory expedient to amend the military penal system, and will afford an experimental proof of the truth or fallacy of the opinion, now very prevalent in the army, that corporal punishment need rarely be resorted to.

With respect to the regulations necessary for the details of this plan, I should think that at first it would be requisite to empower the court-martial (regimental) to combine any of the punishments at its discretion, *except flogging*, with the sentence of degradation. Offenders would otherwise appear at the outset to escape too easily, and the system might lose part of its effect.

In cases of positive insubordination, there ought to be a power, which may be vested only in a general, and general regimental, court-martial, to inflict corporal punishment on men even of the first class for that crime, but not for any other, unless, which I think probable, it may be judged also expedient that it should be awarded for plundering.

Convicted thieves, who have already been tried twice by the civil or military law, and found guilty of theft, might belong as a matter of course to the degraded class at its first formation. This would stamp disgrace upon it, and render it a more formidable punishment to others.

A commanding officer of battalion should have the power of restoring men to the first class when he sees positive proof of their amendment; or as a reward for marked good conduct on any particular occasion, at home or in the field.

The General Officers at the half-yearly inspections would of course pay particular attention to the number of men degraded, and ascertain minutely their offences, and the system under which the punishment had been applied; and they would also investigate carefully the grounds on which men had been re-admitted to the first class.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

My dear Mr. Canning, Riga, 9th April, 1826.

I am very much obliged to you for your private letter of the 25th, which I received yesterday. I send the messenger on to St. Petersburg.

In my despatch regarding the part the French had taken in Greece, I referred only to the paper which you had sent me, which had been transmitted to you by Lord Granville.*

I think that paper afforded no proof against the government, but a great deal against others. The French government have certainly had an offer from the Greeks of submitting themselves to the protection of France of the same description with that which we have had; but I should think with this difference, that this offer was produced by intrigue, &c.

I am just setting out for Warsaw, and hope to be in England by the end of the month.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

Sir, Riga, 9th April, 1826.

As I think it desirable that you should have the information contained in my despatch† of the 6th instant, as soon as possible, I send home the Honourable John Bligh with these communications.

Mr. Bligh came out with me by your permission, and I should do him great injustice if I did not state to you the great satisfaction which he has given me in every way.

I beg leave to recommend him to your notice, assuring you that there is no situation, in which he can be employed, in which he will not prove himself a most useful public servant.

I have, &c.,

Wellington.

Lord Granville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Paris, 9th April, 1826.

I avail myself of the opportunity of Count Potoski's departure to St. Petersburg, to send to you the last French newspapers. You will find

* See page 94. † See page 265.

those of this day containing the account of the rejection of the Primogeniture-law by the Chamber of Peers. The Liberals chaunt a triumph upon the occasion; but I do not think the ministers are in the least injured by the defeat, or that indeed they attached any great importance to the measure. The principle of entailing property for three generations was adopted. Our last accounts from Corfu represented the Greek cause to be very desperate; but I understand that Admiral Rigny is firmly persuaded that, although the Greeks can make no stand in regular fight against the Egyptians and Turks, the latter, notwithstanding their late successes, will not be able for a long time to subdue the country.

The accounts from Spain represent that country to be in a more wretched state than ever.

Yours ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Downing Street, 10th April, 1826.

Mr. Canning's despatches will communicate to you the result of our communication with Ibrahim Pasha. It does not surprise me. As soon as they had ascertained that there was no ulterior communication they took heart, and resolved on the answer which they have given. I am by no means sure that if the Instruction * had ended, as it originally stood, with something more conclusive than "a report home," they would not have given a more satisfactory answer. I say they, for I include the Commissioners, and, indeed, am strongly inclined to think that the Porte has sent them to watch Ibrahim Pasha. You will observe that he did not venture to see Captain Spencer without one of them being present, and that it was at this Commissioner's proposition that the other was sent for. This jealousy of the Porte is not surprising, if Ibrahim spoke to others of his authority in the Morea in the same unreserved way in which he did to Lieutenant Smart.

I send you a copy of a letter from Captain Hamilton, which will give you a good insight into the state of affairs in Greece.

The disposition which, according to your despatches, Nicholas shows not to interfere in the existing contest in Greece, is to a great extent a relief. He is probably induced not to take up this as his cause of war, from feeling that he who has just escaped with his life from an insurrection at home is not precisely the person to support one, though it is against the Turks. But by taking possession of Wallachia and Moldavia he will equally gratify Russian pride. His Note certainly means war, according to my impression, at least if taking possession of those provinces will create it, and this it must do with the Turks.

You seem to think that the Emperor is right in stating that the Porte has not fulfilled the agreement with respect to the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia, and that Lord Strangford had overstated that transaction. In some respects he may possibly have done so, but in the main question whether, under the pretence of this Police Corps, the Turks have not, in fact, a Turkish army still there, each party is equally confident; and, as the Inter-

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* See page 287.

nuncio has made a report lately directly in favour of the Porte, I do not know on what authority you have come to another decision: but you have probably received information which is more conclusive than the Emperor's assertions.

You have adopted two measures upon which you will be aware that a difference of opinion may prevail. The one, that of apprising Mr. Stratford Canning that the Emperor does not take the Greek cause to heart; and the second, your having sent to the Emperor an amended Note.

With respect to the first, I think you did quite right, considering the object which I imagine you had in making that communication, namely, not for the purpose of preventing his pressing the Porte to attempt to compose its differences with the Greeks, but to prevent his pressing it, on the ground of that being the means of averting a war with Russia. But I confess *to you* that I am not quite sure of the prudence of amending the Emperor's Note, for, after all, it is not the measure which you would have advised, even in the amended shape; and, were he to accept your amendments, he will quote you as his authority; you will, however, have gained a good deal, if you stop that which he proposed to send.

The comments which Mr. Canning has made on the Emperor's conversation with you are not written in a very courtly style. He has conceived a great prejudice, I observe, against Nicholas, and has expressed himself in a way which would be objectionable if it were liable to be laid before Parliament; but referring, as it does, to a personal and private communication with the Emperor, that is out of the question. My impression is that the Emperor feels that he must do something to occupy his army. He does not like to engage them in support of a revolutionary war, and I quite agree with him, because his army would naturally imbibe the sentiments of those in whose behalf they would be fighting. His occupation of the two provinces proceeds upon safer principles, but he is, perhaps, mistaken in thinking that the business will stop there. I say perhaps, for it is by no means clear that this will embroil him with the great Continental Powers. With Prussia, clearly not; I think not with Austria, who will be satisfied with Russia not interfering for the Greeks; and France seems to be so occupied with her double intrigues with Egypt and with Greece, that she will probably allow the occupation of the two provinces to go on, for some time at least, without any serious remonstrance; and he will *surmise* by what has passed with you, that it will not occasion a war with us.

It is reported that you intend to go round by Moscow home. This is a very natural wish on your part, but it will delay your return very considerably.

Yours very sincerely,

Bathurst.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My Lord Duke, Foreign Office, 11th April, 1826.

I am still without any direct intelligence of Mr. Stratford Canning's arrival at Constantinople.

I enclose to your Grace the result of the execution by Sir F. Adam of the instruction from his Majesty's Secretary of State for War and Colonies respecting the designs imputed to Ibrahim Pasha in the Morea.

I am, with great truth and regard, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

R. W. Hay, Esq., to Joseph Planta, Esq.

SIR, Downing Street, 10th April, 1826.

I am directed by the Earl Bathurst to transmit to you, for the information of Mr. Secretary Canning, a communication which has been received from the Board of Admiralty, covering copies of Captain the Hon. Robert Spencer's report to Vice-Admiral Sir Harry Neale of the result of the communications which that officer has been directed to hold with Ibrahim Pasha, in order to ascertain the real intentions of that Commander in regard to a design of removing the population of the Morea to Africa.

I am, &c.,

R. W. HAY.

II.

John Barrow, Esq., to R. W. Hay, Esq.

SIR, Admiralty Office, 5th April, 1826.

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Bathurst, copy of a letter from the Hon. Captain Spencer, of H.M.S. *Naiad*, dated at Corfu the 20th of last month, with copies of two letters addressed by that officer to Vice-Admiral Sir Harry Neale, containing a report of the result of the Captain's mission to Ibrahim Pasha, and an account of the situation in which the Captain left Missolonghi on the 17th of March.

I am, &c.,

JOHN BARROW.

III.

Captain the Hon. Robert Spencer to J. W. Croker, Esq.

SIR, H.M.S. *Naiad*, at Corfu, 20th March, 1826.

I have the honour to enclose herewith, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a *secret* despatch, addressed by me on the 18th instant to Vice-Admiral Sir Harry Neale, together with the enclosures therein referred to; and also a copy of a letter to the Vice-Admiral of yesterday's date, which I request you will be pleased to lay before their Lordships.

Duplicates of the above will be conveyed by the messenger Draffen, enclosed to Earl Bathurst

I have, &c.,

ROBERT SPENCER.

IV.

Captain the Hon. Robert Spencer to Sir Harry Neale, Bart.

SIR, H.M.S. *Naiad*, Gulf of Patras, 18th March, 1826.

I have the honour to acquaint you, in pursuance of your order to me dated the 27th of February, enclosing a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty to you, and of one received by their Lordships from Earl Bathurst, and directing me to govern myself by the instructions conveyed therein, I proceeded to the Gulf of Patras, having on my way embarked health officers at Zante, in order to prevent the ship being subjected to quarantine.

On my arrival at Crio Nero (the most convenient point for communication), I lost no time in making known to Ibrahim Pasha my wish of obtaining a personal interview with him, by a letter of which I send you a copy (marked A), and received the next day an answer thereto, of which the enclosure (B) is a copy.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 12th instant, I proceeded to the Pasha's head-quarters, and having stated to him the object of my mission, he asked several questions respecting the present intentions of Great Britain, and of his Majesty's reasons for supposing him to have entertained such a design as the one attributed to him, leading me to infer that he thought more was meant than I felt my instructions conveyed; to prevent which misconception I set before him the observations made in the first part of Earl Bathurst's letter—to all which the only remark he made at the time was, that he had had nothing to do with any cruelties, and that he thought it unjust his name should be coupled with any such acts. I then repeated that the object of my mission related solely to the project avowed by him of transporting the population of the Morea in the manner mentioned, and added, as an answer to a direct question of his, that I had stated the whole of my instructions, and that I was ordered to inform my government of his refusal (if such should be the case) to comply with the demand of his Majesty.

A remark was then made by the only person present (besides the interpreter) to the Pasha, who presently said to me, that as he considered this a business relating to the politics of the Sovereign he served, he should desire the attendance of a great officer from his Court; to which I could make no objection, but remarked that my mission was to his Highness, and that I had neither imparted it to the Captain Pasha (whom I had been obliged to wait upon in my way) nor to any one else.

A person who styled himself Housnon Bey Effendi, formerly Reis Effendi at Constantinople, then made his appearance, and I found that the other gentleman who had taken notes of the previous conversation was his colleague.

Ibrahim Pasha, after talking to these two officers, now informed me that they were sent to the seat of war from the Porte to watch (surveiller) his conduct, and that of the Captain Pasha, and of Redschid, Pasha of Roumelia; that as the business I came upon did not relate to him, except in as far as he was a General serving under the orders of his Sovereign, the Sultan, and unauthorised to do or say anything in war or politics without the consent of Housnon Bey and Nagis Effendi (the two above-mentioned officers), he could give no answer, and that Housnon Bey had ordered him on the part of his government not to give any, because it was a business that must be discussed between the two governments, and not with a Governor or a Vizier; and that as he was accountable to his government through this officer, he must beg I would communicate with him.

Housnon Bey then observed that such questions in general were treated of by persons accredited by their respective governments, and that he wished to

know if I had any authority beyond what I had mentioned. On my answering in the negative, he went on to remark that the Porte had always been in the habit of treating with Great Britain, according to the common forms and usages of nations, and that a captain of a frigate, agreeably to these, not being enabled to treat with a Pasha, neither could the Pasha answer him.

To all these remarks, both of the Pasha's and Housnon Bey's, I could only urge and repeat in the most forcible language that my mission was to ask of Ibrahim Pasha a disavowal or renunciation of the intentions reported to have been declared by him; but this had no effect, for latterly the Pasha appeared disposed to comply strictly with his superior's orders by leaving the matter entirely to him. On my wishing to propose another question to try what I could elicit from Ibrahim Pasha, Housnon Bey said that as he was the only person who could answer for what Ibrahim would do, and for his other above-stated reasons, he begged, although very civilly, that I would say nothing more to Ibrahim Pasha on the subject.

I then put it to them both (referring to that particular part of my instructions) whether this was to be considered a definitive answer; to which I got a clear and distinct affirmative, and Housnon Bey added, that neither at the end of a week, nor of any given time, would he feel himself authorized to make any other. Notwithstanding these apparently hopeless circumstances, I thought it right to address Ibrahim Pasha in writing, which I did by the letter, of which I send a copy (marked C), (enclosing a French translation). This letter he received on the 14th, and on the 17th I sought and obtained a second interview, when I alluded to my letter; and he merely repeated that, for the reasons already given, he could make no reply. Such being the state of the affair on the evening of the 17th, it appearing quite certain that nothing more would be gained by remaining, with respect to the object in view; that as the assault on the town of Missolonghi was about to be given, it was desirable that no English ship should witness it, or the horrors likely to follow it; and that for a considerable time the greatest difficulty would exist in seeing the Pasha, even supposing (which was not the case) that such an interview would have any result, in the thirty hours remaining of the full time prescribed to me, I thought it advisable to come away.

In order that you may have no doubt, Sir, of everything in my power having been done to extract an answer from the Pasha, I beg to state that the language I used was French, and that to prevent anything being said different from the meaning of Earl Bathurst's letter, the notes I used were formed on a translation of that letter, which I enclose a copy of (marked D), that you may know, as nearly as may be, the words spoken.

I also think it well to send you a copy of the translation of my letter of the 14th, the original of which, however, was the only paper signed by me.

I have, &c.,

R. C. Spencer.

A.

À Son Altesse Ibrahim Pasha, Commandant en Chef les Armées devant Missolonghi.

Abord de la frégate de S.M.B. *La Nayade*, dans le Golfe de Patras, ce 9me de Mars, 1826.

J'ai l'honneur de prévenir votre Altesse qu'étant chargé de la part de mon gouvernement d'une commission importante envers elle, je désire qu'elle me fasse l'honneur de m'indiquer un endroit où je pourrais l'entretenir personnelle-

ment, soit abord de quelque bâtiment, soit à terre sur un lieu qui puisse être à ma portée.

Je prie votre Altesse d'agréer l'assurance de ma haute considération.

R. C. SPENCER,
Commandant la Division des Forces Navales
de S.M.B. dans les Iles Ioniennes.

B.

[Translation.]

His Highness Ibrahim Pasha to Captain the Hon. R. Spencer.

SIR, The camp before Missolonghi, 8th (9th) March, 1826.

In answer to your invitation, I beg to observe that the affairs in which I am at present engaged not allowing me to proceed to a distance from this spot, you may, if you please, repair hither from Crio Nero, should you already have left Patras, and should you have on board a saddle, to avoid falling under the sanitary laws; otherwise with your launch you may transport yourself by the way of Vassiladi, to the place called *Le Saline*, a short distance from hence, and I shall proceed thither in person to confer with you.

I salute you affectionately,

THE PASHA OF DYEDDA AND THE MOREA.

C.

Captain the Hon. R. Spencer to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha.

SIR, H.B.M. *Naiad*, Gulf of Patras, 14th March, 1826.

The instructions which I have received from my government, ordering me positively to demand of your Highness either explicitly to disavow the intention of transporting the population, particularly the women and children of the Morea, to Asia or Africa, and replacing them by inhabitants of those countries; or formally to renounce such a project, if your Highness ever had it; I have now the honour to state to you that, with reference to the conversation I had with you on the 12th instant, I must again repeat, that if your Highness does not give me an answer, it will be considered as a refusal to comply with his Britannic Majesty's demands, and will accordingly be reported to his Majesty.

Under these circumstances, I beg to state that I shall wait off Vassiladi or at Crio Nero the time I first mentioned, that is, till the morning of the 19th instant, before which time I hope to receive an answer from your Highness.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT SPENCER.

D.

Il y a longtems que sa Majesté Britannique a eu cause de regretter les atrocités qui ont souillé la lutte dans laquelle la Grèce pour plusieurs années se trouve malheureusement plongée.

Il est vrai qu'on s'était attendu à ce que votre Altesse aurait introduit un système de guerre moins répugnant aux coutumes et aux opinions des nations civilisées.

Il est possible que votre Altesse allègue, pour motif de son éloignement de la conduite modérée qu'elle déclara vouloir suivre dans les commencemens, qu'elle trouva que ceux qui l'opposèrent lui rendaient mal la pareille.

Les évènemens qui eurent lieu à Hydra et autres parts peuvent être avancés

comme lui donnant le droit de représailles, et il est impossible de nier que chaque parti peut citer les cruautés de l'autre, certes pas pour justifier, mais pour expliquer les leurs.

Sa Majesté Britannique cependant, tandis qu'elle déplorait la continuation de ces excès, n'a pas jugé convenable d'y intervenir hormis dans le cas où les droits de ses sujets, et ceux des Ioniens, placés sous sa protection exclusive, étaient évidemment compromis.

Mais quand il est dit que (la Porte y consentant ou non) les intentions déclarées de votre Altesse sont d'extirper systématiquement une communauté entière, de se saisir des femmes et des enfans, de les transporter en Egypte, et de repeupler la Morée d'Asie et d'Afrique; en effet de transformer cette partie de la Grèce d'un état Européen en un qui ressemblerait aux états Barbaresques, sa Majesté, comme Souverain d'une Puissance Européenne, ne peut entendre parler d'une pareille entreprise, sans demander à votre Altesse ou de désavouer clairement d'avoir jamais eu telle intention, ou de renoncer formellement à son accomplissement, si elle l'avait eu.

Sa Majesté ne peut permettre l'exécution d'un tel dessein; et mes instructions portent expressément de déclarer, de la part de mon Souverain, à votre Altesse, que si elle ne désavoue clairement, par écrit, l'intention de transformer la Morée dans l'état susdit, en transportant la population, et principalement les femmes et les enfans, en Asie ou en Afrique, et les remplaçant par des habitans de ces deux pays; ou que, si elle avait jamais eu une pareille idée, elle ne renonce formellement à son accomplissement; des mesures efficaces, par les moyens de ses forces navales, seront prises pour empêcher l'exécution d'un projet si insoutenable.

De plus, il est de mon devoir de faire savoir à votre Altesse que mes ordres me limitent à attendre sa réponse une semaine; à l'expiration de laquelle si votre Altesse ne m'a pas remis une déclaration satisfaisante, signée par elle-même, je me trouverai dans la nécessité de rapporter à mon gouvernement le refus de votre Altesse de convenir à la demande faite de la part de sa Majesté Britannique.

Captain the Hon. R. Spencer to Vice-Admiral Sir Harry Neale.

SIR, H.M.S. *Naiad*, at sea, 19th March, 1826.

For your information I beg to acquaint you that on the 9th instant, the day of my arrival off Missolonghi, the Turkish rafts, floating batteries, and from forty to fifty boats, conveyed an Arab battalion to the attack of fort Vassiladi, the small island commanding the entrance into Missolonghi lake, from which only the besieged can receive supplies, or even communicate easily; and after an obstinate resistance they succeeded in storming and gaining possession of it, many of the Greek garrison making their escape in boats to the main.

On the night of the 12th instant Ibrahim Pasha took the island and town of Anatolica, thereby completing the investment of Missolonghi, and rendering it impossible that it can be reprovisioned, even if the Greek fleet attempt it, which it is very doubtful whether they will do, as they have not been seen in the Gulf of Patras since the 7th of February; the Pasha has now, therefore, the power of storming it from the lake, on which side there is no wall, as well as from his lines, his sap being worked up to the very ditch, and from authentic information that there is not more than one week's food in the place, I have no doubt that it will, either by force or hunger, speedily fall.

We left the fleet (as per margin) * under the Captain Pasha, in person, close

* Thirteen frigates (two of 60 guns), twelve corvettes, thirty brigs, six schooners, one steam-boat.

off; and in coming across the lake on the 17th I observed the body of troops, said to be 1500, embarked in the gunboats, and who were bombarding the town from the south-west side. It is probable that an attack was made on that night, or at any rate will be made very soon.

It is said Ibrahim Pasha spared the lives of the women and non-combatants of Anatolico, and let them go with as many of their effects as each could carry, giving them provisions. I think there is reason to fear that this humane treatment will not be shown to the population of Missolonghi.

During one of the nights of our stay off the Tower, a band took the opportunity of stealing out through the Turkish ships and boats, and coming alongside the *Naiad*, ostensibly for the purpose only of asking if we had any news of the Greek fleet. Some remarks were also made as to capitulating, which the people in the cause declared they never would do without the guarantee of an English officer, which I told them I had no power to give.

I beg to acquaint you that my visits to the camp (to which I was obliged to be accompanied by an escort, &c., the distance being considerable) cost me in presents to soldiers, grooms, &c., 28 dollars, amounting at the present rate of exchange to 6*l.* 6*s.* sterling, which I beg you will be pleased to move their Lordships to cause to be repaid me, through my agents, Messrs. Maudes and Co.

I have, &c.,

R. SPENCER.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 11th April, 1826.

Your Grace's despatches from No. 6 to No. 12, inclusive,* were received here on the 31st ultimo, and have been laid before the King.

Your Grace will have done right in apprising Mr. Stratford Canning of the altered views of the Russian government upon the Greek question, and in apprising him at the same time of the intention of the Emperor to occupy Wallachia and Moldavia, not only unless all questions relating to those Principalities shall have been settled within the course of one month, but unless the Turks shall, within the same period, have executed the 8th article of the Treaty of Bucharest, and have sent plenipotentiaries to the frontier to arrange the execution of the remainder of that Treaty; and of his Imperial Majesty's determination not to recall his army, after it shall once have occupied the Principalities until the Turks shall by a pecuniary contribution have defrayed a share of the expense of the occupation.

The simple intimation of the Emperor Nicholas' indifference towards the Greeks, unaccompanied by a notice of the other demands and ulterior intentions of his Imperial Majesty, might lull the Turkish ministers into a false security.

I am, with great truth and regard, my Lord Duke,
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

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* Dated 16th March, 1826; pages 172—197.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

[The original of this despatch returned to Mr. Planta on the 10th of November 1826, to be destroyed.]

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 11th April, 1826.

Your Grace's despatches, No. 6 to No. 12* inclusive, were received here on the 31st ult., and have been laid before the King.

The contents of these despatches are not a little perplexing to his Majesty's government.

They present a state of things at St. Petersburg different from that for which his Majesty's government were prepared by the conduct and language of the late Emperor of Russia, by the language of his Imperial Majesty's Ambassador in England up to the moment of his departure for St. Petersburg, by Count Nesselrode's language to Lord Strangford upon his Lordship's arrival in that capital, and finally by that which the Emperor Nicholas himself had employed (or which at least was generally attributed to him) up to the period of your Grace's interview with his Imperial Majesty on the 10th March.

It appears to us, moreover, that the language of his Imperial Majesty in that interview is, in some particulars, inconsistent with itself, and that several of the propositions to be collected from it are hardly reconcileable with each other. We are almost tempted, indeed, to suppose that his Imperial Majesty must have been rather throwing out for discussion, for the purpose of seeing what reception they would meet with from your Grace, certain floating notions of expediency and hypothetical schemes of action, than declaring settled principles and laying down a maturely digested system.

The propositions which are either distinctly enunciated in the Emperor's conversation with your Grace, or which are to be deduced from different parts of it, are as follow:—

1. That his Imperial Majesty inherits all the principles, and is determined to fulfil (so far as in him lies) all the wishes and intentions of the Emperor Alexander.

2. That neither his Imperial Majesty nor the Russian nation has any feeling favourable to the Greeks, whom his Imperial Majesty considers simply as rebels, and that his Imperial Majesty has no disposition to make the settlement of the Greek question a condition of the establishment of a perfectly friendly footing with Turkey.

3. That the only case in which his Imperial Majesty would be disposed to interfere with respect to Greece is that in which his Majesty's government had already determined upon interference, the attempt to establish a Mahometan State upon the destruction of the Greek population in the Morea; his Imperial Majesty distinctly declares that he would be ready to co-operate with his Majesty to prevent such an establishment.

4. That his Imperial Majesty would, nevertheless, be prepared to head a crusade for the purpose of driving the Turks out of Europe, if the European Powers would consent to his doing so.

5. That he is determined to settle all matters of dispute with the Turks, and to live on terms of good neighbourhood with the Ottoman government.

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* Dated 16th March, 1826; pages 172—197.

6. That for this purpose it is necessary that affairs in Wallachia and Moldavia should be replaced on the footing on which the Russian government contend they have not yet, and Lord Strangford and the Internuncio contend they have already, been replaced.

7. That it is further necessary that the 8th article of the Treaty of Bucharest in favour of the Servians shall be fully executed by the Turks, and that the Turks shall engage to send plenipotentiaries to the frontiers of the two empires duly authorised to carry into execution all the stipulations of that Treaty.

8. That his Imperial Majesty is not ready to execute himself that article of the Treaty of Bucharest which is in favour of the Ottoman government (the surrender of certain fortresses in Mingrelia), the execution of which article his Imperial Majesty admits to have been hitherto refused or evaded.

9. That though determined to obtain redress of all his griefs from the Porte, his Imperial Majesty is nevertheless averse from war.

10. That he proposes only to march his armies into the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, and to remain there until the Turks shall not only have satisfied him upon all points of complaint, but shall have reimbursed a certain proportion of the expense which this movement of his Imperial Majesty's army will have occasioned to him.

11. That his Imperial Majesty will allow the space of one month to the Turkish government for the consideration and fulfilment of the several demands which his Imperial Majesty has to bring forward. At the expiration of which time, if the Turks shall not have consented to them all, the military occupation of the Principalities is to take place.

12. That although his Imperial Majesty may be thus forced into the occupation of the Principalities, and although he proposes when once there not to withdraw his army until the Turks shall have paid the required proportion of the expense of that occupation, he has no intention or desire to acquire from the Turks the addition of a single village to his Imperial Majesty's dominions.

It appears evident to us, upon a review of these several propositions, that they compose no definite system of policy, that they are in some respects contradictory to each other, and that they convey neither a satisfactory assurance of peace, nor a clear exposition of the motives or objects of a war.

What is more immediately our concern, they afford but few points for a concert of counsels between Russia and England.

It is, indeed, impossible for us to read the first of these propositions, declaring the adherence of the Emperor Nicholas to the policy and sentiments of his Imperial predecessor, and to contemplate the system which the subsequent propositions describe, without asking ourselves, upon what then has the correspondence of the Courts of London and St. Petersburg been occupied for the last two or three years? What was the intention of the Russian mémoire upon Greece which was communicated to England in common with all his Imperial Majesty's other Allies in the month of January, 1824, which found its way into all the newspapers in Europe, and upon which his Majesty's government were so repeatedly importuned for a detailed and categorical exposition of their opinion, not only by the Russian Ambassador in England but by the ministers of all the Allied Courts; specifically that of Berlin (the most faithful interpreter among the

Allies of the real objects of the Court of St. Petersburg), an importunity which ceased only upon the final refusal of his Majesty's government to take part in the Greek Conferences at St. Petersburg.

To cite the official papers in which the absolute necessity of the pacification of Greece has been put forward on the part of the Emperor of Russia, and in which the deep and lively interest felt by his Imperial Majesty and his nation for the fate of their *co-religionnaires* has been urged as a reason for hastening that pacification, would be to cite nearly the whole correspondence of his Majesty's government with the Court of St. Petersburg since the Congress of Verona.

If, instead of the first proposition now before us, it had been stated frankly either that it was the intention of the new Emperor to depart altogether from the policy of his predecessor—or that the Emperor Alexander had latterly changed his own policy, and that it was with the late and not with the original policy of the Emperor Alexander, that the concurrence of the Emperor Nicholas was intended to be proclaimed—the exposition made to your Grace by the Emperor Nicholas would have been at least intelligible. But between the later policy of Alexander, so far as it is to be traced in the Note presented by M. de Minciacky to the Porte last October, and that now professed by his Imperial successor so far as we can understand it, there appears to be but an imperfect coincidence. In that Note of M. de Minciacky, it is true, no mention is to be found of the Greeks, but it is equally true that there is no mention of the Servians. The latter omission is the more remarkable because the Emperor Nicholas especially refers in his conversation with your Grace to the putting forward of that specific grievance by the Emperor Alexander, and because the introduction of the Treaty of Bucharest, the prominent ground of dispute between Russia and the Porte, is, in fact, the variation which indicates most emphatically the adoption of a new course of action by the Emperor Nicholas.

On the other hand absolutely nothing is proved by the omission of any allusion to the Greeks in a Note of which the specific object was not to state *all* the grievances of Russia against the Turks, but to claim the fulfilment by the Turks of specific promised measures of redress.

So far, indeed, this Note of M. de Minciacky tallies with the intended Note of the Emperor Nicholas, as it distinctly menaces the Porte with war.

But if your Grace's construction of the Emperor Alexander's intention be (as we believe it to be) the true one, the Emperor Alexander abstained from any mention of the Greeks in the Note of M. de Minciacky, (not because his Imperial Majesty had lost sight of them, but because he was content to enter into the war under cover of these long-talked-of grievances against the Porte, the justice of which had been acknowledged by his Allies: well knowing that the effect of that war, in whatever cause originating, would equally operate a powerful diversion in favour of the Greeks, and fully intending to make the settlement of the Greek question one of the conditions upon which that war should be concluded.

Has the Emperor Nicholas, notwithstanding all his protestations of indifference to the Greeks, the same reservation in their favour? Upon this supposition his Imperial Majesty's protestations of fidelity to the policy of his deceased brother, would be verified. But yet the vehement and ostentatious manner in which his Imperial Majesty disclaims any interest in the

Greek cause appears to forbid this mode of reconciling the professed adoption of the Emperor Alexander's policy with his apparent departure from it.

Of the other propositions in which I have embodied the principles and intentions of the Emperor Nicholas as declared to your Grace in your audience of the 10th March, the 3rd, 6th, and 12th are the only ones which have any connection with the existing state of the discussions between England and Russia on the affairs of Eastern Europe, and with what we were taught to believe to be the state of feelings and opinions in Russia, at the moment when your Grace took your departure for that country.

As to the third proposition, viz., that the only case in which his Imperial Majesty would be disposed to interfere with respect to Greece is that in which his Majesty's government had already determined upon interference, the attempt to establish a Mahometan State upon the destruction of the Greek population in the Morea—in which case his Imperial Majesty distinctly declares that he would be ready to co-operate with his Majesty to prevent such an establishment—the intention imputed to Ibrahim Pasha to found a new Mussulman State in the Morea whether with or without the consent of the Porte, was first brought to the knowledge of the British government by the Russian Ambassador in England. Other circumstances afterwards concurred to give credibility to that information. But for the information itself, we are indebted to Russia exclusively. It was unquestionably communicated to us for the express purpose of inducing us to enter anew into communication with the Russian government on the subject of the Greeks, and of interesting us in the fate of that people.

This communication was made in the month of October, that is to say contemporaneously with the delivery of M. de Minciacky's warlike Note to the Divan, a strong presumption that the omission of the Greek name in that Note was an omission dictated by policy and not by sentiment.

That the Emperor Nicholas should declare his readiness to co-operate with us, if necessary, in a measure adopted in consequence of the suggestions of the Russian government is, undoubtedly, what we had every reason to expect; and although it is little likely that any occasion for such co-operation should occur, your Grace will take an opportunity of stating the satisfaction with which your government has received this declaration.

As to the 6th proposition, viz., that in order to the settlement of all matters of dispute with the Turks, so that his Imperial Majesty may live on terms of good neighbourhood with the Ottoman government, it is necessary that "affairs in Wallachia and Moldavia should be replaced on the footing on which the Russian government contend they have not yet, and, Lord Strangford and the Internuncio contend they have already, been replaced;" if it be, indeed, established that the promises made by the Porte to Lord Strangford, and by Lord Strangford repeated to Count Nesselrode, in respect to the restoration of things in Wallachia and Moldavia to their ancient and accustomed footing, have not been duly executed, undoubtedly we shall be willing to remonstrate with the Turks for the purpose of procuring the full execution of those promises. Your Grace is already aware that Mr. Stratford Canning is furnished with eventual instructions to this effect. I take for granted that your Grace will have communicated to his Majesty's ambassador at the Porte, the opinion which is declared by your Grace in your despatch No. 6 on this subject; and his

Majesty's ambassador, upon receiving that communication, will forthwith proceed to execute his eventual instructions, unless his own enquiries at Constantinople should have led to an opposite conclusion.

More than this it is impossible for his Majesty's government to say amidst that uncertainty as to facts, and that conflict of testimonies, in which this matter is unfortunately still involved.

The voluntary pledge of the Emperor Nicholas recorded in the twelfth proposition, that even if driven into hostility with the Porte, he utterly disclaims any view to the smallest territorial acquisition at her expense, does the highest credit to his Majesty's magnanimity and self-denial. It may, however, not be easy to discriminate between a permanent seizure of territory and an occupation which is to last until the Turks shall consent to pay the expenses of that occupation, particularly as those expenses must increase in proportion as the occupation is prolonged. Your Grace, therefore, judged wisely in endeavouring to impress upon his Imperial Majesty's mind, the hopelessness of obtaining any such pecuniary contribution from the Turks; and in cautioning his Imperial Majesty against the supposition that a military occupation of the Principalities could ever be terminated upon that condition. Your Grace also did wisely in endeavouring to obtain from the Emperor of Russia a record in writing of this voluntary abjuration of territorial aggrandisement, if it were only because in so recording such a pledge his Imperial Majesty would naturally be led to consider more seriously than he can probably yet have done, the tendency of the measures which he has it in contemplation to pursue, and which, in all probability, must lead to the violation of that pledge, even in spite of his own determination.

With respect to the remaining nine propositions, the answers to them, where they require answers, are such as your Grace has already anticipated.

Your Grace has properly suggested to his Imperial Majesty, that it is neither just nor reasonable for Russia to require of the Turks, upon pain of instant hostility, the execution of *one* article of a treaty, which is to their disadvantage, while other articles thereof, which are in their favour, are notoriously unexecuted by Russia, and avowedly intended to remain so.

To press such a demand upon the Turks, on the behalf of Russia, would be on our part anything but an act of impartial mediation.

As ancient Allies of the Ottoman Porte, we may, indeed, advise the Divan, rather to submit to injustice, than to risk the existence of the Turkish empire in a war with their powerful neighbour. But such advice, if we do give it, can only be given by us in friendship to the Porte, and not in concert with Russia.

We cannot enter into an *engagement* with Russia to press upon the Porte the execution of one part of the Treaty of Bucharest, unless we are previously furnished by Russia with the assurance that she is prepared for a reciprocal execution of other stipulations of the same Treaty, which are beneficial to the Porte, and of which the Porte claims the performance.

Your Grace has well advised the Emperor of Russia, that a war with the Porte, for a quarrel purely Russian, and unconnected with any objects of common interest to the other Powers of Europe, must infallibly excite, first alarm, and in its progress jealousy, in those other Powers, and must lead to

combinations among them, of which England will not, indeed, be the promoter, but in which her own immediate interests may sooner or later involve her.

To sum up the result of your Grace's reports and of these observations upon them.

1st. All question of the affairs of Greece seems to be set aside between Russia and England, with the exception of the very limited possibility of a co-operation between them against the erection of a new Mahometan State under Ibrahim Pasha, in the Morea.

2ndly. If anything had been left undone of that which his Majesty's late ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to accomplish, and which he, and not only he, but the Emperor Alexander imagined to have been accomplished, towards the settlement of Russian complaints against the Porte, his Majesty's present ambassador is already instructed upon conviction of the incompleteness of Lord Strangford's work, to undertake the task of completing it.

3rdly. Mr. Stratford Canning may, and if necessary shall be, also instructed to remonstrate against the detention of the Servian deputies, and to urge in the strongest manner the absolute necessity of an answer to the representations of Russia, which have been so improperly left unnoticed.

4thly. But further we cannot go. We cannot undertake to urge the sending of Turkish negotiators to the frontiers, a demand with which we have reason to believe the Ottoman government will never comply. We cannot countenance the limitation of a month for the settlement of such weighty and complicated differences. And we cannot insist upon the execution of the Treaty of Bucharest by the Turks, so long as Russia leaves the stipulations of the same Treaty unexecuted.

5thly. We concur with your Grace in earnestly exhorting his Imperial Majesty not to enter upon a war in which he has not justice on his side, in warning his Imperial Majesty that the occupation of the Principalities will be war, and in imploring him to consider the alarm and jealousy which such a war would create in Europe.

These statements will show your Grace how little we can approve the sending of the Note prepared for M. de Minciacky, even in the state to which it is brought by your Grace's amendment, and how far only we can support the demands contained in it.

When your Grace has thus unreservedly explained the opinions of your government (coinciding with, and confirming, as they do, those already expressed by your Grace) on these several points, there appears little more to be said.

No right is asserted by us to control the counsels of Russia. No pretension is assumed to menace any consequences of the conduct which the Emperor of Russia may determine to pursue.

Having fairly explained our views, in an unreserved and confidential communication, we have discharged the duty of one friendly government to another.

It remains for us only to shape our own course hereafter, according to events, with a steady and unaltered view to the restoration or preservation of peace, where peace can be restored or preserved, and to the averting, or

mitigating, or circumscribing the effects of war, if a war between Russia and the Porte be after all inevitable.

I have only to add that your Grace will have done right in apprising Mr. Stratford Canning of the altered views of the Russian government upon the Greek question, and in apprising him at the same time of the intention of the Emperor to occupy Wallachia and Moldavia, not only unless all questions relating to those Principalities shall have been settled within the course of one month, but unless the Turks shall within the same period have executed the 8th article of the Treaty of Bucharest, and have sent plenipotentiaries to the frontier to arrange the execution of the remainder of that Treaty, and of his Imperial Majesty's determination not to recall his army, after it shall once have occupied the Principalities, until the Turks shall, by a pecuniary contribution, have defrayed a share of the expense of the occupation.

The simple intimation of the Emperor Nicholas' indifference towards the *Greeks*, unaccompanied by a notice of the other demands and ulterior intentions of his Imperial Majesty, might lull the Turkish ministers into a false security.

I am, &c.,

George Canning.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My Lord Duke, Foreign Office, 11th April, 1826.

The preceding despatch was prepared, and about to be sent off to your Grace, before I learnt from Lord Clanwilliam that your Grace had fixed your departure from St. Petersburg for the 2nd or 4th of this month.

I think it expedient still to send it, although the state of things to which it was applicable is passed by, because I know no other way in which I could more clearly express to your Grace the opinions of his Majesty's government, upon the reports contained in your Grace's former despatches, and the entire concurrence of your colleagues in the view taken by your Grace of the question which you submitted for their consideration.

We learn from Lord Clanwilliam, what indeed we should otherwise have presumed from the mere fact of your Grace's not having waited at St. Petersburg the result of that consideration, that you had not succeeded in your endeavour to prevail upon the Emperor of Russia to defer the transmission of his projected Note to Constantinople.

Further than this we have no information of a later date than your Grace's despatches of the 16th of March.

I am with great truth and regard,

My Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

George Canning.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 11th April, 1826.

I enclose copies of letters which have passed between me and Lord Granville, and of two letters from me to the Duke of Devonshire, on the subject of the Coronation Embassy to St. Petersburg.

I expect the Duke's reply to my two letters on Thursday.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Granville.

MY DEAR GRANVILLE, Foreign Office, 21st March, 1826.

The Duke of Wellington is very desirous to be at liberty to return home, as soon as he may think expedient, without waiting the ceremony of the coronation.

It had occurred to me some weeks ago to write to you, as I am now about to write, upon this subject. But certain unlucky and ill-advised paragraphs in the 'Morning Chronicle' suspended that intention; and, I confess, do now take away great part of the satisfaction with which I should originally have executed it. I am quite sure that what thus appeared in the 'Morning Chronicle' *cannot* have had its origin in anything said or done by me. For the notion floating in my own mind was never committed to paper. It was not communicated by me even to my under-secretaries or private secretaries. It was known but to two persons beside myself, both as fully persuaded as myself of the necessity of keeping it entirely secret; the rather as the Duke of Wellington's decision to remain at St. Petersburg, or to return home, was not announced to me till some days after the appearance of the paragraphs in the newspaper.

After all this preface I come to the point. I address myself to you, because I rely upon your discretion not to proceed in the commission which I give you, if you see any reason to suppose that it will not lead to good.

Will you ascertain from the Duke of Devonshire, whether it would be agreeable to his Grace to be appointed by the King to attend as his Majesty's ambassador extraordinary at the Emperor Nicholas's coronation?

I should not think it right to submit his Grace's name to the King without knowing beforehand that the appointment would be acceptable to his Grace.

So soon as I shall be in possession of that knowledge I shall have great pleasure in doing so.

I request that if for any reason the Duke should not wish to have his name submitted to the King, what passes between us may be considered as confidential.

None of my colleagues, except (of course) Lord Liverpool, are aware of my writing to you, though it may perhaps be right to add that Lord Harrowby some time ago, before he was apprised of the selection of the Duke of Wellington, wrote to me from Sandon to suggest the Duke of Devonshire for the mission.

Ever, my dear Granville, yours affectionately,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I enclose copies of my letter to the Duke of Wellington and of his answer. The latter did not reach me till the 27th of February. The paragraphs in the 'Morning Chronicle' appeared on the 20th.

II.

Lord Granville to the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR CANNING, Paris, 31st March, 1826.

I proceeded to execute your commission, because I thought it *would* be agreeable to the Duke of Devonshire to attend as his Majesty's ambassador extraordinary at the Emperor Nicholas's coronation.

He desires me to say that he feels extremely gratified by your intention of proposing him to his Majesty for this appointment, and that your delicacy in ascertaining previously through me his feelings upon it claims his warmest thanks.

In acquainting me, however, with his willingness to accept the honour proposed, if his Majesty should be pleased to approve your proposition, he expressed his wish that I would mention to you that though he hoped to make a suitable and handsome appearance at the Russian Court, he was not disposed to incur any extraordinary expense by unusual parade and magnificence; the state of his affairs would make it inconvenient to him, and he thought it in better taste not to make such a display. He also thought it right and fair to state that though he approved of the liberal policy on which the Cabinet had lately acted, his political principles and party attachments would be in no degree influenced by the acceptance of this employment, and that he considered himself free to regard it as wholly independent of political feelings, and that it was offered to him by you, and accepted by him, as another mark of that gracious confidence and personal goodwill with which his Sovereign had so long and invariably treated him.

I am, my dear Canning,

yours affectionately,

GRANVILLE.

III.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Granville.

MY DEAR GRANVILLE, Foreign Office, 7th April, 1826.

With the two letters herewith transmitted to you, for the Duke of Devonshire, I send copies of both, which I wish you carefully to read over before you deliver the letters.

I am sure you will see that it was quite impossible for me to acquiesce in the notion of a personal nomination by the King. That his Majesty's "personal wishes" should be consulted on such an occasion, "both in appearance and in reality," I have already told you I was of opinion. As to the "reality" I had no doubt that the Duke of Devonshire's appointment would be most agreeable to his Majesty: as to "appearance" I could not announce his Majesty's sanction however sure I felt of it, without his direct signification of it. But I do assure you, *upon my honour*, that the original suggestion of the Duke of Devonshire's name was from me to the King, *not* from his Majesty to me. (*Perhaps* it was put into *my* head by Harrowby, who wrote to me upon the subject of the embassy to St. Petersburg before he knew of the Duke of Wellington's destination for it; but he never returned to the suggestion, nor did I ever answer it till now). But even if this were *not* so—if the King had privately intimated to me *wishes*, upon which I had afterwards founded *advice*—nothing should induce me to consent to its being stated or assumed that any person appointed at my recommendation, and on my responsibility, owed his appointment immediately and personally to the King. It would not be just to myself,

and it would be in the highest degree discreditable to the government of which I form a part, to allow of such a construction.

Do not suppose that there is the slightest tinge of *complaint* in what I say. I think, indeed, as matter of taste, that the reservation about politics might have been omitted. It was unnecessary. The thing spoke for itself. As that reservation *was* put forward, I have met it (I hope not unkindly). But I must guard myself against the turn which may be given to it, not by the Duke himself, or by his immediate connections, but by others. And I think it fair to give you notice that if in the House of Commons or in the 'Morning Chronicle' or elsewhere, I should find the version of a *personal choice* attempted to be maintained, I must meet it with a positive contradiction.

Ever, my dear Granville,

most affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

IV.

The Right Hon. George Canning to the Duke of Devonshire.

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 7th April, 1826.

The King's service requiring that the Duke of Wellington should return to this country before the period likely to be appointed for the coronation of the Emperor of Russia, it becomes necessary that another individual of the highest rank should be selected to attend that ceremony as his Majesty's ambassador extraordinary.

The personal intimacy which your Grace is known to have formed with the Emperor Nicholas, at the time of his visit to England, would probably render the nomination of your Grace to be the bearer of his Majesty's congratulations on this occasion peculiarly acceptable to his Imperial Majesty.

I have, therefore, submitted your Grace's name to the King. And I am commanded by his Majesty to notify to your Grace his Majesty's entire approbation of the selection of your Grace for this distinguished mission.

So soon as I shall be apprised by your Grace of your readiness to execute his Majesty's commands, it will be my duty to enter into communication with your Grace upon the arrangements connected with the execution of them.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's obedient servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

V.

The Right Hon. George Canning to the Duke of Devonshire.

MY DEAR LORD, Foreign Office, 7th April, 1826.

I cannot allow my official letter to your Grace to go unaccompanied with an expression of the personal satisfaction which I have derived from Lord Granville's assurance that the nomination which I announce in that letter would be acceptable to your Grace.

I hardly need assure your Grace that the King, at once, and most graciously, approved of your Grace's nomination to a mission, for which your Grace is by special circumstances the most peculiarly and conspicuously qualified of all those individuals, from among whom a selection was naturally to be made.

But I trust your Grace will forgive me, if (in consequence of the concluding expressions of Lord Granville's letter) I feel it my duty to state to your Grace

with perfect frankness that, although nothing could be farther from the disposition of his Majesty's servants (nothing certainly farther from mine) than to infer, or to countenance the inference, that your Grace does by the acceptance of such a mission in any degree vary or relax your known political attachments, yet on the other hand I could not, in justice to myself and to my colleagues, acquiesce in a supposition (such as Lord Granville's expressions might be construed to imply) that the choice of his Majesty had in this, any more than in any other instance, been made otherwise than at the humble suggestion of his Majesty's constitutional advisers.

With respect to the expense of the mission, I propose to place at your Grace's disposal, as was done in the case of the Duke of Northumberland, the sum of 10,000*l.*, and to make arrangements with the Admiralty for the conveyance of your Grace (if you shall think fit to avail yourself of it) and of your equipages and suite to and from St. Petersburg.

The number of persons to be attached to your Grace's embassy I leave to your own discretion.

I have not answered any application that has been made to me to be included in that number, except subject to the entire and unfettered option of the Ambassador. All that I would presume to ask of your Grace in return is a corresponding reservation, until we shall have an opportunity of personal communication.

I will only add that in this and in all other particulars your Grace may be assured that I shall have no other object than to consult your Grace's wishes and convenience.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

557.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Krosnevitza, on the road from Warsaw to Berlin,
15th April, 1826.

SIR,

During my residence at St. Petersburg the Emperor of Russia frequently and through various channels expressed an anxiety that I should pay a visit to his brother the Grand Duke Constantine on my return from that capital, and entered more into detail upon the subject latterly; and in the last conversation his Imperial Majesty entreated me to do everything I could to gratify his brother and to conciliate him.

I accordingly went to Warsaw, where I passed one entire day and parts of two others with the Grand Duke, having left him this morning.

I had no conversation with his Imperial Highness upon any point connected with my recent negotiations at St. Petersburg.

The Emperor did not desire that I should; and I did not think it proper to commence upon the subject, to which his Imperial Highness never adverted. But he talked upon everything else.

He did not state that he was positively dissatisfied with anything; and particularly not with his own situation. On the contrary, he declared that he was perfectly satisfied with the latter, and that he wished for nothing that he had not. He is very much attached to his wife (the Princesse de Lowitz), with whom he lives without any show or ostentation, in a small house in the neighbourhood of Warsaw; and his time is occupied by attentions to her and by his military duties.

But certain expressions which he dropped in a long interview which I had with him this morning, and certain omissions throughout the conversations which I had with him, have tended to create an impression upon my mind that he does feel the supercession of his own claims to the throne by his younger brother, and that he is not disposed to pronounce a very favourable opinion upon the measures of the Emperor Nicholas's government.

I should certainly say that in the temper in which I left the Grand Duke, and which I believe to be his habitual temper, he is likely to collect about him all the discontent of the country; and that the Emperor must take care, for some time at least, to shape his course in such a manner as to carry with him the Grand Duke.

I believe this state of the relations between the two brothers will account for the Grand Duke's influence over the Emperor's foreign politics and his measures; as well as for his Imperial Majesty's anxiety that I should pay the Grand Duke a visit, and should do everything in my power to conciliate him.

The Lady to whom the Grand Duke is married is a very quiet, sensible woman, and is highly thought of and spoken of by the whole family at St. Petersburg; and she is disposed and anxious to keep the family on good terms. The Emperor talked of her to me as *un ange de paix* parmi nous! and I certainly found her in the disposition in which his Imperial Majesty had described her to be.

But I believe that the Empress-mother is the person upon whose influence over her family the permanent union of the brothers must principally depend; at least till the Emperor Nicholas can have had time to establish in the country and throughout Europe some confidence in his measures.

The Grand Duke has under his command, besides the Polish army, consisting of 35,000 men, a body called the Corps de Lithuanie, consisting of about 50,000 men; in all 85,000 men.

This last-mentioned corps is composed of regiments bearing the names of places within the Russian provinces, conquered at different times from Poland; and I believe that, with few exceptions, these troops are stationed within the Russian frontier, and are paid and maintained as Russian troops.

The Polish army is quite separate, is differently clothed, and receives a much higher rate of pay than the Russian troops, out of the separate resources of Poland.

I believe this unity of command in the hands of the Grand Duke is the limit of the execution of the measures in the contemplation of the late Emperor at the period of the Congress of Vienna, which were at that time so much discussed.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The King of Prussia to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL, Berlin, ce 18me Avril, 1826.

Le grade que vous occupez dans mon armée, et l'intérêt que vous lui avez témoigné en tant d'occasions mémorables, m'ont fait naître le désir de vous attacher à elle par un nouveau lien. A cet effet j'ai résolu de vous conférer mon 28me régiment d'infanterie de ligne. Ayant été présent à presque toutes les affaires de la campagne de 1815, ayant ensuite fait partie en France de l'Armée d'Occupation sous vos ordres, ce régiment sera fier de porter votre nom, et de vous avoir pour chef. Il a fixé mon choix autant par l'avantage qu'il a eu de déployer sous vos yeux, pendant la guerre et pendant la paix, toutes les vertus du soldat, que par celui qu'il a encore d'être en garnison près des provinces continentales où vous venez fréquemment, et de pouvoir ainsi conserver l'espoir de vous voir et de vous témoigner plus souvent la considération et l'attachement qu'avec tous ses frères d'armes il a voué à votre personne. Puissiez-vous voir dans cette preuve d'estime la nouvelle expression des sentimens distingués avec lesquels je serai toujours, Monsieur le Maréchal,

Votre très affectionné,

FRÉDÉRIC GUILLAUME.

558.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR, Halle, 20th April, 1826.

I had the honour of receiving at Berlin your despatch of the 11th instant.*

The conversation I had with the Emperor of Russia on the

* See page 290.

10th of March * was entirely of a confidential nature, as appears indeed by the contents of the first page of the Memorandum of the conversation which I wrote on the morning after it took place. It was my duty to communicate to his Majesty's government the whole, or as much of this conversation as I could recollect; and I did so, as I hoped, in a form which would give them all the information which the communication was calculated to give, without exposing the Emperor to the risk of having these details recorded in a public ostensible despatch.

I do not think I should have been justified in thus exposing a foreign minister, with whom I should be negotiating, without previously communicating to him my Memorandum of the conversation, and apprising him of its possible consequences; but I am certain that I ought not so to act by a Sovereign who should think proper to talk to me himself.

I regret, therefore, that whatever might be the conclusion which his Majesty's government might think proper to draw from my report of this conversation, they did not record it in general terms, instead of by specific reference to the topics of the conversation in an ostensible despatch.

It is quite obvious to me that my Memorandum of the conversation, however accurate according to my recollection of, and repeated reflection upon, what passed, has not tended to give his Majesty's government a clear idea of the Emperor of Russia's opinions, policy, or intentions; and although my mission is concluded, I think it but fair towards the Emperor to state my sense of the different topics of the conversation, in answer to your despatch.

It is certainly true that the Emperor will not interfere by force in favour of the Greeks. Whatever may have been the inclination towards that people of his brother, the late Emperor, it is quite certain that if he had lived to commence war against the Turks, it would have been exclusively on Russian grounds; and the Emperor thinks he follows his example and adheres to his policy in taking the same ground of complaint.

I don't think that the Emperor's language to the French ministers ever referred to other matters, and it is quite certain that before I reached St. Petersburg he had declared himself in the same manner to the Archduke Ferdinand, as he did to me.

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* See page 179.

We were deceived and misled, as were likewise the Emperor's ministers, to a very late period of time; but I have no reason to believe that the Emperor Nicholas ever entertained any other opinions.

His feelings upon the Greek question are accurately stated in my despatch to Mr. Stratford Canning of the 27th March.

In respect to the Porte, I understood from his Imperial Majesty's conversation that he was sincerely desirous of remaining at peace with them, and that he was determined to do so if possible; but that the Russian grievances must be redressed. These consisted: first, in relation to the Principalities; secondly, in relation to the Servian deputies. I admit that the grievances, the redressing of which was to be the *sine quâ non* of peace, were not stated with sufficient precision in the Note; that the Note contains, in addition, a demand that plenipotentiaries shall be sent to the frontier; and that the demand respecting the Servian deputies is so expressed as to make it liable to the construction of a demand for the execution of the 8th Article of the Treaty of Bucharest. But in answer to my observation upon this point, the Emperor explained that the conditions of peace were intended to be confined to the three demands first mentioned, and that all the rest was to be matter of subsequent negotiation.

It is true that the Note was not sufficiently explicit upon this point when it was sent off; but if his Imperial Majesty's conversation is referred to, his intention, as I have above described, is fully and clearly expressed.

From my subsequent despatches it will have been seen that the demand of the plenipotentiaries is not to be made a condition *sine quâ non* of the continuance of peace between the two governments.

I would likewise beg leave to observe, that his Majesty's government appear to me to have taken a very erroneous view, in this despatch, of the Emperor's intentions respecting the Treaty of Bucharest. That Treaty contains various articles in favour of both Powers, the execution of some of which required previous arrangements, which had been the object of negotiation at Constantinople previous to Ipsilanti's rebellion, and during the period of Count Stroganoff's mission at the Porte.

The intention in calling for the plenipotentiaries is to negotiate these arrangements, and not to carry into execution the

articles of the Treaty in favour of Russia and not those in favour of the Porte.

The reasoning stated in the Memorandum as having been used by me to induce the Emperor not to insist upon the execution by the Porte of the 8th Article of the Treaty, the other Articles in favour of the Porte not being executed, drew from his Imperial Majesty an answer which shows clearly that he did not intend to make that demand, or any demand connected with the Treaty of Bucharest, a condition *sine quâ non* of peace.

The conversation which followed regarding the seaport in Mingrelia was in consequence of my stating that his Majesty's government considered that in these discussions regarding the Treaty of Bucharest the Porte was in the right and his Imperial Majesty in the wrong. But there was no intention stated of going to war upon any point connected with the Treaty of Bucharest.

In respect to the intention of occupying the Principalities, I beg you to observe that it is stated as one of limited hostility against the Porte, in case the three conditions (now two conditions), specified as *sine quâ non*, should not be complied with; and it was thus reasoned upon by me, as well in a political as in a military point of view. The reason for this limited hostility may be justifiable or otherwise. But I do not think it is true in the abstract that the Emperor purposes to occupy the Principalities. He certainly does, if what he thinks his just claims are not attended to; and the consequences and termination of this measure of hostility, as of any other, must depend upon circumstances, of which one stated is the payment of the expenses of the occupation. But if justice is done to his Imperial Majesty on the *two* points, he has no intention of occupying the Principalities.

I certainly have given a very erroneous representation of the views and intentions of the Emperor, if it is believed that he has the most distant intention of endeavouring to drive the Turks out of Europe. The Emperor stated what is reported upon that subject. But the whole of what he said even upon that point, much more the whole of the conversation, and his measures for reducing the establishment of his army, would prove clearly that he had no design in his mind of the nature of that of which he was talking.

I believe I have now gone through all the points of this conversation adverted to in your despatch.

I have nothing to say to the conclusion which his Majesty's government have drawn from this conversation, nor to the directions which his Majesty has given me in consequence. I only regret that I did not receive these directions a little sooner, as I would certainly have carried them into execution strictly.

I conceived, however, that his Majesty's government were anxious to preserve peace, not only between the Emperor and the Porte, but in the world at large; and to limit as much as possible the evil of war, if it should be impossible entirely to prevent war. This was the principle of the instruction to me, and of my mission.

The detail of the instruction to me was, from circumstances, totally inapplicable to the state of the case as I found it at St. Petersburg. But I considered the principle to be applicable; and as there was no time to wait for instructions, I endeavoured to apply that principle, according to the best of my judgment and my view of the instructions of his Majesty's government, and your verbal instructions to me, as minuted by us both.

My firm belief is, that the Emperor wishes for peace. We must not judge of his Imperial Majesty's wishes and intentions from the Note to Monsieur de Minciacky, from which you will have seen that the most objectionable demand has been already withdrawn. Indeed I am convinced that the Note was drawn in the terms which it contains, and was sent off in such haste, solely because it was believed that we were engaged in a hostile discussion with the Porte; and that if that discussion should have been brought to a conclusion, Monsieur de Minciacky will be found as moderate as I have been informed he has been instructed to be.

At all events I don't doubt that there will be no difficulty in modifying these demands, as may best suit the Emperor's views at the time. The chance has been taken of getting as much as possible. But the Emperor will be satisfied with the concession of the two points stated.

The British government would not transmit such a N[illegible]te to the Porte without being prepared and determined to act a[illegible]cordingly. But there is no check upon the Emperor of Russia, w[illegible]ose na[illegible] [illegible]be satisfied if he obtains what is just, upon his o[illegible] [illegible]ce.

[illegible] of his Imperial Majesty's wishes for peac[illegible] [illegible] circumstances which have tended to c[illegible]

that the Russian government do not consider war as probable; but from his Imperial Majesty having been anxious to bring forward his case at the moment at which he thought that the Porte was engaged in a discussion with his Majesty's government, and from his having omitted to make the Treaty of Bucharest a part of the case, notwithstanding that he hoped that the discussions of his Majesty's government with the Porte would forward his views.

If he had wished for war, he would have loaded the case as much as possible; more particularly as I know that the cession of the seaport in Mingrelia is very desirable to him. But wishing for peace, the Emperor has limited his demand only to that which is just, and to that which the honour of his government requires that it should be conceded to him.

Neither did I think that the future discussions between the Emperor and the Porte on the Treaty of Bucharest ought to prevent my carrying into execution what I conceived were the views of the government.

It was well known that at some time or other the arrangements of that Treaty were to be settled between Russia and the Porte, and the expectation of the discussion of this settlement did not prevent his Majesty's government from undertaking to advocate the cause of Russia at the Porte in a recent instance, or from making the offer in respect to the Greeks which I was instructed to make.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and regard, Sir,
your most obedient humble servant,
WELLINGTON.

P.S. On reading over this letter I observe there is one point which I have not noticed relative to the Servian deputies, upon which it appears that his Majesty's government imagine that the late Emperor Alexander had made no remonstrance to the Porte. He certainly did not in his Protestation of the 1 (13) October, and I have not seen the Note of May. But I conclude the late Emperor's remonstrance upon that subject was contained in that document.

You will find the discussion of this point recorded in the Protocol of the Conference of the 1 (13) October, between Monsieur de Minciacky and the Reis Effendi.

Sir Thomas Munro to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Madras, 26th April, 1826.

I did not think of troubling you with another letter, but as we have at last made peace with the Burmans I think I may as well give you a few lines by way of finishing the war. I mentioned in my last what kind of troops the Burman armies were composed of, so that it is not necessary to say anything more of them except that they did not improve in the progress of the war. We are well out of this war. There have been so many freaks and projects since it commenced that I scarcely expected ever to see any one plan pursued consistently. There has been no want of energy and decision at any time in attacking the enemy; but there has certainly been a great want of many of the arrangements and combinations by which the movements of an army are facilitated and its success rendered more certain. There were no doubt great difficulties. Everything was new, the country was difficult and the climate was destructive; but still, more enterprise in exploring the routes and passes on some occasions, and more foresight on others in ascertaining in time the means of conveyance and subsistence, and what was practicable and what was not, would have saved much time. We are chiefly indebted for peace to Lord Amherst's judgment and firmness in persevering in offensive operations in spite of all the argument in favour of a defensive war, founded upon idle alarm about the power of the Burmans and the danger of advancing to so great a distance as the capital. Had he given way and directed Sir A. Campbell to amuse himself with a defensive system about Prome or Meaday, we should have had no power for another campaign or two. Every object that could have been expected from the war has been attained. We took what we wanted, and the enemy would have given up whatever we desired had it been twice as much. They have been so dispirited, and our position in Arracan and Martaban gives us such ready access to the Irrawaddi, that I hardly think they will ever venture to go to war with us again. The Tennasserim coast cannot at present pay the expenses of defending it. It may possibly do so in a few years, as its resources will no doubt improve in our hands, and there may be commercial advantages which will make up for its deficiency of territorial revenue. I should have liked better to have taken nothing for ourselves in that quarter; but to have made Pegu independent, with Tennasserim attached to it. Within two months after our landing at Rangoon, when it was ascertained that the Court of Ava would not treat, I would have set to work to emancipate Pegu, and had we done so it would now have been in a condition to protect itself; but to make this still more sure I would have left a corps of about 6000 men in the country until their government and military force were properly organised. Five or six years would have been fully sufficient for these objects, and we could then have gradually withdrawn the whole of our force. We should by this plan have had only a temporary establishment in Pegu, the expense of which would have been chiefly, if not wholly, paid by that country. Whereas the expense of Tennasserim will, with fortifications, be as great as that of Pegu and will be permanent, and will not give us the advantage of having a friendly Native power to counterbalance Ava. Pegu is so fertile and has so many natural advantages that it would in a few years have been a more powerful State than Ava. One

principal reason in favour of separating Pegu was the great difficulty and slowness with which all our operations must have proceeded had the country been hostile, and if the Burman commanders knew how to avail themselves properly of this spirit the risk of total failure from our inability to protect our supplies upon our long line of communication. The Bengal government were, however, always averse to the separation of Pegu. The thought that the Burmans and Peguers were completely amalgamated into one people, that the Peguers had no wish for independence, that if they had there was no prince remaining of their ancient dynasty, nor even any chief of commanding influence to assume the government. That it would retard the attainment of peace, that the project was in fact impracticable, and that if even practicable the execution of it was not desirable, as it would involve us for ever in Indo-Chinese politics by the necessity of protecting Pegu. Even if we had been obliged to keep troops for an unlimited time in Pegu it would have saved the necessity of keeping an additional force on the eastern unhealthy frontier of Bengal, as the Burmans would never have disturbed Bengal while we were in Pegu. The Bengal government were no doubt right in being cautious. They acted upon the best though imperfect information they possessed. Those who have the responsibility cannot be expected to be so adventurous as we who have none. But I believe that there is no man who is not now convinced, that the Taliens (Peguers) detested the Burman government, sought independence, and in the hope of obtaining it, though without any pledge on our part, aided in supplying all our wants with a zeal which could not have been surpassed by our own subjects.

Yours very sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

We sent to Rangoon about 3500 draught-carriage bullocks, and could have five times as many had there been tonnage.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [55

SIR, London, 28th April, 1826.

I arrived in London last night, and I have the honour of enclosing a letter for the King from the Emperor of Russia, and a copy thereof.

Upon terminating my mission, I beg leave to return you my thanks for having allowed Lord Dunglas to accompany me. I cannot report too highly of the satisfaction which I have derived from the assistance which his Lordship has been enabled to afford me.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 28th April, 1826.

I have received and laid before the King your Grace's despatches to No. 24 inclusive, and also your letter of this morning.

I have received his Majesty's especial commands, to signify to your Grace his Majesty's entire satisfaction at the manner in which your Grace has executed the important mission committed to your charge, and his Majesty's sense of the advantage derived to his service from your Grace's mission, in ascertaining the politics of the Court of St. Petersburg, at a moment so critical, and in laying the foundations of a good understanding between his Majesty and the Emperor Nicholas, the effects of which may be important, in the highest degree, to the peace of the world.

I am with great truth and regard, my Lord Duke,
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,
GEORGE CANNING.

Mr. Stratford Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Constantinople, 29th April, 1826.

Your Grace's despatches were delivered to me on the 20th instant by the messenger Latchford, and I am very sensible of your Grace's attention in giving me such full and confidential information of the intentions of the Russian government with respect to this country.

Your Grace will, I trust, have learnt before this reaches England the untoward circumstances which prevented my communicating with you during your Grace's stay at St. Petersburg. The despatches which did not reach that city before your Grace had left it will of course have been opened by Lord Strangford.

As your Grace will have the perusal of the despatches which I am now on the point of forwarding to England, it is unnecessary for me to say anything of their contents in this letter, except that there is every appearance at this moment that the Porte will accede to the demands of Russia, though such has been my position towards this extraordinary government that I have not yet been able to make any use of your Grace's very important information.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,
STRATFORD CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 30th April, 1826.

I have perused the papers in the box, and I am very sorry to find that the Memorandum of my conversation with the Emperor of Russia has been communicated to Sir Henry Wellesley, as

well as to Mr. Stratford Canning, and that the despatch addressed to me, of the 11th instant,* had been communicated to both those ambassadors after you had received my despatches of the 4th April.†

The impression upon their minds upon the perusal of that despatch, particularly having been communicated to them after the receipt of mine of the 4th of April, cannot be doubtful.

There are, however, two points in the instructions to Mr. Stratford Canning to which I wish to draw your attention. The one is the Principalities, the other the Servians. I put the case of the Principalities entirely upon what Lord Strangford admits was promised to him, viz., that the Turkish troops should be withdrawn, leaving out of the question what he wrote to Count Nesselrode. The question is, have the troops been *bonâ fide* withdrawn? Is there not now in the Principalities a detachment of troops belonging to the Pasha of Silistria, performing the duties of police? Such arrangement cannot be consistent with the letter or spirit of the treaties, or with what Lord Strangford admits was promised to him.

Then in respect to the Servians, I beg you will refer to the 8th Article of the Treaty of Bucharest. This article is the treaty of peace with the Servians. Under this article, and by the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, a deputation of Servians was brought to Constantinople to settle the arrangements, which were its objects. The Protocol of October 1 (13) will show what happened to them. It cannot surely be stated that the Emperor of Russia has no more interest in this question than any other Power, or that we would advise his Majesty to maintain his relations of amity with a Power which should thus treat a deputation brought to the capital under the article of a treaty with his Majesty and by his mediation.

Our object is to be on friendly terms with the Emperor of Russia; but surely it is inconsistent to have such an object in view and not to do the Emperor justice where the case is clearly in his favour. The execution of the Treaty of Bucharest, or of any article of that Treaty, is quite a distinct question, with which the negotiations now pending at Constantinople have nothing to do.

Referring to the despatch to Sir Henry Wellesley (marked separate, secret, and confidential), I must do the gentlemen

* See page 290. † See pages 224 to 262.

about me the justice to remind you that they could not see my instructions, as I did not receive them myself till the day before I reached Berlin. Indeed it is most creditable to them and to the Russian officers that I never heard of the case of Ibrahim Pasha till I returned to Berlin, when Count Bernstorff mentioned it to me, having heard it from Constantinople.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Foreign Office, Monday, 1st May, 1826.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

There are two points in your letter of yesterday, which being founded on misconception, I am exceedingly anxious to set right.

1st, As to the Servians you seem to apply to *Russia* what I say of *England* in my despatch to Stratford Canning. It is not of *Russia* that I say, there is no right of interference except on the general ground of breach of the law of nations, &c., but of this country. *Russia* has the right of treaty: but *that* right cannot be enforced by England, without subjecting us to be called upon to enforce the like right under the same treaty in behalf of Turkey. "If you insist upon our executing the 8th Article, or atoning for the violation of it, insist at the same time upon Russia's executing the 6th Article" would be the language of the Turks to us: and it is a language which I do not see how we could answer. By putting our interference in favour of the Servian Deputies on the ground of *the Law of Nations*, we avoid this difficulty: for though there is breach of *treaty* in the Russian detention of the fortresses, there is no breach of the general principles of international law.

2nd, As to the separate and secret despatch. *You* and *yours* can have nothing to do with it. The disclosure in the "Times" took place after you had left England, and before your instructions could have reached you. The fault must be at home, (but where, I am sure I cannot guess), and not the least inconvenient result of it was the possibility of the embarrassment which it might create to *you*, if the newspaper had arrived at Petersburg before you had opened your commission.

With respect to the communication to Sir Henry Wellesley and to Stratford Canning, I hardly know how it would have been possible to give them a true impression of the state of things at St. Petersburg without letting them see their *progress*. Already the vague and general reports from Vienna of the *pacific* dispositions of the Emperor had defeated Stratford Canning's first attempts at intimidating the Porte, and a compliance with the Russian demands appeared to be hopeless, unless he had the means of reconciling, in his own judgment, these reports, with the doctrine which it is his business to inculcate that *there are* certain cases in which Russia *is* prepared to go to war.

I am afraid, indeed, that all that he can say will be counteracted by the

last instructions sent to the Internuncio, by which that Minister is directed to exhort the Turks to take no notice of the first and second points of the Russian demands (which they *might* have granted) and to consider only of the third (which they probably never will concede). It seemed on this account therefore highly advisable that Sir H. Wellesley as well as Stratford Canning should *know* the whole truth: not for disclosure to others, against which every precaution is taken, but for the settlement of their own opinions, among versions so different from each other, if *parts* only of your correspondence were communicated to them; but which become clear, consistent, and intelligible, upon a view of the whole.

I will write to Stratford to return the Memorandum and keep no copy of it in the archives.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 1st May, 1826.

I have received your note regarding the despatch No. 9.*

When I received that despatch I conceived that the government had taken what appeared to me an erroneous view of the Emperor of Russia's opinions and intentions, and that they must disapprove of all that I had done at St. Petersburg. I thought it necessary, therefore, to write an answer to the despatch, which I did on the day I left Berlin.

Upon my arrival here I found that the government had, upon receiving my despatches of the 4th of April, altered their views of the state of affairs in Russia; but it still appeared to me that justice and fairness to the Emperor should induce me to endeavour to prevail upon you to strike out from the despatch any reference to the topics of a confidential conversation of which he had not seen the Memorandum, leaving in the despatch any conclusion from the conversation which the government might think proper to draw; or that if you should not think it possible to adopt that measure, that I should lodge in the office an explanatory Memorandum, which I extracted from the letter which I had written to you on the day I left Berlin.

Having since seen, however, that you had sent the despatch to Mr. Stratford Canning and to Sir Henry Wellesley since you had received my despatches of the 4th of April, I am anxious to send you the despatch which I wrote on the day I

* Dated 11th April, 1826; see page 290.

left Berlin, which contains a justification of myself as well as of the Emperor. If this is done it is a matter of indifference to me what becomes of the despatch No. 9.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

62.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, London, 2nd May, 1826.

I saw the King yesterday by his Majesty's desire, and had a good deal of conversation with him about the general election, respecting which he expresses the greatest anxiety.

Your government being founded upon the principle of keeping the Catholic question neutral, and as far as possible in the state in which it is, and the King's opinion being decidedly adverse to any further concessions to the Roman Catholics, I conceive it to be the duty of the government generally, and of its members individually, whatever may be their opinions regarding the question of further concessions to the Roman Catholics, to shape their course in respect to the dissolution of the Parliament and to the elections in such manner as to afford the best chance of assembling a Parliament which shall enable the government to keep the Catholic question in the state in which it is.

I beg you for one moment to recollect where we were at the close of the last Session of Parliament. It is perfectly true that affairs never occur twice exactly in the same way, but it is impossible to expect that, if there should be an increased, or the same, majority in the new Parliament in favour of the Roman Catholic question which exists in the present Parliament, we shall not in some shape experience over again the same difficulties and be threatened with the same evils. The consequences will not be confined to a dissolution of the government, but this will be followed by a difference between the two Houses; and possibly the King himself may be brought into the contest in his last entrenchment. It is impossible, then, that any man in the government can think of carrying the question by the force of numbers in the House of Commons; or can object to your using the accustomed influence of your office as far as possible to avoid such evils.

I am the last who would recommend you to take any step

against any friend in Parliament who may have differed from you upon this question, or to omit to give him the assistance in your power. But what I would recommend to you is to keep the exercise of this influence in your own hands, and not allow yourself to attend to the recommendation of anybody for a seat in Parliament respecting whom you should not have a hope that he would oppose further concessions. Nobody who sees the consequences can object to such conduct on your part, and it will give you a chance at least of avoiding the evils which threatened us in the last Session of Parliament.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Mr. Planta.

MY DEAR PLANTA, London, 3rd May, 1826.

I return the box with the papers you sent me yesterday evening.

You are quite right. The expression marked in my despatch is not accurate or correct. I have altered it in pencil as I think it ought to stand; and I enclose the copy of a note which I wrote Count Nesselrode in answer to a question from him respecting the terms which the leading persons in Greece were disposed to accept; which will show you that the Russian government were perfectly aware of the exact state of the case. I quite concur in Mr. Canning's despatch to Lord Granville.

I should prefer a statement of the fact of the agreement that no communication should be made till Count Lieven should come to England, and then formally to the governments themselves, as the reason for saying nothing, without any complaint of Pozzo or of the Russian government.

The conduct of the first is unworthy of our notice. It is best to complain of the second direct to themselves. It will be delightful to the French government and to Pozzo to report these complaints in the most exaggerated terms.

I have made one or two observations in pencil upon the despatch.

If you think the alteration in pencil of my despatch of the

4th April is correct and accurate, I will either alter it in my own handwriting or have another copy written.

I am, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

364.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, London, 6th May, 1826.

I enclose you a Memorandum of what has passed between Sir Robert Wilson and me regarding his case; and between the King and me, in consequence of the application of Sir Robert direct to his Majesty.

The principle on which I have acted in this case is this: First, that I cannot be a party to any recommendation to the King that Sir Robert Wilson should be restored to his service. Secondly, that if his Majesty should himself feel any disposition to restore Sir Robert Wilson to his service, I would not state any objection to his doing so.

Sir Robert Wilson might as well have approached his Majesty without mentioning my name; but having mentioned it, and the King having in consequence sent for me, it was quite clear to me, both from what his Majesty said to me of his own feelings, as well as from his report of what had passed with the Duke of York, that the King was strongly impressed with the reasons for which Sir Robert ought not to be readmitted to his service on public grounds, before I stated to him, by his desire, what had passed between me and Lord Howden and Sir Robert Wilson.

It is quite clear, then, that Sir Robert Wilson and his friends were mistaken in thinking that the King was at all favourably disposed towards him; and it appears from the last part of the Memorandum which I wrote this morning in the Duke of York's presence, that he is equally mistaken regarding the Duke of York's inclination towards him.

I have not yet obeyed his Majesty's commands, as it occurs to me that I am not the proper channel for making that communication, which is the reason for my troubling you upon this subject. But if you should think there is no objection to my making the communication to Sir Robert Wilson I will do so to-morrow.

If you should think there is any objection to my making the communication, I can wait upon his Majesty to-morrow and request him to make it in any other manner.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM REGARDING WHAT HAS PASSED IN RESPECT TO SIR ROBERT WILSON.

London, 5th May, 1826.

Lord Howden called upon me on Sunday, the 8th April, to urge me to consider favourably the case of Sir Robert Wilson, to whom, he stated that Sir Robert believed, his Majesty and his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief were favourably disposed, and whose case he, Lord Howden, understood that some of my colleagues were desirous of reconsidering in the Cabinet, with a view to recommend him for his Majesty's pardon.

I told Lord Howden that I believed the subject had been considered in my absence, and that it had been thought impossible to do anything in the case. I was not certain however, I told him, upon this point, and I said that although it was not regular to talk of the opinion which I entertained upon a subject which had been, or was likely to be, considered in the Cabinet, I did not wish to conceal from him that it appeared to me impossible to recommend Sir Robert to his Majesty consistently with any attention to the discipline and subordination of the Army; and that I could never be a party to any such recommendation. Lord Howden asked me whether I could not let the subject pass *sub silentio?* I answered No; because I was bound to give my opinion, and I could not decline to give it unless it was true, as Sir Robert and his friends supposed, that I was his personal enemy, which I could not admit to be true. I then entered into some details regarding my former acquaintance with Sir Robert and the services which I had rendered him at different times; and I declared the cessation of the intercourse, and even acquaintance, between Sir Robert and me was by Sir Robert and not by me.

On the following day I received a note from Sir Robert

Wilson, who desired to see me; and I received him at the Ordnance, on Tuesday, at half-past two.

Upon his arrival he commenced by explaining the reasons for which our acquaintance had been discontinued; and he proceeded at great length to explain and justify his conduct on the occasion which had drawn upon him the disapprobation of his Majesty. In respect to the case of Spain, he stated that he was not in his Majesty's service when he had gone to Spain; and in respect to Lavalette, he said that he had imagined that he was acting exactly in conformity with the wishes of the King of France's government in that transaction, in consequence of a communication which he had had with a person supposed to be in their confidence.

I told Sir Robert that it was impossible for me at this distance of time to review all the facts of the case which had occasioned his removal from the service; but that I could assure him that neither I nor any of my colleagues could accuse ourselves of any prejudice against him, or of any injustice. That there never had been a case more fully considered, nor one on which more pains had been taken to ascertain the truth; and that it appeared to me impossible, at the distance of five years' time, to revise that proceeding.

But that if his Majesty's government could feel themselves under the necessity of revising these proceedings, or enabled to recommend to his Majesty to readmit him to the service, notwithstanding his conduct upon that occasion, I could not agree with Sir Robert in thinking that his conduct in the Spanish affair ought to be put out of the question, on the avowal that he had not been at that moment in the service. Officers had been removed from the service on account of their serving in Spain on that occasion; and it would be impossible not to take into consideration his conduct since his removal, when the question was whether a recommendation should be made to his Majesty to restore him to his service.

In respect to his conduct in regard to Lavalette, I told him that it did not appear to me that it had anything to do with the case.

I then said that I could not enter into discussion with Sir Robert respecting the advice which I should recommend to be given to his Majesty on any subject which was or might be under consideration in the Cabinet. But he knew my opinion

as well from what I told him as from what I had said to Lord Howden; and he must be aware that in my situation in the army and the government I must uphold the discipline and subordination of the service, and the propriety of conduct of the officers of the army.

I then told Sir Robert that it appeared, from what Lord Howden had said, that he had reason to believe that his Majesty and the Duke of York were favourably disposed towards him, and that, if that was the case, the best thing he could do, in my opinion, was to apply direct to his Majesty and to his Royal Highness; and I stated to Sir Robert the distinction between a recommendation from his Majesty's servants to his Majesty that his Majesty should be graciously pleased to pardon an officer with whose conduct his Majesty might have been displeased, and the desire to extend that pardon originating with his Majesty and being carried into execution by his servants.

A conversation then arose respecting the channel through which Sir Robert Wilson should approach his Majesty, and I recommended to him to write to the King and to send the letter to Carlton House.

In respect to the contents of his letter, I recommended to Sir Robert to throw himself upon his Majesty's favour. To say what he thought would be most likely to conciliate the mind of the King towards him; and, without admitting facts, which nobody could desire him to do, rather to endeavour to satisfy his Majesty's mind regarding his intentions in the particular act which had occasioned his removal from the service than to deny the facts.

In respect to the papers which Sir Robert showed me upon which he asked my opinion whether he should lay them before his Majesty, I told him that I thought none of them could be of any use to him excepting the copy of a letter to Dr. Lushington, written in the year 1820, declining to comply with a request from the doctor that he, Sir Robert, should go to Italy at the head of a commission to collect evidence on behalf of the late Queen in the investigation of her conduct before the House of Lords, in which letter it appeared that Sir Robert had declined to undertake that mission in consequence of his sense of his obligations to the King.

I told Sir Robert that I thought that letter was calculated to

make a favourable impression on the King's mind, and that he would do well to lay it before his Majesty, but that nothing else was.

I heard no more of the transaction till this day, when his Majesty sent for me, and told me that Sir Robert Wilson had written to him, as his Majesty said, *by my desire;* and his Majesty communicated to me a correspondence between Sir Robert and General Bailey, the equerry in waiting, in which Sir Robert had stated that I had desired him to send his letter to Carlton House; and his Majesty desired to know what had passed.

I told the King that Lord Howden having informed me that his Majesty and the Duke of York were favourably disposed to restore Sir Robert Wilson to his Majesty's service, and Sir Robert Wilson having since called upon me and expressed his wish of approaching his Majesty upon the subject, I had recommended to Sir Robert to do so directly in a letter to his Majesty himself, informing his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief of the step which he was about to take. I stated to his Majesty that I had done so because I had thought it was the mode of approaching his Majesty most likely to obtain for Sir Robert his Majesty's favour in case his Majesty was, as supposed, disposed to grant it.

After some conversation, in which the King expressed his strong disapprobation of the conduct of Sir Robert Wilson on public grounds, and his Majesty having asked me what had passed with Lord Howden and Sir Robert Wilson, I told his Majesty what is above stated.

The King then gave me the letter from Sir Robert to read, as Sir Robert had mentioned my name in his correspondence with General Bailey, and I had recommended to Sir Robert to write to his Majesty. The King desired that I would tell Sir Robert that his Majesty had sent for me, and that his Majesty had read his letter and could give no answer to his application.

WELLINGTON.

6th May, 1826.

Since writing the above I have waited upon his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief and have read to him this paper.

His Royal Highness says that he entirely concurs in my

opinions as stated in this paper. That Sir Robert Wilson had called upon his Royal Highness yesterday and told him that he had written to his Majesty; and that his Royal Highness had told Sir Robert that any line his Royal Highness had taken or might take upon this subject was taken upon public grounds, and to this line he must adhere; and although repeatedly pressed by Sir Robert Wilson not to be against him on this subject, his Royal Highness positively declined to give him this assurance.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Liverpool. [5

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, London, 8th May, 1826.

As the Duke of York is out of town, and it would have been impossible that Sir Robert Wilson should not know that I had seen the King upon his letter to his Majesty, I thought it much better at once to make known to him his Majesty's intentions.

I enclose the Memorandum of what passed.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM OF FURTHER COMMUNICATION WITH SIR R. WILSON.

8th May, 1826.

In consequence of his Majesty's command that I should inform Sir Robert Wilson that his Majesty had received his letter, but had not given me directions to give him any answer, I sent to Sir Robert to beg that he would call upon me at the Ordnance, and I saw him this day at a little after two o'clock.

Upon his arrival I observed to Sir Robert that he had informed the King that I had advised him to write to his Majesty, in consequence of which his Majesty had sent for me, and had desired me to acknowledge the receipt of the letter, and to let him know that his Majesty could not give him any answer.

Sir Robert then stated that he had wished to send his

letter through Sir William Knighton, but Sir William was out of town, and that he had then taken it to General Bailey; and that in a conversation upon the possible irregularity of such mode of transmitting the letter, he (Sir Robert) had said that I had recommended that he should thus address his Majesty; and that he was much concerned if there had been any error.

I told Sir Robert, in answer, that I could have no objection to his Majesty knowing that I had given him the advice which I had given him, furnished as it was upon the statement made to me by Lord Howden and by Sir Robert himself, of the supposed sentiments of his Majesty and of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief in his favour; but that I regretted the consequences, as it had occasioned my being called upon by his Majesty to convey his objection to give any answer.

I said, however, that I had ascertained what were his Majesty's opinions, and those of the Duke of York, upon the question, before I had occasion to open upon it at all; that his Majesty had never considered it excepting upon public grounds, and upon his own sense of the public interests had decided that he could not attend to this application.

I then told Sir Robert that I had thought it proper to inform the King of the principle on which I had recommended to him (Sir Robert) to write to his Majesty, but that the King declared he had never viewed the subject in any other light than in its effects upon the discipline and subordination of the army; and that he had never given ground for the supposition that he had the feelings which it had been supposed he had; and I informed Sir Robert that, in consequence of the King's desire, I had subsequently related to his Majesty all that had passed between Lord Howden, himself, and me.

A discussion then ensued upon the case itself and Sir Robert's future prospects, upon the first of which points I told him that he was aware of my opinion, but that he could not expect that I should be *drawer up* of a bill of indictment, which he was to answer; and that, in respect to the last, it was impossible for me to give him any other opinion than this, viz., that his prospects, as arising out of any other mode of discussion of his case, did not appear to me to be deteriorated by what had passed.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 8th May, 1826.

I send you two despatches and a private letter just received from Sir H. Wellesley.

This "*confidential*" communication to all the world of an agreement stipulated to be kept secret, is a bad omen for our future understanding with Russia.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 8th May, 1826.

If you will take the trouble to read the 'Times' of this morning, you will see that a communication to the Allied Ministers has produced the *usual* effect.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

I saw Prince Esterhazy early in the week, Prince Polignac on Saturday.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 8th May, 1826.

It is not much worth while to discuss the probabilities of the communication with the 'Times.' But I confess it passes my comprehension how, without *some* communication, the editor of the 'Times' should have known *the fact* that *anything* (treaty or agreement) was signed between Russia and England respecting Greece; and that other *fact*, that England declined guarantee.

The mistake of calling a Protocol a Treaty, the including of Russia in the determination not to guarantee, are just such mistakes as any man would naturally make, who had received a communication of the contents of a paper, without seeing the paper itself. But the *guess*, if it be one, appears to me marvellous.

The terms of the Protocol are given with sufficient accuracy: the Suzeraineté, the tribute, and the qualified participation of the Porte in the choice of the government. All these are *facts*, and they are all *new*, they did not belong to any former plan.

I cannot believe that the 'Times' has found them out by the light of reason.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I ought to add that the motive which induces me to attach importance to this sort of disclosure is an anxiety for the credit of my office. I directed such precautions to be taken about this Protocol as I am morally sure must have rendered any disclosure from hence impossible.

G. C.

566.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 8th May, 1826.

You may rely upon it that if the newspaper has any knowledge it is from foreigners, but I should think this communication much more likely to have come from abroad than from the foreign ministers here.

However, from whatever source it proceed, it is very provoking; and if the arrangement did not promise advantages for the future under any contingency, such premature publications, as they must deprive us of our best chance of settling the Greek question, would be greatly injurious to us.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Brighton, 17th May, 1826.

I return the letter from Lord Strangford, which you have been so good as to send for my perusal.

I quite agree with Lord Strangford as to the awkwardness of his position at St. Petersburg, and I have already sent him leave to return home by the ship (or steam vessel) which carries out the Duke of Devonshire.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

General Sir Edward Paget to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Sandhurst, 7th June, 1826.

Herewith I send a copy of the Memorandum which I gave in to Mr. Wynn, regarding the Barrackpoor Mutiny. I cannot, however, but hope that after all which passed between your Grace and him on the subject, he will before this time have sent it to you himself.

I have the honour to be

your Grace's sincerely obliged and faithful

EDWARD PAGET.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

General Sir Edward Paget to the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

18th May, 1826.

In considering the report of the Special Court of Inquiry which was assembled, by order of the supreme government of Bengal, to investigate the

causes of the mutiny at Barrackpoor, it is to be observed that the Court set out with a preliminary discourse upon the peculiarities in the character of the Bengal army.

They next proceed to enumerate seven distinct causes as tending to excite that mutiny, entering into detailed reasonings upon each, and they terminate their labours with a statement of the causes which have produced "the deterioration unhappily so evident in our native soldiery."

The seven causes of mutiny set forth by the Court of Inquiry are as follows; viz.—

"First,—The general dislike to proceeding to the unhealthy country in which our military operations were to be carried on.

"Secondly,—The state of public feeling as to the nature and character of the war, and the difficulties which they expected to meet in its progress.

"Thirdly,—The aversion to being employed on board ship.

"Fourthly,—The want of a proper provision of cattle for the conveyance of their baggage.

"Fifthly,—The effect produced by the enormous wages extorted from the public and from individuals by all classes of persons whose services were wanted on this occasion.

"Sixthly,—The want of the knapsacks for which they had been put under stoppages.

"Seventhly,—The undue influence of the Subadar Major and Havildar Major of the 47th Regiment."

Before I offer any observation upon these several assigned causes for the mutiny at Barrackpoor, I beg particularly to call attention to the paragraph in the report which introduces this catalogue of causes. It runs thus, "The causes of the late mutiny may be stated as follows, according to the order of importance which appears to have been attached to each by the mutineers."

To the statement made by the Court of Inquiry as to the two first causes, I have nothing to object. On the contrary, it is the fixed and unalterable conviction of my mind, that to these two causes are immediately to be attributed the disgraceful mutiny at Barrackpoor.

The third cause assigned is, "The aversion to being employed on board ship."

That mischievous individuals may have been employed to instil into the minds of the sepoys a belief that they were to be forced on board ship I can readily give credit to; but whilst the Court of Inquiry so feelingly describe the sufferings to which Hindoos are exposed, when subjected to such mode of conveyance, it appears that they have omitted to state, that so far from there having been any foundation for such a suspicion on the part of the sepoys, Major-General Dalzell, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, with several other officers (both European and native), had taken pains to convince them of its utter fallacy, and that the Commander-in-Chief himself in his reply to the petition of the mutineers distinctly disavowed it.

This *cause*, as it is termed by the Court, I must therefore consider as a mere pretext.

The fourth exciting cause of mutiny is stated by the Court to be "The want of a proper provision of cattle for the conveyance of their baggage."

That such a want in some measure existed I am ready to admit; but when I read the following passage in this report of the Court of Inquiry – "That his" (Col. Cartwright's) "efforts and those of the departments whose province it was to supply cattle for the use of troops marching failed of success until too late to stop the progress of the discontent, must ever be a matter of the deepest regret; for the Court do not hesitate to believe that, in spite of every other

discouraging circumstance, if the means of carriage had been forthcoming at the proper period, and in proportion adequate to men marching on such an arduous and trying service, none of the other points of complaint would have been heard, and the late 47th Regiment would now have been contending against the enemies of the state"—I say, when I read this passage and compare it with the paragraph introductory to the seven alleged causes of mutiny—"The causes of the late mutiny may be stated as follows according to the order of importance which appears to have been attached to each by the mutineers"—I feel justified in charging this Court not only with utter inconsistency; but of using the most unjustifiable means of exposing to obloquy and disgrace the highest authorities in India, in order to screen the mutinous sepoys from reproach.

But is this all that is to be said upon this subject? No! Has this Court pointed out in its proceedings that upon a Court of Inquiry being ordered to investigate the grievances of the mutineers, not one of them would condescend to obey the summons or to state what the nature of their complaints was?

Has this Court thought fit to notice, that in the statement of grievances made to the Commander-in-Chief, the night previously to the suppression of the mutiny, not the most distant allusion is made by the mutineers to the want of cattle?

Has this Court deemed it fair and honest to state, that in the numerous depositions taken before the civil magistrates, no one of the arrested mutineers hinted even at the want of cattle being the cause of mutiny? No! This is all kept carefully out of sight.

But I have stated that I am ready to admit that a want of cattle in some measure existed.

The cumbrous nature of a sepoy's equipment is such as to render carriage cattle necessary to enable them to move at all. The hire of such cattle is at the expense of the sepoys themselves and not at the expense of the State.

The extraordinary demand for beasts of burden for the services of the State in consequence of the Burmese war, added to the utter aversion entertained by the natives of Bengal to be employed on the Eastern frontier, rendered the ordinary hire of cattle impracticable. In this emergency the only expedient that offered itself, was that of the purchase of cattle. This measure was accordingly resorted to, and a loan of 4000 rupees was advanced by government to the 47th Regiment in order to facilitate the purchase. But forsooth! the aid of government was not sufficiently prompt. All that I shall notice on this part of the subject is, that the rules and regulations of the Bengal army give the sepoys no right whatever to the aid of government to supply them with cattle for the conveyance of their personal baggage; that notwithstanding this, the government, in consideration of the emergency of the times, did not hesitate to render them aid in the shape of a loan; and lastly that a hundred head of cattle for the use of the 47th Regiment were actually in their lines the night before this disgraceful mutiny broke out.

I maintain that if the *clearest right* could have been established on the part of the sepoys to this aid of government, the case of their apologists could not be in the smallest degree advanced whilst the fact is on record that a hundred head of cattle were supplied for the use of the 47th Regiment the night before that corps refused to march, and that Major-General Dalzell can state that the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to him were to make the movement of that corps depend upon the arrival of the cattle.

The Court of Inquiry have mixed up their fourth and fifth charges of mutiny together. I shall take the liberty of separating them.

The fifth cause is stated to be "The effect produced by the enormous wages

extorted from the public and from individuals by all classes of persons whose services were wanted on the occasion;" and they make this a vehicle for introducing the question of an increase of pay.

With respect to the cause itself, there is to my mind something in it so monstrously absurd, that I shall withhold offering any opinion upon it, until I meet the man who is prepared to assert that the pay of an army ought to depend upon the fluctuating price of labour.

Upon the question however which the Court has allowed to grow out of it, I shall venture to offer a few remarks.

Abstractedly, I have no scruple in asserting that the sepoy is not only well paid, but very well paid. But there are considerations connected with his pay, and the pay generally of officers and men in the Bengal army, which deserve attention.

It is a notorious and long-established fact, that the natives of Hindoostan have a great aversion to service in the province of Bengal proper; and it is equally well known that this feeling of dislike pervades the native army.

The causes of this aversion have their origin in the opinion and prejudices they entertain of the unwholesomeness of the climate, the deleterious effects produced upon their constitutions by change of food and water, and by the distance by which they are separated from their families and homes.

These are causes which equally apply to all natives of the Upper Provinces; but there are others which operate most powerfully to increase and confirm this aversion in the minds of the native troops. Amongst these is to be ranked, as the most prominent, the deduction of upwards of four and a half per cent. upon their pay, on account of the difference between the Sicca rupee (the current coin of the country) and the imaginary Sonat rupee, in which the army, and the army *alone*, is paid.

That such a distinction should be felt as a grievance by all ranks in the army, and by none more than the private sepoy, is not surprising.

It is in vain that nice calculators and subtle economists argue that the Sicca rupee, in which coin the army is paid in Bengal, is in intrinsic value so much better than the rupee in which the army is paid in the Upper Provinces, that there is in reality no deduction. Independently of the fact that a Sicca rupee does not go so far at Barrackpoor, and other stations in Bengal, as a Benares or Furruckabad rupee goes in the Upper Provinces, it would be difficult indeed to persuade the sepoy, when instead of receiving the number of rupees drawn for him in abstract, he is obliged to receive a less number, that his pay has not been (as he emphatically terms it) *cut*.

Facts upon facts daily came under my notice, which satisfied me that sound policy requires that some boon should be held out to the troops stationed in the province of Bengal generally, as a counterpoise to the aversions, prejudices and disadvantages above referred to.

At present a native regiment marching from the Upper Provinces to Bengal, has in prospect everything which can tend to dishearten and disgust both native officers and men: a hostile climate; deprivation of their accustomed food; harassing duties arising from the insufficiency of troops; a long and distant separation from their families and home; and their pay *cut*. To compensate for all these disadvantages, there is not one circumstance attending the movement of a corps from Hindoostan to Bengal, which can in the smallest degree tend to make the Native troops look upon a change of quarters with satisfaction.

The circumstances of the times seem to require that something should be done to reconcile the Native troops to serve in Bengal, and on our Eastern frontier, with less repugnance than unfortunately at present exists amongst

them, for that particular service; and sordidly avaricious as they are in their nature, nothing would come so home to their feelings as an arrangement by which they would cease to brood over their *cut pay*.

But it is not the Native soldiers alone that feel the above mentioned deductions from their pay as a grievance; the Bengal army at large, and the officers of all ranks, both Native and European, feel it; and when it is considered that the civil officers of government, and all native establishments of every description attached to the civil department, are paid in the Sicca rupee; that the revenue is paid in that rupee; and that in fact, payments in the Lower Provinces are universally made in Sicca rupees; it is matter of astonishment how so unequal and invidious a distinction to the disadvantage of the army should have been so long in existence.

The sixth cause for mutiny assigned by the Court of Inquiry, is stated to be "The want of the knapsacks for which they had been put under stoppages."

The Court of Inquiry, with all their tenderness for the character of the sepoy, seem hardly to consider this as a fair ground for mutiny, and therefore pass it by with little notice. I shall only observe that these sepoys, though they had not their new knapsacks, were in possession of their old ones; and that no blame seemed to attach to the commanding officer of the regiment for their not having received the former in due time.

The practice however of charging soldiers for articles of their equipment before they were delivered to them appeared to the Commander-in-Chief so highly objectionable, that the government of Bengal was pleased at his recommendation to issue a general order prohibitory of such a practice.

It occurs to me here to add (in reference to the sepoys' baggage and the carriage cattle for its conveyance) that the Bengal government has by a general order established a rule and fixed a scale by which these matters are henceforth to be regulated and determined; and it is only wonderful, that with the known propensity of the sepoy to accumulate and hoard up every species of rag and rubbish as so much treasure, such an ordinance should have been reserved for the year 1825.

With respect to the seventh alleged cause of mutiny, namely, "The undue influence of the Subadar Major and the Havildar Major of the 47th Regt.," I have only to observe, that after the amplest inquiry, the Commander-in-Chief had every reason to be satisfied, that so far from their conduct having been objectionable, it had been most praiseworthy and meritorious, and he rewarded them accordingly.

Having followed the Court through their seven assumed causes of mutiny, I shall now take the liberty of stating that it appears to me that much more deep rooted causes of insubordination existed than any of those suggested by the Court of Inquiry.

That the horrors with which the Bengal sepoys viewed a Burmese war immediately produced the actual explosion at Barrackpoor, I have no doubt; and it is not surprising that every sort of pretext for their insubordination should have been resorted to, to cover their dastardly repugnance to the service in which they were about to be engaged; but I think that no reasonable man can view the internal state of the 47th Regiment and be surprised at any irregularities or acts of insubordination, of which that corps might have been guilty.

The conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, who commanded the regiment, is not only free from reproach, but he proved himself, under extreme difficulties, to be a most zealous and deserving officer; but it is in vain to look beyond him for any of that zeal and military ardour amongst his officers, so indispensable to the maintenance of good order, discipline and efficiency of the corps committed to their charge.

If the apathy, indifference, and neglect of duty, manifested by the officers of the 47th Regiment, was confined to that corps alone, it would be a matter of very little moment; but I lament to say that the observations I had the opportunity of making upon the state and condition of the Bengal army have led me to the conclusion that this apathy, indifference, and neglect of duty is very general in the infantry.

A tour of inspection which I made in the winter of 1823 and 1824 afforded me the means of seeing a large portion of the Bengal infantry, and the result of my observations left a very unfavourable impression on my mind as to their order and efficiency.

The establishment of European officers, even if kept up complete, is in my humble opinion very inadequate to its object. What then must be their state of inefficiency may be judged, when the fact is known that almost all the numerous Staff appointments of this army are filled by infantry officers; that the commissariat is supplied in the same way; that almost all the corps of irregular cavalry and infantry are supplied in the same way; that all the provincial battalions are supplied in the same way; that many officers of the same arm are invested with civil and political employments, whilst others are employed in the service of Native princes, and in charge of escorts of political agents. For these and various other objects not here noticed (and not including furloughs and absence from sickness) an immense mass of infantry officers is constantly withdrawn from regimental duty; and what makes the fact more palpably mischievous is, that for the most part, these officers are, from character and talent, the best that can be selected from their corps. The consequence of this deplorable system is that the regiments are left to the management and direction of old gentlemen without energy, and children without instruction or experience, all hungry and thirsty for any employment which will exempt them from the performance of the duties of a battalion.

If it be possible to conceive any system more calculated to produce inefficiency and imbecility than another, it is that of seniority service in India, where the climate makes such dreadful havoc in the moral and physical energies of man; and here this system prevails in all its baneful impotency.

Nor is this pernicious system confined to the European part of the establishment; it prevails equally, and with equally injurious effects, in the Native part of the establishment.

The length of service, more than the good character and useful qualifications of the sepoy, is too much considered as his best claim to the promotion of naick (corporal), and this evil is so deeply rooted, that he considers his promotion more as a matter of right than of reward, and consequently becomes mutinous and discontented by his supercession.

The same dangerous and unmilitary principle prevails in all the superior ranks from naick to subahdar, and little short of downright profligacy is considered as a justification of supercession.

Under such a system it is not surprising that the Native commissioned officers of the army, who all rise from the ranks, should for the most part be composed of imbecile old men quite unequal to the proper discharge of their duties.

The facts which I have here stated are in themselves quite sufficient to account for the present state of inefficiency of the Bengal infantry; but there are other causes of deterioration which are worthy of notice. One of the most prominent is that which results from the dispersion of the infantry in driblets over the face of this extensive Presidency.

In former times it was the practice to keep embodied a considerable corps of

troops of all arms, denominated "The army in the field," and as long as such a corps existed the opportunity was afforded of maintaining a military spirit, and of establishing uniformity of system and practice throughout the army.

Of late years, in consequence of the extension of our territory, and the military occupation of Nagpore, Saugur, and the Western provinces, without any increase of military establishment, this army in the field has been from necessity discontinued; and the evils of this change have not only been productive of serious injury to the order and discipline of the troops, but until the late augmentation took place, had deprived us altogether of a corps of reserve ready to take the field.

Unfavourable as is the foregoing statement. I regret to add my conviction, that the sepoy himself is not what he used to be.

The time was that the sepoy looked up to the commander of his regiment as to the father of a family, as to a friend, protector and defender, in every emergency; whilst the commander looked upon his regiment as his children and devoted dependents: a state of things congenial to the habits and feelings of the natives of a country in which, from time immemorial, all honour, distinction, and power, have been vested in military hands.

The time was, that the sepoy looked up to the European officer as to a being of a superior nature, and the privilege of entering into our service was considered an honour and distinction.

Woefully indeed has our thirst for civil institutions, and predilection for British customs and fashions, changed the nature of the relation between the European officer and the sepoy.

Accustomed now-a-days to see the power and authority of his commanding officer controlled and superseded by every boy fledged from the colleges of Hertford and Fort William, it is not surprising that the respect and even veneration, with which they formerly looked up to their officers, should have vanished.

Having said thus much with respect to the condition of the infantry, I think it may be satisfactory to add that the state of the cavalry was to my mind much more prosperous; they seemed to possess a very superior esprit de corps, and to be in a much better state of discipline and efficiency.

This I in a great measure attribute to the European officers being much less detached from their regiments, than in the infantry, and to the regiments themselves being much less dispersed in detachments.

From what I have written it will be obvious that I have nothing in the main to object to the statement made by the Court of Inquiry of the causes which in their opinion have produced (what they term) "the deterioration unhappily so evident in our native soldiery."

I should therefore here terminate my commentary upon their report, if I did not deem it imperative upon me to offer some observation on the two following paragraphs, which are to be found at pages 505 and 506 of their report.

"On the character of the mutinous proceedings the Court beg to observe that the whole appears to have been the ebullition of despair at being compelled to march without the means of doing so, and that there is not the shadow of suspicion attaching against the loyalty and fidelity to the service of the men who were prevailed upon to set up pretensions with arms in their hands; beyond the absurd attempt at standing out to the last, there does not appear to have existed the most remote idea of carrying matters further, nor any notion of attempting to subvert the government, or to excite hostilities against the State.

"In the prosecution of their mad career, no individual received personal

injury from them, nor did the society of Barrackpoor consider it necessary to remove from the place from a dread of their intentions; and at length when the mutineers were broken and dispersed, hardly any out of nearly a thousand stand of arms were found loaded, although each man was in possession, throughout the affair, of forty rounds of service ammunition."

The spirit of blind partiality which breathes through these paragraphs is too palpable to need exposure; and if the gentlemen who composed them had, in their zeal and anxiety to exculpate their mutinous sepoys, confined themselves within the bounds of common prudence in the colouring which they have given to the transactions at Barrackpoor, I should suffer this "ebullition" of bigotry and prejudice to pass without a comment. They have allowed however their zeal so far to overstep their discretion, that it becomes necessary to point out the egregious fallacy of much of their statement.

The paragraphs are composed of divers distorted facts and gratuitous assumptions, and I shall endeavour to follow them in the order in which I find them.

The first statement I find is that "the whole appears to have been the ebullition of despair, at being compelled to march without the means of doing so."

I deny the fact that they were compelled to march without the means of doing so. The means were in their possession (as already shewn) and instead of obeying the orders of their general to march they met him with pointed bayonets at his breast.

I next find, "that there is not the shadow of suspicion attaching against the loyalty and fidelity to the service of the men who were prevailed upon to set up pretensions with arms in their hands."

What sort of a notion these gentlemen have of loyalty and fidelity it is not for me to determine; but I trust there are not many military men to be found who will blazon forth "the loyalty and fidelity to the service" of men, whose two first causes for mutiny are represented by this very Court itself to be, the dread of the enemy they were about to encounter, and of the climate in which they were about to serve. But it seems they "were prevailed upon to set up pretensions with arms in their hands." Prevailed upon! Who prevailed upon them? this the Court has omitted to tell us! and with the omission, I defy any unbiassed man to read these two fatal words without discovering the animus with which these paragraphs were composed.

We are next informed that "Beyond the absurd attempt at standing out to the last, there does not appear to have existed the most remote idea of carrying matters further, nor any notion of attempting to subvert the government or to excite hostilities against the State."

Beyond the absurd attempt at standing out to the last, there does not appear to have existed the most remote idea of carrying matters further!

In urging this plea of absurdity, it is very obvious that the Court have for their object, either to wipe away, or to justify, a most flagrant and daring act of mutiny.

Had this Court forgotten, when they framed these paragraphs, that a thousand mutineers had but a few weeks before been standing in full military array, with arms in their hands, setting up the most inadmissible pretensions? that they had seized the colours of other corps, and used the most unjustifiable means of enticement and intimidation to bring others over to their cause?

Had they forgotten the reiterated attempts of Major-General Dalzell, of Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, and of some few other officers in the cantonment of Barrackpoor, to bring them to a sense of their duty without effect? Had they forgotten the nature of the pretensions set up by these sepoys; and that

an increase to their pay was amongst the most prominent and urged to the very last? Had they forgotten that these mutineers had even been solicited to come forward and state their grievances, without effect? Had they forgotten that every means consistently with his duty had been resorted to by the Commander-in-Chief to induce them to submit to his authority, before he proceeded to measures of coercion? Had they forgotten that the Commander-in-Chief himself was obliged to take the field in order to reduce them to submission? All this and much more must these gentlemen have forgotten before they could have ventured to state, that there "did not appear to have existed the most remote idea of carrying matters further."

But it seems that they had "no notion of attempting to subvert the government or to excite hostilities against the State."

If such flimsy apologies for military mutinies are to be admitted, farewell (and especially in India) to the stability of governments and states.

My mind is not sufficiently refined to understand what this Court means by the assertion that these mutineers had no notion of exciting hostilities against the State.

They stood in open military array setting the orders and authorities of the State at defiance, and employing all the means they possessed to gain abettors to their cause.

I am perfectly willing, however, to adopt the assumption of the Court that these mutineers had not "any notion of attempting to subvert the government."

With this admission I must however be permitted to express my conviction, that if this mutiny had been allowed to gain head, nothing less than the general mutiny of all the troops then in motion to serve on the Eastern frontier (if not of the whole army) would have been the result.

I next find that "in the prosecution of their mad career no individual received personal injury from them, nor did the society of Barrackpoor consider it necessary to remove from the place from a dread of their intentions."

"Mad" as was the career of these mutineers in the opinion of the Court, I must be permitted to observe, that there was a great deal of method in their madness.

The most perfect order and system prevailed in their arrangements. Their parades regular, their guards mounted, their sentries posted, their patrols in constant motion during the night. The mutineers exercised on the parade, and all under the guidance of a chief. A Brahmin, who two or three days after the suppression of the mutiny was found concealed in the lines of the cantonment (in the habit of a faqueer), tried by a Native general court-martial, condemned to be blown from the cannon's mouth, and executed on the gallows.

My only object in mentioning the above sentence of the general court-martial, is to shew what was the feeling of the natives themselves with respect to the conduct of these mutineers, in contradistinction to that of their apologists.

That any personal injury was received from them beyond the presenting their fixed bayonets at the breast of their general and the hustling some of their officers, both European and Native (the particulars of which circumstances I am not at this moment able to speak to), I acquit them of any acts of personal violence; but when the Court think fit to assert, "nor did the society of Barrackpoor consider it necessary to remove from the place from a dread of their intentions," I find it necessary to assert, in opposition to this statement, that nothing could exceed the trepidation and panic which had seized the society (as it is called) of Barrackpoor, at the time I arrived there, the day

previous to the suppression of the mutiny; and that with the exception, the brilliant exception, of the Governor-General himself and his family, whose perfect firmness and equanimity nothing could shake or disturb, and a very few others in the cantonment, the confusion and alarm were unbounded and disgraceful.

Many did remove from the place, and many more I verily believe would have done so, if they had had the means.

The concluding member of these notable paragraphs is couched in the following words: "And at length, when the mutineers were broken and dispersed, hardly any out of nearly a thousand stand of arms were found loaded, although each man was in possession throughout the affair of forty rounds of service ammunition."

Whether the arms were loaded or unloaded is to my understanding (I acknowledge it without hesitation or doubt) a matter of perfect indifference in the consideration of this question. The legitimate orders of the Commander-in-Chief these mutineers deliberately refused to obey, after having received a distinct declaration from him, that if they did not lay down their arms they would instantly pay the penalty of their disobedience.

The consequences of their stubborn delinquency rest upon their own shoulders.

But I have not done. The Court may know better than I do how many of these arms were found unloaded; but this I presume to know better than the Court, namely, that these broken and dispersed mutineers did not hesitate, when they came to a place of shelter, to face about and fire upon his Majesty's royal regiment of foot.

I here leave this disgusting subject with one single additional observation, to wit, that the most disorderly and determined mutineers in the 47th Regiment were a company of grenadiers, who had for upwards of six months been the Commander-in-Chief's escort in the Upper Country, and to whom he had uniformly shewn the greatest kindness, consideration, and attention.

EDWARD PAGET.

II.

General Sir Edward Paget to the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

MY DEAR WYNN, Blackheath, 18th May, 1826.

I return you the report of the Court of Inquiry on the mutiny at Barrackpoor, with my commentary upon it, and only regret that the numerous occupations which have engaged me since my return to this country have prevented my forwarding it to you sooner.

Yours, my dear Wynn, most faithfully and sincerely,

EDWARD PAGET.

Count Nesselrode to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE DUC, St. Pétersbourg, ce 27me Mai (9 Juin), 1826.

J'ai reçu la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'écrire de Berlin, et je me suis empressé de la porter à la connaissance de l'Empereur. Elle a fait éprouver à sa Majesté Impériale une vive satisfaction, et comme nouvelle preuve de la confiance qui règne entre nos deux Cours, et comme annonce d'un choix d'autant plus agréable à l'Empereur qu'il lui présente un nou-

veau gage de l'amitié du Roi. L'arrivée du Duc de Devonshire en Russie attestera la sincère affection qui unit nos Souverains, ainsi que la continuation des sentiments personnels que le Duc a su depuis longtems inspirer à sa Majesté Impériale.

Vous devez, Monsieur le Duc, déjà être informé du résultat de notre démarche à Constantinople. Il a répondu à nos vœux, et placé dans tout son jour la justice et la modération de l'Empereur par l'empressement même avec lequel la Porte vient d'adhérer à toutes ses demandes. La réponse officielle du Divan se trouve déjà entre nos mains. M. Potemkin a ordre de la communiquer à M. Canning; mais vous avez, Monsieur le Duc, pris une part si active et si directe aux discussions amicales dont cette démarche a été l'objet entre nos deux gouvernements, avant de s'accomplir, que je regarde comme une obligation de vous en faire connaître moi-même le succès. Vous n'êtes d'ailleurs point étranger à ce succès même, car, après avoir reconnu la réalité des droits que fesait valoir l'Empereur, vous avez recommandé à M. Stratford Canning de seconder avec vigueur les efforts de M. de Minciacky, et dans ce moment de crise l'ambassadeur de S.M. Britannique à Constantinople nous a prêté une sincère assistance à laquelle l'Empereur a été infiniment sensible.

Les plénipotentiaires Turcs se rendent sur nos frontières à Akermann, en Bessarabie, où les négociations s'ouvriront le 1 Juillet vieux style. De son côté l'Empereur a désigné pour plénipotentiaires le Comte Michel Woronzoff, qui s'honore de votre amitié, et M. de Ribeaupierre, nommé ministre auprès de la Porte. De tels choix suffiront pour offrir la meilleure garantie des intentions de l'Empereur.

Nous avons annoncé le dénouement de nos premières négociations avec la Porte à tous nos ministres dans l'étranger par une circulaire dont M. Potemkin aura également l'honneur de faire part à M. Canning. Il nous a paru utile de déclarer à cette occasion qu'une intime et solide union règne entre *les Cabinets les plus influents* de l'Europe. Cette assurance ne saurait être superflue dans nos tems où les uns spéculent sur des troubles qu'ils désirent, et d'autres, par une crédulité inexplicable, représentent sans cesse aux peuples alarmés les grandes Puissances comme prêtes à se combattre. Du reste, il n'est pas un seul mot de notre circulaire qui trahisse les termes du Protocole du 23me Mars (4me Avril). Quant à cette acte, nous n'en avons revélé l'existence qu'aux Cours de Vienne, de Paris, et de Berlin. Je m'étais fait un devoir, Monsieur le Duc, de vous prévenir de cette communication très confidentielle qui a néanmoins été faite avec toutes les précautions indiquées par sa nature. En Autriche, comme en France et en Prusse, les représentants de sa Majesté Impériale n'ont eu que l'ordre de *lire* le Protocole en question, sans en laisser copie, et *sans confier l'exemplaire qui leur a été envoyé*. Nous pensons toujours que quand des empires comme la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne s'accordent dans des vues essentiellement utiles et désintéressées, ils peuvent hardiment avouer leur accord, et que cette marche est même la plus conforme à leurs intérêts et à leur dignité, en ce quelle prévient les conjectures erronées et les fausses interprétations. Dès qu'un tel accord est connu et constaté, les oppositions doivent nécessairement disparaître, parce qu'elles seraient gratuites, et les jalousies faire place à un examen sérieux des funestes résultats qu'elles pourraient entraîner. C'est ce qui est arrivé dans la circonstance qui nous occupe. Nous avons vu nos

Alliés au regret de n'avoir pas été admis aux délibérations qui ont précédé entre nous la signature du Protocole du 23me Mars (4me Avril), mais aucun d'eux n'a pu s'empêcher de convenir qu'une loyauté parfaite et un invariable respect pour l'équilibre de l'Europe avaient dicté toutes les clauses de cette transaction salutaire, aucun d'eux n'a pu s'empêcher de nous déclarer qu'il devait souhaiter la réussite du plan dont elle renferme l'esquisse.

Nous apprenons d'autre part que les ouvertures de M. Stratford Canning n'ont point encore obtenu à la Porte l'accueil désiré, mais nos renseignements à ce sujet étant indirects ne peuvent qu'être incomplets et vagues. Nous espérons que M. Canning nous en donnera de plus précis. De notre côté nous profiterons du départ du Comte de Lieven, qui retourne incessamment à Londres pour entrer avec votre Cabinet dans quelques explications relatives à l'exécution du Protocole.

C'est avec un bien sincère plaisir que je renouvelle à votre Excellence l'expression de la haute considération et de l'inviolable attachement avec lesquels je serai toujours, Monsieur le Duc,

Votre très dévoué serviteur,

NESSELRODE.

To Mr. Griffin. [5

MINUTE ON CANALS AND PUBLIC WORKS IN CANADA.

Ordnance Office, 15th June, 1826.

I have perused all these papers with attention, and I concur in the Memorandums drawn by Major-General Sir James Smyth in regard to the lines and construction of the canals, the classification of the works, and their details.

I likewise concur in the instructions given for the formation of the detailed plans and estimates to be formed for the construction of those works. Of course nothing can be undertaken in the way of works till the whole scheme shall have been laid before the House of Commons, and the consent of Parliament will have been obtained.

In respect to the canals, they are considered as works under the Colonial Department, which this department may undertake upon the authority of the Secretary of State, without previous reference to Parliament.

I entertain some doubts, however, whether it is expedient to confine ourselves to contracts in the execution of the work. We shall be very much at the mercy of contractors if they should believe that we possess no other means; and it must be observed that as we have means at our command which no contractor could obtain, the rule that we should work only by contract might delay the final completion of the work.

Wherever the work can be done by contract, that mode should be preferred, more particularly as it must be clearly understood, as well by the officers of the Engineers as by the contractors, that the former are responsible not only for the plan but for the execution of the work, however performed; and that it must be performed in all its parts under the most strict and constant superintendence by the engineers, their clerks of works, &c., under their own personal inspection, control, and responsibility.

The modes to which I advert as being within our reach, and not within that of contractors, are, first, the employment of soldiers. A regiment encamped in healthy stations during the fine season might, with great advantage to the health of the soldiers and without injury to its discipline, greatly advance the work at a small expense. The work thus done might either be entirely on account of the public, or it might be made over to the contractor for the work, at the price of excavation, per foot cube, which he would charge for the work done by the persons employed by him.

In the same manner it may be possible to perform some work by means of convicts. For instance, in the hypothesis of forming a canal to turn one of the rapids of the Ottawa, it might be possible to moor a hulk for the confinement of the convicts in that river, from which they could with facility reach their work every day and be brought back at night. This work might, indeed, appear in the contractor's accounts, &c., paying the public a certain sum for the convicts' labour.

It might likewise happen that a number of settlers on a particular line of the proposed canal might be willing to work on the canal under the Engineers, who would not choose to work under a contractor. I would not exclude any of this class from the work, by making the rule too strict that the work should be performed by contract.

The next point for consideration is the share in the performance of the work which the chief engineer in Canada is to have.

It is my opinion that this work ought to be carried on as any other is within the Canada command.

The Master-General and the Board and the government have decided that these works shall be carried on; and, after an enquiry and report by Commissioners, have ordered out certain

officers under special instructions, some to inspect the loca
and make detailed estimates for the military works of def
others to proceed to the execution of the proposed water
munication. But I conceive we should be guilty of a b
of the ordinary rules of his Majesty's service, and we s
deprive the government and the work of the assistance to for
the object all have in view, if we were to place the office
ployed in the execution of the work in any novel relation to
the authorities in Canada.

It is my opinion, then, that the most ample communic
should be made to the Governor-General and Command
Chief in Canada, and to the Chief Engineer, of everything
has passed upon this subject, including copies of the instruc
to Lieutenant-Colonel By and Lieutenant-Colonel Wright:
the Chief Engineer should be informed that he is to con
those instructions as directed to himself; and that both h
the Commander-in-Chief should be requested to give those o
every assistance to enable them to carry into execution th
structions which they have received from the Board.

It is not to be believed that the Governor-General and
mander-in-Chief, or the Chief Engineer, would unneces
depart from the plan or alter the instructions given by
Master-General and Board with the concurrence of the Secr
of State; but in my opinion it is very desirable that both
authorities should be called upon to report in detail any ci
stance which may have come to their knowledge which
render the execution of the proposed plan inexpedient, o
execution of another advisable.

In respect to the communication between the officers emp
by the Board and their superiors in Canada, I would leave
to be settled by the ordinary regulation of the service a
the good sense of the parties.

The Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Engineer mu
aware that the service may be delayed and its expense muc
creased by their calling for a multiplicity of accounts, draw
and returns.

But, on the other hand, if it be true, as I believe it is
the due performance of a service is insured by giving to su
authority at a distance the means of judging of its perform
and progress by such documents, I do not think it wou
proper by an order from hence to prevent the superior a

rities from having such documents in their possession, if they should think proper.

If the Board should agree in the suggestions of this Minute, let the instructions be drawn accordingly and shown to the Secretary of State.

In order that all parties may see the spirit in which these discussions have been carried on, it might be desirable to send the Minute of the Board and this answer to the authorities in Canada.

WELLINGTON.

General Ponsonby to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Corfu, 15th June, 1826.

There are several things connected with the contest going on in Greece which it may be interesting to you to know, and upon which there is a variety of reports, according to the feelings of individuals. One thing is quite certain, that more lies have been told, and are told, about the Greeks than ever were told upon any other occasion.

With respect to the Greek army, it is, generally speaking, a mob, and a chief can only calculate upon keeping it together as long as he has provisions to give it or the prospect of plunder without danger. An attempt was made to organise a regular corps under Colonel Favrier, who was with Marmont at Salamanca, and it succeeded as long as he had funds to support the discipline of his corps; of course when these failed it went to pieces, and there is nothing to oppose the Egyptian army but a mob kept together by the small sums sent by the different committees in foreign countries. Nobody can tell what has been done with the loans from England, the government has not a shilling. There is nothing by sea or land which can oppose the force under Ibrahim Pasha except the towns of Napoli di Romania, Napoli di Malvoisia, the citadel of Corinth, and the Island of Hydra. The Arabs are wretched troops, but they have some discipline; they are formed into battalions, well equipped and well supplied. The Greeks have a great horror of the bayonet, which, however, they have never seen near except at Missolonghi. The Suliots, who chiefly formed the garrison of that place, are fine men, and certainly fought with great courage. I have seen the plan of the attack, with all the calculations and instructions respecting the work to be done. It was drawn out by an Italian engineer; and Ibrahim Pasha suspected him of treachery because he could not take the place, when the real truth was, that the Arab troops could not face a sharp fire. About 600 Suliots escaped, and are placed in the citadel of Napoli as the garrison to it.

Much has been said of naval actions, but there is no truth in any of the accounts. The Greeks are better sailors than the Turks, but no action has been fought since the beginning of the war, if it is understood by action, that there is risk and loss on both sides. The Greeks, however, have done wonders with their fleet; they have destroyed many large ships;

and in the month of February last, with twenty-three brigs, they outmanœuvred the Turkish fleet of sixty sail, and threw provisions into Missolonghi. This was done by seamanship and not fighting. This was called a great battle and a great victory. I was within ten miles of the fleets, and the cannonade for six hours was tremendous; but when I spoke to Miaulis the following morning, he told me he had not lost a man in his fleet. He seems a plain, sensible man, without humbug. He has done much with small means, and does not pretend to anything more than watching the enemy, gaining the wind, and sending brûlots amongst them.

I should imagine that Ibraham Pasha will blockade Napoli as soon as he can; and I should think he will take it when provisions fail, not sooner. The citadel is really strong. The Turkish fleet will attack Hydra and fail, I should suppose. The citadel of Napoli is well provisioned, the town scarcely at all.

There is a circumstance connected with this garrison which I wish to mention to you. Colonel Pym, the commanding officer of artillery in these islands, has been for some time on bad terms with Sir F. Adam, and certainly I think his conduct improper and unjustifiable. He is a troublesome man and a lawyer; it would be a great thing if he was removed from hence, if it could be done without any injury to him. I have no complaint against him, and I will only add, that I should feel more comfortable with another commanding officer of artillery.

Ever sincerely yours,

F. PONSONBY.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 16th June, 1826.

The subject of Sir Charles Bagot's letter is the discoveries which have been made of the improper conduct of some of the contractors employed to build certain of the works in the Netherlands.

The fact is that these works were constructed in a very short space of time, and the new masonry was loaded with the earthworks rather sooner than it ought to have been. In some (but very few instances) the foundations, which were generally upon piles, had consequently failed; and I believe the investigation which had been made into these failures has led to the discovery of roguery on the part of these contractors.

I have had no intimation of these failures or discoveries from the government of the Netherlands, nor was it or could it have been deemed their duty to give it to me, according to the practice. I heard of the enquiries in the Netherlands by acci-

dent, and immediately sent Colonel Jones to ascertain the truth by inspection as well as by enquiry from the officer at the head of the *corps de génie* in the Netherlands. I have not yet received Colonel Jones's report.

Since Colonel Jones's departure, Monsieur Falck has mentioned the subject to me in very general terms.

I waited for Colonel Jones's report to inform the Foreign Department, if I should see any necessity.

As far back as August, 1814, I was charged with the inspection of these fortresses; and you will see in the office various reports from me upon them, the last, I believe, to yourself. There is a convention upon the subject, I think, in the year 1817, concluded between General Fagel and me.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Wood End, 18th June, 1826.

When I was at the Lodge,* Esterhazy told me that Capo d'Istria was to arrive last Wednesday in London from Paris, and that this was told him by Countess Lieven.

When I saw Mr. Canning about ten days ago he told me that Capo d'Istria has endeavoured to have an interview with Lord Granville, who had very properly avoided it, as it would be improper for him to have, in his official situation, an interview with one who had been removed from his office by the Emperor of Russia. What has passed since I do not know, but I think it very probable that if this excuse was made to Capo d'Istria, Pozzo di Borgo, who has been in the way of seeing Capo d'Istria at Paris, may have readily removed these scruples, and that Capo is now coming to have his interview at the Foreign Office.

Esterhazy was of course very curious and suspicious, but he saw plainly I knew nothing of it. Whether the King is aware of it is doubtful; but if he is, he was anxious to quiet suspicion, for I understand at dinner-time he made a violent declamation against the Greeks to Esterhazy, and a high commendation of you: the declamation, by all accounts, much too strong for a Sovereign professing strict neutrality in the contest. It is clear, however, that this has not removed the Prince's suspicions, possibly from his mistrusting either the King's power or his sincerity.

I am, to say the truth, as suspicious as the Prince; and I am quite sure that if Capo d'Istria obtain an audience at the Foreign Office, it will be immediately reported at Corfu to his own family, with every possible exaggeration. I shall, therefore, be much obliged to you if you would let

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* The King's residence in Windsor Park, now pulled down.

me know what is going on, that I may give the true version by the messenger who is to go back to Corfu at the end of the week.

I cannot conclude my letter without expressing my regret at not being able to dine with you to-day. I postponed making my excuses to the last moment, and not until I found that having put off Lady Bathurst's mother twice, I could not venture to do so a third time.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

To Lord Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 19th June, 1826.

I have received your letter, and I am very sorry that we had not the pleasure of your company yesterday.

Capo d'Istria is certainly not coming, and I think he has been kept at Paris till his presence here can be of use to forward the schemes in respect to Greece.

If the Cabinet should determine, as I hope they will, not to be drawn out of the circle of the Russian Protocol, he will never be brought here.

Capo has certainly been endeavouring to re-establish himself in Russia, but he has failed; and, as he must see, the decision against him in that country is final. He is now endeavouring to work up a Greek cause, and if that fails he will end by returning to Corfu.

Capo as minister in Russia, and his views supported by Russia, might be an inconvenient subject in Corfu. But Capo cast off by Russia is a man like another, with a little more knowledge than most men, and some disposition to mischief. But I confess I have a very indifferent opinion of any government that has any apprehension of what any individual can do; and I would recommend to you to show no jealousy of Capo, who you may rely upon it will, sooner or later, return to Corfu.

Believe me yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 21st June, 1826.

I think that Capo d'Istria is not returning to the service of Russia, for the following reasons:

1st. He is taking an active part in favour of the Greeks, which I am convinced the Emperor cannot wish he should take, and which Capo would not venture to take if he had any hope that the service of Russia was still open to him.

2ndly. The period at which Capo commenced these new measures. He appeared upon the scene at Paris about the beginning of May, which was just the time at which he would have heard of the Emperor's decision not to employ him.

3rdly. The cause of his removal from the service of the late Emperor. He was removed on account of his connection with secret societies, which was proved to the Emperor's satisfaction. The *bugbear* of the present day in Russia is the "secret societies;" and we may rely upon it that the Emperor will not take into his service a man dismissed from that of his late brother on account of his connection with those societies, proved to his entire satisfaction, notwithstanding his prejudices in favour of that person.

I think, therefore, that I may say with confidence that Capo d'Istria is not, nor is likely to be shortly, employed by the Emperor of Russia.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Wood End, 22nd June, 1826.

I was not aware that Capo d'Istria had been detected by Alexander in being concerned in secret societies. This satisfies me that he will not soon return to favour.

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

571.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, London, 23rd June, 1826.

I enclose you a newspaper of which I have marked a paragraph containing what Mr. Huskisson stated lately at Liverpool to a society of shipowners.

I beg leave to recall to your recollection that you and your government are pledged to this and no more, viz., that the Corn-laws shall be reconsidered in the next sessions of Parliament.

There has been no decision of the Cabinet on the object and result of the intended revision of the Corn-laws; and you particularly stated that your mind was not made up as to any particular alteration. But you will see from this document that the head of the Board of Trade, the officer whose official duty it is to bring this subject under the consideration of the government and Parliament, tells his constituents and the world, in so many words, that the whole question is settled, that the trade in corn is to be free, and that corn is hereafter to be admitted upon a duty, to the great benefit of the shipowners and of the trading part of the community in general.

From experience I know the consequences of such pledges. We shall by-and-by be told that opinions have been given upon this subject, and that the measures which the government might advise cannot be adopted, because certain individuals have given such opinions. The discretion of the Cabinet is thus tied up by those individuals, and the discussion comes to be one of existence or non-existence, instead of one upon the merits of the particular question. I protest against the practice, and particularly against the government being considered in any manner bound to more than that the Corn-laws shall be fairly considered in the next session of Parliament.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Coombe Wood, 24th June, 1826.

I have received your letter on the subject of Huskisson's speech to a society of shipowners at Liverpool. I had not seen it till you sent it to me, and I cannot but think that the report must, in some respects at least, be incorrect.

I consider myself as committed on the subject of the Corn Laws to *two* points: first, that the whole subject shall be considered in the next session of Parliament; secondly, that in consequence of the great reduction of taxes, and of other circumstances since 80*s.* was fixed as the price to govern the importation of wheat, *some alteration* in the law is absolutely necessary; but I consider myself as wholly uncommitted even as to the *principle* upon which that alteration is to be made. I have stated the *alternatives* between which Parliament would have to decide, without intimating any opinion as to the alternative which in my judgment ought to be preferred.

This I consider as the actual state of the question, and so it ought certainly to remain till the Cabinet have had an opportunity of fully considering it.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

572.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, London, 25th June, 1826.

I write you one line to tell you that I perfectly recollect what you said about the reduction of the price at which wheat should be imported, which is correctly stated in your letter to me.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

573.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, June 30th, 1826.

I have just now received your letter of the 29th instant, and I think it but fair to give you notice that I shall consider it my duty to object to send artillerymen to the coast of Africa, and that I shall wish to have the opinion of the Cabinet taken upon the subject after considering my objections.

It is useless that I should here state the ground of these objections, as I understand that your official letter upon this subject has come to the office, and I intend to write the answer to it to-morrow morning.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

574.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY LORD, 4th July, 1826.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 30th June, enclosing one from Major-General Sir Neil Campbell on the subject of the want of a detachment of the Royal Artillery on the coast of Africa, and stating the opinion of the Major-General that the detachment of the Royal African corps, lately instructed in the service of the artillery, is not equal to the performance of its duty.

The Major-General has not delivered any opinion that the service of a detachment of the Royal Artillery is necessary on the coast of Africa; but as your Lordship has in your letter stated that in your opinion the service of a detachment of the Royal Artillery would be highly beneficial under present circumstances, and I am so unfortunate as to differ from you upon this subject, and the consequence of a decision upon this subject must be either to save or to lose the lives of the brave men sent upon this inglorious service, I am anxious that the decision of his Majesty's servants should be taken upon the whole subject before this loss is to be incurred.

The first question for consideration is, whether these establishments upon the coast of Africa ought to be maintained; and, with a view to this consideration, the real expense in money and in lives ought to be ascertained, examined, and fairly stated, and contrasted with the effect produced in attaining the object for the attainment of which some of these establishments have been formed and others of late years maintained.

I had in my possession in the year 1822 papers which proved that in each of the years immediately preceding that year not less than 80,000 slaves were exported from the coast of Africa, notwithstanding the efforts and sacrifices made and the expenses incurred by his Majesty's government for the suppression of the slave trade. This is, I believe, double the number exported from Africa in any year preceding the year 1800; and the cruelty, the misery, and the loss of lives attending upon the traffic must have far exceeded any that ever existed at that time when the traffic in slaves was regulated under various Acts of Parliament. In the same period of time the market for slaves has been diminished by the subtraction from it of the whole of the dominions of the United States, the whole of South America, excepting Brazil, all the colonies of European nations in the continent of America and in the American islands, with the exception possibly of Cuba and Puerto Rico, where a contraband trade in slaves is still carried on.

The traffic in slaves on the coast of Africa has doubled, while the market for their sale has diminished almost to nothing; and it must be admitted, then, that the measures adopted by his Majesty's government to put an end to the traffic, however expensive in lives as well as money, have totally failed in producing any effect.

But supposing these measures cannot be relinquished, and others cannot be adopted better calculated to produce an effect, and less costly, the question is, whether it is necessary to keep up the establishments on the coast of Guinea, and particularly Cape Coast Castle. Of all the establishments these are the most expensive and the most unhealthy.

They were originally established with a view to enable his Majesty's subjects to carry on the slave trade, and they have since been delivered over to the government by the African Company, in order the better to enable his Majesty's government to prevent other nations from carrying on that traffic.

It is quite obvious that these settlements cannot produce that effect, and that no settlement or fort upon that open coast, equally accessible at all points, can produce such an effect. Indeed it appears that those entrusted with the conduct of his Majesty's affairs in that part of the world very soon found that the purchase of negroes in that part of Africa by foreigners could not be prevented by these military Posts, and they made use of them for the purpose of protecting some of what are called the native governments in that part of Africa against the oppression of others; and thus by the acquirement and exercise of a political influence to prevent the sale of slaves.

That system has, however, failed entirely. The Ashantees have proved themselves too powerful for the neighbouring tribes, even when protected and sustained by his Majesty's naval and military forces in his forts on the coast of Guinea; and it will be found that, on the one hand, whenever his Majesty's forces take the field, the same disasters will occur and the same disgrace will be sustained as in the year 1824; and on the other, that the Ashantees will be unable to deprive his Majesty's troops of the Posts upon the coast until they will be assisted by Europeans or Americans in the attack of them.

The Posts, then, upon the coast can never be of any use, excepting as fixed stations; and as fixed stations upon an open accessible coast they can be of none to prevent the purchase of negroes; and the political influence which his Majesty's Governor-General in Africa may have enjoyed for the moment must be annihilated by the destruction of the governments and people whom he endeavoured to protect. But if it is necessary or desirable to keep possession of these Posts, is it necessary to have in them detachments of British artillery? Is it desirable

upon a consideration of the circumstances which I am about to state?

In respect to the necessity, I would beg to observe that these Posts have been maintained till this moment, and particularly against a most formidable attack by the Ashantees in the year 1824, without the assistance of artillerymen. Either the services of these artillerymen have been effectual, of whose discipline Major-General Sir Neil Campbell thinks so ill, or seamen have been landed for the occasion, which I will show presently is the preferable plan; more particularly as it does not appear that the natives have any ordnance, or any knowledge of the use of that arm.

But, for the following reasons, it appears to me desirable that detachments of the Royal Artillery should not be sent to these stations.

They are peculiarly unhealthy, and up to this moment no European troops in his Majesty's service, excepting a detachment of the Royal Artillery, to which I will advert presently, have been sent to serve on the coast of Africa, excepting as volunteers raised for the purpose, to serve as a local corps, or as criminals in commutation of punishment for crimes or for desertion. It would be rather unjust to force the Royal Artillery upon an inglorious service on which death by sickness is certain, when other troops in his Majesty's service, excepting the volunteers in this local corps, or criminals, are exempt from it.

I say death by sickness is certain, for the following reasons: in the year 1824, at the desire of the Secretary of State and contrary to my own judgment, a detachment of the Royal Artillery was sent to Cape Coast Castle, not to serve, but to teach the exercise of the great gun and the use of rockets to certain of the Royal African corps. These men embarked on the 29th May, 1824; they landed at Cape Coast on the 20th July, 1824, and in the course of six months that they remained there six died. They were sent to Sierra Leone, where one since died. They embarked there on the 19th July, 1825, and out of the original number sent four are still alive; of whom two are invalids and pensioned as entirely unfit for any duty, and two only remain. This is the history of a detachment of eleven men, all well-behaved men of good character, who had no service to perform, excepting the easy and healthful service of teaching others the great gun exercise and the use of rockets.

But I now beg leave to lay before your Lordship information respecting Cape Coast Castle, received from an officer of Engineers, lately sent there at your Lordship's desire to examine that post. "He had no illness; but he found himself reduced by the climate to so weak a state as to be incapable of the exertion even of walking a few paces without lying down. He says he should not forget the spectral appearance of the few officers of the African corps on his arrival, nor the monthly revels of the men, who being convinced they will not hold out above eleven or twelve months, drink to excess whenever they can procure the means, although certain that that day's drinking will carry off some of the party. But their minds are made up. Of course they are in that state mutinous to their officers in the extreme.

"There is a little contrast in the comparative comfort of these men, who have only a salt ration with bread and rum, and *the seamen* who get cocoa, tea, &c., *and very properly when in port fresh provisions.*

"The bush reaches close to the town. Neither horses nor mules, although repeatedly tried, will live at Cape Coast Castle."

It appears, then, from this account that there cannot be a worse climate, and that great as the expense is at which his Majesty's establishments there are supported, that expense ought to be greater. In fact, that humanity which occasions the supposed necessity for occupying these unhealthy countries at all ought to induce us to take care of the unhappy officers and soldiers who are to be employed to carry into execution our measures for the suppression of the traffic in slaves. We ought to have good Posts for the protection of the troops and army, well built and roomy barracks for their habitation in wholesome well-cleared situations. The troops ought to have the best and most wholesome provisions, instead of, as it appears, the worst; they ought to be commanded by respectable officers capable and willing to take care of them and keep them in order and in health; and, above all, they ought to be relieved frequently and be attended by hospital and convalescent ships to take them to sea or to bring them home, to save their lives at least when attacked by sickness.

Add to the account of expenses of our establishments on the coast of Africa an estimate of those which common humanity

would require from us if this system is to be continued; and let us then see the amount of benefit which will result from this enormous expense.

In the mean time it appears that the seamen have advantages even on shore which the soldiers have not; and that being the case, I would beg leave to suggest that if, notwithstanding the representations above made of the uselessness of these Posts and the experience of the past, his Majesty's government should think it necessary to maintain any establishments in Africa, and particularly on the coast of Guinea, and should think the use of ordnance necessary for the defence of those Posts, they should employ seamen for the service of that ordnance who can have the advantage of these superior provisions, and, above all, that of being taken to sea and have their lives saved if overtaken by those disorders to which man, even in a state of quiet, is liable in this most deleterious climate.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM ON MR. CANNING'S NOTES ON THE PAPER [57
ENCLOSED IN LORD STRANGFORD'S RECENT DESPATCH, NO. 73.

London, 15th July, 1826.

The Russian government has always considered what are called the Barbary Powers as subjects of the Porte, and has called upon the Porte to give compensation to Russian subjects for the piracies committed by the inhabitants of the countries governed by those Powers.

We have *lately* considered the Greeks as belligerents, and have admitted that they have maritime rights as such. It would certainly be unjust to make the Porte responsible for the acts performed by the Greeks in the exercise of the maritime rights which we have admitted that they enjoy, as the Turks believe very much to their injury.

In fact I believe that, up to this time, we have considered the Greeks themselves as responsible for the piracies committed upon the King's subjects by vessels sailing from Greek ports; and that the Greek government have in fact paid for these piracies.

It appears, then, that it would not be quite consistent with

justice or with our practice up to this moment to call upon the Porte to be responsible for these piracies; and that it is not necessary to take any further steps in order to enable his Majesty's government to claim with justice from the Greek government satisfaction for the losses of his subjects occasioned by the piracies of vessels sailing from, and resorting to, Greek ports.

The question of the further recognition of the independence of Greece appears quite disconnected with this subject of piracy. It is one of expediency only.

In the case of the Spanish colonies, upon which I have not at all altered my opinion, the decision rested principally on the absence of all force on the part of the mother country, and the consequent cessation of hostilities, in the particular colony whose independence was to be recognised. This is not the case in respect to Greece, and we must be very cautious in adopting a new principle upon this subject.

WELLINGTON.

[576.] *To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

MY DEAR HUSKISSON, London, 20th July, 1826.

I agree very much in the statement contained in this paper. We must have the frontier of New Brunswick as it was understood to be previous to the late war, and we must stand upon the mode of settling the question fixed by the treaty of peace. But, in my opinion, we must not rely even upon the justice, much less the favourable consideration of any Power, of any claim involving our interests. We don't consider much what they conceive affects their interests, and they can touch us upon so few points, that there is not one of them that would not be happy to discover a point on which an advantage over us might be given to the United States.

On this ground I would recommend to the Cabinet to have an accurate survey made of the highlands, from Mars Hill to the head of the Connecticut River; and of the course of the different streams which take their rise in those highlands and run into the St. Lawrence.

Such a survey, the truth must be admitted on all sides, would probably settle the question with the United States without

reference; but if there is to be a reference, the referee would be ashamed of deciding against us after the inspection of such a document.

But even in that case I can produce no proof that the justice of a third Power ought not to be relied upon.

Against this mode of proceeding there is the argument of a loss of time. But we are much mistaken if we believe that any settlement of any existing question of difference with the United States, or that any sacrifice on our parts, will ever soften their jealousy of, or their hostility towards, us or will prevent them from breaking with us at the moment at which it shall be most convenient to them and most disadvantageous to us.

It is for this reason that I have entreated the government to attend to the communications with Upper Canada and the defences of his Majesty's dominions in North America; and for the same reason I say don't be in a hurry to settle any question, which hurry shall prevent us from coming to the settlement in the manner most advantageous to us.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Charles W. Wynn.

MY DEAR WYNN, London, 25th July, 1826.

I return Sir Herbert Taylor's letter and the Memorandum enclosed.

I have always considered that men from thirty to forty years of age, particularly if they have been soldiers till that age, are the most efficient for soldiers, particularly in warm climates. As well as I recollect, we thought them so when I served in the East Indies; and I understand that they are still thought so serviceable, as that men of the age of thirty-five are received from the King's service into that of the East India Company when the King's regiments are ordered home from India.

If I am not mistaken, you would find at the end of five years' service in the East Indies, or of ten years' service, more men alive who should commence their service at thirty or thirty-five years of age than you would of the same numbers who should have commenced their service at the ordinary age of recruits, viz., from eighteen to twenty-two or twenty-three. If I am

right, it would be cheaper for the East India Company to send out the former.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Charles W. Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall Place, 31st July, 1826.

You will recollect that I spoke to you at Coombe on the difficult question now before us, with respect to the allowances of the Bengal army. It was my wish to have laid before you the correspondence which has taken place on the subject, and the detailed arguments on each side; but I find that this would extend much beyond what it is reasonable to ask you to read.

I have, therefore, desired that an abstract of what has passed may be prepared for you, which Mr. Courtenay has promised to transmit to you without delay; and when you can find time to peruse it, you will very much oblige me by favouring me with your opinion upon it.

I will only observe, that those disparities between the allowances of the armies of the different Presidencies, which formerly produced, perhaps some advantage, but certainly little practical inconvenience, have been much more sensibly felt since the frontiers of the three establishments have been brought to confine on each other, and that the troops are therefore constantly intermixed.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever very faithfully yours,

C. W. WILLIAMS WYNN.

[578.] *To Mr. Griffin.*

MEMORANDUM ON CAPTAIN SMITH'S REPORT ON IRONWORK FOR HOSPITAL, BARBADOES.

Ordnance Office, 31st July, 1826.

This Report shows how necessary it is first to have *accurate models* of everything required, as well as drawings; secondly, to allow no person to alter the models or drawings once fixed upon, excepting by authority of superiors, which must, of course, be on record; and thirdly, to have an accurate inspection made of everything received from a contractor, and comparison made with the model and drawing, and order and contract. Dr. Brandreth is unfortunate in having made any alteration from the drawing without reporting such alteration.

The consequence of the inaccuracy of the mode of execution of the whole of this business is, first, that there is no certainty here that what is sent out will answer the purpose of constructing

a building in the West Indies; and it must be observed that nothing can be corrected there. Secondly, nothing more can be done till the whole will arrive in the West Indies, when every piece must be surveyed and a report made upon it by Sir Charles Smith and Dr. Brandreth.

I doubt very much the decision upon the twenty-one main joists, No. 5, and the joists mentioned in No. 6. My opinion is that they ought to be the length and thickness specified in the drawings; there would still remain space for the lead.

But I beg the attention of the Board to the conduct of Dr. Brandreth in authorising, as Messrs. Bailey state, such a departure from the drawing without saying one word to anybody on the subject. No great concern can be carried on in such a manner, and we must put a stop to it.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord William Russell. [5

MY DEAR LORD, London, 31st July, 1826.

When your letter reached me I was occupied with other matters, at that moment more pressing, and I laid it aside and only lately perused it. I cannot tell you with what satisfaction I have read it, and how entirely I agree in every word of it. I return it to you, but I beg you will let me have a copy of it. It would be very desirable that you should turn your mind to the organization of a regiment of dragoons, for instance of the present strength in one rank. How many troops and squadrons? What should be the original and ordinary formation? In answer to the last question, I should say three single lines. Each line probably a squadron; the distance each 400 yards. I throw out these ideas for your consideration, as it is desirable that you should be as much at home upon the mechanical and practical parts of the question as you are upon the theory. My practice in regard to the cavalry was this: first, to use them upon advanced guards, flanks, &c., as the quickest movers and to enable me to know and see as much as possible in the shortest space of time; secondly, to use them in the momentary pursuit of beaten troops; thirdly, to use them in small bodies to attack small bodies of the enemy's cavalry, but I never attacked with them alone, always with the infantry; and I considered our cavalry

so inferior to that of the French, from want of order, although I consider one squadron a match for two French squadrons, that I should not have liked to see four British squadrons opposed to four French; and as the numbers increased, and order of course became more necessary, I was more unwilling to risk our cavalry without having a greater superiority of numbers. For this reason I used my cavalry less even than Bonaparte did his, for he gained some of his battles by the use of his cuirassiers as a sort of accelerated infantry, with which, supported by masses of cannon, he was in the habit of seizing important parts in the centre or flanks of his enemy's position, and of occupying such points till his infantry could arrive to relieve them. He tried this manœuvre at the battle of Waterloo, but failed, because we were not to be frightened away; and in fact attacked the cuirassiers, who were in possession of the line of our cannon, with the squares of the infantry; and when once we moved them I poured in our Life Guards, &c. This shows the difference of his principles and mine; but it was to be attributed to his having his cavalry in order. Mine would gallop, but could not preserve their order, and therefore I could not use them till our admirable infantry had moved the French cavalry from their ground.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall, 31st July, 1826.

When you have read the enclosed letter from Goulburn pray return it to me.

Depend upon it, that party animosities never were higher in Ireland than they are at this moment, in spite of conciliation.

I do not think the tone of that portion of the Irish press which is known to be under the control of the Irish government is at all likely to remove those impressions of which Goulburn speaks in this letter.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

I have shown the enclosed to Lord Liverpool only.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 2nd August, 1826.

I send you two drafts which I propose to send off to Stratford Canning, to relieve the suspense in which he has been kept as to Count Lieven's return to England; and to prepare him for the instructions which I may have to send, after we have thoroughly considered what Count Lieven brings, and has to say.

I send you also a copy of a paper which contains all that is most material in Count Lieven's communications.

Some of the queries have already answered themselves. The others will require deliberation.

Could I have a talk with you upon them on Friday or Saturday?

Three o'clock on either of those days would best suit me; but take your choice of them.

I wish to get out of town on Sunday.

Very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Be so good as to return me the drafts as soon as you conveniently can, but you may keep the copy of Count Lieven's paper.

G. C.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

DRAFT OF DESPATCH TO MR. STRATFORD CANNING.

SIR, Foreign Office, August, 1826.

I. Your Excellency's despatches to No. 85, inclusive, by the messenger Hunter, have been received and laid before the King.

II. His Majesty has read with great interest the ample details which they contain of the extraordinary transactions which have taken place at Constantinople; and his Majesty is pleased to approve of the conduct which you have pursued during a crisis of so much alarm and agitation.

III. Whatever may be the issue of that crisis, with respect to the internal affairs of the Porte, it is evident that during its continuance, no progress could have been made with the Turkish ministers in any matter less immediately and palpably affecting the authority of the Ottoman government, and the personal safety of the sovereign. Nor would it have been expedient (as it appears to his Majesty's government) to enter with the Reis Effendi upon the question of the pacification of Greece, either during the ferment of such a contest as has been carrying on between the Sultan and his janissaries, or at the very moment of his victory over them.

IV. It is unfortunate in this view, that the very able paper which your Excellency had drawn up for the purpose of being submitted to the Sultan, which contains a just and forcible exposition of his Highness's true interest in the pacification of Greece, should have come under his Highness's view at a moment so unpropitious for a dispassionate consideration of its contents.

V. Your Excellency has also done well in availing yourself of the topics suggested by the increase of piracies in the Archipelago, to prepare the Ottoman government for a serious appeal from the Powers of Europe on that head.

VI. The accounts of those piracies which your Excellency has sent home, and your correspondence with Commodore Hamilton thereupon, have been referred to the proper departments and have been most seriously considered.

VII. The result of this consideration your Excellency will find in the enclosed copies, first, of the letter from the Admiralty to this department; 2ndly, of a letter from me to his Majesty's Secretary of State for War and Colonies; 3rdly, of the instructions issued by Earl Bathurst to the Lords of the Admiralty thereupon.

VIII. Your Excellency will communicate the substance of these instructions to the Reis Effendi. In doing so your Excellency will apprise that minister that the state of things which makes such instructions necessary, is one which cannot be permitted to endure. You will remind him that four years' experience has proved the inability of the Porte to control the proceedings of maritime Greece or to put down the war by which the excesses of those proceedings are generated. You will let him know that we are well apprised that Russia calls upon the Porte for indemnification for spoliations on Russian commerce by Greek cruizers, and that if such demand be just on the part of any one Power, it is equally maintainable on the part of Great Britain.

IX. No such demand has yet been brought forward on the part of your government, solely from consideration for the complicated difficulties of the situation in which the Porte has been placed, and from the hope which we still cherish, that she will seek the only practicable way out of these difficulties, through a pacific arrangement with the Greeks.

X. It is a little too much, however, for the Porte to expect that we should, for an indefinite time, consent to bear with the evils which arise from her want of power over those whom she claims as her subjects; and at the same time admit that very want of power as a plea for not coming upon the Ottoman government for indemnification.

XI. Your Excellency will add that we continue our present forbearance yet a while the less reluctantly, as we trust that the arrangements now in progress between Russia and the Porte, by relieving the latter Power from all remains of those difficulties on the part of Russia, which we at one time flattered ourselves that Lord Strangford's negotiations had effectually removed, will enable the Porte to turn its individual attention to the affairs of Greece.

XII. The Sultan may do this with the more dignity, when all apprehension of hostility on the part of Russia has ceased.

The very doubtful and precarious relations which have subsisted between the Porte and her powerful neighbour since the departure of M. Stroganoff will, after the happy conclusion of the negotiations at Akermann, be replaced by relations of the usual friendly character, and your Excellency may assure the Reis Effendi, that you confidently expect to find in the new Russian minister at Constantinople, the most zealous concert and co-operation in the execution of instructions which you are speedily to receive, for proposing to the Porte a termination to the war in Greece, through a reasonable and honourable accommodation.

Count Lieven arrived here a few days ago charged with fresh assurances from his Court of their desire to combine their councils with those of his Majesty for this important object; and I hope in the course of the present month to be enabled to write to your Excellency fully and definitively thereupon.

II.

DRAFT OF DESPATCH TO MR. STRATFORD CANNING.

SIR, Foreign Office, August, 1826.

I. As your Excellency will no doubt be much questioned respecting the proceedings of Lord Cochrane, I think it right to put you in possession of all that your government knows about them.

II. Your Excellency must not be surprised if that knowledge is both imperfect and uncertain, relating as it does to an individual, who, though a British subject, was more than twelve years ago expelled his Majesty's service; and who from his pecuniary embarrassments is continually an exile from England; or if he occasionally visit this country, is obliged to shroud himself while here in concealment.

III. Lord Cochrane's return from South America last year, after an absence from England of several years, was undisguised; because he arrived in a Brazilian ship of war, and flattered himself no doubt that his character as a Brazilian officer would protect him both against his government and against his creditors.

IV. In this expectation he was doubly disappointed. The government gave directions for instituting a prosecution against him; and his creditors, who were enabled to resort to a more summary process against his person, were so alert in the adoption of that process, that he fled with precipitation.

V. It is unnecessary to revert to the proclamation then issued, which your Excellency was authorised to communicate to the Ottoman ministers.

VI. It is not known to the government that Lord Cochrane has since been in England. There are rumours of his having been seen on the west coast of this country for a short time; but if he had been even in London, the law would have given no power to the government to seize his person, although the prosecution against him would have revived.

VII. I think it necessary to explain these particulars to your Excellency, because I am aware that foreign governments are disposed, and I presume the Turkish not the least so, to attribute to the executive government of this country a power beyond the law, which, not possessing, it cannot exercise.

VIII. We have heard that Lord Cochrane is gone to the Mediterranean; whether it be really so, we know not. But that he should be gone, as is rumoured, to Gibraltar or to Malta, for the purpose of there fitting out expeditions in aid of either belligerent, is not credible; as the same law which would prevent him from preparing armaments in England would equally apply to his doing so in any British settlement.

IX. The enclosed instructions from the Secretary of State for War and Colonies to the governors of Gibraltar and Malta will enable your Excellency to satisfy the Turkish government, that no precaution has been neglected to enforce at those places the observance of the law.

X. With respect to the law itself, however, foreign governments entertain very exaggerated notions. They often appear to think that it not only constitutes a new offence, but arms the executive government with some summary mode of preventing the commission of that offence. This is not so. The law forbids and makes liable to punishment the engaging in military service, or preparing armaments in aid of a foreign belligerent; but the punishment in this as in all cases must follow a conviction of the offence; and the offender cannot be convicted upon any other proof or testimony than such as would be sufficient to convict him of any other misdemeanour.

XI. Lord Cochrane therefore might have continued in the service of Brazil to

the end of his life, unquestioned by his government, if he had not voluntarily brought himself within the reach of the civil tribunals of his country.

XII. He may in like manner enter into the Greek service and continue therein. He may even as a Greek commander institute (as he did in Brazil) blockades which British officers will respect, and exercise the belligerent rights of search on British merchant ships, without exposing himself to any other penalty than that which the law will inflict upon him, if ever hereafter he shall again bring himself within its reach, and be duly convicted of the offence for the punishment of which that law was enacted.

XIII. If, indeed, he should do any of these things without a commission, he would become a pirate and liable to the summary justice to which, without reference to the municipal laws of his country, he would as an enemy of the human race be liable; and liable just as much from the officers of any other country, as of his own.

XIV. The operation of the law with respect to the fitting out of vessels, your Excellency will collect from the Act itself (of which I enclose a copy), from the exposition thereof in Lord Bathurst's letter already mentioned, and from the copies herewith also enclosed, of letters from the Home department.

XV. The strongest suspicion that a vessel building in the ports of this country, or about to proceed to sea, is destined to be armed elsewhere, and to become a vessel of war in the service of a belligerent; the strongest suspicion that a particular cargo of arms, sailing from the ports of this country, is destined for the purpose of arming that very vessel in a foreign port, would not justify the government either in detaining the vessel or in seizing the arms, the vessel herself sailing unarmed, and the cargo of arms being entered at the Custom House as merchandize.

XVI. The law applies only to what can *be proved*, and the attempt to execute it without proof would expose the officers of government to heavy pecuniary damages.

XVII. The Turks will probably deem this a very imperfect specimen of legislation, but it is fit that they should know exactly what the law is, in order that in case of its being violated, they may not suppose that the English government wilfully connive at its violation.

III.

QUESTIONS RELATIVES AU PROTOCOLE du 23me Mars (4me Avril), 1826.
[*Received from his Excellency Count Lieven, 1st August*, 1826.]

I. Les §§ 2 et 3 du Protocole du 23me Mars (4me Avril) prévoyent, l'un le cas où la Porte aurait admis le principe d'une médiation à interposer en faveur des Grecs, à la suite des démarches déjà faites par l'ambassadeur de sa Majesté Britannique; l'autre, le cas où ces démarches ne seraient point couronnées de succès. La dernière de ces suppositions paraît s'être réalisée. Les informations qui font concevoir cette opinion au Cabinet de Russie sont-elles exactes?

II. L'extrait des instructions de M. Stratford Canning, communiqué confidentiellement au Cabinet de Russie par le Duc de Wellington, portait que cet ambassadeur inviterait le Divan de Constantinople à s'expliquer catégoriquement sur la question de savoir, si, par suite de quelque convention avec Mehmed Ali Pasha d'Egypte, ou Ibrahim Pasha, son fils, la Porte avait conçu le projet de faire conquérir la Grèce par les Egyptiens à leur profit, pour y remplacer la population Chrétienne par une population Musulmane, et comme quelques indices faisaient soupçonner l'existence de ce projet, qui avait même paru recevoir un commencement d'exécution, si la Porte consentait à envoyer à Ibrahim l'ordre positif de ne pas en poursuivre l'accomplissement.

III. Cette explication catégorique, a-t-elle eu lieu?

IV. Le même extrait des instructions de M. Stratford Canning ajoutait que dans le cas où la Porte avouerait l'existence d'un tel projet, ou refuserait de donner l'ordre de ne pas le poursuivre, l'ambassadeur de sa Majesté Britannique lui déclarerait que la réalisation d'un semblable dessein ne serait jamais admise par la Grande-Bretagne, et que, pour y mettre obstacle, il suffirait à la flotte Anglaise de la Méditerranée de se placer entre Egypte et la Morée. Cette déclaration a-t-elle eu lieu, et si elle a eu lieu, a-t-elle été ou sera-t-elle suivie des mesures qu'elle annonçait?

V. Dans le cas où les ouvertures de M. S. Canning relatives à la pacification de la Grèce auraient été repoussées, le section 3 du Protocole du 23me Mars (4me Avril), imposant à la Russie et à l'Angleterre l'obligation de profiter séparément ou ensemble de toutes les occasions favorables de faire valoir leur influence auprès de la Porte, pour effectuer l'arrangement dont ce même Protocole renferme les bases, quelles sont les idées du Cabinet Britannique sur l'accomplissement de cette obligation dans l'état actuel des choses?

Le succès de la dernière démarche du Cabinet de Russie auprès du Divan doit nécessairement lui rendre de l'influence à Constantinople. Le Cabinet de Russie se plait également à espérer la réussite des négociations qui vont s'ouvrir à Akermann. Dans cette dernière hypothèse, de quelles instructions le ministre de sa Majesté Impériale auprès de la Porte, devrait-il être muni, relativement à l'exécution du Protocole du 23me Mars (4me Avril)?

VI. Et d'après quels principes doit-il, à cet égard, concerter ses démarches et son attitude avec celles de M. Stratford Canning?

VII. Dans le cas où, contre toute attente, les négociations d'Akermann n'auraient pas l'issue désirée, quelle serait encore l'opinion de l'Angleterre sur le meilleur plan à suivre pour réaliser les bienfaisantes stipulations du Protocole ci-dessus mentionné?

VIII. De plus, l'Angleterre a-t-elle fait, ou compte-t-elle faire maintenant auprès des Grecs, quelque démarche qui aurait pour objet l'accomplissement de cet acte, ou la fixation des détails qu'il a laissé indécis, et qui, en vertu du section 4, devaient être déterminés plus tard?

IX. Enfin, si la Porte était inaccessible à toute proposition relative à la Grèce, quel serait l'avis de la Cour de Londres sur les déterminations à prendre dans cette hypothèse?

X. Telles sont les principales questions que le Cabinet de Russie croit urgent d'adresser au Cabinet Britannique, et qu'il lui adresse dans l'intimité d'une confiance réciproque.

XI. D'un côté, l'extermination des Grecs paraît plus imminente que jamais; de l'autre, au mois de Septembre, le résultat définitif des négociations d'Akermann sera connu; les explications que doivent provoquer entre la Russie et l'Angleterre les questions posées plus haut ne sauraient donc être différées sans les plus graves inconvéniens.

XII. Les opinions qu'émettra sous ces différens rapports le Cabinet Britannique, seront accueillies par le Cabinet Impérial avec le plus vif intérêt, avec le plus sincère désir de remplir tous les vœux exprimés au nom de la Grande-Bretagne, et il est presque superflu d'ajouter que ces explications confidentielles resteront, et doivent par leur nature même rester, entièrement secrètes.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MEMORANDUM ON MR. CANNING'S PROPOSED DESPATCHES TO MR. STRATFORD CANNING.

August 3rd, 1826.

I have numbered the paragraphs in the despatches to Mr.

Canning, and in the paper to Count Lieven, in order to be able to refer to them with more convenience.

I have not seen the papers referred to in paragraph 7 of the first despatch, nor in paragraph 9 of the second.

It appears to me that the intention of the first is to found upon the Greek piracies some claim to compensation from the Turks for his Majesty's government which will enable his Majesty to interfere forcibly in favour of the Greeks.

I have never seen any proof of the fact stated in the 3rd paragraph that Russia calls upon the Porte for indemnification for spoliations on Russian commerce by Greek cruisers.

Russia has made this call, as it is stated, for spoliations by the Barbary Powers on the coast of Spain, who are not at war with the Porte, but not, that I have seen, for spoliations by the Greeks.

But, supposing that Russia did make this demand, can it be made with justice by other Powers, and particularly by his Majesty's government?

First, we have acknowledged the belligerent rights of the Greeks. Secondly, we have admitted, and submitted to, the exercise of all the practices by armed vessels of that nation which result from the acknowledgment of their character of belligerents, such as search, seizure, and condemnation of cargo, &c. Thirdly, we have connived at the aid furnished to the Greeks by individuals of this country in money, arms, ammunition. Fourthly, Lord Cochrane has sailed; and I will here discuss the second despatch.

I don't recollect the facts as they are stated.

If I am not mistaken, it was declared to be possible to hold Lord Cochrane to bail at the time this subject was discussed this time last year; but the government determined that he should not be held to bail, and he escaped and avoided the prosecution, which could not be commenced till the term of November, 1825.

It is not the fact, then, as stated in the 6th paragraph, that the law would have given no power to the government to seize his person; because, according to the opinion of the Crown lawyers, his person could have been seized, and he could have been held to bail.

I cannot see the difference attempted to be shown, in paragraphs 13 and 14, between acting with or without a Greek

commission, as far as the British law is concerned. In either case Lord Cochrane must be brought under the jurisdiction of the Court. But I believe that if a blockade or capture by Lord Cochrane was resisted, and the result of such resistance should be that Lord Cochrane was to become prisoner to one of his Majesty's cruisers, he would be liable to the penalties of the Foreign Enlistment Act, just as he would be liable to the penalties for piracy if he were captured and brought under the jurisdiction of the Court for an act of piracy. In neither case can he be brought under the jurisdiction of the Court till captured. In both cases he would be liable to its jurisdiction.

I confess, likewise, that I have never been satisfied that this country has fairly maintained its neutrality in this contest; and I object to the statement in paragraphs 14, 15, and 16.

The *strict* law is, I believe, as stated. But, to say nothing about ships, I beg leave to put the question, Are there not frequent instances of government interfering to prevent the export of arms and warlike stores when known to be intended for the use of belligerents?

We were neutral in the war between Spain and her colonies, but bound by treaty to prevent the sale of arms, &c., to the latter.

Did we not, by Order of Council, prohibit the export of arms to both belligerents?

We were neutral in the war between France and Spain; but we there again interfered, by Order in Council, to allow the export of arms, &c., to Spain, on condition that Spain should consent to their export to the colonies.

It is true that the officers of the government, in the existing state of the law, could not prevent the sailing of a vessel loaded with arms, &c., for the purpose of arming Lord Cochrane's squadron. But the government might, by Order of Council, according to the usual practice, have altered the law for the purpose of preventing this breach of his Majesty's declared neutrality.

I am afraid, then, that the world will not entirely acquit us of at least not doing our utmost to prevent this breach of neutrality of which the Porte will accuse us.

Fifthly, we have now ordered that the Greeks themselves shall be punished for these piracies.

Is it just or fair for a great nation like this, first, by its conduct to encourage this insurrection and warfare, and then to call upon the Porte for compensation for the damage done to his Majesty's subjects in the course of its operations, not by Turks but by Greeks?

In respect to the 12th paragraph of the first letter, Mr. Canning will know best whether Count Lieven has authorised him to give the Ottoman government the information therein stated.

WELLINGTON.

[581.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MEMORANDUM ON COUNT LIEVEN'S PAPER OF QUERIES.

3rd August, 1826.

I have not got here the copy of the paper which I read to Count Nesselrode and gave to the Emperor;* but, as well as I recollect, the instructions to Mr. Stratford Canning are not accurately stated by Count Lieven.

The answer to the four first paragraphs of Count Lieven's paper is in the fact that there is no evidence whatever of the existence either of the treaty with Mahomed Ali or of the orders supposed by Ibrahim Pasha, or of the existence of such treaty or orders. Upon other points referred to in this Memorandum, it appears to me that the principle of the mission to St. Petersburg, and of the negotiations there, and of the Protocol, was pacific. The measure proposed by the Protocol was to endeavour to reconcile the Porte to its revolted subjects.

The means were to be the subject of future concert, because one of the parties was entering into discussions which might lead to war; but the very paper to which Count Lieven refers contains, if I am not mistaken, a paragraph stating that if war was intended with a view to force a reconciliation between Turks and Greeks, his Majesty's government could not be a party to such measures of hostility.

I conceive that the answer to Count Lieven's paper should be founded on this principle. I am certain that it is in the instructions upon the mission to St. Petersburg.

WELLINGTON.

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* See page 156.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 4th August, 1826.

I will go through the first of your two memoranda of yesterday as shortly and clearly as I can, amidst a thousand interruptions.

1st. The papers mentioned in paragraph seven of the first despatch, and in paragraph nine of the second, are nothing like what you suppose. They are merely the official execution of measures settled in Cabinet—one, to suppress Greek piracies—the other, to enforce the Foreign Enlistment Act at Malta and Gibraltar. The operative part of these papers belongs to Lord Bathurst's office.

2nd. I admit that *we* have less right than other Powers to come upon the Turks for indemnification either for Barbary or Greek spoliations—for the first, because we have acknowledged from time out of mind the Barbary States (a pretty stout acknowledgment), for the second, because we admit the belligerent rights of the Greeks: and it is true that if an admitted right degenerates into an abuse, we may be contented to take the redress into our own hands. I have therefore omitted all that relates *to ourselves* in that part of the despatch; but the general warning to the Turks that what Russia exacts in respect to the Barbary spoliations, other States (not we) may with equal justice exact in respect to Greek spoliations, seems to be perfectly true, unless we mean to allow Russia *exclusive* privilege of indemnification and redress; and seems to me also not ill calculated to awaken the Porte to some sense of her situation.

By omitting all mention of ourselves, the topic becomes one of friendly advice only.

3rd. I have inserted in its proper place the substance of the opinion of the law officers that Lord Cochrane might have been seized and held to bail. The law officers certainly said that there was such a power, though they added that *it had never been used.* The Cabinet, not I, decided against using it in this instance: when they determined, certainly against my judgment, to prosecute Lord Cochrane, not for going to Greece, but for *having been* in the service of Brazil. I was against the prosecution, because I firmly believed and I believe still, that the result would have been a complete triumph over the government, and the sending of Lord Cochrane forth to Greece, not as now, furtively, but in defiance of the law. This opinion may have been right or wrong. The decision of the Cabinet was to prosecute: and I have made full advantage of that decision in my instruction to Stratford Canning. I did not think the holding to bail worth mentioning, because it would have been the idlest of all processes for any purpose interesting to the Turks. I presume a bail of 1000*l.* to stand a trial would have been thought a pretty sufficient exaction. What would the effect of it have been? To add just 1000*l.* to the 37,000*l.* already paid by the Greek Committee for Lord Cochrane's service. Whether it was this consideration, or that of the *unusualness* of the proceeding, that determined the Cabinet, who had ordered the prosecution, *not* to hold to bail, I know not. But I feel that in *defending* the government with the Porte (which is the object of my despatch), I am bound to make the best of their case; and therefore, at the same time that I have added

to my statement, for accuracy's sake, the admission that Lord Cochrane might have been "seized and *held to bail*," I have thought it absolutely necessary to explain that "seizure" did not imply *detention* "of his person" (which is the only thing that could be serviceable to the Turks), and that the holding to bail resolves itself into just so much money, as Lord Cochrane's employers would have had to pay, on the forfeiture of that bail by his running away to join the Greeks.

4th. It is true that a "Commission" or "no Commission" makes no difference as *to the British law*—nor is it so stated. The statement is directly otherwise. But it *might* make a difference *practically* as to bringing Lord Cochrane within the reach of British law. For if he were a *pirate*, *i.e.*, if he were acting *without a Commission*, any one, not an English officer *only*, but an English officer, as well as any other, might justifiably sink, burn, destroy, or capture Lord Cochrane, not under the law of England, but under the law of nations. And supposing him once in a British ship, he is on British territory, and amenable to British law. But supposing him *commissioned*, as no doubt he will be, by a nation in whom (rightly or wrongfully, wisely or unwisely) this government has acknowledged belligerent rights—it appears to me that the case which you imagine of a British officer's resisting the exercise of those belligerent rights by Lord Cochrane, a Greek commander, would be directly at variance with such acknowledgment, and neither more nor less than a *making of war* upon the Greeks.

5th. As to the export of arms, I must beg you to recollect that the purpose of my despatch is to furnish Stratford Canning with the best means of *defending* the conduct of the government, not of impeaching it. The Order in Council of last year was suffered to expire, not by me, or any other individual member of the Cabinet, but upon deliberate resolution of the Cabinet, founded on the alleged fact that the prohibition of export had brought our principal manufactories to ruin. Whether we ought to inflict such a calamity on our own establishments in order to prevent the Greeks from having arms to oppose to Ibrahim Pasha, is a question of very nice morality. But it cannot possibly be stated as a question of good faith. There is no treaty which binds us to the Porte to interdict the export of arms to the Greeks, nor indeed do I believe that such a stipulation ever found its way into any treaty, except with regard to the Indian tribes, and the Spanish colonists in America. *Neutrality* is as completely observed by permitting export to both belligerents, as by prohibiting to both; but to allow it to one and refuse it to the other, may be very wise, or very courteous, or very praiseworthy, but it certainly would not be *neutral*. But whatever be the merits of the case, my business was to state it as it is. The law *does* permit the exportation of arms as merchandize: and I must authorise Stratford so to say, if he is to state the case of his country truly.

6thly. What I say of Count Lieven's professions to me is but a very faint transcript of those professions.

It is not said, however, for the purpose of being repeated to the Porte, but for Stratford's own information. All that he is directed to state to the Reis Effendi is that he hopes to find in M. de la Ribeaupierre, after the negotiation at Akermann, a zealous co-operator in his endeavours to bring

about a termination of the present state of things in Greece by a "reasonable and honourable accommodation." Surely this is sufficiently pacific and sufficiently safe, and after Austria has been for three months misleading the Porte and misrepresenting England, by assurances that the Emperor of Russia had abandoned Greece to its fate, it is surely high time that the *truth* should be made known, not in its details, but in its general character.

Count Lieven's paper I intended you to keep, in order that you might have it under your view when I send you what occurs to me as necessary to be written upon it. That, however, I shall not be able to do for some days.

I return the paper.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, yours most sincerely,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [58

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 5th August, 1826.

I received your letter last night,* and I am afraid that I explained myself badly in respect to the papers referred to in the 7th paragraph of your first despatch and the 9th of the second. I had not seen these papers and could not have intended to characterise them.

It was the first of these despatches which appeared to me calculated to lay the ground for a claim on the part of his Majesty of compensation from the Turks for the piracies committed on his subjects by the Greeks.

This claim I should have considered unjust on the five grounds stated in my Memorandum, of which Lord Cochrane's conduct was one; and in discussing Lord Cochrane's conduct I referred to your second despatch.

I know perfectly that all the decisions to which I referred are those of the Cabinet, and that is exactly what I lament; and, in fact, we do not stand as we ought, particularly in this case of Lord Cochrane. We allowed him to escape from a prosecution which we intended to commence against him; and we did enough respecting armaments to show that we felt it was our duty as neutrals to prevent expeditions from being fitted out in this country by either belligerent, but not enough really to prevent the fitting out of such armaments. Accordingly they have been fitted out, and have sailed, and we shall soon learn

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* See page 363.

the result. But there is no man who will not believe that that was intended which has occurred and will occur.

I hope I did not express a wish in the Memorandum that any British officer should oppose the exercise of legitimate belligerent rights by vessels bearing the Greek flag. But there may be, as there have been, instances of an illegal exercise of these rights; which was what I supposed might be resisted; and in the contest consequent upon this act of resistance Lord Cochrane might be captured. In this case he would come before a British tribunal for his misdemeanour (and possibly for his crime under the Act of King William) equally as he would for piracy if captured in piracy, whether by one of his Majesty's ships or by any other.

I am anxious to explain these points in the Memorandum which I sent you from Windsor, which I don't regret having sent notwithstanding that it has given you the trouble of answering it, as it has drawn your attention to the fact that the Emperor of Russia does not claim compensation from the Turks for piracies by the Greeks; and you admit that *we* could not claim such compensation. You think, however, that as the Emperor of Russia claims compensation from the Turks for depredations upon Russian commerce by the Barbary Powers, other nations not governed by his Majesty might claim compensation from the Turks for the depredations upon their commerce by the Greeks.

According to your notion we are prevented from making such claim by our recognition of the belligerent rights of the Greeks. Every nation whose ships navigate those seas has recognised the existence in some degree of those rights; which rights I believe we have contended successfully to be the natural consequence of the neutrality of the nations in the contest, and of the Greeks having it in their power to carry on the contest with the Turks by sea.

If the fact be true that other nations have recognised the belligerent rights of the Greeks, or the principle for which we have contended be well founded, could any nation with justice demand compensation from the Turks for injuries committed on its commerce by the Greeks, the latter being in a state of insurrection and war against the Turks, being able to carry on war upon the sea, and *de facto* possessing rights which those who chose to remain neutral must in some degree recognise and respect, and which all have recognised?

Can depredations committed by the Greeks, in the exercise of these rights, be put with justice upon the same grounds as depredations committed by the Barbary Powers, subjects or tributaries of the Porte and not at war with the Porte?

I am very anxious that you should consider this principle, particularly if you intend that it should be brought to bear upon the councils of the Divan in aid of your proposition of a mediation between the Porte and the Greeks.

It must in that case be communicated to Russia, and it will eventually to the world; and it might hereafter be brought to bear upon ourselves in a very inconvenient manner; and certainly would if opportunity should offer.

Besides, there is really no occasion for urging this principle upon the Porte, or for sending the first despatch at all, as I last night saw a very able Memorandum drawn by Mr. Stratford Canning upon the state of the war between Greeks and Turks and the prospects of the Porte; and a note to support the views of this Memorandum, containing a general statement of commercial grievances, in which this principle is incidentally put forward in a manner calculated to do good. Proceeding from him it can do no harm; but proceeding from the government it may eventually be brought back upon us.

I intended to call upon you this day; but, as you have postponed writing upon the Russian communication, I will not trouble you unless you should send over to me at the Ordnance.

If you should want me at any time, and will send to the Ordnance or to my house, they will send for me. I am only going to Stratfield Saye.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir James Carmichael Smyth to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD, Nutwood, Ryegate, 5th August, 1826.

I venture to lay before your Grace a précis of all the wars in which we have been engaged on the Canadian frontier from the year 1755, when we first endeavoured to wrest that province from France, to the Peace of Ghent in 1814, which concluded our late American war. My great object has been to prove from facts, as well as from general reasoning, that those points which your Grace has either suggested or approved of as being those

which ought to be held for the safety of his Majesty's North American Provinces, are, beyond the possibility of doubt or cavil, not only the proper ones; but to convince every thinking man that if they are properly occupied, and the militia encouraged and protected, the Americans have no chance of success in any future attempt against Canada.

I have not attached a map to the volume, because your Grace is so well acquainted with the relative situations of the rivers and other military features of the provinces in question, that one did not appear necessary. The table of the principal contents, immediately following the title page, will explain in a few minutes to your Grace the plan of the work; and enable, at the same time, your Grace to turn to any particular passage, or the narrative of any event. It has struck me that although it would not be perhaps prudent or proper to place a volume of this sort before the public, on account of the general reflections arising from an anxious consideration of the subject, which are to be met with towards the end; yet that if your Grace's idea of referring the whole business relative to the defence of Canada and the other British provinces of North America to a secret Committee of the House of Commons, is adopted, a précis of our Canadian wars, such as I have the honour to submit to your Grace, would be useful. The members of the Committee will naturally wish for information; and it will be here offered to them in a condensed shape. Should your Grace approve of the work and think a few copies might be printed for the use of official people and others connected with the discussion of the Canadian question, I will have great pleasure in superintending the impression, correcting the press, and in adding a skeleton map which would perhaps be desirable. At any rate I beg to offer the volume to your Grace, and shall be most flattered if your Grace thinks it can in any way be made useful in forwarding his Majesty's service.

I have the honour to be, with the utmost respect, my Lord,
your Grace's most obliged and most obedient humble servant,
J. CARMICHAEL SMYTH.

583.] *To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.*

MY DEAR WYNN, London, 6th August, 1826.

I have received your letter and the abstract of the correspondence upon the equalization of the Indian pay.

I differ from those who originally recommended the equalization of the pay. I served in the largest armies ever collected in India, composed of troops of the three Presidencies, receiving all sorts of different allowances, some of them even the famous and much envied double full batta, and these armies were placed in the most difficult circumstances, such as were calculated to aggravate all discontents, &c. But I declare I recollect having heard many more jokes than I ever did expressions of discontent respecting one set of officers and soldiers receiving

more than others. The truth is, that all received more than enough for their wants; and the envied double full batta gentlemen were only more loaded with equipages, baggage, &c., than their comrades who were less paid; and the former were supposed to be less active and energetic in the performance of their duty.

I don't believe the junction or neighbourhood of the armies of the three Presidencies in their cantonments in the countries of the sovereigns paying subsidies, or on the neighbouring frontiers of the Company's extended territories, could have made any difference.

The truth is, that in modern times we have a morbid inclination to seek out grievances, and even to suppose their existence, when we do not readily discover them. The natural remedy for this grievance of inequality of pay would have been to raise the pay and allowances of those who received least to the standard of the pay and allowances of those who received most; and this remedy would have been adopted, if those who discovered the grievance could have found some source from which to draw the money, excepting the Treasury, for the expenditure of which they were themselves responsible. Then came the notable resource of lowering the pay of some in order to find the means to be able to raise the pay of others; and as soon as the difficulty of this resource (and by-the-by of another, that of increasing the pay of the whole under a new name, house rent,) has been discovered, then comes a new projector D., with a grand sweeping scheme for augmenting the pay of the whole!

Now, in my opinion, the principle of the whole system is wrong. I declare it to be my opinion that it is not desirable to form into one army or to amalgamate the three armies in India, notwithstanding that the frontiers of the three Presidencies touch each other, or that the troops of the three Presidencies join in the camps or cantonments of the subsidised forces. Many events have occurred in India, and many more may occur, in which the safety of the country and its dependency on the British empire have rested ultimately upon this separation of the armies, and the effect of this separation of the armies upon the difference of the pay of the officers, as I believe there is but little in that of the soldiers.

This difference of pay creates a distinction of interest in all questions between government and army, or rather the European

officers of the army, and enables the government to deal very differently with such questions than they would if they were conscious they had not such distinction of interest operating in their favour.

I admit that the difference of pay may be very troublesome to officers at the head of armies composed of detachments from the three Presidencies, who do not know how to command their armies. But these difficulties are trifles; and if my opinion had been asked at the time these changes were made I would have earnestly recommended to government not to enter upon the subject at all. The fact is, that the pay and allowances of the officers of the army at each Presidency have been formed upon a consideration not of the wants only, but of the mode of life and its expenses of those officers; and when you give an officer of the Bombay establishment, for instance, what an officer receives in Bengal, you give him more than is necessary; and you enable him to accumulate money faster than his comrades of the Bengal or Madras army.

The only officers who have a right to complain on this subject are those of the King's troops, from whom a word has never been heard. Because they are moved from Presidency to Presidency, and having received for five years the best allowances in Bengal, are sent to Bombay to receive the worst. As for my part, I travelled through the three Presidencies.

However, the equalization having been ordered and so far carried into effect, I would recommend you to leave it where it is.

I would recommend you to give the full tent allowance to all the officers of the European troops. What Munro says is very true. This economy falls principally upon the officers of the King's regiments; and although it is very *safe* to trench upon them, it is not very generous, as it is they in fact who carry the armies through all their difficulties.

The full batta at Dinapoor, Burhampoor, and Barrackpoor, originated in an economical arrangement by which the Bengal army in the provinces of Oude and Hindustan was deprived of double full batta.

This arrangement is something of the nature of a bargain, which is a very bad thing with an army; but if once made it must be adhered to.

Although I started at first, therefore, at the notion of intro-

ducing the reduction for those who should enter the service from this date, I believe it is usual, considering the arrangement of 1801 in the nature of a bargain; and if the reduction is to be made, it must be in that manner.

But for the reasons which I have above stated I would not make the reduction at all. I would keep the Bengal Army as an army receiving *full batta*, while the others should only receive *half batta;* and I would introduce no new allowance of house rent; and my opinion upon this subject is strengthened by the necessity of making the alteration to take place only for those who should enter the service from this date.

I believe I have gone through all the points, and beg you, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

MY DEAR WYNN, Stratfield Saye, 7th August, 1826.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have read that part of Malcolm's book which relates to the military establishments in the East Indies, and I see that he recommends the amalgamation of the armies, the equalization of their pay, and indeed the formation of the whole into one. He attacks the opinion which I entertain of the security which is derived from the division of the establishments.

My opinion is not altered by the perusal of Malcolm's. He is a very clever fellow who has considered these subjects more than I have, and knows more of them than I do, and particularly of their present state. But Malcolm, like other men, has prejudices. He thinks the Indian army the first in the world; and of all Indian armies, the army of Fort St. George the finest. He knows the pay of the Bengal army cannot be lowered; that of the others must then be raised to the level of that of the Bengal army.

But Malcolm passes over unnoticed two or three little events not much to the credit of Indian armies, as armies, but which ought to have a great influence in the decision of these questions. First, the mutiny of the European officers of the Bengal army in '95 and '96. Secondly, the mutiny of the sepoys of the army of Fort St. George; and thirdly, the mutiny of the officers of the army of Fort St. George. Some others might be quoted, such as the arrest of Lord Pigot, &c., but I refer only to

those of modern times, as bearing more immediately upon the question.

It is true that this country can always rely upon the King's troops in India, that is to say if the Native army is kept in the hands of the Company; but I declare I believe that if upon any one of those occasions the armies had been amalgamated, and had formed but one, the dependency upon this country would have been lost.

With these events before us, and seeing what armies have done in different countries of Europe, and are capable of attempting; and knowing them as I do, and knowing, moreover, the sort of men whom you must employ to manage them, I cannot but think it fortunate that they are three separate and distinct armies, and not an army consisting of 250,000 men!

But there is one point peculiarly Indian which Malcolm has not put forward in discussing this question, however much it deserves consideration, and notwithstanding that it has not escaped him in considering other parts of this subject; and that is the different classes and nations of people of whom three armies (proposed to be made one army) are composed.

He says very truly in another part of his book that the natives of the countries about Cape Comorin are as unlike those of Hindostan, or of the provinces of Bengal, as a native of Spain or of Italy is to a native of Sweden, or the North of Germany or of Russia; and their languages differ as much as their appearance and manners. The exclusive merit of these officers of the Company's army is their understanding the language, manners and customs of the natives of India placed under their command. But how is a man belonging to a corps raised and stationed on the coast of Coromandel or Malabar, or in the Ceded Districts or the Deccan, to go and command a battalion raised and stationed in Hindostan? He knows no more of them than (not so much probably as) the commanding officer of one of the King's regiments, who may have done duty in Hindostan. The fact is, that all three armies differ in their discipline, appearance, mode of doing duty, &c., not only because they are separate armies and paid at different rates, but because they are composed of people of different nations. This can never be altered. Let us leave the rest as it is.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

If you have not read it, pray read the account of the mutiny of the officers of the army of Fort St. George, which was in fact fomented by the Commander-in-Chief General McDowall. Pray read likewise the account of the late conspiracies in the Russian armies, which are not unworthy of attention in considering this question of forming the Indian armies into one.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

Stratfield Saye, 7th August, 1826.

I am very much obliged to you, my dear Mr. Canning, for sending me the enclosed, which I don't lose a moment in returning. It appears to me to be exactly what is desirable.

I have marked the words at the end of the Note merely to throw out for consideration, whether, as the Allies have manifested a very strange jealousy respecting their being called upon to guarantee the conclusion of a transaction in the arrangement of which they have no part, it would be advisable, in the first official communication of the Protocol, to draw their attention so far to that article as in a manner to require an answer to it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To General Sir James Carmichael Smyth, K.C.B.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Stratfield Saye, 10th August, 1826.

I return your précis,* which I have read with the greatest satisfaction.

It was a knowledge of the events of the late war, and a faint recollection of those of former wars, which induced me to propose for the defence of Canada the system which has been adopted, the wisdom of which this précis proves in the clearest manner.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will have it printed privately. I don't think it desirable to publish it, or even to circulate it extensively. Let those who wish to acquire

* See "Précis of the Wars in Canada," by Major-General Sir J. C. Smyth, Bart.; printed for the use of government in 1826, and published by his son, Sir James Carmichael, in 1862. London: Tinsley Brothers.

the knowledge which it affords labour to gain it; and, at all events, there is no necessity for one letting them know in what manner we propose to apply the information which we have gained.

But the perusal of this document will be very useful to some of my colleagues; to prove to them the importance and strength of his Majesty's dominions in North America, and the utility of what we are doing.

I have written to desire that a decision may be made of the sum which we can lay out upon our internal navigations and communications next year, and that your opinion should be consulted upon this subject.

You will observe that the question of the New Brunswick frontier still remains undecided, and that we can probably do nothing upon the communication between Halifax and Quebec. But we might probably upon the whole line of the inland navigation, including that on the Niagara frontier. I shall be glad if you will communicate with General Mann upon this subject.

It is not intended to do anything in the way of fortification this year; but I will try if I cannot do something in the way of organization, and even of encouragement, of the militia in North America.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[587.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Stratfield Saye, 11th August, 1826.

I return the box with your papers. The addition to the note to Count Lieven will answer perfectly.

The scheme for a loan to Spain I suspect to proceed from the Ouvrard school. I should think that it will not succeed, even if the King should adopt the whole plan proposed; and I doubt the truth of the statement of the Spanish finances.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Stratfield Saye, 11th August, 1826.

I don't know what has been done in Portugal respecting the Constitution, or what impression has been made in Spain by the grant of the Charter by Don Pedro; but I should judge from the newspapers that the Constitution will be accepted in Portugal; and, from all that I know of Spain, that it will create a good deal of disturbance in that country, and will excite the violence of all parties and alarm the government.

I don't know that these new Constitutions do much positive mischief to the neighbours of the countries in which they are established, excepting by means of the publication of the discussions of the Chambers and by the libels of a licentious press; the one being considered the consequence of the establishment of the free discussion of laws by the representatives of the people, and the other of the institution of a free press.

Whatever may be the feeling in Spain upon the grant of the Charter by Don Pedro and its acceptance in Portugal, it will be ten times aggravated by the taunts and revilings of the Spaniards and their government, which we know to be uppermost in the heart and mind of every Portuguese, and will be the daily topic of every speech and every publication; and we must expect that before long the whole Spanish nation will rise as one man to avenge these insults, and that the government, even if we could suppose them not so inclined, will be under the necessity of putting themselves at the head of this movement.

We know enough of European politics and policy respecting Constitutions to enable us to be very certain that such measures by Spain would not be much discouraged, particularly as it is probable that the Constitution would not have put Portugal in a better state of defence than that country is in at present.

We must likewise be aware that the influence which we might have had over the measures of the Spanish government in former times is at an end. They have no longer any interest in the preservation of an uninterrupted intercourse with South America; and they know that we cannot touch their two remaining colonies in the West Indies without exciting the active hostility against us of the whole world. We may rely

upon it, then, that Constitutional Portugal, I mean in the modern sense with licentious Chambers sitting in Lisbon and publishing their debates and a licentious press, will be attacked by Spain.

The question then for us to consider is in what situation should we stand under our guarantee of Portugal? In our view of this case it is scarcely necessary for us to enter into discussions of nice questions whether a neighbour has a right to complain of the Constitution of the neighbouring country, or of the words spoken in a Chamber of Parliament, or in any other public assembly, or of the insults of newspapers. It is sufficient for my view of the case to be quite certain that war between Portugal and Spain will be the consequence of the probable state of things in Portugal, and that we shall be bound to interfere if the attack by Spain is not justifiable; and that Portugal will be lost if we should not interfere either because our interference would not be justifiable or for any other cause.

Under these circumstances I would beg leave to suggest to you for consideration this question:—Would it not be expedient to advise the Portuguese Regency, in the execution of the arrangements under the Charter,

1st. To suspend that Article which states that the discussion of the Chambers shall be public? Discussions with open doors, and the publication of the discussions of a Legislative Assembly, however desirable, are not absolutely necessary for the existence of freedom or good government in any country. Our own regulations, and the principles on which the discussions of our Houses of Parliament are founded and carried on, are, that they are private and not to be made public; and till within the last sixty years they were so in fact.

2ndly. To suspend for five years the freedom of the periodical press till a law shall be framed to regulate that matter.

This also is quite consistent with the existence of liberty in any country. The Portuguese would by these measures deprive their enemies of all cause of complaint, and would give themselves the best chance of establishing in their country a reasonable system of government; and I need not add the advantages even in Spain which would be the consequence of the tranquil establishment in Portugal of the government under the Charter.

But it is not upon this principle that I recommend that you should give the Portuguese Regency the proposed advice. I make this recommendation in order that we may avoid being involved in fresh hostilities in Portugal, in which we must be principals if they are to be successful; or the disgrace and misfortune of seeing Portugal in the possession of an enemy, (Spain), which must be the consequence of our omitting to interfere.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Cirencester, 11th August, 1826.

We shall be delighted to see you on the 25th, which on many accounts will suit us particularly.

I shall be very happy to have that opportunity of seeing your late communications with the Foreign Office.

I am very much surprised at hearing that there could have been an intention of requiring the Turks to make a compensation for what we may have suffered by reason of the piracies committed on our trade under the Greek flag. To require any State to make reparation for what a nation in amity has suffered from the ships which a revolted province may have commissioned in the course of its revolt, has always appeared to me a hard measure against the parent State, which has suffered from that revolt; and I do not recollect that in our conflict with our American provinces, any reparation was asked by, or if asked was given by us to, the nations in amity by reason of what they may have suffered in the course of that warfare. But the case does not stand as favourably with us if we were now to make such a demand. We have substantially acknowledged the Provisional government of Greece as an existing government to whom we may apply for redress. We have clothed her with all the rights of a belligerent. We have distinctly acknowledged her right of search, her right of blockade, and her right to seize and condemn all property belonging to *her* enemy (our friend and ally), which may be found on board of any of our vessels; provided that the ships making such seizures are duly commissioned by the Provisional government of Greece. We have asked, and in one or more instances obtained from the Greek government, compensation for vessels captured by ships under the Greek flag, provided such captures have been made by ships duly commissioned by the Greek government. And lastly, we have given it to be understood that if any ships or boats not regularly commissioned by this Provisional government shall attempt to make any depredation on our commerce, we will treat them as pirates.

I happen to have by me a copy of one of the instructions (something in the state of a summary), on the subject of the complaint which we made two years ago against the Greek government. I send it to you that you may see to what extent we went in treating the Provisional government of Greece as one to which we might apply for redress. It was never sub-

mitted to Cabinet (we had long separated), but it was submitted to and approved by Mr. Canning.

I also send you my last instruction to the Admiralty, founded on what had been agreed upon by Cabinet. By this you will see that the depredations committed by vessels and boats under the Greek flag, but not commissioned by the Greek government (any depredations committed by them if duly commissioned the Greek government are considered as being responsible for), are considered as acts of piracy. Our naval commander is directed to require the local authorities (viz., the local authorities of Greece) to deliver up the vessels or boats committing such acts of piracy, and also to deliver up the cargoes which have been seized: and in the event of there being no local authorities, they are directed to land and seize on the crew guilty of such piracies, and also their plunder. Having thus therefore taken the law in our own hands, having considered the local authorities of Greece as being in the first instance those to whom we ought to apply for redress, and when that redress cannot be obtained, having directed that our officers should redress themselves by seizing on the property so piratically taken, and having further given directions that the persons guilty of these piracies should be tried, and suffer the extremity of the law against pirates, I cannot imagine on what pretence of justice we can require of the Turks to make compensation for depredations committed by these very pirates, when we have taken other means, and those such efficient means, for obtaining redress. After having declared the strictest neutrality between the two belligerents, whose belligerent rights we have also declared to be equal, and as such to be equally respected by us, how can we turn short round and demand that one of the belligerents shall make compensation to us for the depredations committed under the flag of the other? We might require each of the belligerents to make compensation to us for the depredations which are committed by vessels under their respective flags, although they were not duly commissioned (this, however, would be a hard measure), but on no principle of justice or of neutrality can we require that one of the belligerents should make compensation for the depredations committed under the flags of both belligerents.

With respect to Lord Cochrane, I do not understand what the Foreign Office intends. I settled with Mr. Canning that our naval officers should be instructed to require him to produce his commission if he acted hostilely; and in the event of his not producing it, to seize him as a pirate.

I heartily wish you success in your Portuguese discussion.

Yours ever, my dear Duke, very truly,

BATHURST.

The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Llangedwin, 13th August, 1826.

I regret to find that your opinion* is so unfavourable to the project of an equalization of the pay and allowances of the three Indian armies, and to that of a future union of the whole into one army, under the Royal authority, but distinct from the rest of the King's forces, as much as the

* See page 368.

Artillery or the Marines now are from the Line. The latter I am aware is a question of great difficulty and delicacy, which must be materially affected by the circumstances which may take place during the next five years, at the end of which it will be the duty of those who may then administer the affairs of this country to be ready to bring forward their plan for the future government of India. My own opinion is that it will be found impossible, even if it were desirable, to continue this in the hands of the Company. The country, I am satisfied, will not submit to a continuation of the monopoly of the China trade, by the profits of which alone the Company pays its dividends, and a great part of its home charges. It has been sufficiently proved by the experience of the last twelve years that the trade of India may be carried on by private individuals for all purposes as beneficially as by the Company, and as the former are already admitted to a free participation in it, there would remain no *commercial* object which would render necessary a continuance of the *political* existence of the Company. Political authority they have none, as that is by the effect of the different Acts of Parliament entirely vested in the ministers of the Crown. The only objection on which stress is usually laid to the transfer of the government of India to the Crown, is that of patronage, and that I think it would not be difficult to regulate and to vest in different public functionaries, by details which it is now unnecessary to enter into. I do not advert to this topic with any design of at present arguing it, but merely to show that there exists a sufficient probability that the assumption of the government of India by the Crown will be found to be either desirable or inevitable, that it is right not to lose any opportunity of obviating the difficulties and inconveniences which may then attend such an arrangement.

Among other advantages which I am disposed to anticipate from a transfer of the Indian army to the Crown, is that of diminishing that disposition to combination and insubordination which appears to have been a characteristic of the Company's officers from the period of the general resignation of commissions, which the first Lord Clive met with such promptitude and decision, down to that of the mutiny of the Madras officers during Sir George Barlow's government. I mean not to overrate the general feelings of loyalty in these days, but still they are powerful, and many of those who would most willingly engage in a combination, or even an open mutiny against the India Company, for the authority of which they can entertain neither respect nor attachment, would recoil with horror from the idea of resistance or rebellion against the Crown.

This, it seems to me, would be an advantage which would more than counterbalance any evil resulting from an union of interest.

Allow me, however, to ask whether the danger of open and *successful* mutiny is likely to arise from any dissatisfaction of the *officers?* Does not the history of the last sixty years show their utter inability to induce the troops to take part with them against the government, even at periods when the neglect of duty among the officers had not so much weakened their influence over the men as at present? The objection which arises from the difference between the habits and dispositions of the inhabitants of the different parts of India would, I think, be obviated by the maintenance of the present system of regimental promotion, and some further regulations which it would not be difficult to frame respecting the promotion and posting of the Field Officers.

With respect to the particular allowances now under consideration, I do not feel much objection to the recommendation of the Madras government to give that for tentage to all European, as well as Native officers, in garrison and cantonments, as well as in the field; but, at the same time, I should like that there should be a greater allowance in the field, rather than that service there, with all its expenses, should be compensated by profit when in a state of inaction. It is obvious that, though this on the general average may come to the same result, yet it must frequently happen, particularly with respect to the King's troops, that the field service, and consequent loss, may fall to the lot of one, the compensation arising from the allowances in peace to another. To avoid this entirely is I know impossible in all large arrangements; but still I would guard against it as much as possible, and it is on this account that I feel very partial to the suggested division of the batta into five parts for the field and three for garrison.

I am much averse to admit the reasoning of the Bengal letter, which sets up the arrangement of 1796 as a *compact* with the army. It certainly was at the time a beneficial arrangement, and has prevented much additional expense, but I cannot feel that the government is precluded by anything which passed thirty years ago, to the maintenance of which the public faith was neither directly nor impliedly pledged, from now effecting any further retrenchments, or that these retrenchments must be delayed till all the officers now in the army may have quitted it.

The admission of such a principle, and the creation of a precedent which would be appealed to upon all future occasions both by the military and civil service, whenever any measure at all affecting the interest of officers should be proposed, would be of the most fatal consequence.

I would, therefore, far rather continue the allowances to the three stations for an indefinite time, than limit them as proposed in the India House draft. If they are to be reduced, the furthest degree of compensation to which I could reconcile myself would be either their continuance at their former rate to the regiments who should succeed to the two next turns of duty at those stations, as at first proposed, or else that they should be continued to every officer now in the army while he retained the same rank as at the time of issuing the order in India. The latter appears to me to be the true principle—to maintain interests which actually exist, but to overlook those which are contingent. If it were now proposed to reduce the pay of the Guards to that of the Line, the ensigns might reasonably object to the diminution of their *own* pay, in expectation of which they accepted their commissions, but surely they would not be entitled to ask compensation for any reduction in the grades superior to their own because they hope hereafter to rise to them.

It is possible that I have taken a prejudiced view of the question, but it is impossible to find that every account agrees in representing the Madras army as superior in efficiency and every qualification to that of Bengal, without being sensible to their complaints of the inequality of their allowances. This certainly is not a time for subjecting the Indian territorial finance to additional charge, unless some corresponding saving can be discovered.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, ever most faithfully yours,

C. W. WILLIAMS WYNN.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Coombe Wood, 16th August, 1826.

You will of course suppose that I have seen your correspondence with Canning upon the present state of Portugal.

With some few qualifications, which do not affect the result, I very much agree with you in the view you have taken upon this subject; I am anxious, however, to receive at your leisure some explanation upon one point on which I may have taken up very mistaken notions.

From what I recollect of the Peninsular war, I had adopted the idea that Portugal *single-handed* was, in a *defensive war*, a complete match for Spain *single-handed*. I was aware that the population, power, and resources, of the latter very far exceeded that of the former, but I thought this would be fully countervailed in a *defensive war* by the Portuguese being at least more docile soldiers, by the natural strength of the country, by the course of the rivers, and by various other circumstances peculiarly advantageous to Portugal.

I was further confirmed in this opinion by the *fact* of the independence of Portugal, which must have grown rather out of her own strength than out of the abstinence and forbearance of Spain, and by the consideration that the only occasion on which Portugal was conquered by Spain, in the plenitude of the Spanish power, it was not by an invasion by land, but by the Duke of Alva entering the Tagus with a superior fleet. It may be said, perhaps, that Spain would not attack Portugal without the promise of assistance from France. This would entirely alter the question, and the point I wish to have solved is, not what Portugal could do against Spain assisted by France, but what she could do against Spain *alone*.

I think this whole question in short though of not much consequence at the present moment, may become of the greatest importance hereafter; that it is very desirable, therefore, that it should be well considered, and that we should have the benefit of your opinion upon it.

I sincerely hope the case will not occur. I believe by good management it may be prevented; but still we may have to deal not only with perverseness of governments, but likewise with the feelings and animosities of two nations.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Canning is here, and I have shown him this letter.

I am going on an excursion for a fortnight. I shall return to town by the 5th of September.

To Lord Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, Margate, 18th August, 1826.

I have received your letter of the 16th, and I am very happy to find that you agree with me in the view which I have taken

in a late letter which I wrote to Mr. Canning on the subject of Portugal.

I believe it is from me that you have imbibed the opinion that Portugal single-handed, was, in a defensive war, a complete match for Spain. I certainly entertain that opinion, and have more than once delivered it. But it is of Portugal, with her army and her other military establishments and resources, such as militia and landwehr or *ordenanzas*, well organised, complete, and well disciplined and commanded; her fortresses garrisoned and supplied with all requisite for their defence, and the materiel and other establishments of an army in the field in a fit state for service. This is the Portugal which I think is more than a match for Spain single-handed; and this is the state in which I have always wished to see Portugal placed, in order that we might be ourselves in some degree of security that the war would not recommence, as I think the Spaniards would not dare to attack the Portuguese if the defence of Portugal was, as it ought to be, thus provided for; and if the Spaniards should be so blind as not to see their danger, their Allies would be aware of it and would prevent them from making the attack.

But, as far as I have been able to learn, Portugal is at present in no state of defence; and, as I told Mr. Canning in my letter, the Constitution is not likely to improve the situation of that country in that respect. Indeed, on the contrary, I see in the newspapers that a part of the army has revolted, and that the colonels of the regiments at Lisbon had constituted themselves into a sort of deliberative body, and had expressed their attachment to the Constitution. Whatever may be the means of attack which Spain possesses (and I am not disposed to exaggerate them or to entertain a higher opinion of the royalist volunteers than they deserve), I don't hesitate to say that Portugal does not now possess an army or the means of defending herself against any attack which Spain may make.

What we must endeavour to do, then, is to prevail upon Portugal so to shape her course under her new system as not only not to give ground of offence, but that the Allies and advisers of Spain, who are still desirous of, and have an interest in, the continued preservation of the general peace, may be satisfied that the most effectual measures have been adopted to prevent the new institutions in Portugal from giving offence or creating mischief in Spain.

This is all that we can do at present, and we must hope that in time Portugal may not be a burthen to us, if she should not become an useful ally.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Sir John Malcolm. [59

MY DEAR MALCOLM, London, 20th August, 1826.

I received last night your letter of the 15th. I have no notion that the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean can be referred to the Cabinet. Such a proceeding would not be usual, and I should think would not be adopted.

I have both spoken and written to Lord Melville about your brother, and I really don't think I can do more that would be of service to him.

When men come to be of high rank in their profession and to look to the highest situations in their profession or the State, recommendations from individuals, however high in station, can be of no use to them. They must rely upon their own character and their conduct in former situations which they have filled; and in this view I believe there is no man stands higher than your brother, and he may rely upon my giving this opinion whenever there is an opportunity.

I was not in the Cabinet when your brother commanded on the St. Helena station. I don't know what occurred, or whether his conduct gave satisfaction or not.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lieut.-General Sir Mark Colville. [59

MY DEAR GENERAL, Stratfield Saye, 21st August, 1826.

I have perused with attention the papers which you have sent me regarding your claims to prize for the operations in the Persian Gulf and at Kittoor.

In respect to the first, it is useless that I should give any opinion upon it, as it appears that the Treasury have already decided against it.

In respect to the second, I can only give you my opinion of the probable decision of the Treasury.

The inclination of the opinion of the Treasury is always in favour of the actual captors, and I think that on this ground they will decide against you; your political duties having kept you from the siege, they would consider as a reason against the grant to you of any part of the prize, instead of being in your favour. You certainly intended when you sent me these papers that I should tell you my own opinion, which I do for your own information, intending that it should remain entirely between ourselves.

When you were at Poonah, and gave the orders to the troops to move upon Kittoor, you took upon yourself an authority which you did not possess. Nobody but the Governor in Council could legally give those orders, and they must have been in some manner confirmed by him. You could therefore found no claim upon the issue of those orders, nor could you upon any other part of the operation which you could not have ordered.

There is a clear distinction between the authority and duties of a Commander-in-Chief in the field and not in the field, and most particularly in India. In the field he is like the Commander-in-Chief afloat. He is supposed to order all movements and operations, and is responsible for all; and it is on this ground that he claims and has his eighth of prizes. When he is not in the field he does not order movements. They are ordered by the Governor in Council, and the Commander-in-Chief is not responsible. You were not in the field; you could therefore issue no orders excepting by an authority assumed with the reliance that your orders would be confirmed.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

592.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Stratfield Saye, 21st August, 1826.

I have received the box which you sent me yesterday, which I return. I had seen the papers which it contains after I had written to you on the subject of Portugal.

I am as much averse as anybody can be to interfere in the

internal concerns of an independent nation, even in the way of advice; and if I was not convinced of the probable result which an unrestrained press and public debates in Portugal would produce in Spain, and of the probable consequences, as stated in my letter to you, I should not have made the suggestion which that letter contains; and I would advise you and the government not to adopt my suggestion if you do not feel the same conviction.

But if you and they do feel that conviction, I would beg to submit to you that there can be no doubt about the propriety of giving the advice: although upon a matter of internal policy it refers clearly to the relations between Portugal and foreign States, particularly her neighbour; and that is a point in which this country has a direct and immediate interest.

An order to Sir William A'Court, whether given in a despatch or in a private letter, is equally an order. But I confess that this matter appears to me so important, and it is so important that we should be clearly understood, as well here as in Portugal and by Don Pedro, that I should have preferred to see the discussion in a reasoned despatch.

I am aware that such a measure is likely to create a good deal of clamour among those in this country who derive their existence from public confusion; but you may rely upon it that there is not a man of sense in the country who will not applaud an act which must have for its objects exclusively to keep this country at peace, and that she should continue to enjoy the advantage of the independence of Portugal.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel. [5

MY DEAR PEEL, Stratfield Saye, 21st August, 1826.

What passed in conversation between you and me yesterday respecting the crops in Ireland has never been out of my mind since; and as I don't know that you and I look at this impending calamity in the same view, I write you what I think of it, that you may see whether we are of the same opinion, and where we differ.

When I was in Ireland I understood that the common mode

of paying the country labourers at that time was to give each of them a cottage and garden at a certain rent, which rent they worked out for the person from whom the tenement was held, at a given rate of wages. That the labourer, by himself or his family, cultivated the garden, which supplied the food of the family. That if the labour was required for a longer period than was paid for by the rent of the cottage, it was paid in money; which money provided the clothing, fuel, and food of the labourer and his family during the period that the produce of the garden would not supply the latter. This period varied from one to three or four months in bad seasons, and it is for this portion of their food alone the Irish country labourers have been in the habit of coming upon the markets. This portion of their food has been oatmeal.

This system prevailed generally throughout Leinster, Munster, and Connaught; and varied only in some places by the hiring to the labourers of what are called *con acres*, instead of gardens, which *con acres* were only so many roods of land in a field cultivated by the peasantry in general for the production of their food.

Upon this state of things, if it still exists, the calamity of a total failure of the potato crop is at last impending. This calamity, if it occurs, must deprive the country labourers, who are paid by gardens or by *con acres*, not only of the food on which they subsist, but of the wages of their labour. We cannot expect that the landlord or the tenant, who let the garden or the *con acres* to the labourer, will pay him over again for his labour. It follows, then, that even if the markets in Ireland could be filled with food for sale, these unfortunate peasants could buy nothing, as they have nothing; and they could earn nothing, as they have already been paid for their labour by that which, owing to this calamity, will yield them nothing.

This is the way, then, in which we shall stand in Ireland if the calamity of the total failure of the potato crop should fall upon us, in addition to that of the failure of the oat crop.

1st. We must fill the markets with oats, barley, or some other food, for the consumption of that part of the population who have hitherto been fed from the markets; that is to say, those who live upon the profits of their trades, or who receive wages in money for their labour. These I believe live generally in towns.

2nd. We must supply food for those who have hitherto been fed from their own gardens, &c., and who have not been in the habit of coming upon the markets for more than a certain period of the year. If I am not mistaken, this is the whole of the country population of the three southern provinces; and I believe that the whole or greater part of this food, although distributed to the consumers for labour, must be given by the public gratuitously.

3rd. We must contrive the means of distributing this food.

If the state of things in Ireland is what I imagine and as in my time, and the extent of the calamity should be what I suppose, I believe you will find that I am not far wrong in my rough estimate of the expense of what we are about to undertake. But great as the expense will be, that is not the greatest difficulty, which will consist in finding the food and in the distribution of it.

It appears to me that the best mode of proceeding would be to establish in each county, or even smaller district if possible, a committee which should have the power of granting assistance, either in money or provisions, to those whose labourers have hitherto been paid by the lease of gardens or *con acres*, and who may be in want, in order to enable such persons to pay and subsist their labourers. These advances to be in the first instance in the way of loan, to be repaid in the whole or in part, according to the circumstances of the borrower.

According to this system, nothing can be given excepting for labour; and some of the expense incurred might be recovered.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Mr. Griffin.

MEMORANDUM UPON THE MILITARY ARTIFICERS IN THE WEST INDIES.

23rd August, 1826.

I have long had these papers in my possession, and have frequently considered the subject to which they relate, without having yet been able to bring my mind to any satisfactory conclusion.

The first question is this, Is it necessary or desirable to have a

corps of black artificers and labourers under the Ordnance in the West Indies?

Upon this point I have not sufficient information; but I can conceive that circumstances may exist in which such an establishment might be necessary, and even desirable. The evil of such an establishment is its expense, and the habits of idleness and delay which it occasions. In truth, the artificers and labourers belonging to an establishment of this description do but little work; and to have such a one in the service is necessary or desirable only when work is to be performed in a station where artificers cannot be hired.

In this case, however, the artificers and labourers ought to be disposable to be employed in all parts of the West India command.

The next question is, supposing such an establishment to be necessary or desirable, Is it possible to render the establishments of this description now existing in the West Indies available to the formation of it? Are they disposable in all parts of the command? Are any portions of them necessary to be kept in any particular island or station?

If not, an establishment is necessary, and these men can be applied to the formation of it. I would then recommend to the Board the following arrangement: to form a battalion of black artificers and labourers in the West Indies, consisting of two or more companies; to which officers of Engineers (those on the spot) should be posted, as they now are to the Sappers and Miners, and that the number of artificers of each description, and of labourers in each company, should be fixed, as well as the pay for each description.

I would then enrol the men now forming the different descriptions of artificers and labourers in the different islands in these companies; and if it should be thought proper to leave them in the islands in which they are now serving, they should be considered as detachments from their several companies.

I would not propose to diminish the pay of any artificer or labourer now in the service. If he should have been in the habit of receiving more than is allowed to his class in the pay-table to be annexed to the warrant forming this establishment, he shall continue to receive the excess, as additional pay. It appears to me that, according to this plan, this matter may be settled.

I beg the Board will consider this Memorandum, and that if they should approve of what is herein proposed, they should refer it to General Mann.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Brighton, 23rd August, 1826.

I send you a copy of a letter from Pozzo, which Count Lieven has just put into my hands, and which shows that Pozzo is disposed, or professes to be disposed, to act cordially with us in the Turco-Greekish Question.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

En attendant ma réponse officielle, je m'empresse de vous accuser la réception de votre expédition du 15me, qui m'a été remise hier soir par Lord Granville. Nous étant concertés ensemble ce matin, nous avons convenu que nous remettrions conjointement au Baron de Damas le Protocole du 4me Avril; que nous ferions lecture de la correspondance entre vous et Mr. Canning, et que nous en laisserions copie s'il le désire. Cette forme nous a paru remplir le but de nos instructions, et prouver en même tems l'unanimité des deux Cours.

Pour y préparer M. de Damas, je me suis rendu chez lui, d'accord avec Lord Granville, afin de lui demander l'heure à laquelle il voudrait nous recevoir. Il vient de nous appointer pour demain à midi. Je l'ai laissé entièrement satisfait de la marche que nous avons adoptée.

En examinant attentivement la lettre de Mr. Canning à son ambassadeur, nous avons cru apercevoir le désir de faire la chose de manière à éviter une réponse écrite de la part de la France, afin de ne pas donner lieu à quelques observations, surtout à l'égard de la garantie éventuelle dont il est fait mention dans le Protocole. Cela étant, nous avons dû nous abstenir de tout acte qui aurait provoqué la réponse susmentionnée, c'est-à-dire de toute note d'accompagnement à la communication du Protocole.

Avant même de voir Lord Granville j'avais rédigé le projet dont je vous envoie copie. L'ambassadeur l'a trouvée convenable, si nous devions présenter une note quelconque; mais après mûre considération nous l'avons écartée, pour ainsi dire, par la question préalable. Si j'en juge d'après ma conversation avec M. de Damas, la forme que nous avons préférée semble lui être plus agréable.

Lorsque vous nous ferez parvenir votre travail successif, mandez-nous si vous voulez qu'en le communiquant il soit accompagné d'une note écrite, et envoyez-en le projet pour qu'il nous serve de règle. Nous désirons d'agir ici absolument dans vos intentions.

II.

PROJET DE NOTE.

Les soussignés, en vertu des ordres qu'ils ont reçu de leurs Cours respectives, ont l'honneur de communiquer à M. le Baron de Damas, ministre des affaires étrangères de S.M.T.C., le Protocole signé à St. Pétersbourg le 23me

Mars (4me Avril) de l'année courante, par leurs E.E. le Comte de Nesselrode, Secrétaire d'Etat de S.M. l'Empereur de Russie au département des affaires étrangères, et le Comte de Lieven, son ambassadeur près la Cour de Londres d'une part, et S.E. M. le Maréchal Duc de Wellington, ambassadeur extraordinaire de S.M. Britannique près S.M. l'Empereur de Russie, de l'autre.

Le document que les soussignés ont l'honneur de porter à la connaissance du Cabinet de S.M.T.C. a pour but *de faire cesser par un arrangement conforme aux vœux de la religion, de la justice, et de l'humanité, la lutte dont la Grèce et les îles de l'Archipel sont aujourd'hui le théâtre.*

Un résultat si désirable ne saurait manquer de réunir les vœux et d'obtenir la co-opération des Puissances Alliées; et c'est dans cet esprit que les soussignés ont reçu l'ordre de faire au Cabinet de S.M.T.C. la communication confidentielle de l'acte qui en contient les principes généraux, et qui indique la marche qui a été jugée la plus propre à les faire adopter par les parties belligérantes.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Whitehall, 24th August, 1826.

I apprehend that your letter contains a very accurate description of the general state of the Irish peasantry in Leinster, Connaught, and Munster, at the present time.

If there shall be a failure of the potatoe crop in a considerable part of Ireland, so great as to make it absolutely necessary for the government to provide subsistence for the people out of the public funds, I should be disposed to advise that the distribution of the funds should be as far as possible placed in the hands of persons immediately employed by the government, and responsible to the government. I have a total want of confidence in any local committees that could be formed, and believe they would be, if formed, mainly influenced by party feelings and a spirit of jobbing.

The expense of paying regular agents of the government, subject to a strict account, would be nothing when compared with the sums which they would save by checking Irish country gentlemen.

I am much more sanguine than you are as to the rate of expense at which in any, even the worst, event the people in Ireland can be subsisted, particularly when I look at what has been done by the London Committee.

It is astonishing what they have done with an expenditure of less than a hundred thousand pounds. I bear in mind the vast difference of the two cases. Still, making allowance for that difference to its full extent, I shall be surprised if any demand on account of Ireland be made to the extent of one million.

There is one point in your letter that I do not quite understand. You say that, "suppose there is a total failure of the potatoe crop, the country labourers will be deprived not only of the subsistence they derived from their gardens, *but of the wages of their labour.*"

You had previously calculated that the landlord can in general find labour enough for the cottier to *work off* the rent of his cottage and garden, and also to enable him to buy oatmeal enough to subsist the family for a certain period of the year, varying from one to four months, according to the season.

Why should not the labourer earn the same wages now that he did before? What he will lose will be his potatoes; but if he has the same employment that he had before, he will not also lose that portion of his food which he has been accustomed to buy in the markets.

I enclose a letter which I have this day received from Goulburn, which gives a much less gloomy account of the state of affairs than was given in his former letter.

I hope I shall have full information both from Ireland and Scotland before the 29th. I have taken all the necessary steps to procure it.

Ever, my dear Duke, most truly yours,

Robert Peel.

The last paragraph in Goulburn's letter refers to various suggestions which I offered, assuming the worst to happen, and which I begged might be considered beforehand, as far as they were capable of being so considered; with respect, for instance, to the means of providing store-room, transport of provisions, &c., &c.

I think much may be done with the rice that is in store in this country.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

My dear Peel, Stratfield Saye, 25th August, 1826.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter, and I am happy to see from that from Goulburn, which I return, that the prospect has improved a little in Ireland.

I agree with you that the committees to which I referred must be composed of the servants of government. But there must be numerous committees if the distress should be very general.

The way in which I make my estimate of the expense is as follows: I suppose the potato crop to be totally lost, and that you would have to feed the whole population which now take their food from the produce of gardens or *con acres*, for at least the period for which their gardens usually supply them. I suppose the number of that class to be four millions, and that you would have to feed them for eight months, or two-thirds of the year.

I then suppose that the smallest sum which the food would cost would be twopence a day for each person, which would be two pounds in round numbers for the eight months; and this for the four millions would be eight millions sterling.

I may be in error in respect to the numbers; but I don't think I am in respect to the time you would have to feed the population if the calamity should prove to be what I at first appre-

hended, nor in respect to the sum which the subsistence of each person will cost.

I mean this by the expression in my letter to which you advert. The labourer takes his garden for a certain sum, we will say five pounds, which sum he is to pay in labour, we will suppose at sixpence a day. The payment which the labourer receives is the produce of the garden by which he and his family subsist. Whether the garden produces much or little, or nothing at all, the holder of it is equally bound to pay rent to his landlord in money or in labour, and having no money, he would be obliged to pay in labour; for which labour, the crop being gone, the labourer would have lost his wages as well as the provisions for the year for himself and his family. I don't mean that he would have lost two values; but the distinction is important, because the landlord would remain with his claim upon the labourer for his labour till the rent should be worked out; and unless the food is to be doled out to the labourer, without calling upon him for work, it will be necessary to give it to him through the intervention of the landlord.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Brighton, 25th August, 1826.

I send you a despatch, received to-day from Granville, announcing the execution of the *first step* relating to the Protocol.

You will see that Pozzo and Granville have acted together cordially, and that the communication has been as well received as possible by the French minister.

I enclose also the drafts of a letter from me to Count Lieven, and of his answer, which are to constitute the *second step* in this affair.

The enclosures in my letter are extracts from Stratford Canning's despatches, all of which you have seen, and I have not a set of them by me to send to you at present.

You will take for granted that they bear out the description given of them in my letter to Lieven.

Lieven is here: which makes our intercourse upon this matter go on quickly and smoothly. He seems to have brought Pozzo into admirable order.

Be so good as to return this box to the Foreign Office. I shall be there on Monday.

Ever most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [5

My dear Mr. Canning, Cirencester, 27th August, 1826.

Seeing in one of the despatches which I return that the corps diplomatique at Lisbon have manifested a disposition to act cordially with Sir W. A'Court, I venture to suggest for your consideration whether it would not be advisable to modify in some degree an instruction which you recently sent him, which I saw yesterday, in respect to the conduct of those persons.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Count Lieven.**

Foreign Office, 29th August, 1826.

After having transmitted to the representatives of our respective sovereigns at Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, the necessary authority for communicating to those several courts the Protocol of the 4th of April, the next object that presents itself for our consideration is to examine how far events subsequent to the signature of the Protocol may have affected any of its provisions, and may have created either obstacles on the one hand, or facilities on the other, to the carrying of those provisions into execution.

The Memorandum which your Excellency has put into my hands affords a convenient guide for such an examination.

The questions stated in that Memorandum divide themselves into two parts:—

1st. What has been the result of the overtures made by his Majesty's ambassador to the Ottoman Porte in execution of his original instructions?

2ndly. What are the instructions now to be given to his Majesty's ambassador in execution of the provisions of the Protocol of April?

I. The result of the overtures made by his Majesty's ambassador to the Porte, for the purpose of inducing the Ottoman government to treat for the pacification of Greece, appears in the despatches from that ambassador.

It is a result which was naturally to be expected under the alteration of circumstances which had taken place during the interval which had elapsed after the instructions for Mr. Stratford Canning were drawn, and before he arrived at Constantinople.

II. The enclosures exhibit the execution and effect of that part of the ambassador's instructions which related to the project imputed to Ibrahim Pasha (with the connivance of the Porte) for the depopulation and subsequent re-colonization of the Morea.

It is not easy to draw a confident inference from the conduct of the Porte in this discussion.

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* Extract from 'Correspondence with Russia relative to the affairs of Greece previous to the conclusion of the Treaty of July 6, 1827.' Presented to the House of Commons by command of her Majesty, 1863.

In the face of the Reis Effendi's positive verbal denial of the plan imputed to the Porte and its vassal, it would be hardly warrantable to found an assumption of the truth of such an imputation on the mere refusal (not unusual with the Porte) to repeat its verbal denial in writing.

III. The instructions with which the British ambassador was furnished on these subjects at his departure for Constantinople being thus exhausted, those to be furnished to him for his future proceedings thereupon would have been to be founded entirely upon the Protocol of April; but for an occurrence (coinciding remarkably as well with the date as the substance of the Protocol) which has already afforded to the British ambassador an opportunity, and indeed imposed upon him the obligation, to re-open with the Turkish government a discussion respecting the pacification of Greece.

About the same time that the Protocol reached the hands of the British ambassador, he received the letter from the new Greek government.

The substance of the opinions expressed in this paper was indeed collected by Mr. Stratford Canning in his conferences with certain leading individuals among the Greeks on his way to Constantinople, and is recorded in the Protocol as the foundation of that agreement; but never till the receipt of the enclosed paper were we formally authorized to declare to the Turkish government, as a fact of which we had positive knowledge, the readiness of the Greeks to come to an accommodation upon any terms short of absolute and total independence.

This paper supplies us with that authority.

In other respects the contents of the Protocol and of this paper coincide, as I have said, in a remarkable degree:—

1st. The recognition of the suzerainty of the Porte;

2ndly. The payment of an annual tribute; both proposed by the Protocol, are both voluntarily offered by the Greeks. In return, they require what the Protocol stipulates for them:—

1st. Complete independence of internal government and administration.

2ndly. Complete separation of Christian and Turkish society.

These are the essential and fundamental bases of a reconciliation.

The only material differences between the two projects of pacification are:—

1st. That the Protocol assumes a willingness on the side of the Greeks to admit a certain qualified participation of the Porte in the original composition of the Greek executive government, which willingness is not expressed in the Greek paper.

2ndly. That the Greeks do not distinctly advert to the purchase of the Turkish property which is to be given up, in order to effect the required separation between Turks and Christians.

3rdly. That the Greeks propose to extend the benefit of the arrangement to the whole of Greece, including even those parts which may be occupied by the Turkish arms.

4thly. That the Greeks require, as a condition *sine quâ non* of any arrangement to be made, the guarantee of Great Britain.

With regard to all these differences, however, it is to be observed that they are not greater or more numerous than were naturally to be expected between the demands of one of two parties to a dispute, and the suggestions of an impartial mediator. There is nothing in them which is not susceptible of modification.

The first is an omission only, not a contradiction, in the Greek paper, of that which is contained in the Protocol. Supposing other parts of the arrangement satisfactorily adjusted, there is no reason to despair of inducing the Greeks to consent to conform to the suggestion of the Protocol in this particular.

As to the second, the Greeks having admitted the principle of a pecuniary payment, and the Protocol suggesting the principle of a transfer of property, there seems to be no reason why the details of the proposed separation may not be amicably adjusted.

As to the third, the Greeks, perhaps, could ask no less; but the Protocol expressly reserves the designation of territory for an ulterior stage of the discussion.

As to the required British guarantee, it must be remembered that the demand for that guarantee is put forward by the Greeks in an application addressed to Great Britain alone; and not having in contemplation the joint intervention in their behalf of any other Power or Powers.

When the reasons which induce us to wish to decline undertaking such guarantee shall have been explained to the Greeks, and when the guarantee of other Continental Powers, together with that of Russia, shall be offered to them, it is hardly to be apprehended that this difference alone will be an obstacle to a satisfactory understanding.

The British ambassador would have been instructed immediately to bring forward a new overture to the Porte, founded on this application from the Greeks, had not the existence of the Protocol rendered it incumbent upon us not to proceed to any new negotiation with the Porte except in concert with the Russian government.

It is fortunate, perhaps, that there has existed this occasion for delay.

The situation of affairs at Constantinople during the last three months has been such as offered but an unfavourable opportunity for opening any subject with the Divan which required a patient and dispassionate consideration.

It appears to the British government, however, that no time should now be lost in furnishing his Majesty's ambassador with instructions conformable at once to the provisions of the Protocol, and to the propositions of the Greeks.

The details of those instructions; the corresponding instructions to be sent by the Court of St. Petersburg to its destined representative at Constantinople; the mode and the time of inviting the Allies to lend their aid to this new attempt for the settlement of a question deeply interesting to the tranquillity of Europe; and finally, the means by which that settlement is to be recommended to the adoption of the Ottoman government—will form the matter of our next deliberation.

Meantime it is proposed to make to the courts of Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, with your Excellency's concurrence and co-operation, the like confidential communication of this letter to your Excellency, and of its enclosures, as has been made of the Protocol and of the preceding part of the correspondence between your Excellency and me thereupon.

GEORGE CANNING.

597.] *To Colonel Hill.*

MY DEAR HILL, London, 30th August, 1826.

I have no objection to Captain Bouverie. You cannot order the Court of Inquiry in regimental orders, because you cannot oblige ——— to attend it; but you may order it verbally.

But there is one thing on which I must insist if I am to be a party bound by this inquiry, viz., that it shall be a real serious inquiry.

If it is not, it will be much better to confine it to what I suggested in my letter from Stratfield Saye.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Count Lieven.

M. LE COMTE, Foreign Office, 4th September, 1826.

I proceed to the consideration of the questions which your Excellency has proposed to me respecting the measures to be taken in execution of the Protocol of April, in the event (which has actually occurred) of the first overtures of his Majesty's ambassador at the Porte proving unsuccessful.

I state these questions (I believe correctly) in the enclosed paper.

The first and fourth questions are already satisfactorily disposed of by the direct application of the Greeks for the intervention of the British ambassador at Constantinople.

Those conditions of an arrangement between the contending parties, which the Protocol of April had suggested as equitable and reasonable, and had assumed (on the faith of individual opinions among the Greeks) to be not inadmissible on their part, the British ambassador is now distinctly authorised to bring forward (with few variations), as constituting conditions which the Greeks are agreed in demanding, and with the concession of which they would be contented.

His Majesty's ambassador, therefore, by laying before the Turkish government the propositions of the Greek letter, will not only conform his proceedings to the spirit of the Protocol, but will bring forward, in effect, all the stipulations of that instrument, with only those exceptions which are pointed out in my last letter to your Excellency. It may, perhaps, be safely left to the Turks to insist on those excepted stipulations.

Should the arrangement be found in its essential and fundamental points acceptable to both parties, those comparatively less important differences could not long obstruct the conclusion of it.

The question of British guarantee is one between Great Britain and the Greeks, with which, in this stage of the discussion, it is not necessary to embarrass ourselves.

It is proposed, therefore, that his Majesty's ambassador shall be instructed

to prepare forthwith an official note to the Porte, founded on the basis of the Greek letter.

It must be left to the discretion of the ambassador to select the fit opportunity for making this overture, so far as that selection depends upon the state of things at Constantinople.

The second and third questions propose, respectively, the two opposite hypotheses of a successful issue to the negotiations at Akermann on the one hand, or of their failure on the other.

It is asked, "What, in the first hypothesis, are the instructions to be given to the Russian minister at the Porte, as to the share which he is to take in the execution of the Protocol; and what the principles upon which he should act in concert with his Majesty's ambassador?"

In the second hypothesis (which excludes the notion of a Russian minister at Constantinople), it is asked, "In what manner will it be expedient to proceed for the purpose of giving effect to the beneficent stipulations of the Protocol?"

In the first hypothesis (that which is the most to be expected, as well as the most to be desired), it appears clear to the British government that the avowed, direct, and cordial co-operation of M. de Ribeaupierre in the overture of the British ambassador will be the measure at once the most consonant with the spirit of the Protocol and the most likely to be conducive to its success.

The Greek letter must be the basis of the British ambassador's overture, because from that alone he derives the authority to speak confidently of the wishes and intentions of the Greeks, and consequently the means of defeating the pretext hitherto put forward by the Turkish government that even if the Porte were disposed to pacification there is no assurance of a reciprocal disposition on the part of its revolted subjects.

But though the proceeding of the British ambassador is to be thus founded upon the Greek letter, the Protocol of April may (as the British government think) be advantageously announced at the same time to the Turkish government, as constituting the pledge of co-operation between Russia and England.

It may be frankly avowed to the Reis Effendi that the execution of the instructions of the British ambassador has been hitherto delayed for the express purpose of waiting the benefit of that co-operation, to be derived (as was confidently anticipated) from the happy result of the negotiations of Akermann.

The near coincidence between what was agreed upon at St. Petersburg, in April, by the plenipotentiaries of Russia and England as the extent of the concessions to be reasonably required for the Greeks, with what the Greeks, at nearly the same moment, were agreeing upon at Napoli di Romania as that which would satisfy them, may be fairly stated to the Turkish ministers as an indication at once of the altered temper of the Greeks, and of the indisposition of the two Allied Powers to lend themselves to pretensions unnecessarily unfavourable to the interests of the Ottoman Empire.

The invitation to other Powers to accede to this arrangement and to lend the sanction of their guarantee to it, when carried into effect, will, if accepted (as there is every reason, from the reception of our first commu-

nication to the Allies, to hope that it will be), present the first instance of a combined appeal to the Porte on the part of the Quintuple Alliance; while, on the other hand, the refusal (if that were to be apprehended) of any one of the members of that Alliance to come into the arrangement, or the different degrees (if such difference there should happen to be) of their co-operation, would not in this, as in former instances, destroy the effect of our overture to the Divan.

The Protocol of April, the bond of union between England and Russia, would still remain unaltered, and the principle of its operation unimpaired.

The second hypothesis, while it is I trust the more improbable of occurrence, is also the more difficult of discussion, because it is not clearly indicated in your Excellency's Memorandum what would be the immediate consequences of a failure of the negotiations at Akermann as affecting the relations of Russia and the Porte.

It is unnecessary to say how earnestly and anxiously the British government continues to deprecate the breaking out of a war which, however the Emperor of Russia may have studied, by all his Imperial Majesty's declarations, to define and circumscribe its object and its range, might nevertheless lead to complications fatal to the general tranquillity of Europe.

Viewed simply with reference to the Protocol, the effect of a war between Russia and Turkey must obviously be to deprive his Majesty's ambassador at the Porte of any assistance from direct Russian co-operation. But the 3rd article of the Protocol would, in our judgment, be still obligatory upon Russia. In any pacification by which that war should be concluded, Russia would be morally bound to stipulate for the Greeks to the extent of the stipulations proposed in the Protocol, but bound at the same time to stipulate for them in no other manner and to no greater extent.

The self-denying engagements by which the two high contracting parties bind themselves to each other in the 5th article of the Protocol, would also, in our opinion, continue in full force.

There remains to be considered the concluding question :—

"What are the determinations to be taken in the event of the Porte's showing itself inaccessible to any proposition relative to Greece?"

It has been already sufficiently explained to the Court of St. Petersburg that the British government could not consider the refusal of the Porte to listen to proposals for an accommodation with Greece as a just cause of war on the part of the Power through whose mediation those proposals may have been made.

But though we do not consider such a refusal as giving a right of war against the Porte, we do conceive the continuance of a contest so ferocious in its details, so hopeless of termination, and leading to excesses of piracy and plunder intolerable to civilized Europe, to be an evil of so extraordinary a character as to justify extraordinary interposition, and to render lawful any expedients, short of positive hostility, for impressing upon the recusant party the necessity of a reasonable accommodation.

In this view his Majesty's ambassador has already brought before the Porte, in general but forcible terms (by the note of which the enclosed is a copy), the dangers which she incurs from the continuance of the piratical excesses in the Archipelago.

In this view also, the intimation held out by his Majesty's ambassador

in the name of his government, with respect to the alleged plan of Ibrahim Pasha, has been left suspended, but ready to be carried into execution, if what is as yet only matter of suspicion should ever become matter of proof.

Russia may express sentiments and take measures analogous to these; or she may declare her knowledge and approbation of those already taken by England.

Other Powers may do the like, and such concurrence, if general, could hardly fail to make the Porte reflect seriously on her position.

But there are still other measures short of war which would be at once just in principle, and calculated to produce a salutary effect upon the feelings of the Turkish government.

Assuming that the negotiations at Akermann succeed, and that a Russian minister has been established at Constantinople, we think that the threat of a simultaneous withdrawing of the Christian missions from Constantinople, upon an obstinate rejection by the Porte of all proposals of pacification, and the actual execution of that threat if necessary, might constitute a powerful appeal to the pride as well as to the prudence of the Grand Seignior.

The advisableness of taking this step, it must be acknowledged, would depend upon the concurrence of other Powers. But if Russia and England were agreed as to the expediency of taking it, the probability is that neither France nor Austria would pursue an opposite course.

Neither of those Powers could desire to afford countenance and support to the Ottoman government in the protraction of a contest against the consequences of which both of them have recently protested in the strongest manner, and against which Austria especially has been obliged to resort to naval exertions on an altogether unusual scale.

There is yet a further step, one which the Austrian government recommended to the adoption of the Allies at the conferences of St. Petersburg in the spring of 1825, which if it was justifiable under the circumstances of that period cannot but be still more clearly so now, after near two years more of ravage and bloodshed have fruitlessly desolated Greece, and after the Greeks have proved themselves capable of maintaining for nearly two years more a national struggle for independence.

On that occasion it was wisely as well as justly counselled by Austria, that if the Porte should decline the intervention of the Allies, or if, having accepted that intervention, it should obstinately refuse all the concessions which they might judge indispensable for bringing the Greek insurrection to an end, the ministers of the Allies should then assume a severer language and a more imposing attitude.

Accusing then, and with justice, the Divan alone of prolonging those fatal troubles of which the effect is felt throughout Europe, and which place in jeopardy alike the interests of sovereigns and of their people, the Allies would declare the impossibility of allowing such a state of things to exist longer.

They would give the Porte to understand that it was possible that the Allied Powers might draw nearer to the Greeks; they might send to Greece consular agents, and receive such agents in return; they might consent to recognise the existence of the provisional government in that country, and

they might even threaten to admit, some day, the independence of the Morea and of the Islands.

It is to be presumed that when the Austrian plenipotentiaries speak of the acknowledgment of the Morea and the Islands as an independent State, they intend that acknowledgment to be subject to the qualification that such State shall have shown itself substantially capable of maintaining an independent existence, of carrying on a government of its own, of controlling its own military and naval forces, and of being responsible to other nations for the observance of international laws and the discharge of international duties.

These are questions of fact. By acknowledgment we can only acknowledge what is. We have never recognized in Spanish America any State in whose territory the dominion of the mother-country has not been practically extinguished, and which has not established some form of government with which we could treat.

What the Austrian plenipotentiaries mean, therefore, we conclude to be this: that we should intimate to the Turks that (in the case supposed) we should look to Greece with an eye of favour, and with a disposition to seize the first occasion of recognizing as an independent State such portion of her territory as may have freed itself from Turkish dominion.

In this sense, and with this qualification, it does appear to us that what the Austrian plenipotentiaries have recommended is a judicious, and would probably be an effective, course of action.

If this plan was fit to be recommended when the consent of the Greeks to any reasonable terms of accommodation was uncertain, how much more clearly advisable is it now, when the Greeks have shown themselves capable of being satisfied with terms so far short of the extreme pretensions which they were heretofore supposed to entertain?

If the Allies agree now to adopt this plan, it can hardly be doubted that upon their united representations the Porte will prefer the qualified suzerainetés which the Greeks offer, and which the Protocol secures to her over Greece, to the acknowledgment of the Morea and the Islands as an independent State by the most considerable Powers of Europe, with Austria at their head.

Such, therefore, are the means by which we hope to prevail with the Divan, avoiding the extremity of war, and such the order in which we think those means may be successively employed.

I have nothing further to observe to your Excellency, except that upon the principles herein laid down (if your Excellency sees nothing to object to in them) will be founded the instructions which I am about to prepare for his Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

MEMORANDUM RELATIVE TO THE PROTOCOL OF APRIL 4, 1826.

1. In case the overtures of Mr. Stratford Canning relative to the pacification of Greece should be unsuccessful, section 3 of the Protocol of the 23rd March

(4th April), imposing upon Russia and England the obligation to take advantage, separately or together, of every favourable opportunity to use their influence with the Porte for carrying into effect the arrangement whose bases are contained in this same Protocol, what are the opinions of the British Cabinet as to the carrying into effect of this obligation in the present state of affairs?

2. The success of the last step taken by the Russian Cabinet towards the Turkish government must inevitably restore Russian influence at Constantinople.

The Russian Cabinet also likes to believe that the negotiations at Akermann will meet with success.

In this latter hypothesis what instructions should the Minister of his Imperial Majesty receive relative to the execution of the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April)? and on what principles should he conduct his negotiations, and what attitude should he assume towards Mr. Stratford Canning?

3. In case the negotiations at Akermann should, contrary to expectation, fail of success, what would be the opinion of England on the best plan to adopt in order to realize the benefits stipulated for in the Protocol above-mentioned?

4. Moreover, has England taken, or does she calculate upon taking, any action towards the Greeks which may have for its object the accomplishment of this Act, or the determination of any details left undecided by it, and which, in accordance with section 4, were to be decided at a later period?

5. Finally, if the Porte were to be found accessible to every proposition relative to Greece, what would be the opinion of the Court of London in this hypothesis as to line of action to be pursued?

II.

Mr. Stratford Canning to the Reis Effendi.

Pera, 13th June, 1826.

The undersigned begs to call the attention of the Reis Effendi upon the following facts and observations.

He must be aware that the capitulations confirmed by the Treaty of Peace of 1809 constitute the basis of the amicable relations which exist between Great Britain and the Sublime Porte.

It is also notorious that the principal object of these engagements is the protection of British commerce in the ports and seas of Turkey.

The undersigned has already found himself obliged to complain of more than one act of injustice and violence committed by the Ottoman authorities to the prejudice of the subjects of Great Britain and in contravention of treaties. He has also found himself obliged to protest against the delays and the obstacles with which the Sublime Porte too often obstructs the settlement of the best founded complaints. At present a more important matter, and of a more urgent description, presents itself.

Piracy, the consequence of the strife which has desolated during five years the provinces of Greece, is rife in the Archipelago. The security of navigation is destroyed. No flag is respected. Ships are seized, cargoes are pillaged, the crews, often ill-treated, esteem themselves happy if they escape with their lives. Finally, the squadrons of several governments, maintained at great cost in the waters of the Levant, do not suffice to protect commerce.

It is asked who are these pirates who bring disorder everywhere, and who threaten to render useless, and almost to annul, the most sacred engagements contracted by the Turkish government towards the nations of Christianity?

It is answered that they are subjects of the Porte who, irritated by vexatious treatment, and reduced to misery, give themselves up in despair to brigandage

as to the sole means of existence left them without returning to a condition of life which has become, in their eyes, odious and insupportable.

The undersigned believes he is fulfilling the duties of a sincere friendship by calling the attention of the Sublime Porte to this truly deplorable state of things, and in informing it of the opinion which his Court have necessarily formed of the origin of these disorders which directly affect the interests of their trade, and compromise the dignity of their flag.

It is an important prerogative that justice and the law of nations ascribe to an aggrieved nation that it has a right to demand that its subjects should be indemnified for the wrongs and injuries they may have sustained, or to go back to the origin of the wrongs they have suffered, and remedy them in a complete and lasting manner. It is nevertheless impossible to see without pain an interesting portion of Europe abandoned at a period of general tranquillity to the horrors of a barbarous war; to see crime, the growth of misfortune and of want, spreading over a whole population, and the peace of Europe itself exposed during these disorders to the chance of danger.

Stratford Canning.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Cirencester, 5th September, 1826.

I confess to you that as far as I could understand the long despatch on the Greek mediation, I am not satisfied with the manner in which that business is left. But having only heard it read over once, I may be mistaken. I may also be unreasonably jealous on the subject, as I know it has been long a great object with the Foreign Office to take a part for the Greeks, as being a very popular cause among a large description of well-meaning people, as well as with all democrats.

I have always suspected that the zeal which Count Lieven brought to Petersburg in favour of the Greek cause came from the Foreign Office, and I am quite satisfied that all the questions which we heard read as from Count Lieven were at the suggestion, or at least in concurrence with that Office. You met Count Lieven's proposition at Petersburg with great address and advantage to your country by converting it into an obligation on Russia not to require better terms for the Greeks than those contained in the Protocol, in the event of a war with the Turks. The Foreign Office has with as much dexterity, but in my opinion not as advantageously for the country, converted the Protocol into an obligation on us to *require* the Turks to grant these terms to the Greeks, although there should be no war with Russia. It is true that there were some words in the despatch disclaiming an intention to go to war with the Turks if they would not submit to the terms, but there was a pretty broad hint that under some pretence or other force would be exercised, and you will see that menaces at least to this effect will be used.

If there should be war with Russia your stipulations will be of great use, and in that case, what I apprehend will not happen. But in the event of peace, our mediation will only take the appearance of a demand. Acting with Russia only, we can only appear as the friends of the Greeks against the Turks, for we cannot persuade the Turks that Russia is friendly to them, or that Russia has their interests at heart. From that moment we in effect disclaim all real regard for Turkish interests; and the terms which we propose from the Greeks are so little in consonance with the probable

state of the war, that we cannot expect anything but an indignant refusal.

I shall be very glad if I have misapprehended this despatch or overrated the difficulties in which we may be placed by the manner in which I fear it will be acted upon.

You will be able to correct me as to the meaning of the despatch, as you have seen more of it; and you will be able, by watching the progress of the negotiation, to check the manner in which it may be executed.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 6th September, 1826.

In consequence of the opinion expressed in your Grace's Memorandum of the year 1822, on the subject of the expenses incurred in the maintenance of French prisoners of war in Portugal, that, for the reasons stated by your Grace, Portugal might be fairly called upon to defray those expenses, the auditors of public accounts were, in conformity to that opinion, directed to prepare an account of the disbursements made by Great Britain for the subsistence of the prisoners while they were detained in Portugal.

This account so prepared has been transmitted by me to his Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon, with instructions to press the Portuguese government to come to a settlement upon it.

I have the honour to transmit to your Grace the several answers which his Excellency has returned to those instructions.

I would request your Grace to have the goodness to take these papers into your consideration, and to favour me with your opinion, how far your Grace may now think it expedient or proper to persist in urging this demand. The Portuguese government (it appears) not only object to it, but propose to make a demand upon us for the reimbursement of that proportion of the expense which has actually been defrayed by them.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

To Lord Bathurst.

[5

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Stratfield Saye, 7th September, 1826.

Mr. Canning showed me his despatch to Mr. Stratford Canning founded upon that which we saw on Saturday addressed to Count Lieven. The latter is founded upon the Protocol, and its object is to state to, and discuss with, the Russian government the means of carrying that instrument into execution. The Protocol defines clearly that the Greeks are to hold under the Turks. The French term used is *relèveraient*. Yet through-

out the despatch Mr. Canning calls them the New State; talks of the independence, &c., than which nothing was farther from the contemplation of the parties who concluded the Protocol. All this I have had altered.

In respect to the means of executing the Protocol, two are proposed in the letter to Count Lieven, which we heard read on Saturday. One of them is to withdraw our ambassadors, which you will recollect was limited to a proposition to be made to all the Allies to do the same. The other is to recognise the independence of Greece; which proposition you will likewise recollect that I had limited to that portion of Greece in which all contest should have ceased, according to the precedent in the case of the Spanish Colonies.

Nothing is said upon the first point in the despatch to Mr. Stratford Canning. For what reason it is omitted I can't say; but I conclude it is because he did not find Count Lieven very ready to consent to give up the Russian diplomatic relations with the Porte after they should have been re-established in consequence of the settlement at Akermann of all the Russian disputes with the Porte.

The second point is only referred to in the despatch to Mr. Stratford Canning in the discussion of the reasoning to be addressed to the Greeks on their demand in relation to the extent of country which is to be the object of the arrangement. I think therefore that upon both points we are quite safe.

I have always been of opinion that the Turks cannot make the conquest for want of a maritime force; and that opinion will be confirmed if Lord Cochrane can appear in the Archipelago. I have no objection therefore to take into consideration the means of enforcing a settlement. It is true that the piracies of the Greeks will very soon destroy them if Lord Cochrane should not have strength enough to enable him to proceed to the seat of the war. But in that case even Mr. Canning will not wish to protect them, and we shall be pledged to nothing. But at all events, if we look at the threats as they now stand in the despatch to Count Lieven, they are next to nothing. We are not pledged even to state to the Allies the proposition to withdraw our ambassador unless Russia should consent; and not pledged to carry that proposition into execution unless the other Allies, principally France and Austria, should consent. We are not pledged to acknowledge the independence of any part of

Greece unless all contest in that part should have ceased, which is not likely, whatever may be the chance which the Porte may have of completing the conquest. Upon the whole then I consider that the Greek case is still in the hands of the government.

My own opinion is that the Emperor of Russia cares but little about it; and that opinion is founded not only upon what I saw and learnt at St. Petersburg, but upon what has passed here. I beg you just to compare what has passed between Mr. Canning and Count Lieven in the six weeks which have elapsed since the latter came to this country, with what passed between the Russian government and me in the month which I was at St. Petersburg. The truth is that the case has not moved at all at the rate at which any case ought in which either party felt any great interest. The Emperor of Russia seized with great dexterity the opportunity which our dispute with the Porte about Ibrahim Pasha gave him to settle his own affairs; and you will observe that all Lieven's questions upon his arrival were directed to discover where that dispute stood, and how we stood generally with the Porte. The information acquired in his first communication with Mr. Canning was sufficient to enable the Emperor to know that he might safely push his negotiation at Akermann to extremity. That is all that Count Lieven required, and he has allowed Mr. Canning to take his own time about other matters.

But if the Emperor should be able to settle his affairs at Akermann, which Mr. Canning thinks from what Count Lieven has told him that he will do or go to war, we shall find him but little disposed to unsettle them again in order to turn the Turkish sovereignty over the Greeks into a *Suzerainetè*.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Cirencester, 10th September, 1826.

I am very glad you had an opportunity of seeing the instructions to Mr. Stratford Canning before they went. As long as you can keep the Foreign Office to the Protocol we shall be safe; but there will be a constant attempt to slip from it.

It is evident that Russia cares very little about the Greek cause *as a separate question*. Indeed, after the first interview which Canning had

with Lieven on Lieven's return from Petersburg, I heard Lord Liverpool ask what was felt about the Greek question, and Canning answered (I do not believe he intended that it should be heard), "We may do what we please about it."

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[599.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR, Royal Lodge, Windsor, 16th September, 1826.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 6th of September regarding the claim upon the Portuguese government of payment of the expenses incurred during the late war on account of French prisoners, during the period that they remained in Portugal.

You will observe that my Memorandum of January 8th, 1822,* upon the subject of this claim, states that the principle therein laid down appeared to be fair, "unless, indeed, Great Britain claimed, in the discussion of the different cartels of exchange with France, an advantage over the other two Allied Powers."

In answer to this claim on the part of his Majesty's government the Portuguese government state, besides matter which relates to detail,—

1. That they would have a claim upon the French government for the payment of the expenses incurred on account of French prisoners during the war.

2. That they lost the opportunity of making such claim in consequence of his Majesty's government giving up the prisoners upon the negotiation of the peace without stipulating for the payment of their expenses.

3. That his Majesty's government relinquished the claim of the payment of those expenses in consideration of the admission by the French government of the claims of his Majesty's British subjects as subsequently settled by the Convention of 1815.

4. The Portuguese government therefore contend that not only the claim of his Majesty's government upon them for payment of the expenses incurred by his Majesty's officers on account of French prisoners is not just, but that the Portuguese government have a justifiable claim upon his Majesty

* See vol. i. of this series, page 213.

for the payment of other expenses on the same account incurred by Portuguese officers.

I had not the treaties before me when I wrote my Memorandum of January, 1822; but the paragraph which I have above quoted shows that when I wrote it I considered that there might have been negotiations respecting French prisoners of war which might have affected this claim.

I believe it is certainly true that the common practice has been for nations to claim at the settlement of a peace the payment of the expenses of prisoners of war which each may have incurred during the continuance of hostilities; and that the French prisoners captured during the late war by the Allied armies serving in the Peninsula being, at the time of the negotiations for the peace, in England, were sent to France without any stipulation being made for the payment of their expenses; and that they were not mentioned in the treaty of peace excepting by way of set-off against the stipulation in favour of the private claims of his Majesty's subjects.

I am again writing, however, without having the treaties before me, and wholly from recollection. But if my recollection of the treaties be correct, I should say that his Majesty has derived from the keeping of the prisoners an exclusive advantage; and therefore that his government cannot claim from the other Allies the repayment of the expenses incurred by his officers in Spain and Portugal respectively, even according to the moderate arrangement suggested in my Memorandum to the Treasury of January, 1822.

I don't think it necessary for me to enter into the consideration of the question whether the same principles ought to be applied to the claim of the Portuguese government for the repayment of the expenses incurred by Portuguese officers in Portugal on account of the same prisoners.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I return the enclosures in your letter.

To Mr. Planta.

MY DEAR PLANTA, Royal Lodge, Windsor, 16th September, 1826.

I was in hopes that now that government have acted upon the Protocol of the 4th of April last, the affair of the

despatch No. 9* would have been settled previous to Mr. Canning's departure for the Continent.

Mr. Canning told me that that despatch, which had been circulated to different missions, should be withdrawn from the records—should be replaced by another; in consequence of which I did not send to the office my answer to it which I had brought home with me.

It is really not right that that despatch should remain upon the records unanswered; and I am very anxious that this matter should be settled previous to the meeting of Parliament, when it is probable that all these subjects will be discussed.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[601.] *To Mr. Planta.*

MY DEAR PLANTA, Stratfield Saye, 30th September, 1826.

I hope you will find time to arrange No. 9. The fact is that I had written an answer to it, of which I gave Mr. Canning a Memorandum; but I did not give in the despatch itself, as he told me that the despatch No. 9 should be withdrawn or altered as I might wish.

It would not do to go to a public discussion of this Russian negotiation, which however we shall certainly have in the next Session of Parliament, without my answer to No. 9 being on the record, or No. 9 itself being cancelled or altered. I hope that you will find time to settle this matter before Parliament will meet.

Did Mr. Canning write a despatch to Portugal before he went on the publicity of debates and the press in Portugal?

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Paris, 2nd October, 1826.

I send to you through Lord Liverpool, for his and your decision, a question of the greatest importance, upon which I am quite willing to put my judgment into your hands, with two reservations only, in which I think both you and Lord Liverpool will agree with me. If the decision shall be

* Dated 11th April, 1826; see page 290.

affirmative, perhaps you will have the kindness to undertake the communication of it to the person concerned, first ascertaining his Majesty's pleasure upon it.

I do not mention the matter to his Majesty, because, if Lord Liverpool and you should think it better not to proceed in it, the less that is said about it the better.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Walmer Castle, 4th October, 1826.

I lose not a moment in forwarding to you the enclosed letter, which I have received from Canning.

You will perhaps recollect that I have always been of opinion that Lord Beresford should return to the command of the Portuguese army. It is in my judgment the only chance of rendering that army effective, and of checking the insane proceedings of the Spanish government.

Canning refers this question to your judgment and mine, and if the decision is to depend upon my opinion, I must certainly decide in favour of Lord Beresford's acceptance.

At the same time I think the two conditions annexed by Canning quite right in themselves, and likely to obviate much eventual embarrassment.

I hope I have expressed my own feelings clearly, and if you concur in them, you will have no difficulty in acting accordingly.

It is of course of the utmost importance that this whole matter should be kept *secret*, and that it should not transpire, if possible, until the arrival of Lord Beresford at Lisbon.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke,

very faithfully yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Have the goodness to return me Canning's letter, of which I have not had time to keep a copy.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MR. CANNING'S PROPOSITIONS.

4th October, 1826.

1. That Lord Beresford, if he goes, goes only as what he now is, Commander-in-Chief of the army, but not with any expectation of holding, or permission to accept, a seat in the Cabinet or Council of State, or House of Peers, or any political situation or employment whatever.

2. That he is to be considered by Sir William A'Court to all intents and purposes as a Portuguese subject; and that the British ambassador is not to interfere in any questions between the Portuguese government and Lord Beresford.

[602.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, Sudbourne, 6th October, 1826, 8 A.M.

I have only this moment received your letter of the 4th, and its enclosures.

I know nothing that has passed in Portugal, nor of the state of the relations between Portugal and Spain, excepting what I see in the newspapers, and it is not very agreeable to give an opinion upon any subject without having accurate information of the whole case.

With this reserve, however, of a total want of information of the state of things in Portugal excepting what the newspapers give, I do think it desirable that Lord Beresford should be prevailed upon to take the command in Portugal. But I confess that I think there are circumstances in his situation, in the times, and in the relations of the army towards Don Miguel, which render it far less likely that he will be able to re-establish the discipline and efficiency of the army than it would have been some years ago.

In respect to the conditions which Mr. Canning has attached to the permission to be given to Lord Beresford to go to Portugal, I conceive that the first had better be omitted, if it is thought important that Lord Beresford should assume the command of the Portuguese army. I know that his Lordship always thought that in time of peace, at least, he could not perform his duty by the State or by the army if he was not minister of the War Department; and in that character he might be called upon for his advice.

I think the second condition quite necessary; and indeed I conceive that in proportion as this condition is rendered clear and effectual to the extent of Lord Beresford's divesting himself entirely of his character as an Englishman, and of his connexion with the government of this country, will the first become unnecessary.

However, as Mr. Canning considers both conditions important, I will send the proposition to the King with both; and if Mr. Canning should alter his opinion regarding the first, his answer will probably have arrived before I shall have to write to Lord Beresford. But if it should not, I will send the propositions to Lord Beresford as they have come from Mr. Canning.

I enclose the note which I have taken of Mr. Canning's propositions, which I will send to the King.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

P.S. I do not write to Mr. Canning, in order that I may not detain the messenger; but I beg your Lordship will inform him of my opinion and intentions.

To the King. [6C

Sudbourne, 6th October, 1826.

I enclose to your Majesty the copy of a letter which I have received from Lord Liverpool,* and the copy of one from Mr. Canning to myself,† upon the subject of an offer to Lord Beresford of the command of the Portuguese army, upon which your Majesty will observe that Mr. Canning has desired that I should take your Majesty's pleasure, as well as on the conditions intended to be proposed to Lord Beresford, of which I likewise enclose a transcript from Mr. Canning's letter to Lord Liverpool on this subject.

I cannot better inform your Majesty of my opinion of the question referred to in these letters than by enclosing your Majesty the copy of my letter upon them to Lord Liverpool.

I likewise enclose the letter from the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Lord Beresford, and Sir W. A'Court's letter to Mr. Canning, which I request your Majesty to return to me if your Majesty should approve of my making to Lord Beresford the propositions contained in these papers.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Royal Lodge, 7th October, 1826.

The King has read with attention the papers transmitted to him by the Duke of Wellington, and which he now returns.

The King is entirely of the same opinion as the Duke of Wellington with regard to the propriety of the second condition proposed by Mr. Canning.

The King doubts Marshal Beresford's acceptance of the command of the Portuguese army if hampered with the first condition; and therefore if Mr.

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* See page 409. † See page 408.

Canning considers it of *great importance* that the command should be taken by Lord Beresford, probably Mr. Canning will reconsider the first proposition.

The King desires that the Duke of Wellington will communicate the contents of this letter to Mr. Canning and Lord Liverpool.

G. R.

The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Friend, Royal Lodge, 7th October, 1826.

I add this short note *merely for yourself*, to tell you that I am quite of your opinion upon this matter. The first proposition cannot be flattering to the feelings of Lord Beresford; nor do I think, in a political view, it would be a dignified measure for *us* to take.

Yours very affectionately,

G. R.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke of Wellington, Paris, 9th October, 1826.

Lord Liverpool has sent to me your answer to his letter on the subject of the proposal respecting Lord Beresford.*

If you and he think the first of the two conditions which I wished to annex to his acceptance unnecessary, I am not desirous of pressing it. My opinion undoubtedly is, that a British minister in the councils of Portugal will be a thing to which we must expect the strongest objection from foreign Powers; a thing of quite a different sort from a foreign general at the head of the Portuguese army.

All I should still desire therefore would be that this situation may not be of *our asking*; that it may come of itself, if it is to come at all; and that if Lord Beresford declines the service offered to him because the Cabinet office is not annexed to it, *that* reason for declining it may not be stated to the world.

I have my doubts, indeed, how far Lord Beresford *can* properly decline the military service, if he still receives military pay other than as a retired allowance.

Last night I received the enclosed despatch from A'Court, which I send in original. It is fit that Lord Beresford should be apprised of its contents.

It is fit also that I should mention to you a circumstance which has just occurred, strongly confirmatory of Sir William A'Court's opinion of the disposition of the *liberal* party towards Lord Beresford. *M. Pinheiro*, whom Lord Beresford knows too well, I believe, to want any description of him, has sent to request to see me, for the purpose (as the Brazilian Minister, by whom his message was delivered, stated to me) of representing the expediency of sending a British officer to take the command of the Portuguese army, *but not Lord Beresford.*

M. Pinheiro's arguments will not signify a straw; but the fact that he has this objection to Lord Beresford is evidence of the feelings of his party.

M. Pinheiro himself is going to Brazil to negotiate a commercial treaty

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* See page 410.

between that country and Portugal. *He*, therefore, will not be in Lord Beresford's way.

By the telegraph I learnt on Saturday evening that the King of Spain had *given way* on the dispute respecting the Portuguese deserters. But the details of this intelligence will not be here, at soonest, before to-morrow morning.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

George Canning.

To Lord Beresford.

My dear Beresford, London, 9th October, 1826.

I enclose you a letter from Don Francisco de Almeida, requiring you to re-assume the command of the Portuguese army, which I have been desired to transmit to you.

His Majesty has consented to permit you to take this command, and his government are desirous that you should not hold any political situation or employment in Portugal, nor have a voice in the Portuguese Councils or House of Peers. They are at the same time desirous that you should, in your situation of Commander-in-Chief, be considered as a Portuguese subject; and that the British ambassador should not interfere in any question between the Portuguese government and you.

You know what my opinion upon this subject has always been. The circumstances of the times are altered; your own personal position is not the same that it was; and the army has relations with the Infante Don Miguel, which you may find very inconvenient in the exercise of your authority.

But still your name and character carry great weight. You may be able to restore order, regularity, and discipline, to this mass of confusion and mutiny; and if you should succeed, I don't hesitate in saying that you will have rendered to this country and to Europe the greatest service that it is in the power of any man possibly to render at the present moment.

If you should fail, you may rely upon it that there will be candour enough in the world to allow that the circumstances occasioned difficulties which were insurmountable.

After all, what does failure signify, in a personal point of view, to a man like you who has had so much success, and respecting whom it can ever be said that you made every exertion in your power to obtain success?

You will see that you must decide soon upon this subject, as your presence in Portugal is wished by the end of this month.

I have asked Lord Liverpool to have an Admiralty steam-vessel and a ship of war ready for you at Falmouth by the 25th of October.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[605.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, London, 9th October, 1826.

I enclose the copy of the letter which I wrote to the King on Friday.

I likewise enclose the copy of the letter which I have written to Lord Beresford. You will observe how I have modified Mr. Canning's conditions, so as to leave it open to him either to withdraw the first or to adhere to both as he may think proper. I have thought it better to do this than to delay any longer the transmission of the Portuguese Secretary of State's letter to Lord Beresford, as so little time remains before he must depart if he should accept the offer.

I recommend to you to apply to the Admiralty to make arrangements to send an Admiralty steam-vessel and a ship of war to Falmouth by the 25th of October, to take Lord Beresford out if he should consent to go.

I beg you to send all these papers to Mr. Canning.

I send back Sir William A'Court's despatch of the 21st September.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[606.] *To Mr. Planta.*

MY DEAR PLANTA, London, 9th October, 1826.

I return the box which you were so kind as to send me, for which I am much obliged to you.

I conclude that Lord Liverpool has informed you that I had not any information upon a subject on which his Lordship and Mr. Canning desired to have an opinion from me, excepting what I could collect from the newspapers. This is perfectly

true; and you will recollect that I have repeatedly stated to you that, if my opinions or assistance were required, I must, and it was but fair that I should, be kept informed of what was going on.

I am even now very imperfectly informed of the state of this important Portuguese question upon which I have been lately called upon to give an opinion; and, if I am not misinformed, there was intelligence in London a week ago of farther desertions from the Portuguese army, the garrison of Almeida for instance, of which I see no accounts.

The members of the government were in the habit of seeing and knowing everything, and I conclude that Mr. Canning means that his colleagues should be informed.

But this I must say, that I have never failed to go to the office whenever I have come to town, but have never found anything excepting when the Cabinet is summoned.

We then see what is passing at the moment; but no man can acquire information in such a manner, so as to enable him to form an opinion and give advice for which he can be held responsible.

I have not seen any despatches from Constantinople of the 9th September, nor had I seen any of those in this box excepting one from Mr. Lamb.

I take this opportunity of returning to you Mr. Canning's draft to Lisbon upon the discussions in the Chambers. I see that he has omitted to refer to the abuses of the press.

I have not by me the answer which I wrote to the despatch No. 9, nor the Memorandum which I gave to Mr. Canning. I must defer for a day or two to send you a note upon that subject.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Walmer Castle, 10th October, 1826.

I have received your letter this morning, together with your correspondence with the King and your letter to Lord Beresford.

I shall forward them to Canning by the mail of this evening. I have written to him to recommend to him to modify his first condition. It may be quite impossible to draw an absolute line between military and political discretion. I shall be quite satisfied if Lord Beresford is *not* a member of the legislature, and if it is understood that he is only to be called to council when his military situation may render it necessary.

I sincerely hope Lord Beresford will accept, though I admit all you say of the change of circumstances in the course of the last two or three years.

His very name, however, would create confidence in Portugal, and give serious apprehensions to the Spanish government and nation.

I trust Charles X. will yet be induced to recall his minister. In other respects the French government appear to be acting fairly and honourably, and if our respective missions at Madrid could co-operate cordially, we might surely be able to prevent the two countries from coming to extremities.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

607.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, London, 10th October, 1826.

Since I wrote to you yesterday Mr. Planta has sent me some despatches received at the Foreign Office regarding the affairs of Portugal, I conclude because you had informed him that I had no information upon that subject excepting what I had collected from the newspapers; from these papers it appears to be admitted that Don Miguel has a right to the Regency in October, 1827, unless the Emperor Don Pedro should exclude him by an Act *ad hoc*, or keep him at Vienna, or prevail upon him to go to the Brazils.

The course last mentioned would give Lord Beresford more facility in forming and disciplining an army for the service of the crown of Portugal than either of the other two; under neither of which do I think it possible for Lord Beresford to render any service. But at all events, it appears to me but fair towards Lord Beresford, if he should consent to go to Portugal, to let him see these despatches and judge for himself of his chances of success before he sails.

I know that there is still some intelligence in London of the desertion of the garrison of Almeida which I have not seen.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Walmer Castle, 11th October, 1826.

I quite agree with you that if Lord Beresford consents to go to Portugal he ought to see the correspondence of the last few months, and I will write to Planta accordingly.

The question whether Don Miguel has a right to the regency in October, 1827, is certainly a doubtful and perplexing one; the inclination of my opinion is against his right, but you will see the question fully argued in one of Canning's drafts.

It is clear, however, that Don Miguel can claim no right under the constitution until he has taken the *oath* to it, and this Prince Metternich has thought proper hitherto to prevent.

It would be most fortunate if Don Miguel would accept the proposal of the Emperor and go to the Brazils; it would give us time, and might be the means of obviating all other difficulties, but I fear the same influence which has prevented his taking the oath may likewise defeat this project.

If the state of affairs in Portugal should appear to Lord Beresford to be such as to induce him to hesitate about the command of the army, would it not be the best course for him to go out and judge himself upon the spot whether he could or could not be of use?

I wrote to Croker yesterday about the ship.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

To Lord Liverpool. [608.

MY DEAR LORD, Apethorpe, 11th October, 1826.

Since I last wrote to you yesterday Mr. Planta sent me some farther papers respecting Portugal and Spain, including Mr. Canning's instructions to Mr. Lamb to withdraw from Madrid eventually in case the Spanish government should not consent to give up the arms, &c., of the Portuguese deserters.

I will not enter into the consideration whether these instructions are right or wrong; though I must observe that Mr. Canning, in conversation with me, admitted that it was desirable not to withdraw his Majesty's minister from Madrid as long as the discussions in regard to Portugal were going on, notwithstanding that it might be expedient to withdraw him on grounds arising out of discussions on British interests. But here we are with a step taken which will be considered as a signal of war throughout Europe, and which will infallibly mix this country in this Portuguese dispute unless we depart from the course now adopted, and will therefore involve this country in war without any one of the ministers being aware of the existence even of discussion.

I am certain that Mr. Canning would not consent to such a proceeding by any other man. There is no person who (with propriety, in my opinion) reserves to himself more frequently

the right of judging for himself of the cases for which he is to be held responsible. I am certain, likewise, that you will admit that this is not the mode in which the business of this country ever has been, or can be carried on.

I am the last man to desire to put Mr. Canning or the public service to any inconvenience; but I must say that when we come to such serious matters as those now in discussion the Cabinet should be called upon for its opinion.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

[609.] *To Mr. Planta.*

MY DEAR PLANTA, Apethorpe, 11th October, 1826.

It is really useless to continue a correspondence upon a fact stated by me, viz., that I was uninformed of the state of the facts on a Portuguese question in which I was called upon to give my opinion; or upon another fact, that I have frequently gone to the Foreign Office, both during the Session of Parliament and the recess, and have found no papers on the Cabinet table.

I might call you to testify to the truth of both these facts. You have received many complaints from me that I had not found, and had not seen, papers, and was not informed as it was necessary I should be, and you have very kindly sent me the information. But I don't like to trouble you upon every occasion that I go to the Foreign Office: I don't even like the appearance of doing so. I ought to be informed; and the mode of affording the information ought to be so certain as that those who ought to receive the information have only to follow the mode pointed out in order to know all that they can require to know.

I really had no notion of what was passing in Portugal, or regarding Portugal elsewhere, or between Portugal and Spain, until you sent me the papers on Monday evening, which I read and returned to you on Monday night.

Of these facts there can be no doubt. There can be no use in corresponding about them, or in denying that the opinion of a person who is in the state of ignorance described cannot be worth having.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Liverpool. [(

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, Apethorpe, 12th October, 1826.

I have received your letter, and I will attend to its contents if Lord Beresford should object to take the command of the Portuguese army on the conditions stated in my letter to him of the 9th instant. I have as yet got no answer to that letter. He knows that I am here.

If the King of France speaks plainly to the King of Spain, and recalls his ambassador if he does not obey not only the letter but the spirit of the orders which his Majesty will send him, we shall be safe. But you may rely upon it that we never were in such a scrape in relation to war as we shall be in if we get to war with Spain single-handed in alliance with Portugal.

And a war will last long enough in that state to put the country out of temper with its expenses and losses, and the total absence of military or naval glory in the conduct of its operations, and the ridicule which will attend them in the eyes of all Europe.

When the country will be heartily tired of the war France and the United States will take part in it, and God knows the result.

Save us from this disgrace and mischief, my dear Lord, and

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [(

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Apethorpe, 13th October, 1826.

Lord Liverpool will have informed you what I had written to Lord Beresford, and intended farther to state to him, in case in his answer to me he should decline to take the command of the army, on account of the first of the conditions stated by you. I have as yet had no answer from him, and I shall in any farther communications be guided entirely by your wishes and those of Lord Liverpool.

I am delighted to find that the King of Spain has given way about the Portuguese deserters. You may rely upon it that a war between Spain single-handed and this country, either singly or as the ally of Portugal, would be the greatest mis-

fortune, and would afford neither glory nor advantage to compensate for the expense and loss which it would occasion, or the ridicule throughout Europe which the want of effect of our operations would occasion.

The country would soon become tired of such a war, and just at that period France and the United States would take part, and render its operations general, as far at least as we should be concerned. It is with this sentiment of what a war with Spain would be, that I have so often urged that we should attend to the military establishments and state of Portugal.

In respect to my want of information I state the fact, and for its truth I appeal to Planta to whom I have frequently stated it, and have predicted that which has occurred; viz., that you would on some day or other wish to have my opinion upon some subject, and would find me entirely uninformed, as I was found in this case of Portugal.

I understand that it is true that my servants at Apsley House will not tell where I am to be found, though they always know. I conclude that they will not give the information because I have long and repeatedly given directions that they should not communicate my movements to the newspapers, and this from the desire of avoiding to be made the show in every part of England which I might visit; and I believe it has happened more than once that the runners of the newspapers have made enquiries about me at my house, professing to be King's messengers. But this conduct of my servants cannot create any delay in my receiving any communication and returning an answer, as my servants, knowing where I am, invariably send me everything that comes from you or any of my colleagues, or from any of the public offices, by one of the Ordnance messengers if such communication should reach my house too late for the post.

Formerly the papers were sent in circulation. The rule now is that they are to be left on the Cabinet table for the perusal of the members. This system would answer if it was carried into execution. But as far as I can judge, and I can only from my own knowledge, it is not. I don't think I can be mistaken upon this point; and indeed I might recall to your own recollection that I have frequently told you that I had not seen the papers upon which you talked to me.

I cannot accuse myself of not attending to see them, and I

must conclude then that they are not left upon the Cabinet table, as you intend they should be, for communication to the members.

I don't complain that the newspapers have earlier intelligence than the government. But what I stated was that I knew nothing about Portugal excepting what was to be learnt from the newspapers, which was not the state of information in which I ought to be to render my opinion of any use to you or anybody else; as I found afterwards when Mr. Planta, by desire of Lord Liverpool as it appears, sent me the papers on that subject.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

I send to Planta the despatch from Sir W. A'Court which you enclosed to me, with a request that he would either keep it or return it to you as he might think would be most convenient to you.

To Lord Liverpool. [6

MY DEAR LORD, Apethorpe, 14th October, 1826, 9 P.M.

I write you one line by your messenger who brought me your letters of the 13th this afternoon to tell you that Lord Beresford has come here, and will go to Portugal. I have had two or three conversations with him about *conditions*, but have not yet come to a result which he and I clearly understand. But I am going to London with him, and I will send you a letter on Monday to let you know exactly what I shall have done.

I was very glad to learn by a letter from Mr. Canning, of the 9th, that the King of Spain had given way upon the question of the arms, &c. of the Portuguese deserters. I should think that his instructions to Mr. Lamb, of the 4th, could not have been received. But at all events there is an end of all chance of the mischief which I thought would have resulted from these instructions, and I don't wish to give you or myself the trouble and pain of discussing their possible effects.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Walmer Castle, 15th October, 1826.

I have just received your letter of the 11th instant from Apethorpe.

The instructions to Lamb eventually to withdraw from Madrid did not appear to me as by any means deciding the question of war or peace between Spain and Portugal, but were adopted with the full concurrence and approbation of the Russian ambassador at Paris, and with the entire acquiescence at least of the French government, as the only means of inducing the King of Spain to give way.

These instructions, if right at all, seemed certainly to press in point of time, for it must have been of the utmost importance that these questions as to terms, &c., upon which Portugal was clearly in the right, should be settled before the Portuguese Chambers assembled, about the middle of the present month.

You will see by the last letters that they have had the desired effect, and that the King of Spain has given way.

I entirely agree with you as to the irregularities which often occur in consequence of the course taken by ministers, individually and collectively, during the recesses of Parliament.

As long as the war continued we were all constantly at our posts or within a very few days' call.

This is more than could be reasonably expected in time of peace; but I still think we ought not to separate indefinitely as we have done; that we ought to reassemble at fixed and not very distant periods; and, though a culprit in one instance myself, I can by no means approve of the new practice of ministers passing a part of their holidays upon the continent, though in some particular cases it may be attended with advantage.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[613.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, London, 16th October, 1826.

I enclose the Memorandum of the result of my conversations with Lord Beresford on his resumption of his command in Portugal. The observation in the margin in red ink is his own, copied from one he made to the original draft which I gave him for his perusal. I likewise enclose a paper which he has given me.

I wish to have your Lordship's opinion upon these papers as soon as you can give it to me, but as I think my Memorandum settles all the questions to Mr. Canning's satisfaction, and that the question of the peerage stands upon grounds which will probably render the grant of the peerage to Lord Beresford unobjectionable to you, I have desired Lord Beresford to get

ready to go, and he will be prepared to leave London in the end of the week unless you should stop him.

This is the way in which I view the peerage; about which, if I were Lord Beresford, I would not care one pin, more particularly if prevented from accepting it by his Majesty's government. Lord Beresford is a naturalized subject in Portugal, and he is going to serve in Portugal in that character, and without any connection or communication with his Majesty's government. It is but justice to him to allow him to receive and enjoy an honour which the laws and constitution of Portugal (which have not omitted the consideration of the question) enable him to enjoy.

We must leave to Lord Beresford's discretion the use of the powers which the grant of this honour will give him, as we must the use of the great powers of the office which he is to fill. But as he wishes to be a peer in Portugal it would not be quite consistent with justice to tell him that, although the constitution of Portugal will allow of his being a peer, he shall not be one, only because foreign Powers may be jealous. They will of course be jealous of the whole arrangement, but as for my part I shall be indifferent in respect to their feelings if Lord Beresford can only put Portugal in a reasonable state of defence, and thus render that country an efficient ally to, instead of being as she is a burthen upon this.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

I have desired Mr. Planta to allow Lord Beresford to see what will let him know the state of affairs relating to Portugal which may have been received in the last three months.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

MEMORANDUM OF THE RESULT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH LORD BERESFORD.

Apethorpe, 14th October, 1826.

Lord Beresford is perfectly willing to go to Portugal to take the command of the Portuguese army if his Majesty's government should think that his services can be useful, after considering the relation in which the Infante Don Miguel stands

towards the Portuguese army and the existing government, and his claims upon the Regency of Portugal in October, 1827, if he should take the oaths prescribed by the constitution.

Lord Beresford thinks that if the Infante Don Miguel should decline to take those oaths, or if having taken those oaths an attempt should be made to prevent him from exercising the powers of the Regency given to him by the constitution, either by ordering him to remain at Vienna, or by an order of the Emperor Don Pedro to prevent him from exercising the rights which the constitution gives him, it is very doubtful that his Lordship would be able to render any efficient service to the Crown of Portugal.

If, however, the Infante should take the oaths, and should be prevailed upon to go to Brazil, Lord Beresford thinks he might have it in his power to render some service. At all events his Lordship is ready to go to Lisbon to ascertain the state of affairs, and to decide accordingly.

Lord Beresford willingly adopts the second condition stated in the Duke of Wellington's letter to his Lordship of the 9th October, and he thinks that his Majesty's consent being once given to the resumption of his command over the Portuguese army, it is most desirable that it should be clearly understood that there is no political connection or communication between his Majesty's government or any of its officers and Lord Beresford.

Lord Beresford would stand then in relation to the Portuguese government as a Portuguese subject. In respect to the first condition, Lord Beresford is aware that, according to the existing constitution, he could not as a foreigner, or even as a naturalized subject in Portugal, hold any office of state, or belong to any of the councils or to the Chamber of Deputies.

He considers that in his office of *Marechal General Junto ao Real Pessoa* he could have fully sufficient authority over the army and all its departments to insure the due execution of his orders, and the performance of the duty required to put the army on a proper footing. Lord Beresford, therefore, has nothing to desire excepting the accustomed prerogatives and privileges of the office which he fills, and of which he is called upon to perform the duty.

Lord Beresford *knows* that the creation of a Chamber of Peers, selected from the nobility in Portugal, has tended to degrade the situation of those noblemen residing in Portugal

who have not been selected, himself as well as others; and he is desirous that his hands should be strengthened so far as that he should be created a peer in Portugal.

*He does not intend to attend the meetings of the Chamber of Peers, or to interfere in any manner in the politics of the country. But he thinks that his situation would be made more respectable if he was not one of the nobles excluded from the Chamber of Peers.

Lord Beresford is not desirous that his Majesty's government should make any demand of this favour as a condition of his resumption of his office; and he is aware that the grant of it must proceed from the Emperor Don Pedro, if it should be granted previous to his abdication; but he is anxious that his Majesty's consent to his acceptance of this honour should not be withheld from him, if the Sovereign of Portugal should be disposed to grant it.

If Lord Beresford should be successful in restoring order and discipline to the Portuguese army, it is not impossible but that the Portuguese government may think proper to reward his services.

Lord Beresford could not accept such reward without his Majesty's permission, which he hopes will be granted with the protection which must be understood to be the consequence of such permission.

WELLINGTON.

* Observation in Margin by Lord Beresford.—He does not think it would be wise in him, nor does he at present intend, to attend the proceedings of the Peers, or take any part in their debates, or interfere in any manner in the internal politics of the country; but he feels that his situation would be made more respectable if he was not of the nobles excluded from the Chamber of Peers, and even his attendance must be left quite optional with him to secure the respectability, and circumstances may arise that would oblige him to appear there in his place. But that would be an exception to his general rule.

[Enclosure.]

Paper by Lord Beresford.

It appears to Lord Beresford that the principal cause of the present state of Portugal, and the difficulties of again bringing the army back to a state of order and subordination, arises from the Emperor of the Brazils having named a Regency (the present government) that has no symptoms of permanency; whilst he holds up Don Miguel as the eventual governor of the country, both by declaring him the intended husband of his daughter, the young Queen, and apparently also by a clause in the constitution, giving to him the legal right of being Regent when twenty-five years of age, and

this latter case will bring him to the Regency (he taking the oaths) in the short space of a year. Thus it must be doubtful, and particularly whilst so active an agent as the Queen Dowager is keeping alive and spurring on Don Miguel's party, that officers who have of late been speculating on every change of government to gain personal advantages, will be attached to so ephemeral a one as they consider the present. Besides, at present it is uncertain how the Emperor will receive and take the act of the Infanta Regent Donna Isabel Maria, in naming herself sole Regent, and until the young queen comes of age. If Don Miguel takes the oaths to the constitution, he will then claim his right to the Regency (and probably under no other view of the case would he take them); and that would not strengthen the actual government, or the attachment of the army to the actual order of affairs. But if with his taking the oaths he should be persuaded to go to the Brazils, it may be hoped that would tend greatly to put a stop to the attempts of his friends, or would prevent their gaining new partisans; and if to this the opinion of the Emperor was known respecting the step taken by the Infanta Donna Isabel Maria of declaring herself sole Regent, and if his Majesty should approve of and confirm her Highness in it, that would also add greatly to the effect of Don Miguel's being in the Brazils, and would be favourable to bringing back quiet and order. And if to these two points, that of getting the Queen Dowager of Portugal out of the kingdom could by any means of persuasion or of advantage to her Majesty be effected, we might then be pretty sure of bringing back order and tranquillity to that kingdom. The latter is most desirable, though there is little hope of any success in the proposal.

[614.] *To the King.*

London, October 16th, 1826.

In consequence of your Majesty's commands of the 7th inst. I wrote to Lord Beresford to propose to him to resume his command over the Portuguese army, and communicated to him the conditions proposed by Mr. Canning as the wish of the government rather than as positive settled points.

I did not think it expedient to lose any further time in communicating to Lord Beresford the wish of the Portuguese government; and I stated the conditions in such manner as that Lord Beresford might consider them as liable to discussion, and Mr. Canning might either have adhered to them or might have modified them or have withdrawn them altogether. Upon the receipt of my letter Lord Beresford, who was in Yorkshire, came to me at Apethorpe, when after some conversation with his Lordship I wrote the Memorandum of which I enclose your Majesty the copy.* The observation in red ink in the margin is

* See page 423.

by Lord Beresford upon the draft of the Memorandum which I gave him. I likewise enclose the copy of a paper which Lord Beresford has given me.

I transmit these papers to your Majesty because I have desired Lord Beresford to go to Portugal immediately, and he will leave town in a few days, and I think it possible that your Majesty might wish to see him before he goes.

I entreat your Majesty, however, not to form any conclusive opinion upon this affair until your Majesty shall be made acquainted with the sentiments of those of my colleagues for whom I have been acting, and whose duty it will be to submit their sentiments to your Majesty.

I likewise enclose the copy of the letter which I have written to Lord Liverpool upon this subject.

All of which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Walmer Castle, 17th October, 1826.

I received upon my rising this morning your letter with the enclosed Memoranda. I shall forward them by the messenger of to-night to Mr. Canning at Paris.

I have in the mean time no difficulty in stating that I think the King's servants ought to make no objection, and will not make any objection, to the acceptance of the peerage of Portugal by Lord Beresford, if it shall be offered to him, under the circumstances stated in your letter. As a Portuguese subject holding a high military command, I do not think there would be any sufficient ground for objecting to such a distinction being conferred upon Lord Beresford; and Lord Beresford appears clearly to comprehend the relation in which the King's servants wish he should stand towards the Portuguese government, viz., that he should abstain from taking part in the political government of the country, except as far as may be requisite for the efficiency of his military command.

The application of this principle must necessarily be left to himself.

Upon the other part of the two Memoranda I have only to say that, varying as the circumstances of Portugal do every day, it is only upon the spot that Lord Beresford can finally decide whether he can really be of any service or not.

At the same time the safety and independence of Portugal may depend upon the efficiency of its army, and the efficiency of the army may *mainly* depend upon Lord Beresford's acceptance of the command of it at *this particular moment.*

His going out to Portugal, moreover, can in no way be a matter of

indifference, and I should hope therefore that, when he arrives at Lisbon, matters may be so arranged as to make him feel that he can, honourably as regards himself, and advantageously for the country, accept the command which has been offered to him.

I see no reason for Lord Beresford delaying his departure. You will perhaps let him have a copy of this letter.

Believe me, my dear Duke, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

[615.] *To Mr. Planta.*

MY DEAR PLANTA, London, 17th October, 1826.

When I returned to England in April last, I wrote and spoke to Mr. Canning, and gave him a Memorandum upon the despatch No. 9,* respecting which I have already written to you, and Mr. Canning told me that it should be altered, or even suppressed.

I had written an answer to it at Halle,† of which I gave Mr. Canning the substance in a Memorandum; but I did not give in the despatch, because I understood that the result of my negotiations at St. Petersburg had been approved of. Afterwards, upon finding that the despatch No. 9 had been circulated to Paris, Vienna, and Constantinople, even after the report of the 4th of April had been received here of my negotiations, I desired again to deliver in the despatch in answer to No. 9; and it was then that Mr. Canning proposed to alter it or to suppress it. Neither has yet been done; and we are drawing near the period of the discussion of these transactions.

I confess that I am not very anxious respecting those parts of the despatch which refer to the general result of my communications with the Emperor and his government, and to my own conduct. But I took a Memorandum of a confidential conversation with the Emperor of Russia. I sent that Memorandum, without previous communication to the Emperor, confidentially to the government; and I find its contents commented upon in an ostensible despatch, which is circulated as above stated. I confess that I don't think the comments upon the Memorandum are quite justly drawn from the conversation as therein given; and in my despatch from Halle (not given in) I endeavoured to show that the Emperor had been misunderstood here; and at

* Dated 11th April, 1826; p. 290. † Dated 20th April, 1826; p. 302.

all events any direct reference to the terms of such a conversation thus confidentially communicated ought to be avoided.

What I would therefore propose is to omit from the despatch No. 9 what I have marked, which is nothing more than the statement of propositions drawn, in my opinion erroneously, from the Emperor's conversation, and to leave all the rest. Either this should be done, or I should be permitted to place upon the record my despatch from Halle.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. Planta to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

New Bridge Street, Thursday morning,
19th October, 1826.

MY DEAR DUKE,

As you are in town I cannot do better than place this letter in your Grace's hands; and you will be pleased to do what you think proper with Lord Beresford.

I am confined to the house to-day by illness, but trust I shall be at the office again to-morrow.

I have sent everything to Lord Beresford agreeably to your desire.

Ever your Grace's obliged servant,

J. PLANTA.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lord Liverpool to Mr. Planta.

MY DEAR PLANTA,

Walmer Castle, 18th October, 1826.

As it may be uncertain whether the Duke of Wellington will be in town at the time of the arrival of this letter, I think it best to address myself directly to you, and to beg of you to communicate what I am now writing to Lord Beresford.

In the Memorandum which I received from the Duke of Wellington yesterday, I did not perhaps advert sufficiently to the circumstance that it is assumed that if Don Miguel shall take the oaths he will have a right to the Regency in 1827. If Lord Beresford will refer to one of Mr. Canning's drafts which he is now in the course of reading (the number of which I do not recollect), he will see the question fully argued; and though it is certainly a doubtful question, the conclusion to which Mr. Canning inclines to come, and in which, I confess, upon reading the draft I was disposed to agree, was that Don Miguel would not have the right to the Regency in 1827 unless the Emperor decided in his favour. Whether the opinion is well or ill founded, it is quite clear that Don Miguel can have no right whatever under the constitution unless he takes the oaths to it.

These questions certainly do not come within the jurisdiction of the government of this country; but as it is possible that much may turn upon them, I

think it material that Lord Beresford should be aware of the opinion which both Mr. Canning and I at present have formed upon them.

I conclude that the Duke of Wellington must before this time have seen the draft to which I allude, but there is nothing in any of his letters to me which adverts to it.

I wish him, of course, to see this letter, as well as Lord Beresford.

I should be glad if Lord Beresford will not actually leave London till he hears again from me after I shall have heard from Mr. Canning. This will not occasion any loss of time, as the frigate was only to be ready for him at Falmouth on the 25th.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

[616.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, London, October 19th, 1826.

Planta has given me your letter to him which I will give to Lord Beresford. He does not intend to leave London till Monday, and of course will not now set out till he shall hear from you. He lives at No. 48, Harley-street.

The inclination of Lord Beresford's opinion in respect to Don Miguel's claim to the Regency in 1827 agrees with yours and Mr. Canning's. I confess that mine is different, but I did not think the difference worth the trouble of stating it, because in truth Don Pedro must and will decide who shall be the Regent.

My view of the case is this. Don Pedro confirmed the Regency appointed by his father, Don John; but the Constitution provided another arrangement as soon as that Act should be sworn to and carried into execution. If Don Miguel had been twenty-five years of age and had sworn to the Constitution, he would have been the Regent as soon as that Act should be carried into execution. I believe of that there is no doubt.

Then the question comes to this. The Infanta having been twenty-five years of age became the Regent under the Constitution. Is that Regency to last? Where is it stated that an office of Regent shall be held permanently in any country? It is not so stated in the Portuguese Constitution, and yet that is the only ground on which the pretensions of the Infanta can be preferred to those of Don Miguel.

I believe that Don Pedro did not intend that the Regency appointed by his father should be changed. But the Infanta changed it, and claimed the sole Regency under the Constitu-

tion. If she was right in making this claim, Don Miguel will have the preferable right of the male as soon as he shall be of the prescribed age, unless it can be made out that the office of Regent is conferred permanently.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. G. Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Paris, 20th October, 1826.

I received the day before yesterday your letter of the 13th, and yesterday from Lord Liverpool your letter to him of the 16th, with its accompanying Memoranda.

I shall be glad to find, on my arrival at Walmer this day se'nnight, that Lord Beresford is already well off for Lisbon.

The Infant *has taken the oath*, though Metternich conceals and almost denies it to your brother. The game which Metternich has been playing throughout this whole business is pitiful; and appears more so in comparison with the frankness and fair dealing of the Emperor of Russia, and (I believe it is but fair to add) of France. Where France has erred, she has been led astray by Metternich. Henry Wellesley is indignant at his duplicity.

Rothschild had letters yesterday from Vienna assuring him that the Porte had resolved to consent to all the demands of Russia. Your brother's despatches do not affirm the fact so positively; but they state that Prince Metternich expected such a result.

Henry Wellesley's despatches arrived here yesterday, and go through Lord Liverpool to London to-day. Planta will let you see them as soon as they have been to the King, or in their way, if you happen to be in London.

We must consider of some arrangement for ensuring the more regular circulation of despatches. But, once settled by the Cabinet, the system must be regularly executed, whether it be that of the reading-room or that of separate and successive communication. The mixture of both spoils both, and leaves the Foreign Office at a loss what to do. It is quite indifferent to me which is adopted; but if any new plan is suggested which involves *copying*, I must have my establishment considerably increased, for *we* are all overworked already.

I expect every hour a communication from Prince Lieven of the answer to the third and conclusive letter upon the Protocol. I know it to be favourable and satisfactory in the highest degree. You may judge of the temper of the Court of Moscow by the enclosed despatch which I have just received from Prince Lieven. Have the goodness to return it to Planta.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

17.] *To the Right Hon. Frederick Robinson.*

My dear Robinson, London, 20th October, 1826.

I have to apologise for having left unanswered for such a length of time your letter of the 7th September, and the Memorandum which accompanied it on the subject of emigration, which you had sent to Lord Liverpool. But I wished to read the proceedings of the Committee upon Emigration before I should send you an answer; and some time elapsed before I could procure a copy, and then the usual sports of the autumn occupied my time.

Although I don't believe that redundancy of population is the description of the evil under which we are labouring, or that emigration, even upon the scale proposed by you, would be the cure for that evil, if it existed, or the cure for the existing evil, I do believe that it is expedient to encourage emigration from each of the United Kingdoms by public authority, and with the aid of public money.

If we look at the tables of the population, we shall see that taking the increase from the year 1791 to the last accounts as the foundation of the calculation of the average annual increase, which would, I believe, give a result far below the real annual increase at the present moment, we shall find the population of England and Wales increasing at the rate of one hundred thousand souls every year; Ireland at the same rate, and Scotland at the rate of about thirty thousand souls. An emigration of forty thousand souls annually upon a population increasing annually at the rate of 230,000 souls, would be nothing even if the population did not increase in an accelerated ratio, in consequence of this emigration, so as to fill up the vacuum which it would occasion. The theory would teach us that it would do so, more particularly if the causes of the increasing population were suffered to continue to exist. But we need not look to the theory; we have only to refer to our own experience and to the evidence of Mr. Hodges before the Emigration Committee, who tells us that no sooner does a family disappear from one of those country parishes in Kent in which the evil of a redundant population is most strongly and most loudly complained of, than others spring up to take their place. A system of annual emigration alone, then, would be no remedy even for the evil of a redundant population, supposing that it existed generally, or

even where it exists partially, much less a remedy for the evil under which we are labouring, upon which you have not touched in your Memorandum. It is adverted to in the proceedings of the Emigration Committee; and the necessity is admitted of adopting other measures to check the undue encouragement given to an increase of population. But these measures are not stated, and not made as they ought to be the foundation of the measures to be adopted respecting our pauper population, to which emigration should only be subsidiary.

I will advert to the nature of the evil presently; but before I do so I will observe upon emigration generally, that I do not consider it necessary for the defence of the colonies in North America to encourage emigration to them. I believe they are now sufficiently peopled to be able, if encouraged as they ought to be by this country, and with the assistance which it would be the wise policy of this country to give them in time of war, to defend themselves against the United States, if the various improvements and defences suggested are carried into execution. I am not quite certain that a more dense population in the country would not increase the facilities of their invaders rather than their own means of defence. But if we look forward to the result of the natural course of events, consequent upon an encouraged and therefore a premature and forced emigration to the North American colonies, we shall find among them an early and large increase of the population of the country, a recourse to manufacturing industry as means of subsistence for a portion of that population, and an impatience of the subjection and control of the mother country, the gratification of which will be facilitated in the hands of their leading demagogues by the measures to be adopted to repay to the mother country the expense incurred in the encouragement of this emigration.

I do not consider emigration to the North American colonies, then, necessary for their defence, or desirable upon a large scale in reference to our permanent interests in those countries; nor do I consider such emigration necessary for this country, or desirable excepting as subsidiary to the measures which must be adopted for the regulation of our pauper population.

This subject must be considered in reference to the state of the poor in each of the three kingdoms. The mischief in this country originates in an abuse of the poor-laws of about thirty

years' standing. Three important changes then took place in the management of the poor of this country.

First. Allowances were given out of the poor-rates to the wives and children of labourers. In addition to all the encouragements to an increase of population, which the numerous permanent charities of the country held out, a direct encouragement was thus given to early marriages and large families among the lower orders of the people.

Secondly. Surplus wages were paid out of the poor-rates even to those who had not families. A minimum was thus, in fact, fixed upon the price of labour, which all men considered themselves entitled to demand for their subsistence, whether they performed work to the value of such subsistence or not. From this system have flown all the evils of roundsmen, parish workmen, &c., which have, in fact, converted the labouring classes into slaves, and have made them as idle as slaves.

Thirdly. The labouring classes thus encouraged to contract early marriages, and to consequent extraordinary increase, and debased and demoralized and in fact encouraged to be idle, at that very period of time commenced to consume generally the best and most expensive description of food—wheaten bread and meat. Even those who subsist entirely upon what they get from the parish, and for whom provision was never intended to be made by the parish, will eat nothing else.

The object of paying allowances for wives and children and surplus wages out of the poor-rates, was to provide for what was supposed to be a temporary rise in the price of provisions. All parties thought themselves gainers: the landholders by the continued low wages of labour, as taken directly out of their pockets; and the labourers by the facility with which they obtained an increase. But the Reports of the different Committees of the House of Commons and the observation of us all have demonstrated the low state of society to which this system has degraded us. The public mind cannot but be prepared for a remedy; and you will find that emigration will not stand discussion in that light.

The evil is not a redundancy of population, but a population of which the increase is unduly and improperly encouraged by abuses in the administration of the poor-laws; a population encouraged to be idle, and fed and pampered in their idleness by the same abuses which are so general and in their operations

have such influence upon the manners and happiness and independence of the people as to require the serious attention of the government and parliament. Till such remedy is found and strictly enforced, I doubt whether you would find in England and Wales the proportion of those countries of the 40,000 volunteer pauper emigrants for the first year. I am quite certain you would not if they were fairly informed what they were to expect in the colonies, and what labour they were to perform even to procure subsistence. I say I am certain upon this point, because it is obvious that the mischief in this country is idleness, occasioned by the abuses above referred to. The labouring classes are in misery and distress! Why are the fisheries upon the coast neglected? Why is the army incomplete, I believe now to the amount of 20,000 men, being twice the number of *men* that you will call for to emigrate in one year? Because men can get good food, lodging, and raiment for little or no labour; can live without restraint and gratify their idle propensities; and they prefer this mode of life to one of danger and labour, as in the fisheries, or to the military profession, in which they will be kept under restraint.

Why are the poor-rates most intolerably burthensome in those counties in which there are remaining the largest spaces of commons and wealds? Not because those counties are most populous in proportion to the extent of the land that is cultivated, but because these commons and wealds, which would afford increased comforts to the poor in their neighbourhood under a proper system of administration, afford a field under the existing system for pilfering, thieving, and poaching; and the means, to those addicted to those habits, of living plentifully, and indeed in luxury, with the least possible degree of labour.

The principle of the poor-laws is to relieve and support the sick and aged; and this should be done in the fullest manner, so as to render them really comfortable, and secondly, that no human creature should want. But no allowance for wives or children in health should be paid by the parish. If labourers out of work should demand from the parish, or the parish should be called upon to set to work the children of labourers under the Act of Elizabeth, they should pay for such work in kind, and the subsistence which they should give ought to be the best of the lowest kind of subsistence. The system of letting out labourers by parishes ought to be abolished, and the responsi-

bility of magistrates for the orders which they give to oversee of parishes ought to be more easily attainable.

This system will appear harsh; but I am convinced that the facts are fairly considered, and if we don't shut our eyes t the state of the society in which we are living, we shall be dis posed to meet the evil with an adequate remedy.

There is one view of this question which I think ought to b taken. A man who cannot find labour or subsistence comes upo the public to find it. If he is in England, he must be subsiste upon the best description of food; if he is in Scotland, he is sub sisted upon oatmeal; if in Ireland, upon potatoes. It is quit clear to me that idleness is the cause of the necessity for coming upon the public at all, except in a case of sickness or age, which I here put entirely out of the question; and if I am not wrong in this position, there can be no reason for this difference in the food to be given in the three kingdoms, or for giving an English pauper labourer better subsistence than that which will support a Scotchman in Scotland, or an Irishman in Ireland.

I confess that I am quite ignorant of the system of management of the poor in Scotland; but I should think there was no redundancy of population in that part of the United Kingdom. If there is any, it is in the manufacturing towns.

I believe there does exist a redundancy of population in Ireland, occasioned by the description of food, with which the lower orders are satisfied, and the ease with which that food is obtained; and facilitated by the subdivision of lands. A remedy has been afforded for this facility if the gentlemen of the country will avail themselves of it; but the mischief will not be cured by depriving the people of this facility for their increase, any more than it will by any system of emigration.

The majority of the country labourers in Ireland, that is, in three provinces out of four, live upon the produce of their gardens, for which they pay exorbitant rents to their landlords by the mortgage of their labour at a certain rate. This subsistence, although of the lowest kind, is plentiful and easily obtained; and although it is precarious, its plenty and the ease with which it is obtained occasion early marriages and the dense population complained of.

For this population, that is to say, in three provinces out of four, there is no employment excepting the cultivation of land; and they will continue to increase, notwithstanding the check

which may be given to their increase by preventing the subdivision of lands, till they can be brought to consume a higher description of food than potatoes.

Would it be possible by law to prohibit the payment of the rent of land in labour, and to enforce the payment of the wages of labour in money? If these objects could be effected by degrees, the Irish labourer would be forced to seek his subsistence in the markets. If once brought there, he would prefer a better sort of subsistence to potatoes; and the difficulty of procuring that better subsistence would induce him to postpone his marriage till he should have the means of procuring that better subsistence for his family. The effect of such arrangements as those which I have suggested must be slow and gradual; but, if they are practicable, they are certain.

After all, by what means that are not slow and gradual in their effects can the manners and habits of the whole Irish people be changed, and a check be given in this country to abuses which have unduly encouraged an increase of the people, and have totally changed their character? If such measures should produce any effect, it will be much greater than that produced by the most extensive system of emigration that it is possible to carry into execution. A well-digested system of emigration, however, encouraged by the public and aided by public money, would facilitate and render more palatable these measures; and I think would be successful to the North American colonies, and might be so managed as to open the road for emigration on private account to the same colonies.

I confess I doubt the success of a pauper emigration to the Cape of Good Hope, or to the convict colonies in Australasia. We must not expect that all these pauper colonists will succeed as agriculturists; some must continue labourers. There is no demand at the Cape for more than a certain number of the latter, on account of the existence of slavery in that colony; and there can be no demand for labourers in Australasia, where there are still so many convicts unemployed.

Ever, my dear Robinson, yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE. Deepdene, 22nd October, 1828.

Just as I was leaving town yesterday afternoon to come here I received a box from Mr. Planta, the contents of which I could only peruse after leaving London. In it was the despatch of the 1st instant from Sir H. Wellesley to Mr. Canning which you told me of, communicating the medium course about to be adopted respecting Don Miguel by the court of Vienna; and with this despatch was that of Mr. Canning of the 11th instant, with his reasoning of the case as this new event had placed it and as it now stands. You cannot, I think, have seen this despatch. I am very far from impugning the reasoning of it, but you will perceive that this document most materially changes the whole complexion of the affair. Previously the bent of Mr. Canning's inclination and intention was in favour of keeping the Infanta in the regency; now, if his mind inclines either way, it is certainly in favour of Don Miguel's coming to the regency so soon after he shall have taken the oaths as his age and the necessary arrangements will admit.

It is impossible to suppose that this state of the business, as now arranged by Prince Metternich, will not become known to the friends and partisans of Don Miguel by some means or other; and it will not only confirm them in the line of conduct they have adopted to the present government, but afford them the means of keeping that country in an unquiet and agitated state. Thus, so far from seeing the government there receive a more fixed character, or any symptoms of permanency, our own intentions respecting it are less fixed, and we for the moment uncertain which of the two parties it will finally be most prudent to support. Upon the latter point this government may certainly bring their minds to a decision; but if the present state of uncertainty is to exist in Portugal until Mr. Neumann shall have arranged the matter at the Rio de Janeiro, and if it is to continue with the knowledge to those interested (and I am sure it cannot, and will not, be a secret to Don Miguel's friends) of what is going forward, it does not require much foresight to foretel that during that period there will be little respect for, or obedience to, the existing government; or if the Infanta Regent, in conjunction with the Cortes, takes any strong measure for the support of their authority, it may at once lead to civil war. Sir W. A'Court, under the instructions given, cannot himself give either much support or much confidence to the existing government.

The French government's opinion as a question of right appears to be in favour of Don Miguel. The Austrian minister is clearly his supporter; and we are inclined now to believe that his becoming Regent might be the best arrangement for the tranquillity of Portugal and the general interests of Europe. I am, perhaps, far from thinking otherwise, though I cannot think that Don Miguel has any claim of right under the clause in the constitution that treats of the regency. I have only made these observations on the despatch of Mr. Canning to Sir W. A'Court, for the object of applying what is therein stated to my own position, and to ask if it will be wise or desirable that I should go there under this new view of the case, as certainly it is quite changed since the wish for my going was

expressed. I am quite ready to set off when Lord Liverpool or Mr. Canning shall desire; but it is obvious that this new state of things must weigh very much with me when I come to consider the case in Portugal, as it takes from under my feet what little firm ground I had to stand upon. I have thought it right to state so much to you after reading the papers alluded to.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

London, 23rd October, 1826.

P.S.—I brought the annexed with me to town, and on arriving I found Lord Liverpool's letter telling me he had heard from Mr. Canning, who was quite satisfied with the arrangement, and that I need no longer delay my departure. I go to-morrow morning. Accounts from Lisbon of the most unpleasant nature have arrived, but still I think the most unpleasant circumstance is the little prospect of permanency of the existing government, not on account of what is passing there, but from what now appears the general feeling, either of Don Miguel's right, or of the expediency of his succeeding to the regency when of the proper age, for he has now taken the oaths. I am giving no opinion either as to his right or the expediency, but merely observe that, under such a probability, we have not much chance of recalling the estranged minds of so great a portion of the troops and of certain orders of people. I regret, also, to see that the Infanta Regent is calling to her assistance all the worst democrats of 1820, from, I suppose, thinking herself driven to it; but this may give the democratic constitutionalists too much sway. My going is no secret, Esterhazy having just sent to request to see me before I go.

B.

Mr. Planta to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Foreign Office, 24th October, 1826.

I shall send you the despatches from Lisbon as soon as they are returned by his Majesty. They are to the 13th, and their substance is—that an insurrection of one regiment had taken place in the Algarves,—had declared Don Miguel absolute King,—and had appointed a junta of government; but that another regular regiment and the militia had remained stanch, and that the Minister of War was about to march from Lisbon at the head of the whole garrison, with all hope of extinguishing the insurrection.

The attempt at a rising in the north had failed, and the leaders had fled to Spain.

The British authorities at Lisbon had consented, if all the regular troops left Lisbon, to land the Marines from the British ships, for the protection of the royal family.

Lord Beresford left London (I believe) this morning. I communicated to him before he went the above intelligence, and the account of Don Miguel's having taken the oath.

Ever, my dear Duke, your Grace's obliged servant,

JOSEPH PLANTA.

Mr. Planta to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Foreign Office, 25th October, 1826.

Enclosed is the answer of Mr. Canning on the subject of his despatch your Grace, No. 9.*

I await your Grace's pleasure as to the option you may make.

Ever your Grace's obliged humble servant,

J. Planta.

[Enclosure.]

Paris, 20th October, 1826.

I leave it absolutely to the Duke of Wellington's choice, either to preserv the despatch, with the omissions proposed by his Grace, or to suppress it alt gether. I *believe* that there is no other copy of it existing, that which wen through Paris and Vienna to Constantinople having been recalled an destroyed; but if there be any, let it be dealt with in the same manner.

I repeat it, I leave the choice *absolutely* to the Duke of Wellington.

G. C.

[618.] *To Mr. Planta.*

My dear Planta, Hatfield, 27th October, 1826.

I have received your letter and Mr. Canning's note regarding the despatch No. 9, which I now return.

As far as I am personally concerned it is a matter of indifference to me whether the despatch No. 9 remains on the record, my answer to it being in this case likewise placed there, or the despatch is altered as I proposed, or is entirely cancelled. But as a member of the government, and considering that the transactions to which that despatch relates led to arrangements of which the government afterwards approved, and upon which they have since acted, as to the good understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg, which is now so satisfactory to them, I cannot but think it would be desirable that the despatch did not exist.

However, personally I have no wish on the subject.

I beg to have a line from you to let me know if Mr. Canning wishes to have back the original of No. 9, which is in my possession.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

* See page 290.

To Lord Farnborough.

MY DEAR LORD FARNBOROUGH, Hatfield, 28th October, 1826.

I enclose a petition from Mrs. ——, the widow of the late Paymaster ——, which I entreat you to consider. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know if you had in your late office any reason to complain of Mr. ——, and if there is in the office any mode of providing for the widow, such as a pension to herself or increase of salary to Mr. ——, paid in arrear, in consideration of the vastness of the charge imposed upon him, and the manner in which he discharged his duties.

I do think there is nothing so unfair as the practice which is so common of loading a man of this description with a responsibility for millions, and then leaving him and his family to starve, after he shall have passed half his life in the service and making up his accounts, and, as in this case, shall have been driven mad by his labours and the weight of responsibility thrown upon him.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD, Hatfield, 28th October, 1826.

I have received a letter from Lord Beresford, written immediately after he had received your instructions that he might go. He had seen the last accounts from Portugal, and he did not express very sanguine hopes of success. He had always attached more importance to the exclusion of Don Miguel's claim of right to the Regency than it appeared to me to deserve; and he had seen a despatch from Mr. Canning, of the 11th instant, to Sir Henry Wellesley (which I have not seen), from which it appeared that Mr. Canning had altered his view of the question. Upon the whole, I don't think he went away in good spirits.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

621.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

My dear Mr. Canning, Hatfield, 28th October, 1826.

I received your letter of the 20th, and was very happy to find that you approved of the arrangement with Lord Beresford.

I have seen the despatches from Sir H. Wellesley respecting the Infante having taken the oath. The worst of this arrangement is, that it deprives the Portuguese government of the advantage they would derive, if it were public, in the increased tranquillity of the country and in depriving those opposed to the new system of their nominal head. They could not make people believe that Don Miguel had been forced to take this oath.

I must likewise observe upon these transactions at Vienna, that the course adopted by Prince Metternich is exactly the one best calculated to create or increase confusion.

First. Don Miguel takes the oath in secret.

Secondly. He sends an Austrian to Rio Janeiro to obtain explanations from Don Pedro, instead of going himself in the ship of war sent to Leghorn to convey him, or writing by the packet to get an answer by the same conveyance, or sending a common messenger.

All this will delay a settlement in Portugal, and will tend to prevent that which it must be the object of all to accomplish, viz., to create an army for the Crown of Portugal, instead of that undisciplined and corrupt rabble that exists there.

I can have no objection to the existing or any other system you think proper to adopt for communicating the papers to your colleagues, provided it is carried into execution. But I am certain that you cannot expect that any man should give opinions upon subjects on which he is entirely uninformed.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke of Wellington, Walmer Castle, 29th October, 1826.

I arrived here yesterday, and have received this morning your letter of yesterday from Hatfield.

I hope they are by this time, or will be before the opening of the Chambers on Tuesday, in possession at Lisbon of the fact of Don Miguel's having taken the oath. I sent off a courier from Paris with a letter from the Count de Villa Secca (at Vienna) to the Minister for Foreign

Affairs at Lisbon, which, I presume, contained that intelligence; and (not trusting to that presumption entirely) I directed A'Court to make it as public as possible, without quoting his authority. I trust I shall have thus defeated Metternich's most unfair purpose, which was neither more nor less than, by keeping the fact concealed, to *take the chance* of that explosion in Portugal which, if not restrained by some apprehension of consequences, he would undoubtedly have *made sure* of producing, by advising the Infant not to swear.

I enclose, for your private information, some papers which will give you a pretty clear notion of what has been passing at Vienna; and others which will show you the state of things in Brazil.

Pray keep them *sealed up*, and return them so (at your leisure) to Planta.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I cannot imagine from what letter or despatch of mine Lord Beresford can have inferred that I had "changed my opinion" about Don Miguel and the regency. My "opinion" is (as fully explained in my despatch to Sir H. Wellesley, which you have certainly seen), that as things now stand, the Infant has *no right* to take the regency out of his sister's hands. I think that any court of law or equity would so construe the *conflicting* evidence of Don Pedro's intentions contained—first, in his appointment of the present regency, and secondly, in the article of the constitution which regulates regencies for the future. But I admit, I always have admitted, these evidences to be conflicting, and the case therefore to be *doubtful* (though, in my judgment, the decision of it ought upon those evidences to be in favour of the Infanta); and as the *doubt* is as to Don Pedro's *intention*, I think a reference to him the only conclusive way of solving it. G. C.

Mr. Planta to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Foreign Office, 31st October, 1826.

Which of these two *last* alternatives will your Grace adopt?

Pray tell me, and send me back at the same time the original of the despatch in your possession, that I may have it re-copied, and the new version sent to you.

Thus is this matter completed at least a fortnight before the meeting of Parliament.

Ever your Grace's faithful humble servant,

J. PLANTA.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Windsor Castle, 29th October, 1826.

I think this despatch being a numbered one, and acknowledging the Duke of Wellington's despatches, cannot be *entirely* cancelled. But let it be cancelled, with all my heart, from the end of the first paragraph, or, what would perhaps be better (but I attach no importance to the choice, if the Duke of

Wellington does not like it), let everything between the first paragraph and sheet 19 be cancelled, and the conclusion of the despatch remain as it now is.

G. C.

[622.] *To the Duke of Newcastle.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Stratfield Saye, 5th November, 1826.

I have received your Grace's letter, and I am glad to have an opportunity which this answer to it affords of writing a few words upon a subject which I confess has annoyed me a good deal.

I have been informed that Lady Combermere complained that I had spoken in disparaging terms of the service performed by Lord Combermere. I believe that Lord Combermere and those who know me best are aware that I never speak in disparaging terms or otherwise than in praise of the service performed by any officer. In fact, I have never had occasion to mention and never have mentioned this service in any society whatever, excepting once, I believe, in presence of Lady Combermere, before the certain accounts of the performance of the service were received, and doubts were entertained of its successful termination.

I stated upon that occasion what I really thought, that such was the magnitude of the forces and of the equipment which had been prepared and were employed upon the service, which was the siege of a fortress of greater reputation in India than of real strength, that I could not doubt that an officer like Lord Combermere must succeed. I said this in opposition to the current opinion in society; and from that time to this I have never said one word upon the subject. I am aware that credit must not be given to reports of the description to which I have referred; but the report of these complaints of Lady Combermere's come to me from such authority that I cannot doubt their existence.

In respect to the service performed by Lord Combermere, I must beg leave to recommend to you to leave out of the consideration of that point all reference to or comparison with the services of others. I could easily show your Grace the difference between this service and those of Lord Lake, and the difference between this particular siege and the attacks made by Lord Lake upon the same fort. But there is nothing so invidious as such comparisons; and they answer no purpose excepting to

irritate the friends of both the parties whose services are compared.

Having said thus much respecting the service comparatively with those performed by Lord Lake or others, I must add this, that I conceive Lord Combermere to have acted as became his character in going up the country by *dawk* and alone, immediately upon his arrival, to take the command of the army then about to take the field upon this service; that he conducted this service with all the promptitude, vigour, prudence, and ability that any officer could have applied to it; that it was a service in which success, and that not procrastinated or doubtful, was of the utmost importance to the peace of India and to the political situation of the British government, on account of the former failures of Lord Lake in his attempts to take this fort by storm and not by regular siege, and of the hopes of some and apprehensions of other of the natives of India that we had at last found a fort which was impregnable by our arms; rather than on account of the political command of the fort or of the persons, political or military, who held it, or of the strength of the position itself. The proof of the truth of these opinions is to be found in the facts that the fall of this fortress gave peace to India; that after this siege there was an end to the campaign; and that Lord Combermere did not find it necessary to occupy and strengthen this position; but he destroyed all vestige of the fort.

I have nothing, and have never had anything, to say to the distribution of the rewards of government to his Majesty's officers; nor do I know in which way those view this service whose duty it is to advise his Majesty upon these points. But this I must say, that if I were Lord Combermere I should never forgive the person who should interfere to obtain for me a reward which, on account of that very interference, would be no longer the spontaneous act of his Majesty advised by his servants on a fair and impartial view of the nature and importance of the service performed. In giving this opinion I can only assure your Grace that it is in exact conformity with my own conduct. I have received more rewards for military services than any man that serves, or than any who ever served this country. But I never solicited one; and if any man had ever interfered between the government and me by such solicitation, or even suggestion, I should not have considered that man my friend.

Under these circumstances I certainly must decline to say one word to anybody upon the reward of Lord Combermere's services; but I shall not fail, as it is my duty, to state my sense of those services, whenever an opportunity offers.

Your Grace must be a better judge than I can be whether you ought to interfere to obtain for Lord Combermere the particular reward which you think he deserves; but I have thought it best to state to you fairly what I think upon this subject.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[623.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Stratfield Saye, 8th November, 1826.

I return the letters from Count Nesselrode, and your answer, which I hope will reach you in time for your interview with Count Lieven.

I think your refusal to go to war cannot be too peremptory, and that we should stand in respect to the recognition of Greece as a State and to the recall of his Majesty's mission from Constantinople exactly upon the ground stated in your despatch to Count Lieven.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 8th November, 1826.

I arrived here on the 2nd instant, and the packet sailing two days after, I could have nothing to communicate. I was received by the Infanta Regent as I could have expected, with the greatest kindness; and on waiting on the Queen the following day (she is still at Queluz) I was equally well received, which I confess I did not expect; but her Majesty was most peculiarly attentive, and yet she had the good sense never to speak on the present state of affairs, nor did she once ask my object in coming here; and though I saw her the next day (it was the name day, or saint's day of her name), and that also alone, she equally avoided asking any questions as to the cause of my coming here. She pretends to be ill, and receives in her bed; but I never saw her looking so well. My arrival has certainly caused a very great sensation here, and it appears to have paralysed the exertions of both parties, as there has been none since on either side, and they appear as if by common consent to have

suspended their activity until my final intentions should be apparent. And the attention of the Queen towards me has greatly contributed to the Miguelistas slackening their exertions, so that at the moment everything appears as tranquil as if there had been no unpleasantness here. In the mean time the Chambers being met, and proceeding on their work, the constitution is visibly gaining ground; and the passions of the younger people, more particularly of the nobility, being at least momentarily allayed, their attention is diverted to, and solely occupied by, the business passing in the two Houses; and the vanity of the peers has found a new object in hearing themselves speak; and it is greatly gratified in the liberty and independence which they feel and which they appear most willing to take advantage of. And though I can have no hesitation in saying that were Don Miguel to come now he might act exactly as he pleased, yet he would have fewer supporters against the constitution than ten days since; and I am almost doubtful if in a year hence he would be able to overset it, and certainly not but by the assistance of the army. I have had several conversations with the Senhora Infanta Regent, and nothing can be more satisfactory than are her own wishes and intentions; but certainly she has been most unfortunate in the advice she has received as regards the army, and I might say, as regards the nomination of the civil employés, and that in the latter if for no other reason that they are almost entirely of the party that was uppermost in 1820. Great numbers of officers of all ranks have been lately dismissed from their situations in regiments and commands, which are all of those that have been ever most faithful to the royal family; and those put in their room are not only of a contrary party, but most of them of very indifferent characters. To the latter nominations, however, the government has been forced in a great degree by the refusal of several officers of rank and respectability to serve, and this in general not from any dislike to the government of the Infanta, or even to the constitution, but because they fear when the Infant Don Miguel comes, they will be considered as partisans to the Infanta, or to the present order of things, and be visited accordingly. The Royalists want simply Don Miguel; they say they want a King; but when I have asked them what they would do if, when Don Miguel came, he should be satisfied with the Regency and the constitution, they have invariably replied, that if he was satisfied with the constitution, that would be all very well, as it was not to a monarchical constitution that they objected. That the Queen is of this opinion I cannot for a moment suppose, she has too many vengeances to gratify; and the only question is how far Don Miguel will be directed by her. A worse councillor he cannot have; and though, when he comes, he may be able to overthrow the constitution, it would be but a very temporary victory, as from many causes a reaction would not be long in taking place. However this may be, it is most certain, and seen and felt by all, that while the present uncertainty continues as to when and how Don Miguel is to return, there can be no assurance of tranquillity or of consolidating the opinions of the nation, or of bringing parties to unite. There is unfortunately established the name of two parties, that of the Infanta and of Don Miguel, the doing of which alone is sufficient to make the parties, if they did not before exist; and certainly there ought not to have been such a distinction, as the Infanta Regent has no wish whatever

but to act for the general good; and she always expresses herself as being the locum tenens of Don Miguel, and most willing to resign to him when it shall be decided he is to take the reins. But the other party will either not see, or not believe this; and a vast party that cares very little about the matter swell in appearance the numbers of the Miguelistas, because they, either from prudence or fear, do not like to have anything to say to this government, looking for a speedy change to another which they consider inimical to this. Thus, and I speak against what if possible I would wish, I see no chance of a firm settlement in the state of things here, and of permanent quiet, but in the coming of Don Miguel; and if, on account of conforming to the constitution, he cannot come or govern before he is twenty-five years of age, then the sooner it is declared and made public that he is to come at that time the better for quiet here. In short, until this question is decided and known, there will be very little approximation between parties.

As regards myself, I have been very well received everywhere, and by all; and so far as I can learn, the great majority of the nation desire my having the command of the army; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Don Francisco d'Almeida, is most willing to make such arrangements as would put everything military into my hands. Still under the state of affairs here, I do not think it would be wise at present to undertake it; and after all the information I have been enabled to procure, and after the most mature consideration, I have declined it for the present. But as Sir W. A'Court and the government consider my presence useful, and as no one is aware of the decision I have come to, the influence my arrival had on parties continues; and as both are by that keeping quiet, and public affairs going on well and in tranquillity, it appears wise (if indeed all other things concurred to make it expedient, which is far from being the case) not to take a step that might suddenly revive party spirit, and before the Chambers are fully in their seats create clamour and opposition; and I have little doubt that the Queen and her party would immediately commence active opposition. As it is, the government goes on quietly, and the system itself is gaining ground. It is also as yet quite uncertain what establishment and arrangements the Cortes will make for the army; and I think that whilst the present spirit continues in the provinces, and having such a number of their countrymen to run to in Spain, there will be great difficulty in making a recruitment, as it was in all times a most obnoxious thing; and even formerly, those on whom the lot fell used to go off into Spain rather than be made soldiers of. There are several other very weighty reasons for declining to take the command, but the principal is, what I have already stated, the instability of the Regent. I can neither feel or give confidence to others; and though I know and feel I should get greatly better on with the Infanta Regent than it is probable I could with Don Miguel, yet I fear that until he is sent here it will never be considered as a fixed and stable government. He is held out [illegible] as their final Regent or sovereign; and for the peace of the [illegible] the sooner he can be placed in the government the better: it [illegible]ents, do away with what is going on from Spain, and thus [illegible] other great advantages, of what is the greatest obstacle [illegible] subordination. The Infanta Regent and Don Francisco

D'Almeida are quite satisfied with the line of conduct I have adopted, though they would, I believe, rather that I had taken the command; but as I shall be most frequently with her Highness the Regent, the effect will be considerable; and I propose going as seldom to the Queen as propriety will allow of. I have also under these circumstances thought it right to place myself, as to remaining here or going away, entirely at the discretion of this government, in concurrence with Sir W. A'Court, and they all anxiously desire me to remain. I have every reason to be most gratified with the conduct of her Highness the Infanta Regent towards me, and of that of all her ministers, which cannot fail to make me desirous of being of whatever use to them I possibly can. Such is my position at present here, and I must for the future be governed by circumstances or events as they arise, unless here or from home it is wished that I should at once withdraw, which at present is far from being the case here.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

MY DEAR WYNN, London, 11th November, 1826.

I have perused with attention the papers in the box which will carry this letter to you.

In respect to the provinces of Arracan, I entertain no doubt that you ought to retain them, more particularly as it appears that there is a practicable road from the city of Arracan into the valley of the Irrawaddy, or the heart of the Burmese territories. Upon this point I will communicate to you a military principle, which is I believe admitted now by the best authorities.

There is no really good defensive position which does not afford the means of making an attack upon its assailants. This principle is equally applicable to a fortress, to a military position for an army, and to a frontier. The Bengal frontier towards Ava, as I understand it, is excellent; but it becomes improved, for it cannot be attacked with any security if you keep in your hands the means of entering the valley of the Irrawaddy with an army. This advantage, together with that of the power of attacking Rangoon with your naval force, which operation you must observe will not only be facilitated but rendered efficient at small expense and in a short space of time by your possession of the provinces of Arracan, will really give you a decided influence over the future conduct of the Burmese government.

I have no maps and but little information on the other cessions

made by the Burmese, and I don't like to give an opinion whe not sufficiently informed. It appears, however, that Martaba particularly would be an useful settlement in reference to militar and political objects in relation to Ava and Siam; and Mergu in respect to naval and European warfare. All these settlement are situated in important points in the view of commerce— I mean of the good old regular sort which enriched men an States in time, and which was supported by intelligence, industry and honesty! I do not counsel the cession; but I am very wel convinced that the cession of these points to several of certai States in Europe would be considered as making their commer cial fortune! and I cannot consider that that which it would b good for such States to obtain is not or may not be good for u to keep.

I would therefore recommend you to keep them as we have got them, and to keep them upon the lowest possible scale o civil and military expense till you can see what their real capacity and worth is. I entertain no doubt that, under the British government, they will increase in population and revenue so a very shortly to pay the expense of keeping them, if they should not do so by good management immediately.

I believe that all these should be put under the governmen of Fort George or of Prince of Wales's Island; the forme preferably. Arracan should be under the government of Bengal and a good paved road broad enough for two cannon should b made from Chittagong to Arracan.

There is one point adverted to in Mr. Bayley's minute an Dr. Phillimore's memorandum, upon which I cannot avoid saying one word, and that is, the colonization of these settlements b Europeans.

I am not astonished that the latter should have recommended this scheme; but I am that it should ever have occurred to a man who, like Mr. Bayley, must have resided for some years i India.

You are not aware here of the inferiority of the Europea (particularly British) character and of its consequences in all th relations of life. Look at the accounts of the manners and con duct of those British subjects, not Company's servants, who som time ago carried on indigo plantations and manufactories. Ye observe, these men were not *colonists*. They had no right t reside in the country, which I may say was the scene of thei

depredations and plunder, excepting under the Company's licence, which might have been withdrawn at any time.

Observe that when you send a man to colonize in one of these settlements you do not send him to a desert, as in Africa, America, or Australasia, but you must send him to a country peopled more or less, and more or less civilized. He goes there enriched with the character of his country, of which advantage he soon becomes aware; and he uses it and all the other advantages which the absence of law would give him for the basest of purposes, the gratification of all his own base passions. All respect for the character of the country would become lost, and with its character we should lose our settlements. Rely upon it that with all our civilization and advantages, we are the nation in Europe the least disciplined and the least to be trusted in a situation in which we are not controlled by the strong arm of authority and law.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

You will have seen that throughout this contest Munro's opinion and mine have not been far different. I enclose you a letter which I received from him some time ago, from which you may conclude what his opinion is upon this subject.

Pray return Munro's letter, which you will see is for yourself alone.

M. Sodré to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Lisbon, 11th November, 1826.

Your Grace has been regularly acquainted with the vicissitudes and more recent progress of our unfortunate political and national dissensions. But still I think that your Grace is not so well informed as in my anxiety I wish, for the good and real welfare of my country, of the present alarming state of our public affairs; and it is on this account that I take the liberty of addressing your Grace, in order to afford you faithful information, on which an impartial opinion may be formed regarding the best expedients to be adopted in the actual state of things, by the British government, of which your Grace is one of the most conspicuous members, with a view to procure for my country the re-establishment of order and tranquillity among the general community.

Such desirable services can only be rendered now with the superior assistance of your Grace's political wisdom and general knowledge in the affairs of the Peninsula. I trust that in so asserting I am in possession of great personal experience, derived from my long services near your Grace during a period of the most complicated embarrassments, and indeed of

almost general despair, in regard to the ultimate desired result of the cause n which the Allies were then engaged, and when no person to my knowledge, excepting your Grace, constantly predicted, that with firm courage and honest perseverance, the cause would ultimately obtain a glorious termination. Therefore, my Lord Duke, I can never forget such uniform and constant predictions, and which, indeed, were entirely and exclusively happily realised from your assiduous management and superior direction of the political and military affairs of this country,—a country which, after all, deserved a better destiny than that which it is now experiencing, owing to its political discords of such an alarming extent. Your Grace is well acquainted with all the previous circumstances which have attended the arrival and presentation of the Constitution in this country, given by the Emperor of the Brazils, and brought here by Sir Charles Stuart, whose sudden recall to England in such a moment, as I then expressed would be, was one, and in a great measure the first, source of our most determined national distrusts; for Sir Charles, from his well-known political and administrative abilities, if he had been allowed to remain for some time amongst us, would have, in all appearances of real cause for distrust suggested the adequate measures to conciliate and tranquillise the most influential and directing classes of this nation; and, indeed, would have conciliated the parties in all their dissensions, by proposing expedients which none but him could then recommend, and, moreover, persuade to their acceptance. Therefore I considered then that his recall would, as I have already mentioned, turn out to be, as it has, a great national misfortune to this country; the present results have realised my fears.

The newly appointed government left to itself, and in such an important occasion, did appear to act with good faith and true honest motives. But soon after framing the law for the elections, having made it in a very hasty manner, and although in all appearances so conceived as to exclude all sorts of intrigues and cabals in the progress of the necessary operations conducive to the elections, nevertheless it was almost immediately perceived by the acute observers that a powerful unknown yet visible influence prevailed in favour of the late liberal party, for the electors were chosen in almost all the elective circles of the kingdom from that party whose adherents were likewise appointed to fill the most important places in the state, notwithstanding that such party and adherents had left amongst us so pernicious and destructive principles and examples of social disorganization.

To such electors, and so chosen, the law had left the faculty of ultimately electing from their body the representatives of the nation; how far they availed themselves of this right, the results have shown, and to what party their greatest number belonged; the individual history of such deputies need not be here recorded.

The influential part of the nation from the beginning had persisted in declaring that the Constitution, notwithstanding the general goodness and apparent wisdom of its dispositions, did not contain, *as it ought to do*, either record whatever, or link with, our first fundamental laws and the venerable institutions of the monarchy; which, although they had in latter times, by the force of the kingly government, been brought into disuse, yet no power had been able to obliterate them from the history of the rise and glorious existence (through so many ages) of the Portuguese nation.

Such recollection had from the commencement, with the already-indicated portion of the nation, a great and universal preponderating effect in promoting distrust and discontent, but they still remain quiet, and as if in anxious expectation. It was the results of the elections, as already detailed, and the general employment of the most conspicuous adherents of the late Constitution, that prompted them to act; and now, without openly conspiring, they became the most formidable, decided, and dangerous opposers to the new order of things. From this moment no means have been spared to undermine the new institutions; how far they have been assisted by a certain foreign influence, a little time will show. They began by proclaiming the probable and visible dangers to which the country was now exposed in its political and future independence as a nation. This national plea has had a wonderful effect in the promotion of general discontent, and, in fact, in the supporting of their ultimate views. The army, which from well-known and not too remote a cause, had been rendered a sort of acting political body, with its greatest and most influential chiefs, willingly made common cause with such directing, and, indeed, select part of the nation. The progress of their operations and their tendency are now manifest to all the world, and, in a word, have arrived at such a point that I begin to be afraid that the actual executive government of this country possess neither moral nor physical means to counteract or prevent its further progress, and the completion of the well-known object in view.

To the attainment of this object they have, and with daily increasing force, fixed their views, in a manner that no word by me can divert them from pursuing in their plan, as they insist, to save the country, and, in fact, nothing now can put a stop to such vast and ramificated dissension, except the immediate realisation of their object.

It is not, my Lord Duke, in my sphere to point out how the wisdom or inconveniences attached to such an object, or the consequent results that it might hereafter produce relative to what on one side is asserted to be exclusively legitimate, whilst on the other quite the contrary is pretended. With this latter opinion we, however, actually see what a considerable part of the nation sides, and appear determined to support it. And I may here be allowed to observe, where are the means to restrain this party? Where are now to be had the required moral and physical resources to prepare and support the adequate expedients of opposition to such a vast number of known, and still more dangerous secret enemies of the new order of things? The government, it is then evident, possesses no force to restrain the operations of so formidable a party. The emperor is far off to command and enforce his desires. The remaining military force, its dispositions and intentions, are no longer doubtful.

In the midst of such important and alarming events Providence has brought amongst us, in an unexpected manner, Lord Beresford; and I dare say that from his superior judgment, and long knowledge that he has had of this country, his Lordship has already formed his opinion of the progressive and exact state of the views and pretensions of the contending parties.

It is not my intention, neither do I presume, to penetrate into the exact object of his Lordship's appearance in this country at so complicated a moment. I am however able to affirm, and this from my own persona

conviction, and moreover without knowing his personal opinion on the present state of public affairs, that a grand and salutary result, I may add a most important service, has been already rendered to this country by his Lordship's sudden arrival, and in fact a calm has at once been perceived, and in some manner experienced in the occult proceedings of the conflicting parties; their exertions have in a visible manner undergone a sort of palliation. Such results have been owing entirely to a moral influence, to the exalted character, and in fine to the recollection of the many and conspicuous services that his Lordship has rendered to this country in co-operating towards the support of its national independency during the Peninsular war.

In fact, my Lord Duke, a general and most anxious expectation has succeeded, and still continues to predominate. In this awful moment, in this momentary calm, great and definite advantages might now be obtained in order to put a term to such ruinous and disastrous national divisions of political interests; to produce general tranquillity, and ultimately the greatest of all blessings with us,—a general and permanent reconciliation of all the conflicting and now discordant interests.

It is, therefore, at the present moment that a noble opportunity is offered to the British government, as our best and constant friend, to interfere in an open manner, and to recommend such means and concessions as may produce, and before it is too late, an amicable termination of such distressing and lacerating contentions. In this important subject your Grace and Lord Beresford are the only two personages that I know in the world capable of enforcing, with the amicable assistance of the British government, such measures as may tend to ensure with us general and permanent tranquillity. My wishes, my constant prayers, have been always directed to this happy result; and it is from such natural wishes, and from my well-known feelings on this important subject, that I have been induced to present to your Grace's consideration the above observations. Seven years' residence with your Grace, my constant services near your person, and of such a confidential nature for the good of the cause of my country, surely have, and will always, as long as I live, facilitate my access and direct communications to your Grace, particularly on such momentous occasions, and for motives like the present.

It being, in conclusion, my Lord Duke, in my power to say and to prove, from the retired and secluded manner in which I exist in this country, that I have never belonged, nor do now belong to either of the acting parties in this country, being only and exclusively of that party whose sole and constant wishes tend to promote the real and permanent happiness and prosperity of my country. Of this party, I know from long and valuable experience, that your Grace has always been and still continues to be the first and most sincere friend.

I have the honour to be, with sentiments of everlasting respect and gratitude,

My Lord Duke, your Grace's most humble servant,

FRANCIS SODRÉ.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 12th November, 1826.

I did not return Prince Lieven's Projet de Note as I conceived that you wished me to keep it till you should send me the draft of your answer, which I received last night.

I write from recollection, but it appears to me that Prince Lieven has mistaken your despatch of the 4th September. You did not propose to withdraw his Majesty's ambassador from Constantinople, or to recognise Greece as an independent State provided the Emperor of Russia would do the same. But you suggested that the two Courts engaged by the Protocol should endeavour to prevail upon the other Powers of Christendom to withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from the Porte in concert, and simultaneously with his Majesty and the Emperor; and that the threat of this abandonment of the Porte by the Powers of Christendom should then be used as a means of negotiation with the Porte, to be carried into execution if the Porte should not be disposed to listen to reasonable terms.

You did not suggest that the Porte should be threatened that his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia would recognise Greece as an independent State; but this recognition, *in the case of the dereliction of all hostilities on the part of the Porte*, was suggested as another means of negotiation.

It appears to me that the Russian government have totally forgotten their declaration to me which they authorized me to convey to the Porte, and which you will find in their own words in my letter to Mr. Stratford Canning. They have forgotten the principle of the Protocol, which is not to render Greece an independent State, but to reconcile Turks and Greeks permanently by regulating the form and conditions of the dependency of the Greeks upon the Porte; and you may rely upon it that you will fail in effecting your object unless you incur the risk of having to enforce it by offensive war if the principle of the Protocol is lost sight of.

I will here venture to give you my opinion of the march of the negotiation. The two ambassadors should make a simultaneous and more formal effort to prevail upon the Porte to attend to the proposed mediation, and to listen to the terms of the Protocol, of which they should in detail explain to the Porte the objects and the advantages; particularly in finance.

While this is going on the two Courts should endeavour to prevail upon the allied Courts to give them a more active support, even to the length of threatening to withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from the Porte unless the Porte should consent to a reasonable settlement.

If the allied Courts should refuse to assist by placing those or any other means of negotiation in the hands of the Powers parties to the Protocol, it will rest with those Powers to consider of the further steps which they will take. But of this I am quite certain, that a threat to withdraw the ambassadors of the two Powers in the existing state of the negotiation and *of the war*, and even the withdrawing those ambassadors, would at present be nugatory: and that a qualified threat to recognise the independence of Greece, which alone we can make; or even such recognition, if we could make it consistently with our professed neutrality in the war, which in the existing state of the war we cannot; would be ridiculous unless we should go to war to protect the independence which we should have recognised.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

26.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 13th November, 1826.

I return the papers.

I recollected your despatch of the 4th September perfectly. You cannot threaten the Porte to withdraw from Constantinople the ambassadors and ministers of the Christian Powers without the previous consent of those Powers; and to threaten to withdraw those of the contracting parties of the Protocol, or to withdraw them, would be nugatory. Indeed the meaning of the despatch of the 4th September is not that the Porte, but that the allied Courts, should be informed of the intention of the parties to the Protocol to withdraw their ministers.

It is a question of prudence whether such intention shall be announced before the allied Courts shall be sounded whether they will or not follow the example, or give any other support to the negotiation at Constantinople.

I likewise recollected the other point, viz., recognition, perfectly.

Whatever is to be done must be in concert with the allied Courts; and there is, moreover, this condition on our parts: that all contests must have ceased on the part of the Porte in the country the provisional government of which is to be recognised.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 13th November, 1826.

Everything here remains as when I last wrote to you, perfectly quiet outwardly and in appearance, but the feelings of the parties are very far from decreasing, though I am still told on all sides that all are waiting to learn what I am come here for, and what part I mean to act, and they are considerably puzzled by the various reports on this head that appear in the English papers. The provinces are not so quiet as this immediate neighbourhood, and there has been some little blood spilt in Tras os Montes, where the peasants openly attacked a small party of military, which was of no other consequence than to show the spirit they are filled with; and though here there is nothing of overt act, nor likely to be I think, yet even in this town, where undoubtedly the great numerical strength of the constitutionalists is, I should doubt that they outnumber the others, and which others are not, I apprehend, so much against the present order of things as against those employed to carry the Constitution into effect, for the Royalists or Miguelists say they are all and every one those who figured in 1820; and I am sorry to say that is very nearly true, not from any intention in the Infanta Regent to have it so, but she was badly advised at first in not more equally employing of both sides, and then from some imprudences of the minister of war (who is under the tutelage of the greatest rascal in Portugal, and who is the head and organ of the clubs) in dismissing a great number of officers on suspicion of their want of attachment to this government, which has caused every person that is considered of respectability to avoid as much as may be taking any situation, and the poor Infanta by this is left without a choice of persons, I mean in the lower departments and in the army. She sees this and regrets it, but it is too late to remedy it, as the generality of the nation are not sorry to be considered as belonging to Don Miguel's party; and with the prospect of seeing him here sooner or later, it is quite impossible to work against that feeling, or to bring any of the party to attach themselves to this government. Either, then, all hopes of ever seeing Don Miguel must be extinguished, which cannot be, or it is wisdom to let him come as soon as it possibly can be. Spain, notwithstanding all the promises of the government, continues to protect the Portuguese refugees and deserters, and to encourage, by all means, the discontents and distractions of this country. We know her too well not to know that there is no dependence to be placed on her promises, and that it is impossible to judge of the conduct

she will adopt, by any ordinary rules, or as one would of any other government, besides the doubt of what the government there is able to do if willing. The apostolic party has more control than the government itself; and whilst there is this division here, one of the two or both, the government and apostolic party, have power to keep this country in a continued ferment, and perhaps even will do that which may oblige England to come to the assistance of this nation, and it is impossible to see where that may end. If however, Don Miguel having taken the oath and the marriage been solemnised, any arrangement can be made with him in respect to the continuance of the present order of things under this government, his coming here would immediately and at once put an end to all the plots from Spain. This I know may possibly be done by the moral coercion from England upon that government; but suppose it was so, still that would not give quiet within to this kingdom; nothing I am convinced can do that but the return of Don Miguel, or some declaration showing that he will be here at a given period, but which latter would weigh heavy upon any temporary government. I cannot now pretend to know the disposition of Don Miguel, or how far dependence may be had on any promises or arrangement he might enter into. I see that were he to come soon he might do whatever he liked (though, as I before wrote, were he to attempt to do away with a representative government, it would not be long ere he had a reaction), and I have strong reason to fear that the Queen would endeavour to induce him to be absolute; yet, though I see there is considerable risk on that side, it would only be an internal concern here, and might be left to themselves, and at all events it is a possible danger, whereas the present state of things is an existing and positive danger; and whilst there is danger from without, there is great anarchy within. If, therefore, Don Miguel has a right, or it shall be found expedient under all the circumstances of the case to declare he has a right at the age of twenty-five, may not the Powers of Europe, if required by England, and have they not a right to say that Europe shall not be thrown into a war merely on the question whether this young Prince governs at twenty-four or twenty-five? I say so much on the supposition that the obstinate Spaniards will continue so. If there is no danger of that nature, the internal government may go on till the expiration of the year, but not without confusion and consequent injury to the country. As I told you in my last, the army is in that state, and so totally demoralised, that the coercion over it necessary to restore discipline and subordination would drive every delinquent into Spain; such an attempt, whilst Spain holds its present attitude, and that the Miguelistic party are using every effort to debauch what remains of the army, would, I am convinced, dissolve the army altogether. Under such singular circumstances there is no hold of it to be got, and whilst I should not and could not succeed in our object, I should be put down to a party, and from that moment lose what influence I may have now or at any future period, in this nation. It is on such considerations that I have declined taking the command of this army, and every day I am the more convinced, as well on my own account as on that of my country, that I have done right. It is to me most vexatious, for the more I see of the Infanta Regent the more I am certain she would make the best sovereign this country has seen for ages; for even though I have told you that unhappily

the great body of employés are of the times of 1820, and which the nation calls Liberals, this is from no prejudice of the Regent's; the natural propensity was for the other side, knowing as she did better the individuals that compose it; but circumstances and events, and not her wishes, have so cast the lot. Would to God she had been the undoubted rightful sovereign! How long my presence may be wished for here I cannot say. I shall not be sorry when it appears to others that it is unnecessary; but as I mentioned to you in my last, that as I was sent here to be of what use I could, I still think it right to stay so long as the actual government and Sir W. A'Court may think it good, or desire that I should remain.

In this I have no will of my own. I have been this day with the Infanta Regent and with the Queen; to the former I go every second day, to the latter it is my second visit, that I propose repeating every eight or ten days. I was equally well received by both.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

Prince Lieven to the Right Hon. George Canning.—(Received November 20.)

SIR, London, 7th (19th) November, 1826.

I lost no time in bringing to the knowledge of my august Master the note dated the 4th of September, in which your Excellency, while stating the views of your government relative to the pacification of Greece, has examined the steps to be taken to induce the Ottoman government to cooperate for this object, either in the hypothesis of a rupture, or of a happy conclusion of the negotiations of Akermann.

His Majesty the Emperor has received with the interest which they merited the overtures conspicuous for their frankness and practical ideas which this communication of your Excellency contained, and the hypothesis of the success of our negotiations with the Ottoman plenipotentiaries being happily realized, my august Master has authorized me to concert with your Excellency as to the means to be adopted for communicating to the Court of Vienna, of Paris, and of Berlin, his communication of the 4th of September, and my answer of to-day; and also as to the means to be adopted to induce these Courts to participate in the action of Russia and Great Britain towards the Porte, to give to them that collective character which is in conformity alike with the wishes of the Emperor and those of the English government, and to throw into the scale the whole weight of the European accord.

I have, moreover, to announce to the British Cabinet, in the name of his Imperial Majesty, in reply to your Excellency's note of September 4th:—

That it is understood between Russia and England that this note itself will serve as instructions both to M. de Ribeaupierre and to Mr. Stratford Canning;

That as soon as M. de Ribeaupierre arrives at Athens, it will be his duty to concert with the ambassador of his Britannic Majesty as to the official and simultaneous measures to be adopted by those two Courts towards the Porte, to communicate to it the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April),

to invite it to adhere to this Protocol, and to propose to it also the immediate conclusion of an armistice;

That in case of a refusal on the part of the Ottoman government, and in the supposition that this measure, at once the simplest and the one most calculated to succeed with the Sultan, should attain the consent of the allied Courts, they should threaten the Sultan with the departure of the representatives of these Courts, and with the formation of relations with Greece, which would terminate by leading them to recognize her independence;

That if, after a period of delay, which it will be necessary to fix, the Porte still persists in the same refusal, the representatives will take their departure, and will enter into relations with Greece.

In communicating these resolutions to your Excellency, based as they are upon the views put forward by the government of Great Britain itself, it still remains to me to fulfil the duty of reiterating here, in the name of my august Master, the assurance that his Majesty knows how to appreciate the value of the relations which the Protocol has formed between the two Courts; that his Majesty regards the results already attained as very beneficial and very important; that his Majesty is firmly determined to follow them up, and is fully convinced that the work of conciliation and of peace, undertaken under such favourable auspices, will arrive at a satisfactory termination.

I have, &c.,

LIEVEN.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Prince Lieven.

MON PRINCE, Foreign Office, 20th November, 1826.

I have laid before the King my master your Excellency's letter of yesterday, in answer to that which I had the honour to address to your Excellency on the 4th of September, and which your Excellency transmitted to Moscow for the consideration of your august Sovereign.

His Majesty has seen with the greatest satisfaction the cordial concurrence of the Emperor of Russia in the plan of proceeding suggested in my letter of September, for the execution of the Protocol of April, and I have received his Majesty's commands to lose no time in concerting with your Excellency the communication of the plan thus agreed upon by our two Courts to those of Paris, Berlin, and Vienna.

The declaration that instructions framed for his Majesty's ambassador at the Porte, on the basis of my letter of the 4th of September, may serve also as instructions for M. de Ribeaupierre, his Imperial Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, is highly flattering to the British government, and furnishes a strong motive for hastening the further steps in this important affair; so that the order to his Majesty's ambassador to enter upon the execution of his instructions may reach him as soon as possible after M. de Ribeaupierre's arrival at Constantinople.

I proceed, therefore, upon your Excellency's invitation, to propose to your Excellency that instructions should be sent, without delay, to the British and Russian ambassadors and ministers at Paris, Berlin, and

Vienna, to make a joint communication to those several Courts of my letter of the 4th of September and of your Excellency's letter of yesterday; adding thereto the expression of an earnest hope, on the part of both our Sovereigns, that those Courts may be disposed to co-operate with the signing parties to the Protocol, for the pacification of Eastern Europe, and that they will send instructions to their representatives at Constantinople to enter into unreserved communication with his Majesty's ambassador, and with the minister of your Imperial Master at that residence, with the assurance that Mr. Stratford Canning and M. de Ribeaupierre are instructed to meet with the most entire confidence their advances towards such communication.

Whether this concert shall be established simply through the instrumentality of instructions from the several Powers to their representatives at Constantinople, or whether any more formal accession of those Powers to the Protocol shall take place, may, according to the opinion of my Court, be best left to their own decision.

We do not pretend to insist upon such accession, but we should see it with pleasure, on the part of all or any of those Powers, or we would readily accept the co-operation of all or of any of them, to the degree and in the manner in which it may be most agreeable to each to afford it.

What it is most important for us to know as soon as possible from each is whether they are ready to join with us in the measure of withdrawing their diplomatic representatives from the Porte, in the event of an obstinate refusal on the part of the Sultan to listen to any proposal for accommodation.

Your Excellency will observe, on reference to my letter of the 4th of September, that it is there stated as our opinion, that the efficacy of the menace to withdraw the Christian missions from Constantinople, or even of the act of withdrawing them, would mainly depend upon the degree of concurrence which it obtained from other Powers. A hope is there expressed that if Russia and England concurred in recommending it, Austria, France, and Prussia would not pursue a different course.

But the question is left open for consideration whether, if in disappointment of this hope, France, Austria, and Prussia should decline to withdraw their missions, it would be expedient for England and Russia alone to withdraw theirs, leaving the others in continued residence at Constantinople, or whether it might not be in that case more advisable to pass over that particular measure, and to go at once to such ulterior measures as the other Powers might agree in adopting.

It appears to us, upon mature reflection, that it would be more advisable that Mr. Stratford Canning and M. de Ribeaupierre should be instructed not to bring forward the menace of withdrawing from the Porte, unless other Powers shall authorize their representatives to concur in it.

The Allies may be requested, at the same time that they return their answer, to signify it also to their missions at Constantinople.

It is not till every hope of a favourable acceptance of the propositions of the Allies is exhausted, that the menace of withdrawing the Christian missions should (in our opinion) be employed, and it is not till after a direct reference home, and specific orders from home, that it should be actually carried into execution.

The arrangements necessary to precede or accompany such a step, especially on the part of England and France, require such an interval; and the knowledge on the part of the Porte that a courier was despatched from Constantinople on this errand, might possibly produce that reflection in the minds of the Ottoman Ministers which would render the execution of the orders with which that courier would return unnecessary.

Supposing the other Powers to decline concurring in the threat to withdraw their representatives, we are of opinion that we should endeavour to induce the Allies to resort at once to the second line of action pointed out in my letter of the 4th September; that in which Austria, having been the original adviser, we may, it is to be hoped, reckon with confidence on her support.

Generally, it is our decided opinion that every effort should be made to secure the co-operation of our Allies, and even, if opportunity offers, of other Powers; that we ought, indeed, to obtain the co-operation of all or of as many Powers, and on as many points, as we can.

It may be true that this plan of action, and the references incident to it, will occupy some time. But we do not think that a positive disadvantage.

There does not appear a likelihood of any considerable and immediate change in the state of affairs between the Porte and the Greeks.

The winter brings with it a practical armistice; and before the approach of the season favourable to the recommencement of hostilities, we trust that an armistice will have been established by convention; which we agree with your Excellency's government in considering as a necessary accompaniment to an amicable negotiation.

I believe I have now touched upon every point to which it appears necessary to advert in your Excellency's letter.

If I do not terminate mine without reminding your Excellency that the ultimate recognition of a separate and independent State in Greece (which forms the essential part of the Austrian plan of proceedings) is understood by us, with the qualifications explained in my letter of the 4th of September; and also that we should not consider a mere refusal of our proposed mediation by the Turkish government as a justifying cause of war,—I beg your Excellency to be persuaded that I mention these particulars only lest, from the omission of them, the Allies should conceive any unfounded alarm, unfavourable to the co-operation which we so earnestly desire, and which affords so much the best chance of success to a conciliatory negotiation.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

[627.] *To the King.* [*Not delivered.*]

MEMORANDUM AS TO THE UNDERSTANDING ON WHICH THE MINISTERS ACT IN REGARD TO THE CATHOLIC QUESTION.

London, 20th November, 1826.

Every individual member of the Cabinet is at liberty to take such line as he may think proper in Parliament, whether in

debate or by his vote, on the question of further concessions to the Roman Catholics; but he speaks and votes upon this question as an individual, and not on the part of the government.

Every individual member of the Cabinet is at liberty to propose for the consideration of the Cabinet such measures upon this subject as he may think proper.

A sound discretion must be exercised upon this subject. Each individual must feel, first, that the existing administration was not formed with a view to carry what is called the Catholic Question; secondly, that to propose in the Cabinet measures which have for their object further concession to the Roman Catholics may create want of confidence and disunion among colleagues; and thirdly, that the repeated renewal of discussions of this question in Parliament, and particularly if brought forward by a minister although in his individual capacity, may lead to the disunion of the Houses of Parliament, than which a greater misfortune could not occur.

These considerations are calculated to influence the discretion of a member of the Cabinet, and might induce him to avoid proposing measures for further concession to the Roman Catholics, although he would find himself under the necessity of voting for such measures when proposed by others.

In the mean time the government of the United Kingdom must be conducted impartially on the principles of the existing laws; and all questions affecting the government of Ireland must be considered by the Cabinet at large on their own grounds, of which no member of the Cabinet can entertain a doubt.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Stanhope House, 21st November, 1826.

I entertain some doubts with respect to the paragraph which I have marked. You have in the preceding paragraph stated the right of each member to propose in Cabinet what measures he may think proper, and also the great delicacy of exercising such right. His right of proposing, or, as you have expressed it, suggesting, measures relating to the subject which might have the result of creating differences between the two Houses (and a proposition in favour of Catholic concessions in the House of Commons would have that effect) is one which, if you recollect, Mr. Canning soon after the rejection of the Bill in the House of Lords intimated he

might possibly exercise, as he would think himself at liberty to propose on some future occasion a Bill of Concessions.

He said this when he was not quite so well at Court as he is now; and I doubt whether he would exercise this right, but it may be as well not to question it in your paper.

The rest of your paper stands on such good grounds that you are quite safe, and the King will be so in maintaining the principles contained in it; and although I think that the paragraph I have marked may be well maintained, yet it may be more prudent not to advance it. You will have done great good in preventing our master beginning the affray; and I trust that this inconsiderate act of the Duke of York will, by your means, soon be buried in oblivion.

Yours, my dear Duke, very faithfully,

BATHURST.

[628.] *To Lord Granville.*

MY DEAR LORD GRANVILLE, London, 21st November, 1826.

I have received your letter of the 17th, and I need not assure you that the libel contained in the 'Journal des Tribunaux'* is totally without foundation. In fact Bonaparte had abdicated the 3rd of April, of which I was informed on the 12th, and on the 18th signed a convention for putting an end to hostilities with Marshals Duc d'Albufera and Duc de Dalmatie, which I had been soliciting the latter to agree to from the 12th. It is not very probable, therefore, that I should have hanged a man on the 21st for being a partisan.

In truth, I never hanged anybody for being a partisan.

In respect to the treatment of the libel, I confess that I have been so often libelled in France that I don't care one pin about the matter. I should wish, however, that these dates were not mentioned even to Mons. Jouhaud, as I think it not unlikely that the libel may be copied into some of the English newspapers, upon which I will fall *à bras raccourci*.

In respect to M. Jouhaud himself, between ourselves I recommend to you to have nothing to say to him, excepting to tell him that I am much obliged to him for his attention upon this occasion. It is perfectly true that I employed him to prosecute a libeller in the Netherlands, who accused me of having made use of the influence which I possessed as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France, in order to forward some dirty job about a gentleman in the French West Indies. The libeller was punished. But M. Jouhaud demanded from me,

* In relation to the execution of François La Tour.

and was paid as his fee, five hundred pounds, which is I believe more than all the Dutch lawyers in the Netherlands gain in any year. However he insisted upon being paid what he demanded, which I really thought was five hundred francs! but I ended by paying him five hundred pounds.

Pray remember me most kindly to Lady Granville, and believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I cannot conceive upon what this story can be founded. I know I saved many Frenchmen from the vengeance of Spaniards and Portuguese, and disgraced whole corps of the former particularly, in order to prevent these acts of vindictive retaliation, and I cannot recollect to have had occasion for even one act of severity, much less such an act as that imputed.

All my acts in France were done by proclamation, and therefore must be known to the whole world.

The English Guards were never at Tarbes, or further in France than Bayonne. The Spaniards were at Tarbes after the suspension of hostilities.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 21st November, 1826.

I have perused the papers in the box regarding the dispute between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Persia, and it appears to me that although the original provocation was given by the Emperor by the seizure in time of peace of the districts of Gochelee and Balickdoo, avowedly belonging to the King of Persia, the existing hostilities are to be attributed to the latter. By the good offices of Mr. Willock, means of preventing hostilities had been discovered and agreed to by the King and by the Russian ambassador Prince Menzikoff; but in the mean time accounts had been received by the Prince Royal, who was on the frontier with an army, that there had been a successful insurrection within the Russian territory, and he moved across the frontier to support the insurgents.

The state of our engagements appears to be as follows:—The Treaty is defensive, and is stated in the 3rd Article to have been concluded "for the purpose of repelling the aggression

of enemies;" "and the purport of the word aggression in this Treaty is an attack upon the territories of another State."

The 4th Article grants a subsidy to Persia in case the King of Persia should be attacked, and contains the following paragraph:—"It is further agreed that the said subsidy shall not be paid in case the war with such European nation shall have been produced by an aggression on the part of Persia."

The 6th Article states that in case Persia should be engaged in a war with any European Power at peace with his Majesty, his Majesty "engages to use his best endeavours to bring Persia and such European Power to a friendly understanding." The end of the Article contains an engagement to support Persia by force, or with a subsidy, in case his Majesty's mediation should fail of success; but it is obvious, from the reference to the preceding Articles, that the assistance to be afforded in the case supposed in the 6th Article depends upon the fact of *aggression*.

The King of Persia will still remain, therefore, with the claim of his Majesty's interference in his favour under the 6th Article of the Treaty, even though it should be decided that, as the aggressor, he cannot have his assistance and support.

I must say that in this case we stand in an unpleasant situation. The late Emperor declined to attend to our mediations in favour of the King of Persia, after we had settled for him the Treaty of Gulistan; and the King of Persia is acquainted with this fact, and has suffered in consequence. We then call upon him not to be the aggressor, and his territories are seized and occupied in time of peace. He feels that his Majesty's interference is of no use, and that the Emperor of Russia will not listen to it, and we must not be surprised that he should manifest a disinclination to submit to an injustice, particularly considering the state of excitement in which his army and subjects were in consequence of the disputes of the Russian authorities with their Mahometan subjects, and of the injustice above recited.

We have a real interest in the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Persian monarchy; and the existence of this interest is well known in Russia as well as throughout Europe. It will not answer, then, to allow the Persian monarchy

to be destroyed, particularly upon a case of which the original aggression and injustice is undoubtedly on the side of the Russians. The real, well understood interest of the Emperor of Russia in this case is likewise to keep the King of Persia in a state of independence and respectability, if not as a barrier between him and India, at least as one between the Russian dominions and the wild tribes of Mahometans in that part of Asia. I think, therefore, that you will not find the Emperor disinclined to listen to your counsels upon this subject.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 22nd November, 1826.

I am much obliged to you for the trouble which you have been so good as to take in looking through the Persian Papers, and in giving me your opinion upon them.

Mine agrees with yours on every point but one, on which, however, I am not very confident in my difference of opinion. It is this:

Does not the article which defines the *casus fœderis* to be *aggression against Persia* limit also the effect of the whole Treaty, and therein of the 6th Article, which promises our mediation?

Are we *bound* even to mediate in a case in which Persia was the aggressor?

I do not know that the decision of this question either way would affect the *expediency* of mediating, but it would change the nature of the obligation, and leave us more masters of our mode and time.

The whole Treaty is a most unlucky effort of negotiation; and to add to the difficulties of it, it has never been laid before Parliament, as I find upon inquiry.

I shall be very glad of an opportunity of talking with you upon this matter as soon as the first pressure of Parliament is over.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To Lord Granville.

MY DEAR LORD GRANVILLE, London, 24th November, 1826.

Since I wrote to you on Tuesday I have had my papers examined to endeavour to discover something about the case of La Tour.

He was executed not for being a partisan, but for

various acts of robbery, and plunder, and violence, upon the inhabitants in the neighbourhood of Vic, committed by him as chief of a banditti, under pretence of collecting supplies for a body of partisans.

I don't find any report of an act of hostility against the army, and there is none in the report of the evidence.

The complaints of him and his banditti were first made by the magistrates of Vic, where the inquiry was regularly conducted according to the forms of the French law, including the interrogatory of the prisoner, and not less than twenty-one witnesses appeared against him.

Excepting then that the execution took place by my authority, which must necessarily have been the case, as there was no other at the time in the departments south of the Garonne, no part of the statement in the newspaper which you sent to me is true.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 25th November, 1826.

I have little more to say to you on the state of affairs here than to confirm what I have already stated to you on that head. The view I then took and the line I adopted appear to have been correct, and so far the results expected have taken place. Though no longer an object of novelty, my situation here is looked to with great curiosity, and does not a little puzzle as well the foreign ministers as the people here. The Regent and her ministers appear so perfectly satisfied with my presence only, that there seems very little anxiety for anything more. The public mind, though perhaps not much changed, is yet gradually getting quieter, which the taking of the oath by Don Miguel and his subsequent solemnization of the marriage ceremony has no doubt much contributed to. But as these acts, independent of what his party here could do for him, bring him nearer to have authority here, it is not to be expected that his adherents will diminish, or that content and quiet can be secured here under such a state of things. If Spain does not interfere, I have no doubt that open acts against this government can be avoided until Don Miguel comes to his twenty-fifth year; and unless Spain takes an open part against this country, there can be no fear of the troops of this nation now in Spain returning hostilely here, though if they did there is some reason to fear for the loyalty of those in the north of Portugal, though it is certain that since my arrival there has been less symptom of dissatisfaction amongst those troops. The wisdom and indeed necessity of sending Don Miguel here, as

soon as political considerations will admit, is not less evident, and should it be once decided that he is to come as Regent when of twenty-five years, the sooner that is publicly known the better; that of itself would insure public tranquillity until that period. What is wanted here is a certainty of what is to be, then every one would have ground upon which to determine and fix his future conduct; for though I will not say it would insure quiet in this kingdom, yet if it were decided that the Infanta Donna Isabel was to retain the Regency till her niece the Queen came of age, it would give her a much greater party than she has. It is the uncertainty and dread of change does the greatest mischief here, and whilst that lasts the minds of the nation will not settle, nor can any one calculate which way, even for the public good, it is best for him to steer his course. But here I fear that personal considerations are much more influential than public ones.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 27th November, 1826.

I return the letters from Mr. Salt, of which the enclosures are very curious indeed.

Acquiescence in, or even encouragement to, Mahomed Ali's proposals, would be quite inconsistent with our neutral character, and with our character as mediators, and indeed with our treaties with the Porte.

It would be the worst description of war against the Porte.

These papers, however, show very clearly that Mahomed Ali has no great taste for the war in which he is engaged; does not entertain any sanguine hopes of its successful result; and does not see very clearly his own interest in a termination which should place the Greeks at the mercy of the Porte.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 29th November, 1826.

Before Lord Beresford went to Portugal I informed him of my opinion that he ought not to write to any of the King's ministers; and I particularly requested him not to write to me unless he should have occasion to do so upon his private affairs.

Notwithstanding this opinion he has written to me, and I enclose his letter.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 30th November, 1826.

You will before this reaches you have learnt of a small corps of the Portuguese troops that had gone into Spain having made an inroad into Portugal. This information Sir W. A'Court sent by a brig of war. They appear to have been about 800, which, crossing the Guadiana in the night of the 25th instant, surprised a squadron of cavalry early in the morning of the 26th at Villa Viçosa, and it appears they made some booty of the silver articles belonging to the chapel there, and retired about 9 o'clock of the same morning. They were previously armed and furnished with ammunition, &c., by the Captain-General of Estremadura, Don Jozé de S. Juan. This person appears to be entirely devoted to, and only obeys the orders of, the Junta Apostolica. He is extremely active, and is disciplining and instructing very assiduously the troops under his orders; and I understand that even this inroad of the Portuguese was supported by 40 horse and the provincial regiment of Truxillo, though I believe they did not pass the Guadiana, but remained in observation on its left bank. I rather think this act was not in the general plan made for the simultaneous entrance of the Portuguese troops from Spain into this country, but took effect from some particular information that gave them to hope they would, as they did, succeed in arresting the plate, &c., that was packed up for removal, and probably informed of the negligence of the squadron there. I think so, because of their again sudden departure, and because the two corps, 14th Infantry and 4th Caçadores, that lately went from the Algarve had not joined them, which they will have done about this time. But by this attack the government has been alarmed and has had time to send troops from here to protect those points. Last night came an express from the north, by which we have learnt that the Marquez de Chaves (the day when I am not informed of) had entered by Bragança with 1400; that he had been gallantly opposed by the 3rd regiment of infantry, not having more than 300 men, and which it is said have been nearly all destroyed. It is pretended that the plan was to have entered in three places, and the principal corps by Castello Branco, but we have not yet heard of any Portuguese in that neighbourhood. Such so far as I am informed is the present state of things on the frontiers. So far as I can gain information or get insight into the present state of the army, it appears to me that the officers employed are in general willing to do their duty (of the first line), but that the soldiers are almost all of a contrary opinion, and this I think has been much brought about by the dismissal of a great number of officers in whom the soldiers had most confidence; and most certainly the step taken on that head by the present minister of war was most impolitic, for they were not only the best, but the most honourable officers in the army, and the greatest part of whom, whatever their opinions might have been,

would have done their duty if confided in. The fact is, that the present Minister of War is entirely governed by the clubs in this town, and the person he has chosen for his second in office frequents these clubs daily, and is indeed their principal organ, and the merits of officers are there first discussed, and according as they are approved or disapproved of the Minister of War acts. Thus, instead of conciliation by showing confidence where no accusation against the parties had ever appeared, the very contrary is done, and the consequence is the throwing of a great number of respectable persons into the other scale, and to these again are added their families and friends. This conduct has been practised even in the case of the officers who actually belong to the corps that went from here yesterday. As the cavalry regiments are weak they (the two regiments) were formed into two squadrons each, and the commanding officer very properly named the number of officers necessary, by the roster. The officers so named joined the squadrons, but on the parade it was observed that such officers though named should not go. The major, who is a great Liberal, went to an individual to say he would not go if such and such were to accompany the troops; and without anything further that individual, being only one of the contractors of tobacco, had sufficient influence to procure an order that the objectionable officers should not go. Thus has everything in the military here been governed of late, and everybody admits it is now most uncertain what the troops will do, and it is by much too late, in the confused state of everything here, to be assured of bringing them back to better sentiments. There is not time to take the necessary steps for it, and an unsuccessful attempt would make matters greatly worse.

In respect to general opinion, the majority in Lisbon may be for the present state of things; at all events admitting that, most certainly it is not so in any other part of the kingdom, not even I find at Oporto, and in the provinces it is quite the contrary. In truth every nomination to any principal employment gives additional disgust to the partisans of Don Miguel. Pedro de Mello, that you may remember, who was lately ambassador at Paris, and who was so great a friend and partisan of the French when Junot came here, has formed an alliance with the Count of Subserra; the latter had asked for leave to return, which the Infanta told me she meant to refuse, but on Pedro de Mello arriving, it was immediately granted. Pedro de Mello's eldest son is to marry the daughter of the Subserras, a match made before the husband was dead, and she is now, being an only child, a great heiress by the robberies of Subserra when here, and by the succeeding to the fortune of the late husband, whose will Pedro de Mello in Paris made himself, cutting out the man's brother and family in favour of the wife by whom he had no children, and to whom his son was to be married. What do you think of this? The Count of Subserra is returning here, and expects naturally to have still great influence, through Pedro de Mello. But I am not sure that the latter is much of a favourite with the Infanta.

The present state of affairs here as you will see is most critical, and though the Marquez de Chaves should be beaten back or obliged to retreat, as he must be if the troops hold firm, and that no Spanish troops enter, yet the nation will not be quiet, nor will the intrigues of the Junta Apostolica cease. I have already given you my opinion on that point, and I am so far from seeing any occasion to change it, that every day confirms me

more and more in it; but unfortunately every day also, by more and more committing individuals and parties, makes it doubtful if even the return of Don Miguel, though it might stop the cause of the actual disturbances, might not produce others, but those at least would be entirely internal. I send to you the copies of some letters from Spain and the frontiers.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 1st December, 1826.

After writing to you yesterday, the packet arrived with papers to the 22nd November, consequently with the King's speech, and what was more to us with Mr. Canning's observations on the intentions of England as regarded Portugal. They were such as have ever been professed by our government, not to interfere in the internal distractions, or with parties in this or any other country, but to prevent an invasion of this kingdom.

Mr. Canning observes, "It is our duty if there be faith in public obligations, to take care that the frontier of Portugal shall not be crossed by an invading army." I told you yesterday that the troops of the Marquez de Chaves had entered Tras os Montes. The Portuguese troops that were in that part of Spain have acted as I stated, but I find the government here is not informed of who commands or is with them, but that is of no consequence. Will these troops coming in be considered as an invading army? When in, if unassisted by Spaniards, it becomes clearly a civil war or one of party against party; and this makes me doubt if we should here interfere; though the allowing these troops to muster and indeed to give them arms and ammunition and I understand guns, is clearly an act of hostility on the part of Spain, as great I think as if her own troops had accompanied them. But that Spain is answerable for, and the question still remains, if whilst the war between the two parties is Portuguese against Portuguese, England will from the above act, if coming from Spain, take part with the defending side?

I believe, however, that the question if even it now stands on those grounds, will not long remain so, as Spanish troops are everywhere in march towards their frontiers and corps are already marshalled and seen on the left bank of the Guadiana, with the apparent intent of entering Portugal, which after sending in the Portuguese troops, we may reasonably expect they will do. Indeed with the troops that have entered at Bragança, there are some lancers, which must be Spanish; but we have no particulars whatever from there, and whether these are guerillas or troops of the line cannot be known. In respect to myself, I remain under the same resolution that I formed shortly after my arrival. To have then attempted anything with the army under the circumstances here, would have been worse than useless, the ministers themselves immediately saw and acknowledged that, and now whilst it continues a civil war I feel the strongest repugnance to take any part in it. I see and know that whatever might be the result I would not afterwards remain in Portugal. If, however, Spain should take a decided part and invade this kingdom, then my position might be very much changed, and it might be right I should lend my assistance to check

and retard the enemy till assistance would come from England. We are here in another difficulty, to know whether these acts are with the consent and knowledge of the Spanish government, or if the Junta Apostolica are the real authors; but in case of an invasion, that could be of very little consequence. If the Spanish government is at the bottom of this, their preparations being made, and with the very diminutive means of resistance to be now found here, it is to be feared they will have overrun the kingdom before any succours can arrive.

It is useless I fear now to say anything more respecting the Infante Don Miguel; but until he comes here there will be no quiet, and his presence would in a moment quiet everything, and it is perhaps the last thing Spain would desire, and more particularly if he came under any understanding to support what he has sworn to. In case of the success of the present undertaking, either the Queen will be Regent or Spanish authorities will have the control. I fear the spirit in the provinces is entirely opposed to the present order of things here; the Infanta Regent told me this morning that the whole of the population of Tras os Montes is up in arms to support the invading party. I send you a state of the Spanish forces in Estremadura, whither it is said more troops are marching. It is said the Spanish troops are inclined in general against their government, but that must be a matter of doubt.

I have just received the 'Gazette,' by which the accounts from Tras os Montes are much worse than the Princess gave me to understand, as it is clear that the troops with Colonel Valdez are taken prisoners, and will be added probably to the numbers of the enemy. My idea is, that at all events so long as it continues a civil war, it is wise that no British take a part in it, as it is too late to have any moral effect, and indeed I have thought so ever since I have been here, from the height to which party spirit has risen.

Yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

P.S.—I need not tell you that if any troops are sent here cavalry will be the most wanted, as they have none and can make none for want of horses.

The Right Hon. George Canning to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Foreign Office, 3rd December, 1826.

This is what I think we ought to do, and without loss of time.

If we let Parliament separate, we may have either to call it again suddenly, which would be ridiculous; or to act without its sanction, which, having had that sanction within our reach, would be impeachable.

My belief is that this measure *will* bring Spain to her senses; and that nothing short of it will.

It will also keep France right. We have now a direct assurance from the French government that they have told the King of Spain that he is not to look for support from France against the consequences of what *has been done*, and the French government evidently *expect* immediate consequences. The language of Polignac to me, and of Damas to Granville, shows this; as does the language of Lieven to Planta, whom I would not see yesterday, because I was aware that he came to fish.

If we do not do anything now, the French ministers will recover from their first *astoundment*. Spain will apologise. France will retract her threats to abandon Spain to her fate. And Villèle, believing no longer that we are in earnest, will think it safer to side with the ultra factions in France and Spain, as the strongest side.

Remember, the French Chambers meet during our adjournment. I will lay my life that if we adjourn without bringing this matter to a point, the French King's speech at the opening of the Session will be wholly at variance with the professions of his ministers now. This moment is ours; if we use it, we shall settle the dispute; but if we miss it I foresee a series of growing difficulties, and the very war which we wish to avoid, in the distance.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—It is no business of mine departmentally, but I cannot help adding that this message, and the debate arising upon it, will leave you *master* of your estimates.

G. C.

The Right Hon. George Canning to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Foreign Office, 3rd December, 1826.

I think I can answer your doubts satisfactorily.

The first, as to the fact of a demand, I have answered (where you have stated it) in the margin.

To the second, I say, that acting upon the report of France is surely safer than upon any other. Lamb is not stated to have quitted Madrid, but only to be in possession of contingent orders to quit if not satisfied.

Thirdly, I think that our *non-interference* is sufficiently indicated by the insertion of the words "against foreign aggression" at the end of the last paragraph.

Fourthly, I have so altered the phrase at the beginning of that paragraph as to show that what we want is *not* immediate armament but parliamentary assurance of support. I will not produce the proposal *to-day*, if you wish it deferred. But we have only this week: and it will take a day, perhaps more, to get the King's sanction (though I have no doubt of that) and signature.

I did *not* know that you had been unwell.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 3rd December, 1826.

The steam packet has been detained by some accident which has occurred to its boiler. We have little more of news here from the different places of invasion than when I last wrote. I learn that the invaders from Spain (Portuguese troops) did not after their retiring from Villa Viçosa recross

the Guadiana, but remained at a small village or rather quinta, called São Laurenço de Alcaide, about a league from the Guadiana, and between Jurumenha and Villa Viçosa. The Governor of Estremadura, Jozé de S. Juan, on hearing of their having seized the arms and ammunition where they were left for them, pretended to be extremely enraged, put into prison the officer who had charge of them, and went out of Badajoz with a military force, giving out his intention to disarm the Portuguese, whom he knew to have crossed the Guadiana. It is therefore I suppose that they still remain on the Portuguese territory, but inaction to them must be fatal, and will probably turn even the wavering from declaring. The force gone against them is quite sufficient, unless there is great treachery indeed, which their own conduct will tend to prevent. We have had three days of ceremony on account of the marriage of Don Miguel; this is the principal one, and though we have been already at a Beja Maõ, we go on to-night to a grand Serenata. I went of course to the Queen, who remains at Queluz. She always sees me, but never yet touched in the slightest degree on the present state of affairs in Portugal; and to-day I was only entertained with an account of her illness and remedies, though she was looking very well and in great spirits, therefore she must believe that things are likely to go to her wish. From what I have heard from those I know to be of the same way of thinking, and that conceive themselves in the secret, it does not appear to be the plan for the Spanish troops to enter Portugal, and the conduct of S. Juan greatly corroborates that view of the case. I cannot see what difference that makes as to the conduct of Spain, which appears to have been most treacherous, but I cannot pretend to say how far you in England will consider the entrance into Portugal of these Portuguese troops a cause to induce you to take part against them and their adherents in Portugal, or if you will consider them in Portugal as the two parties fighting for superiority. (I of course put your indignation against Spain out of the question.) But until we know here what you feel there on this point, as de facto it is a civil war, as I before told you I think all British had better keep out of it. But so far as I am concerned, if a Spanish force enters Portugal, as I cannot doubt the opinions of my own government under such an event, so I could not hesitate immediately to take a part and do whatever was in my power against such a proceeding, by taking the command of this army or any force at hand. The case will of course be considered by you in the event of your sending any troops here, that is, how far they are to support either party or remain neutral, provided there is no Spanish force in Portugal; I think, as respects the result of the present undertaking, it must be decided before any force can arrive from England. We have nothing further from the north than at the date of my last. But something may have come this afternoon, and if so I shall know it at the palace and give it as a postscript.

Yours sincerely,

Beresford.

4th Dec.—There is no news from Tras os Montes that can be relied on, which does not, I think, augur favourably to the government, and it is useless to repeat the stories given by either party.

Annexe à la Dépêche No. 2, secrète, de Vienne.

EXTRAIT d'une LETTRE de S.A.S. Monseigneur le PRINCE PHILIPPE DE HESSE au PRINCE CHANCELLIER.

St. Pétersbourg, ce 3me Décembre, 1826.

Sur l'observation que je me permis de faire à sa Majesté, que ce qui paraissait donner le plus d'inquiétude à l'Empereur mon auguste maître, c'était les opinions de Mr. Canning, l'Empereur Nicholas me répondit: "Je ne veux que ce que veulent mes Alliés. D'après une communication de M. de Damas à La Ferronays, Canning lui-même a pesté contre la constitution malencontreuse de Don Pedro; voilà comme je suis de son avis, et je ne demande pas autre chose que d'aller conjointement."

C'est principalement, répliquai-je, de la manière dont l'opinion générale sera soutenue à Londres par l'ambassadeur de votre Majesté que dépendra le bien qui est encore faisable.

"Eh bien!" me dit l'Empereur, "il n'y manquera pas. Quant à la Grèce, j'ai toujours dit que leurs projets sont des chimères, mais je veux que Canning se compromette dans notre sens (propres paroles de sa Majesté). Qu'il fasse les demandes qu'il voudra, moi je ne consentirai à rien que de l'aveu de mes Alliés. Ce n'est donc que dans l'intention de les mieux servir que je suis entré dans cette affaire alors."

La conversation étant tombée ensuite sur le prétendu retour à l'alliance du gouvernement Anglais, je ne puis m'empêcher de remarquer que ce retour se trouvait contrédit dans une dépêche de Mr. Canning à Mr. Temple, qui devait être connue de sa Majesté, et dont le contenu repoussait expressément toute adhésion de l'alliance. L'Empereur m'interrompant, s'écria: "Oh! pour ceci c'est de la faute de Comte de Bernstorff, qui oublie toujours qu'il a affaire à un fou; témoin leur dernière dispute pour la communication du Protocole, qui au Comte de Bernstorff fut donnée en Anglais, que celui-ci ne voulait pas recevoir, et que Canning, furieux, ordonne de lui présenter une seconde fois, pour être refusé encore. Moi, avec l'aide de mes *deux* ambassadeurs (le second, c'est la Princesse de Lieven), j'espère en venir à bout."

Pour moi, Sire, répliquai-je, je m'en réfère à ce que votre Majesté a bien voulu dire précédemment sur la résolution de ne rien faire sans l'aveu de ses Alliés.

633.] *To Lord Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD, London, 5th December, 1826.

I write you one line in answer to your letters.

You must be the best judge of the expediency of your taking upon yourself the command of the army, and of the moment of your doing so; and however I may regret the necessity for the delay, it is impossible to disapprove of it. Of this however I am certain, that Portugal will continue to be a thorn in the side of this country, and a burthen of great risk and danger, till the military establishments of that country can be reformed and

put in a state of efficiency. I know nobody but yourself who is capable of effecting those objects; and in my opinion you should turn your mind seriously to the measures to be adopted to put you in a state to be able to set to work in earnest. These objects are not more important to us than they are essential to Portugal.

You had better explain yourself upon these points directly with Lord Liverpool or Mr. Canning, and act in concert upon them with Sir William A'Court. It is not that I am not most happy to hear from you whenever you will write to me, and that I shall not always be ready to give my aid to forward any object of yours either public or private, that I point out to you these channels of correspondence; but it is because they are the correct channels, and because it is most desirable, as we agreed in conversation, that you should have no correspondence with this government, or any of its servants, that is not absolutely necessary, and that you should be enabled at all times so to state publicly. A correspondence with the minister of this country, upon a point so interesting to this country and to Portugal as the measures to be adopted to enable you to take the command of the Portuguese army and to bring it to a state of efficiency as a military body, and thus to fulfil the objects of your mission, is legitimately necessary; but no other would be so.

I entreat you, then, to write your opinions to Lord Liverpool and Mr. Canning.

There is no news here. The King has been in town, and, while here, was in very good health. The Duke of York is better, and I hope he will recover; but he will never be as strong as he was.

Ever, my dear Beresford, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 9th December, 1826.

I rather think my former letters will, in some measure, have prepared you for the accounts I have now to give you of the state of affairs in this unhappy kingdom, which are of the most unpleasant nature. The troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Valdez, that had retired into the small fort at Bragança, held out three or four days, and then capitulated, when all the

soldiers joined the invaders. They have now undisputed possession of all Tras os Montes, and will have been joined by its militia, 4000 or 5000 men. The disbanded soldiers there will also probably have joined them, so that they may have 10,000 men, besides swarms of armed peasantry and guerillas. We learnt yesterday that Beira Alta had also declared in favour of Don Miguel, and the militia of Lamego had assembled and secured that town for him and his partisans. Thus they have the pass of the Douro. The General in the Minho writes that he is collecting troops, but that he has no confidence in them, which I believe, because they have none in him. General Stubbs, now Governor of Oporto, writes that it has been with much difficulty he has so long curbed the spirits of the people, which I know to be true, and the general officer commanding in Lower Beira writes also that he has no confidence in his troops, which I believe are only militia. The spirit having manifested itself in Upper Beira, and knowing that Oporto has long been ready for insurrection, the thing is fast approaching the Tagus. Those who had invaded the Alemtejo had since I last wrote to you recrossed the Guadiana into the Portuguese territory on its left bank; they have now again crossed to its right bank, and as the Count de Villa Flor was by the last accounts at Villa Viçosa, they ought in a short time to come in contact. It is said that the invading force is 6000, but this must be a great exaggeration. The government has now little or nothing to oppose to all this, and therefore we must say that nothing but a miracle can be of use to the existing state of things. To add to this, there is no longer any authority in this town, and every one, even the Infanta herself, is exposed at any moment to insult or still worse, as may be directed by the clubs, headed by half a dozen well-known revolutionists, the head of all being the second person in the War-office and the director of the actual Minister of War, though not now the acting one, being unwell; but notwithstanding my recommendations to the Infanta on my arrival, and her own determination to get rid of him, she has not been able to effect it, so strong has been the influence of that *outré* constitutional party. They have succeeded in dissolving the ministry itself, that protected them, though it would not go the lengths they desired, and Giuntella, the Minister of Marine and acting Minister of War, was attacked by them in the Praça do Commercio, and narrowly escaped with his life. Senhor Trigozo, the Minister of the Interior, to whom, for some reason, they had taken a dislike, though to a great extent of their party, had notice of what was intended, and did not therefore go that day to his office, and so escaped being attacked. These fellows are now in fact masters of Lisbon, but have as yet contented themselves with ill-treating those they designate Corceandas, a nickname for royalists. There are now no troops of the line here, and the local troops and militia doing duty dare not and do not interfere, and there is no police. That corps you will recollect was accused of disloyalty to the Constitution, and this very morning the Infanta told me she now knew that the accusation had been framed by these very people, and that there was not a word of truth in it, and the consequence is there is no police, so that the orders of the magistrates are a jest. In short, as I said, there is no authority, and there is even no ministry, the only one retained being Pedro de Mello, in whom I find the Infanta has no trust, and I fear justly. The Marquez of Valença has accepted the war department. I had a conversation with the

Infanta this morning, when I repeated to her that though since my arrival my taking the command of the army could have been of no use, I would place myself by her side, if any personal danger appeared to threaten her. This, under present circumstances, she could not but fear, and my promise at such a time gave her comfort and confidence. I told her, however, that it would be well if her Highness would decide on the line she would take in case of the necessity of providing for her personal safety, as it would enable those interested, Sir William A'Court and the Admiral, to take the necessary measures to secure it, and that if there were no necessity there was no harm done, as no one would be aware of it. She decided instantly, saying she would go on board a British man-of-war; though conversing with Pedro de Mello yesterday on that point, he proposed she should go on board a Portuguese vessel, which of course I joined him in, as in so far it would be getting a weight off us; but she dislikes that and will not do it, and therefore the other alternative is at her service. Under these circumstances, and still to add to the confusion, the Queen, who is at Queluz, desired and insisted that the guards of honour, and we ought to say now, of security to the person, shall be removed. She desires to be left without guards. This causes curious suspicions, and particularly of her intending to escape. This she may do with the guards as they are, whenever she pleases, and be away days before they know of it. Indeed, from the present appearances, it is of little consequence, as her presence elsewhere would scarcely make the state of things worse. What decision under the representations sent to you from here you will have come to I cannot pretend to decide. The conduct of Spain has been most infamous, but her troops have not entered Portugal, and certainly the war now raging here is between national parties. Thus there is an aggression on the part of Spain, and yet only a civil war in Portugal. When British troops may arrive here, if any are to arrive, by present appearances it will be too late to succour the falling party, if even it were intended, which I cannot suppose. I never doubted that if those troops were let in from Spain what is now going forward would occur; I gave you my opinion and I governed my own conduct under it, and every one here of both parties say I have acted right, and the Infanta told me so this morning, and it is possible, though I will not say how probable, that I may yet be of some use from the line I have taken. But be assured that the only remedy is now sending here Don Miguel (supposing the present government upset), as more cannot be feared from him than from the Queen. Indeed I am still, as I have been, convinced that no internal tranquillity can take place in this nation until he comes here. Whether that will secure permanent quiet is another case, but to arrive at it eventually that experiment must be tried. Every opposition will only make the nation more obstinate, and gain him, if possible, greater popularity and the stronger attachment of the people. But as I said there is now every prospect that in a few days the Queen will be Regent, and the nation will declare it a legitimate Regency, until the appearance of Don Miguel, whom they declare to be the legitimate King.

How you are to acknowledge this or how you will act on it, I cannot say. But under any government to secure order and tranquillity here, and to enable it to act as it may desire, I am sure that foreign troops will be necessary, though I do not suppose that under such a change you will

either give any for that object or permit any to come from another nation. If this Silveira party continues with influence, on the success of this their undertaking, I can see very little difference that will be between what is under their influence, or that of the greatest democrats now here. How the government can fall into any middle system I cannot see, and her Majesty is not suspected of great moderation. I am sure if any troops are sent here, great care will be taken in the instructions to whosoever may command them; that will be most requisite.

Yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

London, 9th December, 1826.

PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT FOR ASSEMBLING A FORCE FOR PORTUGAL.

General Officers.	*Rank and File.*	
Lieut.-Gen. Sir William Clinton	Two battalions Guards from London	1000
	4th Regiment from Portsmouth ..	500
	1st battalion 60th from Plymouth .	500
Major-Gen. Sir Henry Bouverie	63rd from Windsor..	500
Sir Edward Blakeney	10th Hussars }	400
Sir Thos. Arbuthnot	12th Lancers }	
	Two battalions to embark from Cork	1000
		3900
	Gibraltar to furnish two battalions	1000
		4900
	1 Assistant Adjutant-General from Ireland	
	1 Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Sir C. Broke Vere.	

The 2nd Battalion 3rd Guards from Manchester to London.
Depôt of the 63rd to take duty at Windsor.
Detachment from Chatham to take Tower duty.

[634.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MEMORANDUM ON THE INSTRUCTIONS TO BE GIVEN TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE CORPS DESTINED FOR PORTUGAL, AND ON THE OPERATIONS ON WHICH IT IS TO BE EMPLOYED.

London, 10th December, 1826.

It is necessary that we should immediately come to an understanding respecting the employment of the corps in Portugal, the conditions to be required from the Portuguese government,

and the instructions to be given to the commanding officer of the British division.

The state of affairs in Portugal may change before our corps will arrive there.

It appears to me to be at present a state of hostility of a mixed nature. The government of Spain has connived at the invasion of Portugal by bodies of Portuguese deserters, which bodies will of course co-operate with, and be supported by, the insurrections in the country.

I conclude that if there should be such a body in arms within the country, the British corps is to take the field against it if so required by the Portuguese government, and the general officer commanding should deem his force sufficient. That will be a mere military question.

If however these invading bodies should have been driven out, I conclude that it is not intended that our corps should take the field, or move from Lisbon, with a view to protect any part of the country against invasion, or to put down insurrection in any part of the country, which insurrection is not actually supported by a body of troops from Spain.

A discretion must, however, be exercised on the spot upon this question, which is merely political.

Who is to be the judge and responsible for the determination of this political question? Is it to be the King's minister, the commanding officer of the British division of troops, or Lord Beresford?

I should advise that as little should be required from the Portuguese government in the way of conditions as is possible.

We must avoid imitating the conduct of the French in Spain; and we must give as little ground as possible for the imputation that we take charge of the Portuguese government and destroy its independence.

We must however secure our troops, and the communication with them, and the means of supporting them or bringing them off; and we must not shut our eyes to the fact that in a few months the Infante Don Miguel may be the Regent of Portugal, with the Portuguese army and people, and Spain, France, and all Europe at his back.

I would recommend that we should desire to have possession of Fort St. Julian and the Bugio; and the two lower forts, if they still exist, which I constructed on the left bank of the Tagus.

The instructions to be given to our commanding officer should then be—

First. To put his corps as soon as possible in a reasonable state of equipment to be able to move. I will give him a Memorandum on this point, which will be of use to him.

Secondly. That in case there should be any body of Portuguese deserters from Spain, or of Spanish troops in arms in Portugal, he must exercise his own military discretion whether to march to attack those troops, if so required by the Portuguese government, or to remain at Lisbon for the defence of that city and the entrance of the Tagus. In case he should determine to march to attack these troops, and Marshal Lord Beresford should be in the exercise of the command of the Portuguese army, or of the Portuguese troops employed in this service, he is to put himself under the command of Lord Beresford; it being clearly understood, however, that this British division, although liable to be united in divisions or brigades with Portuguese troops, must no part of it be detached from the same service with its commanding officer.

If, however, Lord Beresford should not exercise the command of the Portuguese army engaged in this particular service, the officer commanding the British division is to co-operate with the Portuguese officer employed, but is not to give up the command to such officer.

Thirdly. In case the bodies of Portuguese deserters above referred to should have been driven out of the country, but insurrection should still continue, the officer commanding the British division is not to move from Lisbon or its neighbourhood unless so ordered by his Majesty, or thereto required by the ambassador.

In case there should be any insurrection in Lisbon itself which shall endanger the lives or safety of the Princess Regent, or any part of the Royal Family, the officer commanding the British division is to make every effort, by the employment of the force under his command, to protect their persons, to provide for their safety, and to put down such insurrection.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Downing Street, 10th December, 1826.

I have been thinking over the paper you read at Mr. Canning's, and I cannot help apprehending that (as it strikes me) you propose giving our commander more discretionary power than it will be convenient even for his own sake that he should be furnished with. If it be known that he has the power of marching into the interior, you may be quite sure that he will be earnestly pressed to do so, and he will be exposed to the choice either of hazarding an advance in compliance with a demand earnestly made, and on false information which it may not be in his power to correct, or of incurring the ill-will of the Portuguese for declining what they well know he can do, and which they may think he had no sufficient reason for declining.

Men are very bold with troops not their own, and the Portuguese might think it would not be a bad thing if our troops did suffer a little, while on the other hand no officer likes to be charged with being backward. I cannot help wishing you would consider some way of modifying this part of the directions.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

To Lord Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 10th December, 1826.

I have received your note; and having well considered your proposition I do not see how we can relieve our commanding officer from the responsibility of determining whether he will or not attack the enemy. We cannot lay it on the ambassador, or on Lord Beresford who is not in our service, nor refer the case to the consideration of the three without an insult to the commanding officer.

You may, indeed, cover his responsibility by pointing out to him how desirable it is that he should incur no risk of defeat, nor that of losing his communication with Lisbon or the sea.

You will see that in my Memorandum I propose that the political question should be decided by the ambassador, or by Lord Beresford, or by the general, or by a consultation of the three. The military question, whether the enemy is to be attacked or not, must be decided by the general.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[636.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 11th December, 1826.

I threw up five, or I believe six, redoubts on the left of the Tagus, of which the two lowest on the river (if they should still be in existence) ought to be given up to us.

It would probably be best to make these forts the subject of a separate despatch and application, if Sir W. A'Court, upon inquiry, should find that they are still in existence. Lord Beresford could tell him.

I have marked a few words in the despatch to Lord Granville which I would recommend to you to omit.

Whatever may be your ultimate determination respecting the French troops in Spain and his Majesty's troops in Portugal, it is very obvious that you don't send the latter because the French troops are in Spain; and it is as well not to give any person even a pretext for saying that we had been seeking for an opportunity of adopting this measure with a view to get the French troops out of Spain.

I venture to suggest to you the expediency of desiring the continuance of the good offices of France in concert with this country to prevent war between Portugal and Spain.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 11th December, 1826.

I have omitted the paragraph which you marked in the despatch to Lord Granville, and have substituted another to the effect which you suggested.

Would you allow me to suggest to you that if you could make up your mind to say a word in the debate to-morrow, in the sense of what you said at the Cabinet on Saturday (touching the evident proofs of *combination* and *design* in the simultaneous movement along the whole line of the Portuguese frontier), it would do infinite good, not in this country only, but on the continent?

Forgive the impertinence of this suggestion. But if you should be disposed to act upon it, or indeed in any case, I should be very glad to see you here to-morrow for five minutes any time before the House, if you could make it convenient to call here.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

To the Silver Stick in Waiting.

ORDER RESPECTING HONOURS TO TROOPS PASSING.

London, 12th December, 1826.

The attention of the officers of the Life Guards and Horse Guards is called to his Majesty's Regulations, 23 and following pages, regarding the *honours to be paid by the troops;* particularly to those honours to be paid by troops meeting other troops on a march, as stated in pages 25 and 26.

These Regulations are strictly applicable in the daily marches of the reliefs of the Guards; and the respect which the different corps of the army owe to each other, as well as to his Majesty's Orders and Regulations, requires an observance of them.

All officers taking the command of a detachment of any of the troops under the Gold Stick must be reminded of these Orders, and must be directed to attend to them in passing all Guards or other detachments of troops, and in case of any detachments of troops passing the guard which such officer may command.

WELLINGTON.

[Let this be copied and sent to the Silver Stick in Waiting, with the Duke of Wellington's directions that it may be enforced in a G. O. to the Household Brigade.]

To Lord Beresford.

MY DEAR BERESFORD, London, 13th December, 1826.

I have received your letters to the 3rd and 4th instant, and I have communicated some of them to Lord Liverpool and all to Mr. Canning. I should have communicated them all to the former only that he has been unwell, and I did not wish to trouble him with more than was necessary at the present moment. You will have seen accounts of what has passed in this country upon the recent transactions in Portugal. We consider the combined movement of Portuguese deserters upon different parts of the Portuguese frontier from Spain as an hostile attack by Spain upon Portugal, and as the *casus fœderis* which entitles Portugal to our assistance.

A corps of 5000 British troops has therefore been ordered

to Lisbon, is now on its march, and the greatest part of it will sail in the end of this week.

The commanding officer of this corps, Sir William Clinton, will be directed to attack these Portuguese deserters who have made these attacks from Spain if he should consider himself strong enough. We cannot blow hot and cold. We cannot consider these attacks as hostile, and as the *casus fœderis* entitling Portugal to our assistance, without repelling them by force. The only question in respect to them will be the military question, whether the force is sufficient. It may be the case that these hostile bodies have joined themselves, or have been joined by insurgents in the country, or other troops who may have passed over. So much the worse for those who have joined them. There can be no choice on a field of battle, and however strongly we may desire and sincerely intend not to interfere in the internal concerns of Portugal, we cannot allow an hostile corps sent in from Spain to exist in Portugal if we have the means of destroying it or driving it out.

This is the plain simple way of viewing this case, and I will add, in my opinion, the only way of getting us out of this difficulty. I will add that Sir W. Clinton has been directed to put himself under your command, in respect to these operations, if you should have taken the command of the Portuguese army, or of that part of it which may be employed against these deserters; of this you will be apprised by the Secretary of State. You will understand, however, that we do not propose to any other Portuguese officer the command of our corps. It is my opinion as an individual interested in the welfare of Portugal, and who knows something of that country, that when the British corps shall arrive, and shall be in a state of equipment to take the field, or shall have taken the field, the government should grant a general pardon to all concerned in the late events, who should lay down their arms and submit. When princes commit the follies which those of the house of Braganza have committed in the last few years, it is not unlikely that subjects will go wrong, and they may be misled even to the last extremities of rebellion and treason. But some allowances must be made for the circumstances which have occasioned these misfortunes; and as it is to be hoped that the whole Royal Family of Braganza, at least that part of it which is not connected with a foreign and hostile power, will now draw

together, it may be expected that a general pardon offered at the moment in which the government will be in strength to put down the rebellion, will be submitted to and thankfully accepted, that the misfortunes of a civil and possibly a foreign war may be avoided, and that the country will be restored to its accustomed tranquillity and happiness. This is my individual opinion and recommendation.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 14th December, 1826.

I enclose a letter from Lord Beresford which I received only late last night. I likewise enclose my proposed answer.*

It appears to me that he has mistaken the case. At all events he has taken a view of it different from that on which we are about to act, and it is very desirable he should be set right.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 15th December, 1826.

When I wrote to you by the last packet I had just come from the Infanta, and I received the news I gave you from her. In two days after less favourable accounts came from the north, though even yet we have not any very distinct or clear information on the positions or forces of the respective contending parties. We know generally that Tras os Montes is entirely abandoned by the government troops, and that these latter have taken a position behind the Tamega, of course on its right bank. The Minho by the last accounts was quiet, and so was Oporto, but every respectable person and family are leaving the latter, so that the hire of a beast to Lisbon was twenty moidores. The Count de Villa Flor has had the advantage in two trifling affairs in the Alemtejo. The first near Monsaras, to the south of Jurumenha, where there appeared a small rear guard of the enemy, but only put there to draw him that way, whilst the main force under Magessi, crossed the Guadiana near Jurumenha, and marched towards the Tagus, obviously to pass it into Lower Beira. However, Villa Flor again overtook their rear guard near Alegrete, and having guns he dispersed it, and he says they crossed the mountains behind Portalegre, in which case they must again have gone into Spain, and will only reach

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* See page 485.

Beira by crossing at Alcantara; they appear to have been marching for Villa Vilho. I told you in my last that Upper Beira had taken the part of the invaders, but shortly after it was hoped that the militia and town of Vizeu had returned to their duty; but Brigadier Telles Jordan having entered from Spain and taken possession of Guarda, the militia of which had joined him in Spain, Vizeu has decidedly taken that side, and the general commanding has retired to near Coimbra. Thus all Upper Beira, we may say, is engaged on the other side, though I have heard nothing positive of Trancoso. Including that town and Tondella, Upper Beira would give five regiments of militia, Tamega, Vizeu, Guarda, Trancoso, and Tondella. We know nothing whatever of what is passing in Tras os Montes, or of the force of the enemy there. But if they act with common sense, they may easily collect a force of 10,000, including those they entered with, the disbanded soldiers in that province that would join them to a man, and five regiments of militia, every soldier of which would join, and they were 1000 each regiment, and this besides guerillas. This province is the most enthusiastic, and they may have every man in it. But except they are waiting for other combinations, they appear to be losing much precious time. Much, indeed everything in the north, where the great danger is, depends upon the defence of the line of the Tamega, as if once the invaders pass that, I should fear they will be joined by everything north of the Douro, and getting Oporto I fear the defection would not be long in reaching to the Mondego, and between those two points there were some of the best regiments of militia. Count Villa Flor is passing from the south to the north of the Tagus into Lower Beira, where it is probable Magessi is also directing his force. Count Villa Flor's arrival may stop the infection passing from Upper to Lower Beira, and may have effect also on the former if he can march there. But by a courier which yesterday arrived from Madrid, there appears great probability of the Spaniards acting more directly, as I understand they threaten to declare war against this country. In such a case, as I before told you, my duty is clear, and at all risks and without looking at means, I shall not hesitate to take a part. After what I have stated, I need not tell you with what prospect of success; you are as well acquainted as I am with the state of things and means here. But of the most requisite, money, they never were one-half in so bad a predicament as now. They have none, and under present circumstances, it appears impossible they could make or get a loan. We may also say they have no cavalry, and of artillery for the want of horses or mules they are equally scarce. Their army in short is reduced to little or nothing, and that little as ill-composed as possible in respect to officers and subordination. Still, if Spain declares war, I will do what I can, and put myself at the head of what troops can be got together, and endeavour to delay the total occupation of the kingdom by the enemy. I need not renew the subject of Don Miguel's coming here, I have not changed my opinion on that head, and whatever may be the result of the present struggle, without his presence I [illegible] chance of quiet for this unfortunate kingdom. He has sworn to the [illegible], he has by another act committed himself to uphold it, and [illegible] gement be made by which he might come here under the [illegible] stitution? I can no way judge now respecting him, but I [illegible] passing in this country, and I can see no other possible

remedy to its evils, short of a strong foreign force to be kept here—one I should imagine much more objectionable; and the present supporters, advocates, and well-wishers of the present state of things, see no other remedy but Don Miguel or an English force, and this independent of the interference of Spain. It is true, I believe, that had she not acted the disgraceful part she has, the business here might have been carried on with more or less unquiet or dissatisfaction till October next, and without open acts of hostility from one party to another; but beyond that term nothing less than a foreign force could have kept down civil war. In very truth, this kingdom, in doubt as it is by whom it may be governed nine months hence, is morally without a government.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

P.S.—I need not observe that by that part of Upper Beira declaring for the invaders, they have the pass of the Douro at Tamega, and there is some idea that their plan is to cross there and join Magessi in Beira. I cannot learn the force on the government side that is on the line of the Tamega, which must operate much on such a movement as that of their enemy into Beira, leaving Tras os Montes, their stronghold, in danger.

To Lord Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 16th December, 1826. 9 A.M.

I write you one line to tell you that you must be cautious about the allowance for Sir W. Clinton, as I find that I was paid only as a Lieutenant-General when we fought the battles of Vimeiro and Roliça. We must do the thing, but consider well of the mode. I will talk to you upon it at the Council.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

EXTRACTS FROM INSTRUCTIONS TO SIR WILLIAM CLINTON, ON TAKING THE COMMAND OF THE EXPEDITION TO PORTUGAL. DATED 17TH DECEMBER, 1826.

"His Majesty having received an earnest application from the Princess Regent of Portugal, claiming in virtue of the ancient obligations of alliance and amity subsisting between his Majesty and the Crown of Portugal, his Majesty's aid against an hostile aggression from Spain; his Majesty, in compliance with this application and for the maintaining the faith of treaties and for securing against foreign hostility the safety and independence of the kingdom of Portugal, has

directed that a corps of 5000 men, of which a return is herewith enclosed, shall forthwith proceed to Lisbon."

"8. If the Portuguese deserters who have made hostile inroads into Portugal from Spain, shall have been driven back into Spain, and if there shall be no troops belonging either to Spain or to any foreign country in hostile occupation of any part of the Portuguese territory, and if internal commotions and insurrections shall continue to exist in any of the Portuguese provinces, you are not, in compliance with any application, to employ the British troops for the suppression of such internal commotions or insurrections, nor to move from Lisbon or its immediate neighbourhood, without further orders from home."

"9. But in the event of any insurrection breaking out in Lisbon which should endanger the personal security of the Princess Regent or any part of the Royal Family, you will exert every effort in your power, by the employment of the force under your command, to protect the Royal Family and to put down insurrection in the capital."

[ENCLOSURE.]

ENCLOSURE in Draft of Instructions to Lieut.-General Sir William Clinton.

Horse-Guards, 17th December, 1826.

FORCE about to proceed to PORTUGAL, under the Command of Lieutenant General Sir WILLIAM CLINTON, G.C.B.

	Rank and File.
From England:	
10th Hussars, 2 squadrons	200
12th Lancers, do.	200
Royal Artillery, 4 companies	300
Grenadier Guards, 1 battalion	504
Third do. Second do.	504
4th Foot	516
60th Foot, 1 battalion	516
63rd Foot	516
Royal Staff-corps, 1 company	60
Royal Waggon-train, detachment	40
From Ireland:	
10th Foot	516
11th Foot	516
From Gibraltar:	
23rd Foot	516
43rd Foot	516
	5420

Staff.

Lieutenant-General Sir William Clinton, G.C.B.
Major-General Sir Edward Blakeney, K.C.B.
Major-General Sir Thomas Arbuthnot, K.C.B.
Major-General Sir Henry Bouverie, K.C.B.
Colonel Sir C. Broke Vere, K.C.B., Deputy Quartermaster-General.
Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. Warre, Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Captain Davis, 32nd Foot, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Colonel E. I. Murray Macgregor, Bt. Deputy Adjutant-General.
Lieutenant-Colonel H. E. Hunter, Grenadier Guards, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Brevet-Major Craig, half-pay, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Lieutenant-Colonel John Muir, half-pay, Deputy Judge-Advocate-General.

Majors of Brigade.

Captain Boldero, Grenadier Guards.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Cuyler, half-pay.
Major George Johnstone, half-pay.

Medical Staff.

1 Deputy Inspector of Hospitals.
1 Physician to the Forces.
3 Staff-Surgeons.
1 Apothecary to the Forces.
1 Deputy Purveyor to the Forces.
10 Assistant Staff-Surgeons and Hospital Assistants.
3 Purveyors' Clerks.

William Petrie Craufurd, Esq., Deputy Paymaster-General.

(Signed) H. TAYLOR, Military Secretary.

MEMORANDUM FOR SIR W. CLINTON ON THE POINTS TO WHICH HE SHOULD CHIEFLY ATTEND FOR THE EQUIPMENT OF HIS TROOPS.

17th December, 1826.

The first point for Sir W. Clinton to attend to will be the equipment of his corps. First, he will have nothing to say to the private baggage of the army, and he cannot be too strict and peremptory upon this point. The officers will have their bât and forage money, which is intended to provide for all their wants.

The officers commanding companies have an allowance for the carriage of the tents of their companies. Upon this point Sir William will have the copy of the order given by me. The

strict adherence to this order was found highly convenient and useful.

A similar allowance is granted to the surgeon of each regiment to carry his medicine chest and instruments, and to each paymaster of a regiment to carry his books.

I earnestly recommend to Sir W. Clinton to adopt the rule which was found so convenient in my time, that is, to allow of no private baggage whatever on wheel carriages. Thus then, the public departments will be relieved from all private or regimental demands, excepting one mule for each battalion to carry the intrenching tools, which mule should be placed in charge of the quarter-master of the battalion, and one for the veterinary surgeon, one for the sergeant saddler, one for the quarter-master to carry the intrenching tools of each regiment of cavalry. These must be invariably applied to the purpose for which they are given.

The guns of the army are equipped and horsed with the means of moving 126 rounds for each gun, and 84 rounds for each howitzer; and there are ordnance wheel carriages horsed which will carry 160,000 rounds of musket ammunition, or above 35 rounds a man for each rank and file of the infantry, besides 60 rounds a man which each soldier carries for himself. I think that 300,000 rounds ought, besides this quantity, to be moved with the division on the backs of mules.

If 150 mules cannot be procured to move the whole of this quantity, then the greatest number that can be hired should be so applied. The deficiency must be made up by bullock carts, each of which will carry six hundredweight or six thousand rounds.

It cannot be expected that these will move with the troops as mules will. But they must be made to follow at a distance to be within reach.

Besides the mules required to carry musket ammunition for the infantry, a few, probably ten, will be required to carry the pistol and carbine ammunition for the cavalry.

About 60 rounds for each gun and howitzer ought likewise to follow the army upon bullock carts. This ammunition is likewise packed in boxes, each weighing one hundred pounds; of which the bullock cart will carry six.

In respect to the commissariat, the late army in the Peninsula always marched with three days' bread carried by the men, the horses with three days' corn and forage if possible.

There was a commissary attached to each brigade of infantry, each regiment of cavalry, and each brigade of artillery.

These commissaries had attached to them mules to carry provisions and forage with the troops, or to communicate with the magazines upon the following establishments; that is to say, one mule for 15 men with the infantry, and one mule for every horse in the cavalry and artillery, head-quarters, &c.

The principle of the calculation of this establishment was as follows:

A mule will carry two hundred pounds of biscuits. This quantity would last 15 men between 11 and 12 days. For biscuit only we could communicate at the distance of six marches. But not only biscuit was required, but spirits and forage corn; the latter, it is true, sometimes at shorter distances.

We therefore reckoned that we could communicate easily at 12 or 14 leagues, or even more when necessary.

In the same manner the mule for each horse could carry the 10-pound ration of forage corn for 20 days; the 12-pound ration for 16 or 17 days. But the men were to be considered likewise; and when they were provided for the communication came to be about the same as that for the infantry.

Supposing the infantry 5000 men, they will require for their commissariat about 350 mules; the cavalry about 500, and the commissariat of the artillery and musket ammunition about 400; making in the whole 1250 mules for the commissariat, besides that for head-quarters, waggon train, &c., and besides the mules required as above stated for the musket ammunition. In the late war these mules were hired, and cost a dollar a day each for man and mule, food for both, shoeing, &c., &c.

I should doubt the possibility of procuring so many in Portugal as soon as they will be required.

But if they cannot be got, bullock carts must be substituted; and although each bullock cart will carry as much as three mules, I recommend to Sir William to calculate particularly for the commissariat upon a bullock cart for two mules, as they will not go the same distance on their daily marches.

Bullock carts appear much the cheapest mode of conveyance; but as efficiency in war is cheapness, I earnestly recommend the exclusive preference of hired mules for everything.

In respect to hospitals I recommend that they should be

regimental till it should be necessary to establish a general hospital on account of the number of men in regimental hospitals, and the impossibility of moving the sick.

The spring waggons should be strictly and invariably applied to move the sick exclusively. This requires strict attention.

I recommend that as the division will probably move together the spring waggons should be under charge of the principal medical officer, who will apply them as he thinks proper.

If the division should be extended, the spring waggons might then be attached to heads of brigades or battalions.

I refer Sir William to my orders for the regulations respecting hospitals, the march of convalescents, &c., which require the utmost attention.*

I likewise refer him to my orders of the 31st July, 1808, and 7th October, 1809, respecting the settlement of accounts in the country. He will find that the payment in ready money, and at all events the immediate settlement of the account for the supplies received from the country, is the best mode of supplying his army.

It is very necessary to attend to the G. O. respecting the watering and feeding the horses of the army.

I likewise refer him to my orders of the 3rd May, 1809,† respecting the mode of marching through the country.

The roads, bridges, and villages will not admit of the march of more than one carriage abreast, nor of a heavy column.

The infantry, therefore, marched by *sections of threes*, and we found this front so convenient, and it lengthened out so little that we continued the practice even when the communications of the country were broader. The cavalry in file. In the two last campaigns we always encamped. There is neither difficulty nor expense in doing so, nor does it retard the movements of the troops. On the other hand to encamp the troops preserves health and discipline.

I should think that if Sir William should take the field before the month of March, he would be obliged to canton. But I earnestly recommend him not to *bivouac* excepting when it is absolutely necessary.

In respect to the communications, we navigated the Tagus and the Douro quite up to the Spanish frontier.

* See Index to *Supplementary Despatches* (Spain and Portugal), and *General Orders*, pages 137 to 147.

† See *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. vi., p. 248.

We made great use of the Sado, which is, I believe, navigable three leagues above Alcacer do Sal, towards Algarve.

The Mondego cannot be navigated, I believe, higher than Coimbra.

But in case of a movement to the northward the division will be easily supplied from the Tagus till it will reach the Mondego, and from Coimbra till it will reach the Douro.

However for this small division there will not be much difficulty anywhere, if there is money, and accounts are speedily settled.

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—I omitted to draw Sir William Clinton's attention to the expediency of practising marching. It is very essential. It should be done once or twice a week while he is at Lisbon. I refer him to my Orders on that subject of the 31st October and 14th November, 1809; 15th April, 9th July and 7th October, 1811; and 22nd August, 1812.

To Lord Melville.

MY DEAR LORD MELVILLE, Sudbourne, 18th December, 1826.

Ever since I saw you I have been tormented by the subject which you mentioned to Lord Bathurst and me on Saturday. To have the young Queen educated in Portugal instead of in the Austrian dominions, and to land her in Lisbon instead of at Leghorn, are very justifiable objects; but they ought not to be attained by a trick, and particularly through the means of an admiral or captain of the British navy.

I would prefer to consent to take her, and then upon the eve of her departure let the King's minister at Rio de Janeiro solemnly and publicly protest against taking her anywhere excepting to Lisbon, as being a measure calculated to prolong the state of dissension and civil war in Portugal, and to delay indefinitely, if not ultimately to defeat, the completion of the abdication of the Crown of Portugal by Don Pedro; and I would then refuse to receive her on board excepting to go to Lisbon.

I suggest this manner to you as equally effectual and much more manly, and I entreat you to suggest it in the proper

quarter. Of course I shall say nothing upon the subject to anybody, whatever may be the course adopted.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[644.] *To the King.*

18th December, 1826.

When the office of Constable of the Tower was mentioned to me I was not aware of its exact nature, nor that I was indebted for the offer exclusively to your Majesty's favour and kindness. I concluded that a mere removal from the government of Plymouth to the office of Constable of the Tower was in question; and although I felt some reluctance to quit the government of Plymouth, I consented on account of the convenience likely to result from the arrangement to the business of the Ordnance; and all doubt upon the subject was removed when I was informed that his Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester wished to have the government of Plymouth, and that the governor's house would be a convenience to her Royal Highness the Duchess.

The reason for which I had felt any reluctance to be removed from Plymouth was that I had already had the satisfaction of lending the house, and I wished still to be able to gratify any of my friends in that manner, and to your Majesty I will add that I thought it not impossible that hereafter, when Lord Wellesley should retire from his government in Ireland, it might be a convenience to him to reside in the governor's house in Plymouth.

However all reluctance ceased when I heard that your Majesty wished to give the government of Plymouth to the Duke of Gloucester.

Under these circumstances I attended your Majesty at St. James's on Saturday, and I was astonished and confounded when your Majesty was pleased to announce to me your Majesty's gracious intention not only to appoint me Constable of the Tower, but likewise that I should retain the government of Plymouth.

I stated but imperfectly to your Majesty my sense of your Majesty's gracious favour towards me; but I stated it was too much. It was impossible to enter into details upon that last part of the subject upon that occasion, not because I did not

feel at the moment what I am now about to submit to your Majesty, but because your Majesty talked to me of other subjects.

It is certainly true that the office of Constable of the Tower is reserved for your Majesty's exclusive disposal, and that the government of Plymouth is a military office, in the appointment to which your Majesty is in the habit of attending to the recommendation of H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief. But this is so little known that I was not aware of the fact till this day. The office has lately been held by military officers of great character and distinction, who have not at the same time held any other military government, and it is not extraordinary that this office should be generally considered in the same light.

I stand in this situation in your Majesty's service. As I have long commanded your troops in the field, and have had frequent occasion to witness the good conduct of your officers, so am I in a great degree the person whom they employ to represent their merits in the proper quarter, and to solicit for them rewards and marks of your Majesty's favour.

They would form a very erroneous notion of me, and it would be highly injurious to me, if they could suppose that I could be a competitor with them for a favour out of the usual course, and which never had been conferred upon others however distinguished and meritorious. I certainly feel that in proportion as the public have no reason to suspect that I am disposed to avail myself of your Majesty's gracious favour and kindness towards me to promote objects of my own and for my own personal advantage, the means which I may have of being serviceable to your Majesty will be increased.

The disappointed in their objects do not seek for the truth. Your Majesty's gracious favour and kindness in this case could not be known, and it would be suspected that I had availed myself of these advantages to obtain from your Majesty two governments which had never before been held by any officer.

Under these circumstances and in expressing to your Majesty my most grateful thanks for your Majesty's gracious favour to me in appointing me Constable of the Tower, I entreat your Majesty to permit me to resign the government of Plymouth.

All which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 19th December, 1826.

It was late yesterday evening when the packet arrived and brought me your letter of the 5th instant. A small vessel of war came in at the same time with despatches for Sir William A'Court, having come in five days from Plymouth. By these the state of things here becomes entirely changed, though such has not been unexpected. By this vessel we have the King's message to both houses to support his Majesty in defending this kingdom against the hostile aggression of Spain. I have not seen Sir William A'Court, and as the packet is about to sail I cannot wait for the chance of seeing him, which I hope to do in the course of the day. He has sent me word to say that troops are embarking for this place, but I am still ignorant under what instructions. The Spaniards have not with their own troops entered Portugal, and thus if the troops coming are to attack those now waging war in the kingdom against this government, they are Portuguese only. However, if our government consider them as Spanish from the mode and circumstances of their entering Portugal, so far as I am concerned it would obviate the objection I had to attach myself to the one party until I knew the view my own government would take of it.

This event (sending troops here) places me, independently of former considerations, in a new situation, that is, until I know what part if any may be allotted to me as regards the British troops, though I see I need not wait for such information to take a part here, if by this government it should still be desired, and that they will accede to such conditions as I have all along thought necessary, and the which I have had no reason to suppose would be denied, in case they may still think my services useful or that they wish them. It is useless now to advert to any other means of pacification here, as this measure has decided that subject, but I fear you will have long to keep that force, or some at least here, to maintain what it will certainly establish.

I have seen Sir William A'Court, and though he has no express directions or instructions respecting the part the troops coming here are to take, yet he does not doubt—nor indeed can there well be any—that they will act against the invaders from Spain of whatever nation. The knowledge alone of their arrival will, I believe, go far to put down that party, nor do I suppose that against the will of England and France they will receive any further support from Spain. Thus in a short time we may expect to see this kingdom without overt acts of unquietness, but it will be long ere the seeds are eradicated. I think, under present circumstances, it is unnecessary for me to write as you advise to Lord Liverpool or Mr. Canning, or until I am informed whether I am or not intended to have any command of or relation with the troops coming out; and certainly as a matter of choice I would rather command our own troops than the Portuguese army, though both are compatible. By the next packet also I shall judge if this government has any strong desire for my services, or if there is any probability of their acceding to what I should think necessary, and the only thing of material consequence on which there appears any doubt is the readmission of British officers.

Independent of the confidence that the knowledge of the arrival of the

British troops has given, things were looking rather better in all quarters. It is credibly reported, and believed, that the invaders have been beaten in an attack made at Amarante, and though they had stretched down into Lower Beira as far as Apedianha, yet they are not reaping any great advantage from it, and a very little will oblige them to leave all Beira. It appears that the rebels from Alemtejo were by the last accounts at Alcantara. Everything remains perfectly quiet in the south.

I remain, my dear Duke, yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

To Lord Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, Sudbourne, 20th December, 1826.

I have received your letter regarding the government of the Tower, upon which I have written a letter to the King to decline holding both governments, that of the Tower and the government of Plymouth.

I enclose you the copy of that letter, which I beg you to return to me.

You are mistaken in thinking the government of Plymouth worth three thousand a year. It is worth about one-third of that sum, and is about two or three hundred a year more than the Tower. But I would not take both. If, after all, the King should insist, I can take but one salary.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR FRIEND, Royal Lodge, 21st December, 1826.

I must tell you that I feel a pride, whenever the opportunity offers, of showing not only the affection I have for you, but the gratitude which this country owes you. The glory of my reign is so identified with *you*, that the *one* can not be separated from the *other*. It is like yourself to think so little of yourself, and as you do not choose to hold the office of Constable of the Tower and the government of Plymouth together, take *that* which will be most agreeable to your own feelings. If you do *not* take that of Constable of the Tower, I will then bestow it on Field Marshal Earl Harcourt, now, from his great age, the father of the whole army; in that case I shall appoint my old and attached friend and servant, General Sir William Keppell, to succeed him in the government of Portsmouth, to whom I have long owed this debt of *proper* feeling. Upon *your* taking the Constableship, then Earl Harcourt shall go to Plymouth, and my intentions towards Keppell

will still be fulfilled by the government of Portsmouth. I have given you this detailed explanation to set you quite at your ease, and believe me ever yours very affectionately,

G. R.

P.S.—Give me one line, with your decision, as soon as you can. Alas my poor brother!

[646.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Sudbourne, 21st December, 1826.

I return your box, and am much obliged to you for the perusal of its contents.

I am delighted to find that the troops are off. I was certain that the invaders on the side of Villa Viçosa would retire. Lisbon is now, and will probably continue to be, in safety till the British division shall assemble there. They will probably have to move across the Douro, in co-operation with some Portuguese troops. But if this is done *in style* there will be an end to the insurrection, and there will be no war. By the time Parliament will meet again this matter will probably be cleared up.

I don't think the despatches from Paris tell much. I judge from the report of the conversation with M. de Damas that the King of France would not inform the legislative body that he had been acting in concert with his Majesty because we pass in Europe for a Jacobin Club! However, as yet we have only boasted that we are such a body. Our acts do not yet prove it. I form this judgment from what I see in the newspapers, and from M. de Damas' silence in respect to the reason for which the King of France did not mention his Majesty, I conclude the truth is known in this country by private letters.

But I hope that in future, when we come to a question of peace or war, we shall have something to go upon besides private letters.

I have not seen anything about Greece.

We have very bad accounts here of the poor Duke of York.

Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

I see in the despatches to Vienna and Paris that we are now explaining away the meaning of our speeches.

To Lord Combermere.

MY DEAR LORD COMBERMERE, Sudbourne, 22nd December, 1826.

I have received several letters from you, for all of which I am much obliged to you, and I sincerely congratulate you upon the success of your first operation in the East Indies.

The Duke of Newcastle and Lady Combermere will have informed you of what had passed respecting your promotion in the peerage. That promotion was the spontaneous act of his Majesty, acting under the advice of his responsible servants, and if the honour was not exactly that which you wished to attain, and which your friends wished to attain for you, it was conferred in the most honourable, gratifying, and creditable manner.

But that is not the point on which I am anxious to write you a few lines.

I have had a good deal of experience in Indian governments and in the mode of conducting public affairs in that country, and I confess I was concerned to peruse more than one Minute of yours, differing with the Governor-General upon points purely political, and those most of them bygone transactions. I will not write much upon this subject, nor enter into a discussion whether you or the Governor-General were right. But of this I am certain that any public and continued difference of opinion between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief is prejudicial to the public interests, and cannot be allowed to exist. It is prejudicial for this reason. It shakes the authority of government to its very foundations, and while such difference continues, every little man who takes part with either one or the other becomes of importance. The interests of the party are the great object. Those of the public are laid aside and forgotten, and even injured with impunity.

God forbid that I should desire you to approve of measures of which you disapprove, or withhold from the Governor-General your real opinions. But let them be your own opinions. Discuss them with him in private fairly and candidly before you do so upon record, and avoid to record your difference of opinion by Minute if it should be possible. The Commander-in-Chief is the first executive servant of the government. He is the right hand of the Governor-General, and he must be his friend and support his authority, or one or both

must be recalled. Rely upon it that in this country of law and civil government the military authority, in such a contest, will go to the wall. I entreat you to attend to this letter, and let no man persuade you that your honour or interest is involved in a contest by Minute with the Governor-General.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

London, 5th January, 1827.

P.S.—I wrote this letter at Sudbourne about a fortnight ago. I have since read the Minutes of a discussion in the Council of Fort William respecting the territories on the Coast of Tenasserim, ceded by the King of Ava, to which my attention has been drawn in consequence of the opinion recorded by you that the force required to keep those territories ought to be about 4000 men, of which above one-third Europeans!

I had recently been looking over Snodgrass's history of the war, and although I know that in that part of the world in particular we must not reason upon the force necessary to retain a conquest in reference to that by which it was made, I could not help adverting to the force with which Major-General Sir A. Campbell carried on his operations, and thinking that you had made an exaggerated estimate, considering that with each of these settlements, however distant from each other, there must be an uninterrupted communication by sea.

I am quite certain that you are incapable of giving in such an estimate of the force required to defend these settlements, in order to defeat the Governor-General in his object of retaining them by making the expense too high to be supported. But I see that you and he had differed upon this point of retaining these settlements or not, and it will not be easy to convince others, who do not know you as I do, that this was not the motive for this exaggerated estimate, which indeed I must observe must appear to others who do not know the Indian service much more exaggerated than it does to me.

I entreat you once more to allow your own good judgment to guide you. Ascertain facts, but don't allow anybody to presume to advise you respecting the course of conduct which you are to follow.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the King. [(

Sudbourne, 23rd December, 1826.

As I think it probable that his Royal Highness the Duke of York may have recommended Lord Hill to your Majesty for a mark of your Majesty's favour, in consequence of the vacancy upon the death of the Marquess of Hastings, I think it proper to inform your Majesty what passed between his Royal Highness and me respecting that officer.

In consequence of Lord Hill's desire, I recommended him some time ago to his Royal Highness for a government of a higher class, and when it was first proposed to me to be removed to the Tower, I again entreated his Royal Highness's consideration of Lord Hill, and again since I wrote to your Majesty on the 18th instant; I had known that you wished that Sir W. Keppell should have a government, but I did not know that you wished he should have one of the highest class. I don't mention these facts to your Majesty to induce your Majesty to alter the arrangement which your Majesty has announced to me that you have in contemplation, but in order to account for my recommendation of Lord Hill, of which your Majesty will most probably have been informed by his Royal Highness the Duke of York.

All which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [(

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Sudbourne, 23rd December, 1826.

I send you a letter from Lord Beresford, which I beg you to show to Lord Liverpool, Mr. Canning, and Lord Melville, and any of our colleagues in London.

In my opinion the instructions already given provide for the case as it is likely it will be found on the arrival of the troops at Lisbon, according to Lord Beresford's account, which does not much differ from that of Lord Amelius Beauclerk, which Lord Melville will show you.

The Regent of Portugal will probably be found in one of his Majesty's ships in the River Tagus; the town of Lisbon more or less in a state of revolutionary confusion; if the government

should not have been transferred to a Provisional Government acting in the name of Don Miguel.

The discretion whether the troops shall be landed or not will rest with Sir W. A'Court, who, it is to be hoped, will exercise it wisely, and will not allow them to be landed even upon the requisition of the Regent to involve them in an hopeless revolutionary contest at the very moment of their disembarkation.

On the other hand, he will not allow them to land if a Provisional Government should be in the exercise of the authority of the State.

Matters have got worse much faster than I expected when I wrote to you last.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Brighton, 26th December, 1826.

I have received by a messenger last night a letter from Mr. Canning, enclosing Lord Beresford's letter to you, and Lord Liverpool's letter, a copy of which I enclose (though you probably may have seen him, as I hear you are in town), on account of the last line in it with reference to a passage in Lord Beresford's.

The telegraphic news from Madrid show that no convulsion had broken out at Lisbon, and there will therefore be nothing to prevent the landing of the troops.

I enclose you a proposition about an augmentation of the waggon train. Unless the train were much more than was necessary, this expedition should require a corresponding increase. If you are in town, I wish you would send to Hay on that subject, as well as the expediency of taking up steam-vessels, in contemplation of our troops advancing towards Oporto.

I have a proposal for purchasing one which will convey (as they say) nearly a thousand men. Now I conceive that when you suggested the use of steam vessels it was not for the purpose of conveying men (for that implies detachments of the force, which the Instructions prohibit), but baggage, &c.; in other words, a constant sea-communication independent of winds, and for this purpose smaller vessels would be preferable to one large one.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lord Liverpool's Answer to Mr. Canning.

I strongly incline to the opinion that any fresh instructions to Sir W. A'Court at this time might seriously embarrass matters, and could do no good.

He has certainly an awful responsibility, but the decision, whatever it may be, must be taken by this time, and we may place him and ourselves in a very difficult situation by writing before we know what that decision has been.

Nothing can be more alarming than Beresford's letter. I hope it is (illegible), but the facts can hardly be untrue, though they may be exaggerated. It certainly corresponds with Lord C. Beauclerk's account, and though more gloomy, is not in contradiction to that of A'Court's of the same date.

Look at the passage I have underlined.

Yours, &c.
LIVERPOOL.

To Lord Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 27th December, 1826.

In my opinion the waggon train ought not to be augmented at the present moment. When the accounts shall have been received of the landing in Portugal, this corps might be augmented to the amount of one-half the number detached.

My notion of a steam-vessel was that it should be used in towing other vessels along the coast, or in the rivers in Portugal. Instead of being very large, it ought to be of very light draught of water, and of great power.

There is nothing so useless as a vessel to carry troops. Troops carried in a vessel are useless when landed, excepting to defend a particular point. We have no business to defend any point in Portugal excepting the entrance of the Tagus. Our business is to drive out the enemy. Nothing else.

Ever, &c.,
WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Brighton, 28th December, 1826.

I will give directions for the steam-vessel of the class you describe.

You say that our business is to drive out the enemy, but are we not soon coming to the point, when we may know more distinctly than we have hitherto known, who is the enemy which we shall have to drive out? It clearly will not be either French or Spanish troops, but deserters from the Portuguese army proceeding from Spain, combined more or less with the Portuguese population. If they are not supported by the mass

of the people, they cannot be formidable except to the inhabitants of the districts in which they are acting, who will soon join with the Portuguese troops to drive them away. But the hunting down such irregular corps is not a business in which our army ought to be engaged. It appears to me, therefore, that the contest can only become grave, if, notwithstanding our disembarkation, the insurgents remain in force; and this they can never do unless they are supported by the people. If so, ought we to engage in such a warfare? We should have no difficulty in beating them; they would not stand a minute before us; and the Portuguese troops, with whom we should have to co-operate, but over whom we should have no control, would wreak their vengeance upon them, and we should be thought answerable for their excesses. Our true position seems, in my opinion, to be Lisbon. Under the Instructions, we are to put down all insurrection there. By this we are upholding the constitutional party in Lisbon; and their opponents must be strong indeed, and they miserably weak, if, with the capital secure, and all their force free, they cannot drive out the enemy.

Our policy is to bind up the wounds which these dissensions have inflicted as soon as possible. If by our intervention a general amnesty (with a very few special exceptions possibly) were promulgated, we shall have appeared not simply the supporters of one party, but the protector of the rest. I am aware that such a measure might probably provoke the demand, and entail the necessity, of a continuance of our troops in Lisbon. To this I confess I have not the slightest objection. But if a contrary system is to be pursued, the sooner we quit the better. My persuasion is, that with the knowledge of our troops having disembarked, the insurgents will be abandoned, and will soon disperse and disappear.

Yours very sincerely,

Bathurst.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke of Wellington, Foreign Office, 29th December, 1826.

I send for your perusal several communications made to me within the last few days by Prince Lieven, all of which have more or less of interest, and all conspire to show the good temper and good disposition of his Court.

Do you think the time come at which we might venture to offer mediation for a peace with Persia?

I will send you a heap of papers on that subject before you answer this question.

The steamboat from the Tagus is not yet arrived.

There are despatches from Lamb to-day of the 19th, full of *promises* of better behaviour. The intelligence of the message had just arrived.

Ever sincerely yours,

George Canning.

Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Arlington Street, London, 30th December, 1826.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset has written to your Grace and acquainted you that the poor Duke of York's situation has become so much more unfavourable that the physicians apprehend the melancholy crisis may occur in less than forty-eight hours. The mortification has spread, and has become more deeply seated; and his weakness is much more apparent. He continues perfectly sensible and composed; never complains, although suffering great pain; and appears anxious, chiefly from the apprehension of distressing or giving trouble to those about him. I think he is well aware of his danger, but does not like it to be supposed that he is so; and with the Dukes of Clarence and Sussex, who saw him this morning, he spoke of Portugal, steamboats, &c., without adverting once to his own state. Last night he was very restless from pain, and sent for me frequently; but I have seen him only once to-day, when he kept me three-quarters of an hour; and I apprehend that he has been under the effects of laudanum since the Princess Sophia left him.

Lord Bathurst desired Mr. Hay to ask me what would be the course of military business during the interval of his Royal Highness's dreaded death and the nomination of a successor. I stated that heretofore, when there has been no Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, being the King's staff, have taken his Majesty's pleasure directly on the arrangements connected with their departments. The Secretary-at-War would submit all appointments and promotions, and he would receive his Majesty's commands in regard to general arrangements and movements. The military secretary, being secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, would cease to exist; but I should of course be ready to execute the details, under the instructions of his Lordship, Lord Palmerston, or of any other individual who may be authorised and may require my services during the interval.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 30th December, 1826.

I have now had for some days your letter of the 13th instant, and have delayed answering it until I could say something decisive as to myself. Until I knew of the decision in England respecting the invasion by the Portuguese troops from Spain into this kingdom, I could only consider it a civil war; and from the connection I had so long had with this country, I could not but feel the deepest repugnance in taking a part in their civil commotions, not having been employed before those commotions commenced. But so soon as I learnt that the aggression made

* Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief.

was considered and declared by my own country a foreign one, the case became changed. I had, however, some doubt how far they would, under the change of circumstances and the security it gave them, be urgent, as they had been, for my services; and being informed that they would be still acceptable, I then sounded to feel whether the government would so far favour my assuming the command as to propose an amnesty, with such exceptions of chiefs as they might judge it prudent and necessary to except. This was also favourably listened to, on which I went to Don Francisco d'Almeida, and having on my arrival settled with him that there could be no difficulty in placing under my authority everything military, by the suppression of the Ministry-at-War, I foresaw no further difficulty, as besides that condition I only required that I might have a very moderate proportion of British officers, which is a measure at the least as necessary now as when I came here in 1809. It is now four days since I saw Don Francisco, who received all my proposals in the kindest and most favourable manner. I have not since directly heard anything more on the subject, but I have indirectly heard that much difficulty and doubt exists. There was last night a council held on the subject, but no communication of its results has been made to me; so that I fear by this packet I shall not be able to inform you what is likely to be done on this head. Under the circumstances of the case, I judged it better not to propose anything particular regarding myself; but that as to everything personal to me, I would only require to be on the same footing as I was before. I told Don Francisco that if they wanted me for the present crisis, it would in all probability prevent my continuing in the command after the business was concluded, as it would infallibly make me be considered as a party man, and deprive me afterwards of that character of impartiality so necessary to guard to be useful after such unhappy conflicts as those now passing here. I told him, besides, that for the present object I was not really necessary. The truth is, that so soon as the news came here of the decision in England, the moral effect was sufficient to turn the scale most decidedly; and in this town, in one hour, everything was changed from the strongest depression and melancholy on one side to confidence and exultation, and the reverse on the other side. The same effects have been felt in the provinces, and the natural results are operating. The Marquis of Chaves had got into Vizeu, and Almeida had been given up to them by treachery; but he must retire into Tras os Montes, and Almeida, now that Spain has given them up, can be of no use to them; they must evacuate it. The Portuguese troops under the orders of the government ought, and I hope will, now do the business themselves, and avoid thereby the necessity of the British taking a more decided part. Such is the state of things here now. I was only waiting, as I expected to receive some information of the decision of the government respecting me, to write to Mr. Canning, but until then it is unnecessary. I have continued my correspondence with you in the manner I have, because I have not been employed; and it was only, as I understood, when I should be here employed, that then all correspondence, and more particularly private, with any member of the government must cease; and I was of course fully aware that my letters would be communicated to Mr. Canning, for so much as they might be worth.

I am still of opinion that no fixed tranquillity, or any internal peace, can be depended on, until the question respecting this Regency is settled and known; and until then, most difficult is every one's part belonging to or acting under this government.

I remain, my dear Duke, yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have received my Lord Liverpool's letter with the Memorandum attached to it, in all of which I most perfectly coincide, and according to which I will most certainly act; and I have also received the official intimation from Lord Bathurst of the Instructions to Sir W. Clinton, and of the circumstances in which he is to place himself under my command.

To Lord Bathurst. [65

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Apethorpe, 31st December, 1826.

When I mentioned in my former letter the idea of driving out the enemy, I meant to express the Portuguese troops who had entered from Spain, and any Spanish troops who may have accompanied the Portuguese troops. We must attack these whether they be joined by insurgents of the country or not. I make use of the term *drive out*, because I think we ought not in the existing state of circumstances to cross the frontier to attack such a body, or in pursuit of them supposing them to retire into Spain. They may, and most probably will, disperse in Portugal. But that I should consider tantamount to their being *driven out*. The civil government would then deal with them.

I confess that I don't see how we can refuse to allow our troops to be engaged so far as I have above mentioned, having considered the entry of the Portuguese deserters from Spain, under all the circumstances which attended that entry, as an invasion, and the *casus fœderis* which entitled Portugal to demand from us, and required that we in good faith should grant, the stipulated succours.

I quite agree with you in thinking that when our troops arrive, and at all events as soon as they are ready to take the field, and when they take the field, a general pardon should be offered on condition only of laying down and surrendering arms. But I doubt that we can formally recommend such a measure without involving ourselves to a greater degree in, and ren-

dering ourselves responsible for, the conduct of Portuguese affairs.

My firm belief is, that if the whole affair is not settled one way before our troops will arrive, it will be settled in the other way upon their arrival, or as soon as they will be prepared to march.

But I beg you to read the newspapers. See Don Francisco de Almeida's (the Minister's) report, and the Comte de Villa Real's speech, and the papers and despatches accompanying. Can we hope that the Kings of France and Spain, and their ministers and ambassadors, will quietly submit to be insulted by the Portuguese Legislature; and only because the Portuguese Liberals choose to publish their speeches, despatches, and debates? Are such publications in reality necessary for the happiness and good government of any nation? Even if they are, is this country to be liable at every moment to be involved in war occasioned by such foolish and indecent insults?

The government had, upon considering the subject, determined that a remonstrance should be sent to Portugal to warn that government of the danger of such publications. I never heard what was done upon that subject, but I am certain that we shall not long avoid the war from which the good sense and moderation of the French ministers have saved us, if we don't effectually stop the publication of this description of trash.

Ever, my dear Lord Bathurst, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

[ON THE INSTRUCTIONS TO SIR WILLIAM CLINTON.]

January, 1827.

The instructions to Sir William Clinton and Sir William A'Court, as at present drawn, appear to me to combine every case in which the British force in Portugal ought to be brought into action.

They are to act against any Spanish corps invading the Portuguese territory, or against any Portuguese corps collected in Spain and entering the Portuguese territory from Spain.

They are not to be employed in putting down insurrections in Portugal after the Portuguese corps above referred to have been driven out of the country or subdued.

Under these instructions, Marshal Beresford, Sir William Clinton, and Sir William A'Court can have no difficulty in deciding what is to be done

in the state of affairs such as they were when we last heard from them, and they will probably have acted accordingly.

The *new* case which has occurred is the account of the collecting a Spanish army of observation on the frontier of Spain.

Is the British corps to be permitted to form part of an army of observation upon the frontier of Portugal?

My present impression is strongly against it.

In the first place, I believe, upon military grounds, though I speak this of course with diffidence (and subject to the correction of the Duke of Wellington), the British corps could be nowhere so well situated as in Lisbon and its neighbourhood. It might be kept together and might keep in check the Spanish force on the whole line of their frontier, whereas if it were marched towards one part of the frontier, and still kept together as a body, the Spaniards might enter at the other extremity and force us to retreat or get into our rear.

In the second place, two armies of observation thus opposed to each other (if the Spanish army could for any time be kept together) might lead even unintentionally to war.

Thirdly, I have a strong impression that the Spanish army could not long be kept together. That it will either fall to pieces by desertion or that it will revolt.

If the latter should prove to be the case, and I think it highly probable, and this should occur in the presence and neighbourhood of an army of observation of which a British corps formed a material part, I am satisfied that Spain and all Europe would ascribe the revolt to the British authorities.

I am inclined therefore to make no alteration in the present instructions, and as soon as Portugal shall be cleared of hostile force, I think the best station for the British forces would be Lisbon, or such a circuit round it as would secure good cantonments and ensure its collection in one body as soon as possible.

LIVERPOOL.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Lisbon, 1st January, 1827.

I had on Saturday night, the 30th ultimo, an interview with Don Francisco d'Almeida to learn the result of the deliberation of her Highness's council on my proposals for taking the command of this army. Though the condition for having the entire military authority, independent of a Minister of War, had been conceded to me on my arrival, I was surprised to learn that the council had entirely dissented, considering that the Constitution required that the responsibility should be with a minister, and therefore he must have the authority, and a commander-in-chief must be subservient to him. The other condition also, requiring a limited number of British officers, was equally rejected. Thus left with infinitely less authority than I had had previously, and, indeed, that which my commission of marshal-general gives greatly diminished, I could not possibly undertake the re-organisation and discipline of this army, and therefore declined such a trust. It was, however, most painful to me under the circumstances of the times here, when disorder and confusion prevail everywhere, and

when my own government feels such interest in seeing a stop put to this state of affairs, and when a British force has arrived to assist in that object, to be obliged to decline the command. It left the two armies without a general head or point of union, and I confess myself I cannot see how things could have gone on well, and strong representations were made to me by all authorities here. Under such and other considerations applicable to the present unhappy state of affairs here, and as a duty owed to my own country, I have consented to take the command of this army (if it can be called one) temporarily and until we have put down the now insurgents, and I assure you it is a great sacrifice of feeling. But if the result shall prove fortunate and for the general good, I shall be repaid. So soon as this object is effected, I shall very certainly resign, as it would be quite impossible for me to remain here, not only with an authority insufficient to the object in contemplation, but greatly less than I had before. Whilst there are active operations going on, it is a full excuse with myself for acting under circumstances that would be otherwise degrading, besides that I feel that these disturbances here ought to be immediately or as soon as possible put down, as if they last it is impossible to foresee what may result from them. I trust this will be quite satisfactory to the King's ministers.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, Monday, 1st January, 1827.

I have great pleasure in sending you copies of despatches this instant received from Sir William A'Court.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—Show them to Lord Westmorland.

P.S.—The address in the Chamber of Deputies has been carried by 200 to 30, which last is therefore the exact strength of the Ultra-Jesuitical party in that Chamber.

It appears to me to be of the greatest advantage that they have been obliged to show their numbers by dividing *alone*. Hitherto they have been mixed up either with the government on one side, or with the *liberal* opposition on the other, and have therefore been able to exaggerate their own importance.

There is a despatch to-day from Vienna, by which it appears that Prince Metternich professes *entirely to approve* of the King's message!!!

G. C.

Prince Metternich's answer upon the Greek question is so long, that I have not yet been able to read it through. It appears to promise little help, but no opposition.

Baron Damas undertakes to draw a projet of treaty for the accession of France to the Protocol.

G. C.

P.S.—The account of the poor Duke of York this morning does not materially differ from yesterday's.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [6

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 2nd January, 1827.

I return the box which you were so kind as to send me yesterday, and in it two letters from Beresford, one of the 15th which your messenger brought me last night, and one of the 19th which I received here this evening.

I understood that Lord Liverpool had determined that the Portuguese government should defray the expense of the barrack-quarters, provisions, and forage for our troops.

I think this is very right for many reasons, and we ought to persevere in making the demand.

I am aware of the difficulty and embarrassment which would attend our dependence upon the Portuguese government for the two last. There will be none in respect to the first. In my conversations, therefore, with Sir W. Clinton and the Commissary-General, I have desired both to depend upon our resources for provisions and forage; for which eventually a charge must be made to the Portuguese government.

If I am not mistaken you will not find it inconvenient to have such a charge to liquidate with them hereafter.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I wait for the papers on Persia before I trouble you on that subject.

Will you send the letters from Lord Beresford to Lords Liverpool and Bathurst.

To Lord Beresford. [6

MY DEAR BERESFORD, London, 2nd January, 1827.

I have received your letters to the 19th December. You will have seen from mine of the 12th what we had done and had determined to do, and the principle of our acts. In that letter I state my own opinion; I know nothing of other people's speeches. The troops which have entered Portugal from Spain having been dispersed or driven out, we must for our own sakes, as well as for the sake of Portugal, keep clear of the internal concerns of Portugal, excepting that our interference should be necessary for the protection of the Royal Family. However I agree with you that the arrival of our troops will

settle the matter. I think you will find the British troops arranged for you exactly in the manner you would wish.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Downing Street, 2nd January, 1827.

Many thanks to you for your letter. The Lisbon news is so favourable that I do not think there will be any demand for the advance of our troops. If there should, I suspect that the Portuguese government will not offer the command of theirs to Lord Beresford. It might not be improbable that they might offer the command of the corps destined in that case to act with us to Sir William Clinton. I suppose he might be allowed to accept it. If not, what reason could be given?

I am afraid that there are those about Mr. Canning who are persuading him that his speech was not too strong, and he does not seem to take much alarm at the speech of Villa Real, as you will see by the extract of a draft of his letter to Lord Granville, which I have enclosed to you in case you have not seen it.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

The debility of the Duke of York is, as I understand, so great that it is not thought possible he can survive the night.

[ENCLOSURE.]

EXTRACT, 26th December.

"The exhibition of M. De ——— in his correspondence with Count Villa Real (which has found its way to public knowledge from the report of the proceedings of the Chambers at Lisbon), has created a disgust here, which it is difficult to describe, and which has rendered the publication of Baron Damas's peculiarly timely and important."

[654.] *To George Dawson, Esq.*

MY DEAR SIR, London, 2nd January, 1827.

I have read with great attention the papers in the box. They represent a state of society such as I don't believe exists in any other part of the globe! In my view of the case the most important of all the allegations is that of a priest of the name of Larkins having refused a man a certificate, which, however, he afterwards granted him on the [illegible] of five shillings. We cannot prevent the influence [illegible] *the mouth of the priest*, or *of the* [illegible] *priest*. But to give such peop[illegible] refusing certificates is too much! [illegible] be made of these documents. [illegible]

the names of the persons mentioned in them? If you could, I would publish and circulate them in a cheap pamphlet. They will be contradicted, but still they will make an impression, and will show gentlemen here how beneficial the influence of the priests is. I think there would be no use in publishing them without the names. A moderate-sized speech would hardly hold them, with the necessary comments upon them, and the truth would be contradicted.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Major Sullivan to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

White House, near Kirk Michael, Isle of Man,
2nd January, 1827.

SIR,

The present prospect of an approaching war will, I trust, be a sufficient apology for intruding myself upon the great general of England, as I presume that your Grace will be called upon to exert again on the Peninsula those well-known military talents which crowned you with laurels and England with glory.

The numerous and very great difficulties your Grace encountered during the late Peninsular war in collecting a sufficient force to cope with the armies of France under the command of the ablest generals she could boast of—and the obstacles that were thrown in your way from the egotism of the Spanish nation, from the little faith that could be placed in its troops, and from the intrigues of the Portuguese government after the enemy had been expelled from its soil—are evils that you must be most anxious to avoid in the event of a new war.

The experience your Grace had during the late Peninsular campaigns of the bravery of foreign troops when commanded by British officers, and also when in India of the men of colour when supported by European troops, will, I am inclined to think, point out how England can (by availing herself of her colonial possessions in procuring troops from them to act in concert with those of the mother country) place at any time in the field more formidable armies, composed of her own subjects, than any other power on the face of the earth.

Many officers in his Majesty's service have served in the field with African soldiers, and know well their value for any kind of service, particularly from not being biassed with the prejudices of caste in the manner the native troops of India are; and there is not a shadow of doubt that, if they were to be formed into regular corps, well officered, partly non-commissioned officered with Europeans, and were to have an interpreter attached to each troop, company, and corps for the purpose of explaining fully to the men the orders and views of their commanders, they would be found to be a useful body of men for warlike purposes; and that their numbers could be recruited and increased *ad libitum* as long as England remained mistress of the seas, an advantage which no other nation could enjoy without the consent of the British government.

Under the hypothesis that his Majesty's ministers will find it convenient

and will be induced to employ Africans in European warfare, I will attempt to show what force England can (with the view of attacking France and Spain), without distressing her own population, place in the field. I consider the population of the three United Kingdoms with their adjacent isles to amount to 20,000,000; then, if one-half be deducted for women, children, aged, and infirm, and one-twentieth be taken from the remainder for the service of the army, and one-twentieth for that of the navy, of the militia, and of the other services of the State, it will be found that 500,000 men can be spared for the line alone, which force could be considerably increased by mixing Africans with them.

The accompanying details of the different parts that compose a large army, which I take the liberty of sending your Grace, will, I am inclined to think, clearly point out that, by pursuing the plan of employing African troops in European warfare, England could send two powerful armies, one to the Peninsula and the other to the Continent, of 257,571 men each, and each to consist of four corps-d'armée, one corps of reserve, one corps of cavalry, a grand park of artillery, and a reserve corps of engineers: composed of 18 divisions of infantry and 6 divisions of cavalry; of 54 brigades of infantry and 17 brigades of cavalry; of 162 battalions of infantry of 10 companies each, 18 rifle battalions of 6 companies each, 34 regiments of cavalry of 8 troops each, 25 troops of the Staff corps, 70 squadrons of the waggon-train, 97 brigades of foot artillery, 21 troops of horse artillery, 16 brigades of pontoons, 8 companies of artificers, six companies of sappers and miners, and 22 companies of pioneers; besides ample military, civil, and medical Staffs, not included in the strength of corps: the whole amounting for the two armies to 314,412 Europeans, and 200,730 Africans; leaving 185,588 Europeans for the service of garrisons, colonies, &c., out of which a large force might be spared for his Majesty's Hanoverian dominions, as well as officers for the organisation of the Portuguese and Spanish constitutional troops.

In those details I have separated the commissioned officers from the non-commissioned officers, privates, &c., and the Europeans from the Africans, that the number composing each class may at once be seen. But in them the number of officers, clerks, and servants of the different departments of the general Staff have not been minutely calculated, as your Grace is aware that they must vary according to circumstances; however, I hope that the general estimate I have given will be found to answer every purpose.

The troops of the Staff corps that are attached to the divisions and corps, I suppose, are to furnish orderlies for the general officers and to assist in maintaining the interior police of those divisions and corps, and so prevent the necessity of taking men for those purposes from the effective strength of the divisions and brigades of cavalry; and therefore, as their services would in that case be confined to limited duties, I have concluded that they could be composed of Africans without detriment to the service.

It may be necessary for me to enter into an explanation why I have included in the details separate companies of pioneers and such a numerous train of the waggon corps.

Your Grace must have experienced when employed in the East Indies the great utility of a pioneer corps, under proper officers, distinct from those taken from the effective force of battalions; and from the want of *such a corps*, during the late Peninsular war, must have met with great *difficulties*; as the pioneers of battalions, from not having been regularly

taught their work, were often found to be unfit to perform the task they were set about, and were readily inclined to avail themselves of every opportunity for remaining in the rear; when they not only deprived their corps of their fire, but also, to the disgrace of human nature, frequently became the plunderers of the dead and the murderers of the wounded. All of which evils might be avoided by the employment of a regular corps of pioneers composed of Africans, and officered, and partly non-commissioned officered, from the corps of engineers: which corps might be armed as archers, so that, when required, it might be employed offensively in various ways, and might during an action inter the dead and assist in conveying the wounded to the hospital-waggons, and by so doing be the means of saving many a valuable life.

The numerous obstacles which a commander has to encounter for the want of efficient transport for the baggage of his army, the enormous expense individuals are put to in procuring animals for their personal baggage, the great confusion generally attending the march of baggage carried on the backs of horses, ponies, mules and asses, particularly when an army is retreating before an enemy; the great number of bât-men that are obliged to attend that baggage, whose absence from their corps must be seriously felt during an action; the enormous expense the crown is at in maintaining bât-animals; the heavy losses individuals suffer from the stupidity and carelessness of their servants; the very great difficulty of procuring the means, and the enormous expense attending the hire of transports for the stores, provisions, and treasure of an army, and the rascality of the greater part of the drivers employed in the commissariat department in deserting with their carts or animals, in destroying the bread, and in adulterating the wine and spirits (in which latter act the underlings of the commissariat often joined), all loudly cry out that another mode of transport ought to be adopted, by which all those great inconveniences might be avoided, and the march of baggage reduced to a uniform system. Such can only be effected by employing a numerous train of the waggon corps; in the waggons of which not only the sick and wounded could be transported, but also the necessary stores, provision, and treasure of an army, the officers' baggage, the camp equipage, and the soldiers' knapsacks and companies' kettles, could be carried to the very great comfort of all ranks, while it would be an essential saving to the State. Objections may be made against its use from the numerous impediments it would meet with on a march from badness of roads, destroyed bridges, &c.; but permit me to say that where a field gun with its ammunition waggon can go, a waggon of the waggon-train could also go; however, every possible inconvenience might be avoided by attaching to every waggon six pack-horses. The drivers of the waggon-train, as well as those of the brigades of foot artillery, and those of the brigades of pontoons and field stores might, without detriment to the service, be Africans.

It may be asked what could be done with the Africans, if they were employed in European warfare, on the conclusion of the war? The East Indies would be a sufficient field for their employment, which would considerably strengthen the European force established there, and effectually check the native troops from attempting at any time to revolt against the authority of England.

Although everything that I have here mentioned may be familiar to your Grace, yet as it is possible that they may have either escaped your

notice, or that the extent to which African troops might be employed m not have before been reduced to calculation, and considering it to be t duty of every officer to exert himself at all times for the benefit of l King and his country, I have humbly ventured to trouble you with the remarks, hoping that I shall be pardoned for the liberty I have taken.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your Grace's

most obedient humble servant,

BENJAMIN SULLIVAN,

Major Half-pay.

[ENCLOSURE.]

DETAILS OF TWO ARMIES OF DIFFERENT STRENGTH, SHOWI THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, I CLUSIVE OF THE SEPOY TROOPS OF INDIA.

DETAIL OF A LARGE ARMY, WITH ITS COMPONENT PARTS.

CLASSIFICATION.	EUROPEANS.			AFRICANS.	
	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers, Privates, &c.	Total.	Non-commissioned Officers, Privates, &c.	Total Europeans and
Brigade of Infantry :—					
2 Battalions of Europeans of 10 companies each	100	1,894	1,994	..	1
1 Battalion of Africans of 10 companies each	50	38	88	920	1,
1 Brigade of Field Artillery, drivers included	9	121	130	80	
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Brigade	9	18	27	..	
Total	168	2,071	2,239	1,000	3,
Division of Infantry :—					
3 Brigades of Infantry	504	6,213	6,717	3,000	9,
1 Battalion of the Rifle Corps of 6 companies	32	570	602	..	
1 Company of Pioneers	8	7	15	95	
2 Squadrons of the Waggon-train, Detachment Staff included	26	57	83	360	
1 Troop of the Staff Corps	5	6	11	93	
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Division	24	51	75	24	
Total	599	6,904	7,503	3,572	11,
Corps-d'Armée :—					
3 Divisions of Infantry	1,797	20,712	22,509	10,716	33,
Brigade of Cavalry :—					
1 Regiment of Europeans of 8 troops	42	784	826	..	
1 Regiment of Africans of 8 troops	42	49	91	744	
1 Troop of Horse Artillery	6	173	179	..	
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Cavalry Brigade	9	18	27	..	
Detachment of Artillery :—					
3 Brigades of Heavy Guns, drivers included	27	363	390	240	
3 Brigades of reserve guns, spare carriages, reserve ammunition, &c., drivers included	27	363	390	240	
Artillery Detachment Staff	8	5	13	..	
Detachment of Engineers :—					
2 Brigades of Pontoons, drivers included	18	38	56	338	
1 Company of Sappers and Miners	8	13	21	89	
1 Company of Artificers	8	101	109	..	
A Detachment of the Driver Corps, equal to one for a brigade of guns, for the transport of field stores, forges, trucks, &c.	1	5	6	80	
Engineer Detachment Staff	8	5	13	..	
2 Squadrons of the Waggon-train, Detachment Staff included	26	57	83	360	
1 Troop of the Staff Corps	5	6	11	93	
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Corps-d'Armée	25	51	76	24	
Total	2,097	22,743	24,800	12,924	37,

DETAIL OF A LARGE ARMY, WITH ITS COMPONENT PARTS—*continued.*

CLASSIFICATION.	EUROPEANS. Officers.	EUROPEANS. Non-commissioned Officers, Privates, &c.	EUROPEANS. Total.	AFRICANS. Non-commissioned Officers, Privates, &c.	Total Europeans and Africans.
WING OF AN ARMY:—					
2 Corps-d'Armée	4,114	45,486	49,600	25,848	75,448
Division of Infantry attached to the Head-quarters of the wing	599	6,904	7,503	3,572	11,075
Unattached Division of Cavalry:—					
2 Brigades	198	2,048	2,246	1,488	3,734
2 Squadrons of the Waggon-train, Detachment Staff included	26	57	83	360	443
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Division of Cavalry	24	51	75	24	99
Reserve Artillery:—					
2 Brigades of field guns, drivers included	18	242	260	160	420
2 Brigades of heavy guns, drivers included	18	242	260	160	420
1 Company of Artillery, and Detachment of the Driver Corps, sufficient for 2 brigades of guns, for the transport of reserve carriages and reserve ammunition	10	126	136	160	296
Artillery Detachment Staffs	16	10	26	..	26
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Artillery of the Wing	9	18	27	..	27
Reserve Detachment of Engineers:—					
2 Brigades of Pontoons, drivers included	18	38	51	338	394
1 Company of Artificers	8	101	109	..	109
1 Company of Pioneers	8	7	15	95	110
Detachment of the Driver Corps, equal to that for a brigade of guns, for the transport of reserve field-stores, forges, trucks, &c.	1	5	6	80	86
Engineer Detachment Staffs	16	10	26	..	26
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Engineer Corps attached to the Wing	9	18	27	..	27
3 Squadrons of the Waggon-train, Detachment Staff included	36	83	119	540	659
1 Troop of the Staff Corps	5	6	11	93	104
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Wing	26	51	77	24	101
Total	5,159	55,503	60,662	32,942	93,604
ARMY:—					
2 Wings	10,318	111,006	121,324	65,884	187,208
Corps of Reserve:—					
Brigade of Infantry:—					
2 Battalions of Africans of 10 companies each	100	76	176	1,840	2,016
1 Battalion of Europeans of 10 companies each	50	947	997	..	997
1 Brigade of Field Artillery, drivers included	9	121	130	80	210
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Brigade	9	18	27	..	27
Division of Infantry:—					
3 Brigades of Infantry of Reserve	504	3,486	3,990	5,760	9,750
1 Battalion of the Rifle Corps of 6 companies	32	570	602	..	602
1 Company of Pioneers	8	7	15	95	110
2 Squadrons of the Waggon-train, Detachment Staff included	26	57	83	360	443
1 Troop of the Staff Corps	5	6	11	93	104
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Division	24	51	75	24	99
3 Divisions of Infantry of Reserve	1,797	12,531	14,328	18,996	33,324
1 Division of Cavalry	248	2,156	2,404	1,872	4,276
3 Squadrons of the Waggon-train, Detachment Staff included	36	83	119	540	659
1 Troop of the Staff Corps	5	6	11	93	104
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Corps	25	51	76	24	100

DETAIL OF A LARGE ARMY, WITH ITS COMPONENT PARTS—*continued.*

CLASSIFICATION.	EUROPEANS.			AFRICANS.	Total Europeans and Africans.
	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers, Privates, &c.	Total.	Non-commissioned Officers, Privates, &c.	
ARMY—*continued*:—					
Unattached Corps of Cavalry:—					
3 Divisions of Cavalry	744	6,468	7,212	5,616	12,828
2 Troops of Reserve Horse Artillery, Detachment Staff included	20	351	371	..	371
1 Squadron of the Waggon-train, unattached	16	31	47	180	227
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Corps of Cavalry	25	51	76	24	100
Park of Artillery:—					
7 Brigades of guns drivers included	63	847	910	560	1,470
2 Companies of Artillery, and Detachment of the Driver Corps, sufficient for 4 brigades of guns, for the transport of artillery, stores, &c.	20	252	272	320	592
2 Troops of Horse Artillery	12	346	358	..	358
1 Squadron of the Waggon-train, Detachment Staff included	16	31	47	180	227
Artillery Detachment Staffs	32	20	52	..	52
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Park	42	87	129	24	153
Reserve Corps of Engineers:—					
4 Brigades of Pontoons, drivers included	36	76	112	676	788
2 Companies of Artillerers	16	202	218	..	218
2 Companies of Sappers and Miners	16	26	42	178	220
2 Companies of Pioneers	16	14	30	190	220
Detachment of the Driver Corps, equal to that for a brigade of guns, for the transport of field-stores, forges, trucks, &c.	1	5	6	80	86
1 Squadron of the Waggon-train, Detachment Staff included	16	31	47	180	227
Engineer Detachment Staffs	32	20	52	..	52
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs of the Reserve Corps of Engineers	42	87	129	24	153
Head-Quarters:—					
1 Division of Infantry	599	6,904	7,503	3,572	11,075
1 Brigade of Cavalry	99	1,024	1,123	744	1,867
2 Squadrons of the Waggon-train, Detachment Staff included	26	57	83	360	443
General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs attached to Head-quarters	50	75	125	48	173
Recapitulation:—					
2 Wings	10,318	111,006	121,324	65,884	187,208
1 Corps of Reserve	2,111	14,827	16,938	21,525	38,463
1 Corps of Cavalry, unattached	805	6,901	7,706	5,820	13,526
1 Park of Artillery	185	1,583	1,768	1,064	2,832
Reserve Corps of Engineers	175	461	636	1,328	1,964
Head-quarters	774	8,060	8,834	4,724	13,558
Total	14,368	142,838	157,206	100,365	257,571

British population disposable for the Line	500,000
Deduct Europeans for three armies of the above detail	471,618
Overplus remaining	28,382

DETAIL OF A SMALLER ARMY.

CLASSIFICATION.	EUROPEANS.			AFRICANS.	Total Europeans and Africans.
	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers, Privates, &c.	Total.	Non-commissioned Officers, Privates, &c.	
Corps-d'Armée:—					
3 Divisions of Infantry, as mentioned in the Corps of Reserve of the other detail	1,797	12,531	14,328	18,996	33,324
Brigade of Cavalry; Detachments of Artillery, Engineers, Waggon-train, and Staff Corps; and General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs, as stated in the other detail for a Corps-d'Armée	260	2,031	2,291	2,208	4,499
Total	2,057	14,562	16,619	21,204	37,823
Corps of Reserve:—					
4 Divisions of Infantry, as mentioned in the Corps-d'Armée of the other detail	2,396	27,616	30,012	14,288	44,300
Brigade of Cavalry; Detachments of Artillery, Engineers, Waggon-train, and Staff Corps; and General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs, as stated above	260	2,031	2,291	2,208	4,499
Total	2,656	29,647	32,303	16,496	48,799
Head-Quarters:—					
Brigade of Infantry of 2 European battalions and 1 African ditto	168	2,071	2,239	1,000	3,239
1 Regiment of European Cavalry	42	784	826	..	826
Detachment of Waggon-train; and General, Civil, Medical, and Clerical Staffs, as stated in the other detail	76	132	208	408	616
Total	286	2,987	3,273	1,408	4,681
Army:—					
2 Corps-d'Armée	4,114	29,124	33,238	42,408	75,646
1 Corps of Reserve	2,656	29,647	32,303	16,496	48,799
Corps of Cavalry, as stated in the other detail	805	6,901	7,706	5,820	13,526
Park of Artillery, idem	185	1,583	1,768	1,084	2,852
Reserve Corps of Engineers, idem	175	461	636	1,328	1,964
Head-quarters	286	2,987	3,273	1,408	4,681
Total	8,221	70,703	78,924	68,544	147,468

British population disposable for the Line	500,000
Deduct Europeans for 6 armies of the above detail	473,544
Overplus remaining	26,456

Major-General Sir H. Douglas to Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD, Fredericton, New Brunswick, 2nd January, 1827.

Your Grace having been pleased to direct a copy of the Report of the Committee of Engineers upon the Defence of his Majesty's Colonies in North America to be transmitted to me confidentially, perhaps with a view of affording me an opportunity of recording and transmitting my opinion on the same, so far as it relates to the province of New Brunswick; and being under doubts of which I can no otherwise discharge myself than by submitting them to your Grace's judgment, I venture, with the greatest deference, to address to your Grace some observations on that Report, and to introduce these by a short reference to the actual condition and circum-

stances of certain parts of the province, which, if the Commission had not been prevented from visiting them, would probably have appeared to the distinguished and able officers composing that body, to possess such special features of importance as might warrant a departure from the general principle laid down with so much ability, that establishing a multiplicity of small posts upon the coasts, islands, and frontiers of a country is not the best way of defending it.

In my conference with Sir James Smyth I mentioned my sense of the importance of Passamaquoddy Bay generally, and relatively of certain points and islands situated in and near it. I did not venture much into detail in support of this opinion, because I had no doubt that the Commission would visit that very important part of this frontier province; but could I have foreseen that adverse circumstances of weather, and want of time were to operate as they have done, I should have endeavoured to make a more forcible representation of the importance which, in my judgment, may be attached to the military occupation of certain points in that quarter.

The recommendation which the Report notices at page 115 to have been made by me with respect to a small military post on the island of Grand Manan, is but a very minor part of the consideration which I have bestowed upon that quarter of the province generally; and my reason for bringing that proposition alone under the view of the Commission as a measure which it had appeared expedient to adopt, was from having in my possession a copy * of a strong recommendation to that effect made to Earl Bathurst by Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie, and a Report † with estimate from the then commanding engineer who had been sent to inspect the island: I had not then seen Grand Manan, and therefore confined myself to making that reference to a measure which I had found noted for execution; but now, connecting it with a more matured consideration of the whole case, and a knowledge of the locality, I venture, with unfeigned deference to your Grace, to state that, in all respects, I entirely concur with Earl Dalhousie and others who think that the military occupation of the island of Grand Manan will be found to be of the utmost importance to the safety and welfare of these parts of his Majesty's dominions in North America, and that there is policy and expediency in there displaying the British flag in a military post to command the anchorage in Long Island Bay.

The county of Charlotte is the frontier county on the sea-board of the province. Grand Manan and the islands similarly coloured lying in Passamaquoddy Bay, belong to Great Britain, and form part of the county.

The agricultural condition of Charlotte county is much advanced, and it is upon the whole perhaps the most forward in the province in all its statistical circumstances. It is peopled chiefly by the loyalists who fought in the war of the rebellion and their descendants, and I have witnessed with great satisfaction by the strongest manifestations that loyalty and attachment to the British sovereign and constitution have taken good root there.

There are two roads leading to St. Andrew's and to places in its vicinity from the chief settlements on the river St. John; one road, now passable for carriages, passes from Carleton, opposite to the city of St. John, by the

* Enclosure No. 1. † Enclosure No. 2.

coast, through Maggaquadavick, to St. Andrew's and thence to St. Stephen's, on the river St. Croix, near to which place, viz. at Milltown, the river is very narrow, and there crossed by a bridge, whence an excellent road leads into the United States. The other road, a good bridle-road, passes direct from Fredericton to a little above St. Andrew's. The distance from Carleton (opposite to St. John) is 68 miles, that between Fredericton and St. Andrew's is about 87 miles. On nearly the whole line of the road between St. John and St. Andrew's the country is settled where the land is good. In the vicinity of St. Andrew's the country is highly improved; and settlements, of which there are already many, are daily extending, and all the land lying on the direct road between Fredericton and St. Andrew's has already become private property. A road has also been opened on the right bank of the river St. John between Fredericton and the city of St. John. It skirts the river from Fredericton to the confluence of the Oronnuto and St. John rivers, and thence passes nearly in a direct line to strike the river again a little above Carleton; and in its course this road communicates by by-roads with several settlements on the large sinuosity of the river which the main road intercepts.

These circumstances do not at all accord with that backward condition in which the committee appear to have considered the country lying between the St. John's river and St. Andrew's, for the land in that quarter which the Commissioners recommend should not be settled, is already granted, rapidly improving, and cannot be restrained from cultivation. The communications which it is recommended should not be permitted to be opened, have already been formed, at great cost, and with great advantage to the country; and the question therefore is, not whether an unsettled, impracticable wilderness country should be opened and improved, or left to form a barrier upon that part of the frontier of the province; but whether a settled country, through which movements would be easy and prove vulnerable, should be abandoned to its own means of defence.

Had that part of the province even been in a wilderness state, I should, nevertheless, with great deference to the opinions which have been given, still presume to submit my reasons for dissenting from the recommendation, that a rear line of defence being established, a frontier of forests should be left unsettled and unimproved upon a frontier up to the very outer demarcation of which our neighbours are planning and pushing thriving and very populous establishments, laying out townships, cutting roads, &c.

This principle has, much heretofore, been followed in Lower Canada on the frontier bounding on the states of Vermont and Maine; but experience has proved the measure to be insufficient in its object and disadvantageous in its results. It has been found that nothing but actual possession of the soil could prevent vast numbers of alien families from creeping into and settling upon our territory; and many here, as well as there, have now acquired such possession by prescription of law that they cannot well be disturbed; and, after all, in self-defence, it has been found necessary to settle those forests with all the emigrants and wanderers that could be collected. So would it be in New Brunswick, where (and particularly near that very frontier) there are already a great number of aliens established.

This has been permitted so long, and has gone to such an extent, that it requires a good deal of circumspection in the measures which I am taking to admit them to naturalise with us or to eject them as aliens. These

people committed their trespasses and located themselves when the country was in a wilderness state, and your Grace may be assured that there is no other way of preventing such encroachments but by pre-occupying the land, on all parts of the frontier which are yet in a wilderness state, with settlements of British subjects, and as soon as possible, up to the most advanced verge of British territory. Whether and where to establish military posts in young settlements is a general question which will depend upon the degree of countenance and support which, in policy, it may be expedient to afford in peace, and upon any specific and important objects for which it may appear practicable and expedient to provide in the event of war.

If the military posts at St. Andrew's were withdrawn, and the defence of the country beyond the St. John abandoned to its own resources, the moral and political effect in the mean time would be prejudicial, and the remote effect in war would prove extremely disadvantageous to all the lower provinces of his Majesty's dominions in North America. I am quite convinced, and I state it from having ascertained what the feelings of that loyal population would be on such a measure (by a petition which has lately been presented to me from the magistrates and principal people in that country on the defenceless state of St. Andrew's and a recent diminution of its small garrison), that the countenance and consequence afforded by the presence of a British post and a British flag are essentially necessary to support loyalty, put down defection, and inspire confidence, and I am certain that to withdraw that post would be felt and considered by the people to be an indication that that fine portion of New Brunswick is not estimated as it ought to be, that it is not considered to be safe from the enterprises that might be made against it, and that in the event of war it would be abandoned to its own means of defence. This, in peace, would expose it to be overrun with republican principles, American smugglers and trespassers, and to introduce into the very heart of the country, that is to the St. John river, people, principles, and expectations, which would there speculate upon and promote the alienation of that important part of the province from the dominion of the British crown.

Under such indications and discouragement the militia would not fail to imbibe corresponding notions, and your Grace may rest assured that such a principle of military occupation and plan of operations would not produce in the militia "sentiments of rivalry and hostility" to their neighbours, but rather promote dispositions of fraternity with them.

The Americans have established a military port at East Port on Moose Island, with a garrison of sufficient importance to be commanded by a major. I visited it at the same time that I visited all the other islands in Passamaquoddy Bay in the autumn of 1825, in which excursion I went to St. Andrew's by one of the roads I have described and returned to Fredericton direct by the other.

The Commissioners state that they do not attach much value to St. Andrew's as a military post, and recommend that the garrison be withdrawn from that "very remote and unconnected situation." But I have already shewn that St. Andrew's is neither remote nor unconnected with this part of the country; and besides the internal communications which I have already described, it is a very favourable point for communicating with the exterior, by being the chief seaport of that part of the country,

and an important station upon one of the finest bays and best harbours on the coast of North America, the least remote, and the most accessible at all times to the means by which succour may be afforded; and so long as, by this and other measures, we hold possession of Passamaquoddy Bay, it is obvious that no significant movement can be made into, nor force maintain itself in, the province, for by our command of the sea and points of debarkation secured in the Bay, we might occupy or intercept any communication by which an advance could be made. Then with respect to the value of St. Andrew's in other respects, it is the county town, the residence of most of the principal people in that part of the province, the depository of all the records of the county, it is the seat of the chief custom-house establishment (of which the port of West Isles, immediately opposite to East Port, is an out-harbour) which exercises most important and indispensable duties to check a very extensive illicit traffic which would otherwise be carried on between the United States and all the bay shore of this and the adjoining province, and it contributes considerably to the public revenue. When the statistical condition and local circumstances of a country have raised places to such degrees of value and importance as these, it would not be right, even if the military feature were not an important one, to refuse recognition of that importance by withdrawing the garrison from that quarter.

The Commissioners state that they conceive "the militia to be the proper people to employ in the defence of such detached towns and settlements, the capture or destruction of which would not have any effect upon the general result of a war." This, too, as a general principle, accords with the most approved maxims of defensive war, but I really presume to think that the local circumstances which I have ventured to submit, with every deference to your Grace's judgment, are sufficient to place this case on special grounds, and to warrant a departure from the principle which has been laid down. St. Andrew's is not detached; the abandonment of those interests which I represent, the destruction of that county town, and the possession of Passamaquoddy Bay and the island of Grand Manan by the Americans, would produce very serious effects in the event of war, for should we then have withdrawn our military posts from that quarter, it would be one of the first and most favoured objects of the Americans to occupy them.

Then, if the defence of country beyond the St. John is to be abandoned to its own resources, and distinct indications of this to be given by our present measures, every facility will be afforded by us, and would be taken advantage of by them, to occupy all those commanding points of the bay, and then to make a movement upon and to destroy the city of St. John without passing the river. The Americans make no secret that, in another war, their main exertions will be to make the St. John river the line of frontier, and so to establish a right, without which they would not acquire it, to the navigation of this magnificent river, and should they even establish that object, there would remain no purely British seaport on the bay shore of New Brunswick. The proposed measure of withdrawing our military post and making that river the line of defence, would be a gratuitous concession on our part, which might tend to the final accomplishment of their purpose, and at all events be greatly advantageous to them and prejudicial to us during the war.

Entertaining such projects (to correspond with the claims which they now lay, in negotiation, to that possession and to that right of navigation), their military post at Moose Island may, if we withdraw, be considered an offensive post; a *tête* from which, if not to be faced, a very respectable military force would soon overrun and occupy the islands and promontories on which, according to the suggestion of the Commissioners, we should have none, and which the Americans would support with the militia of an adjoining population, superior in numbers, eagerly desirous of taking possession of all the country beyond the St. John, countenanced by the respectability of their garrison and by the display of their flag on the most advanced post of their territory; whilst our people would be disheartened, discouraged, and mortified, our posts withdrawn, and our flag struck! According to this, too, we should relinquish the command of the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay, which our vessels could not securely resort to nor frequent so long as the Americans held the strong points, and we no stations at all to command its entrances and roadsteads. The command of the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay is absolutely essential to the safe navigation of the Bay of Fundy, and this of itself, I submit, with great deference to your Grace, is sufficient to warrant a departure from the principles which have been laid down by the Commissioners. From Passamaquoddy Bay, and from the anchorage under the north-east end of the island of Grand Manan (available in all southerly winds), the American cruizers would be enabled to intercept the trade to and from the city of St. John, Annapolis, and all the bay-shore of Nova Scotia; and, when it is remembered that these are stores to which Great Britain has already been compelled to look for masting and timber for her navy, as well as for supplying the West India colonies with timber, it is clear that, besides all other considerations, the naval command of the Bay of Fundy cannot be surrendered.

It would then be found absolutely indispensable to recover it, and that could not be effected, nor held securely for the transit of trade, but by re-possessing the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay. For this we should have to contend for re-possession of the commanding land points which by timely measures we may now secure; and this shows at once, I humbly submit, the error there would be in our relinquishing them, in not securing them now by all necessary applications, and in believing that their loss would produce no effect upon the general operations of a war; and this further shows, I humbly submit, that instead of withdrawing our military post from that quarter, it should be augmented, its defences rendered respectable, and the earliest operation of a war should be to take possession of Moose Island, and never more permit the American flag to be displayed on the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay. This province is the centre of the British position which Great Britain holds on this continent, and Passamaquoddy Bay is, in my estimation, the most important military point in that centre, a magnificent harbour, open at all seasons, easy of access, in which Great Britain can put herself into and maintain connection with this colony, and cover and support it with the right-hand of her power, her naval superiority. I have always thought that in selecting points for the operations of colonial defence, those are objects of the greatest, most obvious, and most special importance, which secure the possession of great maritime points, and I consider Passamaquoddy Bay to be one which we should never surrender, and by means of which it will be still more neces-

sary to strengthen this centre, should the American government succeed in the claims they are pursuing to the territory under negotiation.

With the possession of St. Andrew's, and the command of the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay, the next great object which the Americans would unquestionably attempt, if the line of the St. John is to be the line of defence, would be the destruction of the city of St. John, by moving forward from St. Andrew's, on a good road, with a small force and a body sufficient to observe or check the militia. They might gain the heights at Carleton, where at present there are no significant defences, and thence, without crossing the river, burn the city, chiefly built of wood, and destroy the shipping, with a few howitzer-shells.

Partridge Island, properly strengthened, may be made fully equal to the defence of the harbour against a *sea* operation; but the sketch will show that, according to the plan of operation proposed, a small force might succeed in destroying the city (untouched by Partridge Island) in a land operation.

St. John is the commercial capital of the country. It has a population of 9000 souls. It cleared and entered last year 134,465 tons of shipping, employing 7073 seamen. It must ever be the great port of entry and export of all the trade and produce of the settlements on the river St. John and of those on the banks of the magnificent lakes and rivers which fall into it, and connect the city with the greater part of the interior in a very remarkable degree, as the plan will show.

The Americans should never be suffered to have any participation in the navigation of that great outlet, they must never be permitted to establish themselves on the lower regions of its right bank, more particularly if they succeed in their claim to that above. The city of St. John is, besides, the asylum which Great Britain assigned to the loyalists who settled there, when in a wilderness state after the American war.

These altogether form features of importance, and claims to military consideration, which, I humbly submit, should warrant a departure from the principle laid down, and to push the line of defence beyond the St. John, with measures contemplated to secure the command of Passamaquoddy Bay.

It is certainly very important to establish a military post in the centre of the country in the vicinity of Fredericton. I know that, so soon as the boundary question shall be settled, the American government intend to establish a military post on the most advanced point of *their* frontier. They are now occupied in making a road from the head of the Penobscot to their settlement below Mars Hill, and they contemplate another to the Restook. It will be proper for us to pause in our choice of a site for a post in the vicinity of Fredericton until that question is settled and their post chosen. In the mean time the road of communication hence to Canada is rapidly improving, also downwards to St. John by both banks of the river, and also a road to Miramichi to fall into that very important communication which will connect the three provinces by a road along the Gulph shore, which the Commission so satisfactorily approve, and which is under execution; and were I not apprehensive that this paper, already so long, would be too much extended into detail, I should show that with a respectable post in the vicinity of Fredericton, with so many favourable lines as are shown by the plan for communication with the other provinces,

with Passamaquoddy Bay secured for succour from the exterior and for naval co-operation, and with such facilities as New Brunswick possesses in the vast ramifications of her inland navigable waters for internal operations, the centre of the province would be safe from any considerable inroad or permanent lodgment.

For the reasons I have, with great deference, offered to your Grace, I submit the expediency of establishing a formidable post on the promontory and island of St. Andrew's, and a battery with a keep to command the roadstead of Grand Manan; also to establish some defences on the heights of Carleton sufficient to resist a *coup de main*, and which might, without serious risk, be occupied (by throwing across part of the force retained in St. John) to protect that place from the destruction which the Americans might otherwise effect, should they acquire a temporary superiority in the bay or on the country beyond the St. John by any uncontrollable circumstance of weather or unfortunate contingency.

I consider it proper to address this in the first instance as a private communication to your Grace, following naturally upon that mode by your Grace's commands in ordering a copy of the Report to be sent to me confidentially, and should your Grace desire to have it in any other shape or form, your directions shall be obeyed.

I have the honour to be, my Lord, your Grace's
most obedient humble servant,

HOWARD DOUGLAS.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lord Dalhousie to Lord Bathurst.

MY LORD, Halifax, 15th January, 1820.

With reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 26th May, 1819, I have now the honour to transmit, in obedience to the commands of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, a plan and estimate for a battery, barrack, and other buildings proposed to be erected on the island of Grand Manan.

With the desire of obtaining the most correct information of the place, and with instructions to be guided by the most simple and economical mode of performing this service, I sent the chief engineer in this command to the spot, and the whole has been drawn up to assimilate with the new barracks at Sydney, Cape Breton, and St. John's, New Brunswick.

With respect to the ground required for the establishment, I would strongly recommend that the space of 20 acres should be purchased by government without any other exchange of land, because we are yet altogether uninformed of the value of the public property there, or the further value that may arise on it by this measure of occupying the island as a military post.

I have nothing to add to the letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Arnold herewith transmitted, unless it be the expression of my entire satisfaction with the manner in which he has executed my order, and my conviction that the island is a station and post that will one day be found to be of the utmost importance to the safety and welfare of this part of his Majesty's North American dominions.

I have, &c.,

DALHOUSIE.

II.

Lieut.-Colonel Arnold to Lord Dalhousie.

Royal Engineers' Office, Halifax, Nova Scotia,
3rd July, 1820.

MY LORD,

In obedience to your Lordship's commands, I have visited Grand Manan, in order to fix upon a spot for a battery and barrack for the purpose of establishing a post on that important island; and I have the honour to submit to your Lordship's consideration the accompanying plans and estimates of such services as I would recommend for carrying that object into effect.

The advantages likely to result to Great Britain from the occupation of this island, in the event of another contest with the United States, are already so fully appreciated by your Lordship that any remarks on the subject would be superfluous; indeed, a very cursory inspection of the chart of the Bay of Fundy must be convincing on this head. I therefore only consider it necessary to point out the situation on which I would place a battery and barrack with the requisite appendages.

The only tolerable roadstead at Grand Manan for any vessels but small craft is Long Island Bay; and that is much exposed to the south-east wind, but the anchorage is good, being stiff clay; and I was informed by some of the oldest inhabitants that the* from the shore greatly counteracts the effect of that wind, and they have seen large vessels ride out a heavy gale without injury.

The point A on the large plan, No. 1, of the island, shows the part of Long Island Bay which appears the most desirable position for a battery,† as it completely commands the roadstead, is a fine healthy situation, and there is ample space in the rear for the barracks and all necessary accommodation for the troops. But as this is not a government reserve, sufficient land must be purchased for the purpose, the probable expense of which is included in the estimate, on the average of the price demanded by the two proprietors, though apparently much above the value of the land. This point, however, must be settled by a jury. Perhaps some part of the government reserve, marked B, might, as one of the proprietors wishes to be, given in exchange; unless, indeed, it were thought advisable to retain the whole of that reserve.

The proposed situations for the officers' and soldiers' barracks, hospital, and provision store, are noted in the plan No. 1, and the project for the whole establishment is more clearly marked in the plan No. 2 of the piece of ground it is proposed to purchase, containing about 20 acres, though probably more eligible sites for these buildings may present themselves when the ground shall be cleared. No. 3 shows the plans, sections, and elevations of the proposed officers' and soldiers' barracks; and No. 4 of the proposed hospital and provision store.

In planning these barracks I have constantly kept in view the total impossibility of lodgings or any sort of accommodation being procured by married officers or soldiers who may be ordered on duty at this post; and on that ground, as I have already had the honour of explaining to your Lordship, I have ventured to exceed the instructions contained in Colonel Darling's letter to me of the 28th August last relative to the capacity of the barracks; but they are nevertheless so contrived that, if desired, only one wing may be at first completed, and space may be left for the extension of the building at pleasure.

On the foundation of such an establishment there must always be numerous

* Word illegible in MS.

† Six 24-pounders.

contingencies to provide for, which I have made an allowance for of one-seventh, instead of one-tenth, which is customary, of which I trust your Lordship will see the propriety.

J. R. ARNOLD,
Commanding Royal Engineers.

[655.] *À S. A. R. le Prince Frédéric des Pays Bas.*

MONSEIGNEUR, Londres, ce 5me Janvier, 1827.

J'étais à la campagne quand j'ai reçu la lettre de votre Altesse Royale du 15me Décembre, et les mémoires, &c., relatives à la Place d'Oudenarde étant en ville, j'ai remis jusqu'à mon retour la réponse que j'ai l'honneur de donner à votre Altesse Royale.

Je dois d'abord remercier votre Altesse Royale pour l'honneur qu'elle me fait de consulter mon opinion.

La Place d'Oudenarde est importante sous le point de vue stratégique. Elle combine le passage de l'Escaut avec les communications de Courtray, Tournay, et Gand; et celles de la rive droite de cette rivière. Les facilités d'inondation la rendent susceptible d'une bonne défense sans grands frais en ouvrages.

Je suis entièrement de l'opinion de votre Altesse Royale que l'ouvrage projeté sur la hauteur de Beveren est de peu ou même d'aucune utilité pour la défense de la Place.

Il faut convenir aussi que les ouvrages du corps de la Place ne sont pas tout-à-fait ce qu'on aurait pu désirer, si on ne peut pas être certain de l'effet des inondations. Il serait sage de sacrifier la redoute de Beveren, afin d'avoir les moyens de pouvoir renforcer les ouvrages de la Place.

Mais, Monseigneur, je prie votre Altesse Royale d'observer que la hauteur de Beveren domine non-seulement les chaussées de Gand et de Tournay, mais aussi celle de Courtray. Celui qui défendrait la Place d'Oudenarde désirerait toujours y avoir une porte; et il y établirait en tout cas un ouvrage de campagne.

Voilà pourquoi j'y ai désiré établir une redoute, laquelle quoique je ne me ressouviens pas d'en avoir vu le plan, a été renforcée en conséquence et en proportion de la distance où elle se trouvait des ouvrages de la Place.

Cependant je n'ai rien à répondre au raisonnement de votre Altesse Royale, et j'y souscris volontiers.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall, 6th January, 1827.

I called at your house this evening, but found you had left town.

I wished to speak to you on the subject of the succession to the Duke of York as Commander-in-Chief. Perhaps I am meddling with what does not concern me; but I confess I feel the utmost anxiety that you should succeed the Duke of York in the command of the British army.

I hear, indeed I *know*, that the King is *talking* of an arrangement which is almost incredible: that he, the King, should personally command the army. I hope he is only *talking* of it, and that he will never seriously propose anything so fatal to the interests of the army, so pregnant with unceasing embarrassment to his government.

You ought to succeed the Duke of York. The Duke of Cambridge and the Duke of Cumberland are for different reasons equally out of the question. What other person can pretend to it?

The command in itself may be no object to you. You may not personally wish for it. If the question were between you and another subject you might have a difficulty in giving an opinion; but I do hope, indeed I firmly believe, that no false delicacy will prevent you from giving a most decided opinion against the propriety of committing such a trust as the command of the army of this country, to the hands, not of the King, but of those who may for the moment have acquired an influence over him.

It is possible that I may be giving you unnecessary trouble in reading this, and that you may have heard all that I have heard on the subject. Still, as you left town this morning, there is a chance that you have not heard it, and I will therefore without reserve repeat to you what I have heard, requesting only, that if it be new to you, you will consider this communication from me a strictly private one.

The King this morning told Sir Herbert Taylor that he thought it was possible that he, the King, might succeed the Duke of York in the command of the army; that he should have a secretary who might give directions in his name; that Taylor should be Adjutant-General, some provision being made for Torrens.

Sir Herbert told the King that he thought the arrangement quite impracticable, and I am sure that nothing would induce him to acquiesce in it.

I saw Lord Liverpool only the day before yesterday, and I am confident that such a proposal as this never had occurred to him as possible.

He appeared to contemplate your succession to the command as unquestionable.

Sir William Knighton was, I believe, to see Lord Liverpool to-day, and if he is a party to this scheme would probably mention it to Lord Liverpool.

I am confident he (Lord Liverpool) must entirely discourage the proposal, but I shall certainly write to him to-night.

I have kept no copy of this letter, and wrote it in great haste.

Believe me ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

[656.] *To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL, Woodford, 7th January, 1827.

I have received your letter of last night, for which I am much obliged to you. However extraordinary the arrangement is which you tell me that his Majesty has in contemplation, I suspected that something of the kind was in agitation; and I determined to go out of town as soon as the melancholy event occurred which affords the opportunity for such an arrangement.

The fact is this. About three months ago, or possibly more, the King told me that in case he should lose his brother his Majesty wished me to be Commander-in-Chief. I entreated the King not to think of any arrangement to fill his brother's office until the misfortune should have occurred. I pointed out to him the satisfaction it would be to his own mind to have postponed such an arrangement till it should have become absolutely necessary; that he well knew that I was always ready to serve him; but that I recommended to him to consult his ministers and to follow their advice respecting the arrangement to be made whenever the misfortune in contemplation should have occurred.

The King said nothing more after this recommendation, but his Majesty in making the proposition discussed different arrangements respecting his brothers and himself, but gave the preference to the arrangement respecting myself, or rather said that that was the only one which could be deemed satisfactory.

If I had not had, as I thought, reason to believe that another arrangement was in contemplation, I should have considered it my duty to remain in town to attend to his Majesty's commands. But as his Majesty's intentions appeared to me to be at least doubtful, I considered it better to leave town as soon as the melancholy event occurred; more particularly as being the senior officer of the army, and being deemed, as I believe, fit for the office, it might have been supposed by the public that I was looking out for it.

I have always considered the conversation which passed between his Majesty and me, like many others, as so many empty and unmeaning words and phrases, and I consider his Majesty perfectly at liberty to make any arrangement for the command of his army that may be thought proper by his

government. It appears that his Majesty is of the same opinion, as he is very forward in his arrangement since he has proposed to Sir Herbert Taylor to bear a part in it.

I conclude that before Lord Liverpool consents to such an arrangement he will consult my opinion. At all events when it will be made, or whenever it comes to my knowledge otherwise than confidentially, I will protest against it in the most formal manner, and with all the earnestness in my power, for the sake of the army, for that of the government, and, above all, for the sake of the public.

I may, and probably shall, be accused of having a personal interest in the question. But I think my conduct will have shewn that I have not endeavoured to promote that interest, and that nothing that has passed is of a nature to prevent me from coming forward upon this subject as forcibly as might be wished.

I am going to Woburn to-morrow. I cannot express to you how much gratified I am by your letter, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will write to me again. One of my servants will leave town to come down to me there to-morrow; and I desire my messenger to call upon you before the man leaves town to know whether you have any commands.

Ever, my dear Peel, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Coombe Wood, 7th January, 1827.

I am this moment returned from the Royal Lodge, and I have received his Majesty's commands to inform you that it is his intention to appoint you Commander-in-Chief of the army.

It is further his Majesty's wish, that the office of Master-General of the Ordnance shall be considered as merging, for the present at least, in that of Commander-in-Chief. In the whole of this arrangement I most entirely and cordially concur.

In order to prevent speculations and false reports, his Majesty will be glad that his intention should be generally known, but from respect to the memory of his lamented brother he would not have the appointment gazetted till after the funeral.

Believe me to be, with great truth, my dear Duke,

yours very sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

[657.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, London, 8th January, 1827.

I have received your letter, and I am much obliged to you for making known to me this fresh mark of his Majesty's most gracious favour and confidence.

I beg you will assure his Majesty of my gratitude and my earnest desire to merit his confidence by making every effort in my power to perform the duties of the office to which his Majesty is pleased to appoint me, in a manner satisfactory to his Majesty.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[658.] *To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, London, 8th January, 1827.

You will see that I have received your letter. I believe that the office of Master-General must be kept separate; or in case of the separation at any future period some difficulty might be experienced in transacting the business.

The office of Master-General is accountable for money which that of the Commander-in-Chief is not; the former could not be *merged* in the latter. But we both understand the same thing; viz., that I am to hold both offices and perform the duty of both, but receive the salary only of one.

Ever yours sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[659.] *To the King.*

London, 8th Janu

Lord Liverpool has made me acquainted with your intention to appoint me the Commander-in-Chie and I have requested Lord Liverpool to convey the expression of my gratitude for this fre Majesty's most gracious favour and confidence.

At the risk of interrupting your Majesty a venture to address yourself for the same purpos assure your Majesty that, although I cannot h

the duties of the high office to which your Majesty intends to appoint me equally to your Majesty's satisfaction and the advantage of the public, as they were conducted by my illustrious and universally lamented predecessor, it shall be my invariable study and endeavour to merit your Majesty's gracious confidence and approbation.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most grateful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Coombe Wood, 8th January, 1827, ½ past 10 P.M.

I have received both your letters, and I have thought it right to lose no time in laying the one intended for his Majesty's perusal, before him. I have accordingly transmitted it by a messenger to the Royal Lodge.

With respect to the Ordnance, we are quite agreed as to the substance, and we may therefore at our leisure consider of the most convenient way of carrying the purpose into execution. This is a matter comparatively of little importance.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Whitehall, Monday morning, ½ past 10 A.M.,
MY DEAR DUKE, 8th January, 1827.

I have no doubt that Lord Liverpool's messenger will have brought you the letter which he wrote to you last night after having seen the King at Windsor, and of which he sent me a copy.

Immediately after I had seen Taylor on Saturday evening, I sent off a messenger to Lord Liverpool with a full account of what had passed at Windsor between Taylor and the King.

I must say in justice to Lord Liverpool that I believe no man can have felt more strongly than he did throughout, that it was due to you, to the army, and to the country generally, to place you in the office of Commander-in-Chief.

When I saw Lord Liverpool on Thursday last, the day before the Duke of York died, he entirely acquiesced in the observation that I made, that you would of course succeed his Royal Highness.

When I wrote to him on Saturday night, and apprised him of the King's project with respect to the command, he said it was *preposterous*, and that he would never consent to it: that he would propose you.

I am sure he made Knighton see this, in an interview which took place between Knighton and him on Saturday morning. Lord Liverpool imme-

diately after the death of the Duke wrote to the King, proposing to come to Windsor. The King acquiesced, but sent Knighton to Coombe to speak to Lord Liverpool on Saturday. Lord Liverpool saw the King yesterday.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Brighton, 8th January, 1827.

Lord Liverpool has informed me of his having received the King's commands to communicate to you that he intends that you should be appointed Commander-in-Chief, and that, for the present at least, the office of Master-General of the Ordnance should be considered as merging in that of the Commander-in-Chief. Although I never in my own mind doubted that the King would not alter the intentions which you told me he had some time ago communicated to you, yet I could not help being a little startled when you said that you had never heard anything more on the subject; more particularly as, to my surprise, I found on arriving here that the Duke of Cambridge was talked of. However, I am satisfied that the King never varied his original intention.

You are, I hope, too well assured of my attachment to you to make it necessary for me to express my satisfaction at this arrangement, which in truth is the only one which could have been approved by the public.

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Brighton, 8th January, 1827.

Since writing my letter on your appointment, I have met Mr. Canning, and from what he said, there appears to be a doubt whether the ministers are to attend the poor Duke of York's funeral. They have attended all the funerals at Windsor, beginning with that of Princess Amelia; and if it be to be considered a military funeral, the ministers attended that of the old Duke of Cumberland. You may depend upon it that if the ministers do not attend it will be said that we are countenancing the paragraphs of the opposition newspapers, which maintain that the Duke of York is not entitled to any mark of respect, except as being a good Commander-in-Chief.

I am aware that the decision does not rest with us, but you may have opportunities of preventing what the King certainly does not mean, but what others may be willing to suggest.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

To Lord Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 9th January, 1827.

I have received your two letters of the 8th. Notwithstanding what passed between his Majesty and me in September last there were serious thoughts of another arrangement for the command of the army, and offers were made to an individual to carry such arrangement into execution. But we must not think of this subject, and particularly not talk of it.

I have not heard from the King myself, but I have written to him; and it is possible that he may desire to see me. If he does I will give a hint on the subject to which you refer.

The funeral is to be anything but military. It cannot be military because we have not men enough in England to bury a Field-Marshal! Whether the government attend or not as a body, I will attend; and I would recommend you to do the same. In neither case will Lord Liverpool attend I should think, as he is gone or going to Bath. Of this I am quite certain, that if it is suspected that the government don't attend the funeral for the reason referred to by you, it will be the best attended funeral that ever took place in England.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 9th January, 1827.

I return the drafts of the Convention with Portugal, with alterations in pencil which I beg to suggest to you, and a Memorandum explanatory of the reasons for which I suggest them. I likewise send to the Foreign Office to Lord Clanricarde the papers upon Persia with a Memorandum upon them.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I have a direction for you in the box of Persian papers, and I send it at once by the post.

[662.] MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSED CONVENTION WITH PORTUGAL.

London, 9th January, 1827.

First Article.—I understood from Lord Liverpool and th gentlemen of the Treasury that they would not require *mean of transport* from the Portuguese government, but only barrack and quarters, and buildings for hospitals, &c., and provision and forage. I have altered the article accordingly.

I have included the officers. This will not add materiall to the expense, as, according to our regulation, the Commander in-Chief receives no more than the private soldier.

Second Article.—The second article was unnecessary as i stood. I have substituted an engagement which is necessary. I there were not such an engagement the Portuguese governmen might give us provisions at Lisbon for the troops in Tra os Montes.

Third Article.—The third article is a concession on th part of his Majesty, and it may as well so stand. I have accordingly omitted the first words, and have altered the last in orde to provide for the possibility that it might be more convenien to both parties to receive the provisions from a Portugues magazine than to purchase.

Fifth Article.—The fifth article is unnecessary, as we finc our own means of transport.

Sixth Article.—The sixth article is made applicable solely t provisions and forage, as provisions and forage are alone to b required. Barracks and quarters will not be required of cours when the troops will not be in the country. But it is bette not to advert to them in this article, as there might b hospitals or sick or wounded officers left behind who must b provided for.

Seventh Article.—I have omitted the mention of the Fort of the Tagus. In this expression would be included the For of Belem and the Torre Velha, and others which it is no necessary that we should have. The less we appear to take th better.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING RUSSIA AND PERSIA.

London, 9th January, 1827.

I have perused all the papers sent to me by Mr. Canning regarding the war between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Persia.

I think we are bound by the sixth article of the Treaty to mediate if the King of Persia demands our mediation. That may be a question which, however, our learned civilians might solve for us. It is quite clear to me that we are not bound to give succour or money in lieu thereof.

There can be no difficulties then, such as are discussed by Mr. Ellis in his paper, respecting the transfer of the money from the British Treasury to that of the Russian government!

I don't think that Mr. Willock in this paper expresses so strongly as he did in his journal that he had arranged with Prince Menschikoff the retreat of the Russian troops from Gochelee. Even in this paper, however, it appears that it was arranged that they should be withdrawn.

There was an end then to the provocation given by Russia.

In point of fact the attack was made by Abbas Mirza in consequence of the success of some of the insurgents within the Russian territory, and was quite unconnected with the progress or state of the negotiations with Prince Menschikoff.

Prince Menschikoff's conduct was quite consistent with what I learnt at St. Petersburg, and with what the Emperor himself told me regarding the state of his affairs in Georgia. The Emperor could not at that time desire a Persian war; and when Prince Menschikoff found that the Persians were in earnest, he took upon himself that for which he had not probably the authority, viz., to engage that the Russian troops should retire from Gochelee.

But the truth is that in this case the King of Persia has acted as a revolutionary power. There is a curious account in one of Mr. Willock's despatches of the efforts made to excite a religious enthusiasm in Persia in favour of the Mahometan subjects of the Emperor of Russia; there is likewise a despatch from Colonel Macdonald, dated the 6th of September, which gives a detailed account of the relations between the King of Persia and the discontented Mahometan chiefs and other subjects of the Emperor of Russia, which relations have cer-

tainly occasioned the present war. But not only have these revolutionary measures or relations occasioned this war, but like measures of the same kind they will render difficult, if not impossible, any satisfactory peace.

The Emperor of Russia cannot make peace without at least having these rebels restored to his power. He can consent to no terms in their favour. On the other hand the King of Persia cannot, with honour, deliver them up. He must endeavour to make terms for them. The very effort, if it fails (and fail it must unless the Emperor should be induced to allow of the constant interference of the King of Persia in the internal government of Georgia), will only increase the disgrace.

It is impossible then that the King of Persia can come out of the war without suffering, unless he should obtain some remarkable military success.

We are really interested in the preservation of the independence of Persia. We are so in honour as well as politically. If the Emperor is wise he will see his interest likewise in the preservation of the Persian monarchy in a state of independence. His money will be saved by making peace, and I think he is likely to listen to the representations which might be made with truth of the harshness and injustice of the government of his Governor-General, General Yermoloff. The letters from the Persian minister, stating that the correspondence between the two governments was not faithfully transmitted from the one to the other, must have some effect upon his mind. At all events, this representation gives you fair ground for approaching the Russian government upon the subject, and must be appreciated by them if it should appear, as I think it will, that you are besides bound by the Article of the Treaty to propose to mediate, or rather to talk for Persia if Persia should make the demand.

If peace cannot be made, the only measure for the King of Persia to adopt is to increase his cavalry to the utmost, and to carry on the war with that arm alone.

In the wars in India we have long found the means of getting the better of such warfare. I suspect that the Russians are better prepared against it than they were found in former wars. But it is the only chance the King of Persia has, and a preparation for such warfare, and possibly his taking the field himself, might induce the Russians to listen to terms of peace.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. F. Robinson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Downing Street, 11th January, 1827.

I quite concur with you in thinking that the question of providing further relief for the Spaniards, and even of continuing that hitherto provided, must be decided by the Cabinet upon full discussion and consideration. I never liked the original grant, and always feared that whenever it was begun, it would never stop until it swallowed up all our means. That result has now occurred, and the treasury funds are actually exhausted, or so nearly so as to leave us next to nothing for purposes of the most urgent necessity; I mean the making up of the deficiency of the 4½ per cents., upon which pensions are charged far beyond the amount of the funds, and which have only been paid by applying the droits of Admiralty. The diminution which these droits have sustained by the payment of the Spaniards has now reduced them so low that I do not know how in future these deficiencies are to be made up: so that the *money* question, independent of the other very important considerations belonging to the subject, is one of very serious embarrassment. I shall see Lord Liverpool at Bath next week, and will talk the matter over with him, in order that he may be prepared for discussing it in Cabinet. I perfectly recollect your original objections to giving anything.

Believe me, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

F. ROBINSON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Woburn Abbey, 13th January, 1827.

I return you Count Palmella's proposed alterations of the convention, with a Memorandum upon them. I have had many transactions with this gentleman, and he certainly is the most difficult to deal with that I have ever met. He must have been educated by a Portuguese Jew attorney!

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM UPON THE PROPOSED CONVENTION WITH PORTUGAL.

Woburn Abbey, 13th January, 1827.

As I understood that the diplomatic relations between Portugal and Spain were restored at the desire of the former Court,

* Created Viscount Goderich in 1827, Earl of Ripon in 1833, and succeeded his brother and became Earl de Grey and Ripon in 1859.

I thought it desirable not to insert words in this Convention to recall to recollection that of which no man in England entertains a doubt.

Two nations may be at peace even though diplomatic relations may be discontinued. But when such relations have been restored after they had been interrupted, and had been so restored at the desire of the injured country, of that by whose immediate order these relations had been interrupted, there can be no doubt of peace.

If there is peace there can be no advantage in bringing forward to view at this moment the aggression. However, the fact is undoubted, and if either party insists upon the mention of it, the other party cannot object.

In respect to No. 2, I beg to remind Mr. Canning that in Marquis Palmella's projet the mention of the officers was entirely omitted. I altered the Article so as to include them but leaving the words general and referring to the regulations of the British army.

By way of argument to induce the Marquis of Palmella to consent to include the officers, I stated in my Memorandum the words of No. 2; and then Marquis Palmella insists upon inserting them into the Article.

I object to those words because they would afford ground for the belief that the officers of the British army had been in the habit of claiming more than they were entitled to by regulation; than which there is no assertion more false; and the insertion of these words would naturally be very offensive to that body of men. If the Marquis of Palmella is not satisfied with reference to the regulation in general terms as in the Article, by far the better mode of proceeding would be to obtain from the Treasury the regulation and insert it as a schedule to the treaty. But if we are so very precise upon one point, we ought to be so upon others, and, indeed, upon all; and then the character of the Convention must be altered.

I don't see why the words No. 3 are to be inserted in the 3rd Article. The Portuguese government by the 1st and 2nd Articles engage to supply his Majesty's troops, notwithstanding which engagement his Majesty engages to make the pecuniary advances for those supplies.

Why is the Princess Regent to signify her consent to an arrangement which is entirely at his Majesty's option? The

insertion of these words would really make the whole treaty ridiculous.

I have no objection to Nos. 4, 5, and 6.

In respect to No. 7, I purposely inserted the words *from time to time* in order to leave the concert at the option of the British Commissary-General, who, after all, must be responsible for taking care of the troops; and I know enough of Portuguese commissaries not to feel very confident that this proposed perpetual concert will be for the advantage even of the Portuguese government.

I don't believe you would prevail upon any respectable man to stay with the troops in Portugal in the responsible office of Commissary-General under the obligation always to act in concert with a gentleman appointed by the Portuguese government.

I have no objection to the alteration No. 8. I believe the original words of the Article would answer better than No. 9, as specifying the objects of the intended concert.

There can be no objection to the principle of No. 10. But I should think the wording should be carefully examined.

This amendment, however, affords another instance of the strictness with which the Portuguese interests in this Convention are taken care of!

The Article proposed in No. 11 will not answer.

First, I don't recollect that we occupied these forts during the war. We might at times, at others certainly not.

Secondly, the Article as drawn by the Marquis Palmella does not give us the exclusive occupation of these forts, which is what we must have *sine quâ non.* The command must be in our hands.

The Article as proposed by me would have answered all the purposes, and I should have no objection to insert at the end of the Article, as proposed by me, a clause to enable the Portuguese government to keep at Fort St. Julians the officers of the pratique, those of the police of the harbour, and those of the customs, all of whom it shall appear have resided there for the last year; provided the list of their names is given to the commanding officer, and that they are to consider themselves as strictly under his orders in respect to all that concerns the military and the defence of the forts.

I object to the alteration No. 12. The word *subsistence* does not represent what I meant by *maintenance.*

The Portuguese government engage to supply barracks and quarters as well as *subsistence*. I don't know whether the word *maintenance* describes what I meant, but it does better than *subsistence*. Besides, the word *maintenance* is in the preamble.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Brighton, 13th January, 1827.

With reference to the Order of the Bath, the arrangement between the Commander-in-Chief and my office has hitherto been this: that the Grand Crosses should rest with me, and the recommendations of the second and third class with the Commander-in-Chief, though it was deemed regular that they as well as the Grand Crosses should be submitted to the King from my office.

Now I have felt a strong inclination not to fill up in future the vacancies of the Grand Crosses, as there does not appear to be any general officer with a very paramount claim for that distinction, and there will be great convenience in having vacancies, which may be filled up in the event of any new claims, which would be left unrewarded if the number were always kept up complete. The navy have for some time pressed for this rule, not confining it indeed to the first class. I should not, however, come to this decision without your concurrence, and as it will be well known that I shall consult you in the recommendations, I think you will find convenience in being able to say that such is the rule, at least, as far as the Grand Crosses, which indeed is all I have to do with.

My reason for troubling you with this question *now* is this: Sir William Houston called upon me three days ago to ask for the Grand Cross vacant by the death of Lord Hastings. He said that the Duke of York had applied *specially* to me in his favour, and that I had given for answer that on that particular occasion I could not attend to his application.

I answered that the Duke had mentioned his name among others, and that I did not consider myself under anything like an engagement; that I doubted whether Lord Hastings were not a supernumerary knight (I have since found that he had been one, but had become afterwards on the regular list), and that I felt a great disposition not to fill up further vacancies. He said that he should be in waiting next week, when he would apply to the King, who he knew was favourably disposed. Now it is quite clear that the King will recommend him, for he has done so already through the Duke of York, who I find from Sir Herbert Taylor by this day's letter, admitted Sir William's claim, according to his impression, more willingly than what my recollection of what passed inclines me to believe.

I feel I cannot resist this command, if made in a way that I shall interpret as being in earnest, for there are no real objections to be stated, and I cannot plead a rule of not filling up vacancies, not having taken his Majesty's pleasure on the subject. But I shall be much inclined to submit such a regulation to his Majesty, at the time I obey his commands in

favour of Sir William Houston, and the more so, as there is now a second vacancy occasioned by the death of Sir William Stewart, and a third hourly expected by the dangerous state of Sir John Sherbrooke, and I shall be inundated with *commands*, as we wish to be our own Commander-in-Chief, probably of a less unobjectionable nature than that in favour of Sir William Houston, if I cannot get the King to agree to the rule I have suggested. I do not, however, like to come to such a rule or submit it to his Majesty, without your approbation, though I shall propose it as from myself, as it might appear ungracious for you to begin by such a measure.

As I am anxious to have your opinion I send this to my office by the Saturday's post, and it will be given to you, if you are in London or its neighbourhood.

Yours, my dear Duke, very sincerely,

BATHURST.

If you have one or even two who you think should have the Grand Cross, let me know, as I can mention their names to the King at the same time that I obey his commands in favour of Sir William Houston, and I can then suggest the rule afterwards.

To Lord Bathurst. [6

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 15th January, 1827.

I have long thought it would be desirable to limit the grant of Grand Crosses of the Order of the Bath, but I have never turned my mind to the mode of effecting that object; nor particularly to the consideration whether there were or not officers who had not the Grand Cross who had claims to it. You will not see the King of course till after the funeral, and between this time and then I will consider of the subject. In the mean time, however, I beg to remind you that there are now six or seven extra Grand Crosses of the Bath created at the period of the coronation.

The old mode was that extra Knights were in the first instance included in the original establishment as vacancies might occur.

You should revert to the old rule, and bring these upon the establishment. His Majesty would not object to this arrangement, and none need be made till the extras are brought in. We might in the mean time consider of a plan to limit the Order to numbers more consistent with the real wants of the service, and further consider whether we would keep even these numbers full in time of peace.

Even at the period of the battle of Waterloo I considered the

second class too large, and proposed a scheme for reducing it, which I believe has worked well. But we might revise the whole if you and Lord Melville like to do so.

Believe me ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. Glenny to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Committee Rooms, 5, Lancaster Place,
Strand, 16th January, 1827.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR GRACE,

A number of distinguished individuals having determined to promote a subscription for a public monument to the memory of his late Royal Highness the Duke of York, I am directed by the provisional committee respectfully to solicit the honour of your Grace's name as one of the general committee.

I am desired to state that application has been made to the proper quarter to ascertain the feeling on this subject, and the result has been an assurance that the measure has the decided approbation and best wishes of the higher authorities. A reference to the 'Courier' evening paper of last night will further explain the object of the committee.

I have the honour to be, your Grace,

your Grace's humble and obedient servant,

GEORGE GLENNY, Assistant Sec.

[Compliments to Mr. Glenny. There is nothing that would gratify the Duke in a greater degree than to promote any plan which has for its object to mark the public grief for the loss of the late Duke of York, or the public respect for his Royal Highness's memory. But as plans are sometimes formed upon occasions like the present which have not exactly those objects in view, and the Duke has not had the good fortune of seeing the prospectus to which Mr. Glenny refers, or of knowing who are the members of the committee with whom the Duke is desired to associate, he hopes he may be permitted to request to be furnished with such information before he gives his answer.]

[666.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, Hatfield, 17th January, 1827.

I enclose two letters from Lord Beresford, from which it appears that he has accepted the command of the Portuguese army. His command, however, is very different from that which

I held during the war, from that which he held himself since the war, and from that which I conceived he would have held when I proposed that the British troops should be placed under his command in case there should be any conjoint operation.

The command which I held, and which he held afterwards, was that of Marechal-General *junto ao Real Pessoa*, that is to say, taking his orders from the Sovereign. He is in his existing command under the Minister at War. In the way of forming the Portuguese Army he will certainly do no good; and that, in my opinion, is the main object of Lord Beresford's remaining in Portugal.

But we ought to consider whether it is right to leave the King's troops in Portugal under the instructions which Sir William Clinton now has. In case of conjoint operations Sir William Clinton is to obey Lord Beresford's orders; but it is not Lord Beresford acting according to his own discretion, upon his own views, and upon the responsibility of his own military character, as we understood he was to be placed, but Lord Beresford acting under the orders of, and responsible to, a revolutionary Minister at War.

I confess that I have always considered that Lord Beresford carried too far his notions of the power of the office of Marechal-General; but I must likewise confess that I was not so well acquainted with the details as he was. It appears to me, however, that in respect to the operations in the field, those in particular in which our troops may be concerned against those bodies of deserters which have invaded Portugal from Spain, we ought to insist upon Lord Beresford being allowed to exercise in the most ample manner his discretion according to the ancient usage of his office of Marechal-General *junto ao Real Pessoa.*

He will still be a different character in relation to the Portuguese army from that which he was heretofore; and I think it most probable that he will not hold the office for one moment after the deserters shall be driven out. But that is not the point which presses at present: we must take care not to incur the risk of the honour of the King's arms being tarnished by leaving his troops at the disposal of the Portuguese Minister at War.

I cannot but think that our friend at Brighton has been meddling in this affair. It is not easy to believe that the Infanta and her ministers should have turned short round at

once to insult Lord Beresford, having been so long endeavouri to prevail upon him to take the command upon any terms.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will show th letters to Lord Bathurst, and send them to Lord Liverpool.

[667.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 18th January, 1827.

I have received your letter of the 17th, with Sir Willia Clinton's despatch and private letter to you; the two last I ha sent to Lord Liverpool at Bath.

I don't understand the want of oats. The army which w with me in Portugal always used barley. Even when all t horses will be collected they will not amount to one thousan and they cannot already experience a want of barley. I can know anything of the details of the arrangements heretofo made by the Horse-Guards; nor can I interfere in them till shall be appointed Commander-in-Chief. I should think, how ever, that Sir William Clinton must mean that his infantry wi not be complete till the troops will join from Gibraltar. should think that the battalions which went from this countr and Ireland must have been complete in numbers; inasmuch a their depôts were with them when they were ordered abroad and it is probable that the commanding officers took care t embark complete in numbers.

I sent Mr. Canning yesterday two letters from Lord Beresfor which I requested him to show to you. You will see from my lett to Mr. Canning that I don't think Lord Beresford's situation exactly what it ought to be, and I think it should be altered or we ought not to give him the command of the King's troo in his capacity of Portuguese Commander-in-Chief. I shoul like, however, to see Sir William Clinton's instructions as finall sent to him.

Ever, my dear Lord Bathurst, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

I have seen Sir Herbert Taylor, who says that the 4th Reg

ment, having lately returned from the West Indies, may have embarked fifty or sixty men under their numbers, but that all the rest must have been complete.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Brighton, 18th January, 1827.

Mr. Canning has communicated to me your letter to him, and Lord Beresford's two letters. My first information of Lord Beresford's acceptance of the command of the Portuguese army was by Sir William Clinton's private letter to me, as none of the despatches from Sir William A'Court, which Mr. Canning had communicated to me, though of the same date, contained that intelligence. I afterwards had an opportunity (when he dined with me yesterday) of asking him when he had received that intelligence; he told me that he had received it the day before, as I understood him, that Lord Beresford had for some time been insisting on various terms on which he could alone accept the command; among others of being entirely independent of the War Minister, which was felt to be inconsistent with the constitutional responsibility of that minister, but that all of a sudden (as he supposed in consequence of Lord Liverpool's letter) Lord Beresford accepted unconditionally. I have, however, not seen the despatch in which this was stated.

I do not now know what are to be the powers with which the Portuguese government will invest him, but I think it very material that he should be in command in any combined service in which our troops may be engaged in conjunction with the Portuguese army.

Before I had seen your letter and its enclosures, it appeared to me, in considering the very general way in which Sir William A'Court had expressed himself with respect to the nature of the service in which our troops were likely to be called upon to engage, that it would be very expedient that the requisition (whenever more directly made) should be more special; and I accordingly drew up the draft of an instruction, with a view of securing that object. Some instruction to this effect will be the more necessary, if Lord Beresford is not to be left with discretionary powers.

Lord Beresford's letters do not advert to a service to which my instructions advert, and which I have collected from what has occasionally dropped from Mr. Canning will be that to which the British force will probably be directed—I mean, to watch the Spanish army now assembling on the frontiers. I own I think this a most legitimate employment for our auxiliary force. With respect to their being employed in suppressing the insurrection, I have, you know, always doubted the expediency of that measure; those doubts are now confirmed, first by the impression which I have taken from Sir William Clinton's private letter that the country is generally indisposed, and secondly from finding that Lord Beresford, under whom Sir William will have to act, *may* not have such discretionary powers as would make it safe for a British army to be employed in so very delicate a service.

I observe that Lord Beresford talks of resigning as soon as the insurgents

are driven out of the country. I think it highly important that he sho retain the command as long as the British troops remain, and if they ar be employed on the frontier, according to Mr. Canning's idea, that will an employment contingent on other events than the dispersion of insurgents.

Lord Beresford will be playing (indeed he has been too long playing) game of the revolutionary party, if he takes the earliest possible opportun of resigning. I am quite sure that his acceptance has disappointed hopes of that party, for they must know that his power and influence be always formidable so long as he keeps the command and has the Brit corps under him. As soon as we withdraw he may resign, but not bef

Although the draft of my instruction was written before I had seen y letter to Mr. Canning and its enclosures, and does not therefore apply p ticularly to the case you advert to, I shall send it to you.

Mr. Canning will probably propose to you that our troops should not placed under Lord Beresford's command, as you do not think that he l the authority which he ought to have. But you will recollect that consequence of this will be that Sir William Clinton will in effect be un Sir William A'Court's direction, who will receive the instructions from Portuguese ministry, with which it is clear that he has now become ide tified. By withdrawing the troops also from Lord Beresford's commar you will at once play the game of the revolutionists, who wish Lo Beresford out.

We can settle on Saturday whether we shall have a Cabinet on Sund or Monday, as I think it may be desirable to have one.

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

I send you the last accounts which I have received from Corfu.

[668.] *To Lord Melville.*

MY DEAR LORD MELVILLE, London, 18th January, 1827.

I wish I could convince my friend ——— that he ougl to rely upon his services and his character for advancemen rather than upon the private solicitations of any man. Howeve he has again written to tell me that he is a candidate for th command at Chatham, &c., &c.

I will only repeat to you that I have known ——— abov thirty years on service with the army in different situations, an I don't believe there exists an officer more zealous, and able and conciliating, than himself.

Ever, my dear Lord Melville, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Armstrong. [

MY DEAR COLONEL, London, 19th January, 1827.

Sir Herbert Taylor has sent me your letter, and although I have no reason to complain of your decision, I regret it much.

I hope, however, that if you should at any time think I can be useful to you, you will feel yourself certain of being listened to with attention, and that you will not scruple about mentioning to me your wishes.

Yours, my dear Colonel, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM ON LORD LONDONDERRY'S PROJECT OF RAISING A SUBSCRIPTION FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE DUKE OF YORK'S DEBTS. [

20th January, 1827.

The Duke of York is supposed to have owed 200,000*l.* at the period of his death, for the payment of which no provision is made.

The honour of the family may be considered as involved in the payment of these debts. That point, however, must be laid out of the consideration of this question. The officers of the army cannot be considered as the persons who ought to be called upon to provide the funds for this purpose.

In respect to the lamented individual himself, whatever may be the degree of imputation resting upon him for incurring these debts, leaving them without the means of discharging them, it will still remain. What has passed is a fact; and whether the debts are paid or not, and by whomsoever paid, the fact will continue to exist, and the imputation, whatever it may be, resulting from the fact. The creditors, indeed, will be satisfied, and their complaints will be silenced. So far we shall hear no more of the fact of the Duke of York having died leaving his debts unpaid. But still the fact will remain.

Let us now see whether this subscription ought to be set on foot, with a view to satisfy and silence the creditors.

Let us only look at the situation of the General officers and officers of the army in general. There may be from a dozen to twenty of us capable of subscribing a sum of money for any purpose. But the great majority of the General officers have

from three to four hundred pounds a year. Those best pro vided for among those not having private fortunes have from 700*l.* to 1000*l.* a year! How can it be supposed that men thus provided for can advance 300*l.*, or even 100*l.*, to pay the Duke of York's creditors? The distress of the creditors relieved (which, by-the-by, it must be observed has been occasioned by their own acts) would fall upon this meritorious body of men who neither could nor would resist the call if made upon them whatever might be the distress it would occasion to them and their families.

I am certain that if this question is fairly considered, and that the list of General officers is accurately examined by those who have moved in this question, they will find that I am right and they will see that the distress of the creditors relieved by the subscription will be more than counterbalanced by the distress which the subscription will occasion.

But this is not the only view of this subject. It is though desirable that the officers of the army should manifest their attachment to the memory of their late deservedly lamented Commander-in-Chief. I quite agree that the army cannot manifest too strongly its gratitude, its attachment to his person and memory, and its respect for all his measures and institutions. But in order to obtain this manifestation in reality, we must take care not to propose to them measures which every man, or at all events the great majority, will feel to be, and which will be in fact, an exorbitant tax upon the scanty means of subsistence which he possesses for himself and his family It is true that this measure will be cried up by that which we all despise, the venal Press, as the finest trait in the character of the army, the most marked instance of its attachment, &c. &c But what compensation will those cries be for the individual distress which such a measure will occasion?

I earnestly deprecate it, and I may do it with the more freedom as there are two persons now alive who know that I was willing to come forward, if others would, to arrange the Duke's debts some years ago, if he would have allowed of their being arranged.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Liverpool. [6

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, Stratfield Saye, 20th January, 1827.

I quite agree in Lord Beresford's view of his own situation as stated in his letters to you, which Mr. Canning has sent me. Lord Beresford had written to me on the same days, more in detail, and I sent his letters to Mr. Canning, begging that he would forward them to you, which I see that he has done.

Our affair now is to put an end to this warfare in Portugal as soon and with as high hand as possible. If we don't, we shall have Spain interfering in such a way as to render war with that Power inevitable. No man can foresee the consequences.

Lord Beresford is, as a military character, fully competent to perform the task with the force at his disposition. That is to say, Lord Beresford having unfettered discretion in the exercise of his command over the Portuguese army as its Commander-in-Chief, in the same manner as this government has given him the same discretion in the exercise of his authority in the field over his Majesty's troops, he being the Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese army.

But here is Lord Beresford without the authority which your Lordship and your government imagined he would have; which experience has shown that every Commander-in-Chief ought to have in his operations against the enemy; and this authority is vested in the Portuguese Minister-at-War, whose name even we don't know.

I might easily show that, in times like these, Lord Beresford placed in such circumstances labours under many disadvantages, and that he cannot perform the duty to perform which the Portuguese asked and his Majesty granted him the permission to serve them.

But in this case of the operations of the war the arrangement is impracticable, and may be fatal. I will put a very simple hypothetical case which will most probably occur.

The insurrection is now it is said confined to Tras os Montes, and Lord Beresford's first movement would naturally be across the Douro with his whole British and Portuguese force.

We will suppose that the enemy detach a force into Beira or Alemtejo, or that the insurrection revives in either province, and the Minister-at-War orders Lord Beresford to detach a part or the whole of his Portuguese force into Beira or Alemtejo.

What becomes of his Majesty's division of troops? of their

honour? of our responsibility? but, above all, of the operations the war against the troops sent in from Spain? or of its pr bable early termination?

I entreat you to consider this matter well. If we trust Lo Beresford as we do, we ought to insist upon the Portugue giving him full and exclusive authority as the Portugue Commander-in-Chief over the Portuguese army while engag in operations against the enemy. There can be no trifling *middle term* upon this subject. He must have this authority we employ him; and I confess that I don't see any other mo of bringing the existing warfare to an early termination.

The French in part destroyed Almeida during the war. refitted it and occupied the place as a post in the last years the war. I believe that the Portuguese government have sin dismantled it entirely; so that the possession of that place is n more important than the possession of any other considerab town.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Madrid, 21st January, 1827.

What I send to-day finishes the affair, and never was a more despera one saved. But it is not secure from breaking out again till Don Miguel in Portugal. Do not lose sight of this.

You will readily suppose that while this was going on I have sa nothing about your affair. I shall now take the first opportunity of tryi what can be done in it. I heartily regret the Duke of York, but hope y like the appointment, with which I shall only be pleased if it does n remove you from the Cabinet. I conclude this to be the case, and shou be heartily sorry if it were otherwise.

My task being ended here, I have asked for leave of absence. I thi you should now let this country and government settle, see what line takes, and whether in its anger against France it will show any dispositi towards us. But nothing is to be gained by making advances to it; on t contrary, they would only excite distrust and suspicion. Leave of absen to the minister is, in my opinion, the best measure that can be take Much as I recommend it, I equally deprecate the removal of the missio or any measure which might indicate coldness or ill-will. I equall deprecate the revival of any old discussions or the introduction of any ne ones for the moment. Let them alone and see what turn they are dis posed to take of themselves. Make use of these notions if you agree wit me, but say nothing of my letter.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

F. LAMB.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, London, Stanhope Street, 21st January, 1827.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset has sent me a copy of your letter to Lord Liverpool, and I send you a copy of the instructions. You will see that there are none but verbal corrections in what was settled at the Cabinet, except perhaps an alteration as to occupation of the two forts by the marines. This was occasioned by Sir George Cockburn having informed me that the Cabinet had misconceived the orders which the Admiralty had given on the subject; but in substance the instruction in that particular is not altered, it providing equally that those forts should be occupied by marines, instead of being occupied by a part of Sir William Clinton's division.

With respect to your letter I so far agree with you, that it is essential that so long as Lord Beresford is engaged in active operations against the enemy, he should have full powers over the army as Commander-in-Chief. But the question which I wish to have solved is, whether there be anything in these instructions which requires to be altered, because we have reason to believe that he has not those full powers.

If you look at the instructions, you will see that there is but one case provided for, in which he would be authorised on the application coming from Sir William A'Court, to move out of Lisbon. This is contained in the 5th article. Under this he is bound, except for reasons purely military, to proceed against "any Spanish, or other foreign troops, or any body of Portuguese deserters coming from Spain, such troops or bodies of Portuguese being in occupation of any part of Portugal." The 6th article then provides that Sir William Clinton should "place himself under Lord Beresford's command (in the event of his proceeding against this enemy), should Lord Beresford either have accepted the command of the Portuguese army, or the command of a body of Portuguese troops," but Sir William Clinton was not to "divide his force, though it might be liable to be united with divisions or brigades with the Portuguese troops." The 7th article instructs Sir William not to give up the command to any other Portuguese commander in any joint transaction in which Sir William shall have consented to be employed, but directs him at the same time to act cordially with such Portuguese commander.

Now what you apprehend is, as I understand your letter, this: that Sir William may have placed himself under Lord Beresford's command according to the instruction of the 6th article depending upon the co-operation of the Portuguese troops which Lord Beresford commanded; but that the Portuguese War Minister might suddenly order a part or indeed the whole of these Portuguese troops away, when our troops should have advanced far up the country, and that thus the glory, if not the safety, of the British troops might be compromised. But you will, I am sure, observe that this danger does not exclusively arise from Lord Beresford not having the full powers as Commander-in-Chief. It would have equally arisen, if Sir William had consented to the joint operation, and had placed himself under the command of Lord Beresford, "having accepted the command of a body of Portuguese troops," and still more if he had consented to a joint operation, the command of the Portuguese troops being under any

other Portuguese General. I had persuaded myself that we had suffi
guarded against any danger to which the British troops might be e
in any of these joint operations, by providing that under no circums
whether Sir William was acting under the command of Lord Beres
only in conjunction with some other Portuguese commander, he sho
no account ever consent to any division of his force; as I imagined that
as he kept it united, there was no body of Portuguese deserters (whi
the only enemy he was likely to meet) which he need to appr
However, after the opinion you have given, I have no doubt that we
guard against this possible desertion of the co-operating army, by
ever General that co-operating army may be commanded. I can th
have no difficulty (if the Cabinet consent) to instruct Sir William
consent to proceed against any Spanish or other foreign troops, or Port
deserters coming from Spain (according to the 5th article of the in
tions), if he should be applied to for the purpose of assisting in att
them, unless he shall have previously ascertained the amount of th
tuguese force with which he is to co-operate, and have been assure
such force is not to be withdrawn without his consent during those co
operations. In all this, he would be only exercising a "discretion p
on military principles."

You are quite aware that I do not look with much satisfaction at th
of our troops being employed in this description of warfare; at the
time I must confess that you bring a very strong argument for bringi
to a speedy conclusion.

But there is another point on which I think it essentially necessa
give Sir William some instructions.

Sir William Clinton may be applied to, to proceed towards the fro
for the purpose of forming or of assisting in forming a corps of observa
with reference to the Spanish army now collecting in that quarter.
Cabinet could not have foreseen that there would have arisen suc
occasion for a demand for our troops, and accordingly there is no instru
which meets that case, the only occasion foreseen being that of his
ceeding against the Portuguese deserters, &c. It will, therefore
absolutely necessary to give Sir William some instruction, whethe
refuse such a demand, or to consent to it. It must also be recollected
he cannot consent to both demands, as he cannot consent to a divisio
his troops.

If the Cabinet should be of opinion that it is preferable to comply
this demand rather than with the other, it will be necessary to furnish
with instructions as to the conditions on which he is to consent to it.

The conditions which strike me are, first, that he should be assured
the Portuguese government can furnish him and his troops with g
cantonments on the frontier, without any inconvenient separation fr
each other; secondly, that he should not consent to invade, or supp
others in invading, the Spanish territory; thirdly, that he should neit
receive, or give any encouragement to, deserters from the Spanish army.

I have written you, my dear Duke, a very prolix letter, but when y
have looked at the instructions and read my letter I must desire you to se
on the messenger to Lord Liverpool and Mr. Canning at Bath, with
[illegible]ctions and your opinion on the two points to which I have cal
[illegible]ntion. Fi[illegible] the expediency of giving an additional instru

tion for the purpose of securing a continued co-operation of the Portuguese troops, in the event of Sir William consenting to a conjoint attack upon the Portuguese deserters coming from Spain. Secondly, an instruction, by which Sir William may be guided in the event of his being required to proceed with his division towards the frontier, for the purpose of forming an army of observation.

I shall be anxious to obtain an early answer to these two questions, and I trust there will be no such difference of opinion, as to require the summoning of a Cabinet on Thursday.

Yours very sincerely, my dear Duke,

BATHURST.

To Lord Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Stratfield Saye, 22nd January, 1827.

I have received your letter of yesterday, and I think it best to address you this answer, and to send a copy of it according to your desire to Lord Liverpool at Bath.

In my opinion there is an omission in the fifth article of the Instructions to Sir William Clinton. In my Memorandum upon which the instructions were founded, Sir William Clinton, upon receiving the requisition to make the movement from Lisbon, was to exercise a military discretion upon the question of compliance or not, in which would have entered of course the discussion of the amount of the Portuguese force to be employed in co-operating with him. The military discretion to be exercised under this article of the instructions as they stand is only, whether it is necessary to remain at Lisbon. This is certainly not sufficient. He ought to exercise a discretion in respect to the force which is to co-operate with him, and he ought to have some certainty that that force will remain in co-operation with him till the service shall be performed. If Lord Beresford were to command the Portuguese army with unfettered discretion, the instructions might answer perfectly as they are drawn, as we place full confidence in Lord Beresford.

But as Lord Beresford will exercise his authority under that of the Minister-at-War, I conceive that we ought to make the proposed addition to the fifth article.

I don't at all alter my opinion. Our division, constituted as it is, and well equipped, ought to be *safe* against these Portuguese deserters and insurgents under any circumstances. In some military cases *honour* and *safety* may be synonymous

terms. But in this warfare, and in its existing state, complete success, and that at no distant period, is necessary, not for the safety of our troops, as they will be safe at all events, but for our military honour and for our safety from the extension of the war. Our best, indeed I should say our only, certainty of early and complete success consists in Lord Beresford's exercising the command as he ought. If we cannot attain that object, we must insist that the corps which shall be employed in co-operation with our troops, and which Sir William Clinton shall have considered sufficient, shall not be withdrawn till the service is completed.

Sir William Clinton is now instructed to march against any Spanish troops which may have entered Portugal. I am rather inclined to think this is sufficient at present. This British division in Portugal should, in my opinion, be considered as a *corps de reserve*, and should not be placed in advance in the existing state of affairs for any but a specific object. The Portuguese army should guard their own frontier. There are several military questions depending upon this one of observing the frontier, which must be well considered upon the spot, and the decision upon which would depend as well upon the Spanish force as upon the Portuguese force similarly employed in observation upon different points of the frontier. I don't mean to say that Sir William Clinton may not safely be trusted with the exercise of a discretion on these questions, but my own opinion is against his moving from Lisbon as part of a corps of observation for many reasons; and it appears to me that the instruction on this point may as well be delayed.

Ever, my dear Lord Bathurst, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Bath, 22nd January, 1827.

I received last night your letter by Canning, together with the letters which Lord Beresford had written to me.

I had previously seen Lord Beresford's letters to you of the same date, which you were so good as to desire Canning to transmit to me.

Your letter of the 20th instant gives me in some respects a new view of the matter.

I was quite aware of certain differences between Lord Beresford and the Portuguese government, and that Lord Beresford was of opinion that he could not be of any permanent service to the Portuguese army, unless the

powers of Minister-of-War were combined with those of Commander-in-Chief. But I always considered this as applicable to the internal formation and discipline of the army.

I never conceived that if Lord Beresford decided to take the command of the army upon its present construction, and was actually engaged in operations in the field, the Secretary-at-War was to be allowed to interfere with the detail of those operations.

Indeed I have always considered it as necessarily incident to the powers of a Commander-in-Chief, and particularly to the Commander-in-Chief of a combined force, that whatever his previous general instructions may be, he must have a complete discretion as to the details, and to the application of them, till the campaign or operations in progress are brought to such a close as may render other instructions practicable or advisable.

If, therefore, there can be the least doubt upon this point, there ought to be no delay in setting it right; for every one must see that it would be nearly as unsafe to trust the command of the British army to Lord Beresford as it would be to trust it to any other Portuguese officer, if Lord Beresford has not really the efficient command of the Portuguese army.

I should advise, therefore, that instructions be immediately sent out to bring this matter to a clear understanding.

Since I wrote the above Canning is arrived here and I have seen him. He entirely agrees in all I have said, and desires me to say that he will send instructions to Sir William A'Court to this effect by Wednesday's mail.

Will you have the goodness to send this letter on to Lord Bathurst.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Downing Street, 23rd January, 1827.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, and as the question presses (the Lisbon packet sails to-morrow), I send you a messenger, with a draft of an instruction founded upon your letter.

On looking at the wording of the fifth article, it certainly bears the interpretation you give it; but I assure you it was so in the draft I sent you before I brought it before the Cabinet; but even the wording of your Memorandum does not give Sir William Clinton any other military discretion than the option of complying with the requisition, or remaining at Lisbon for the defence of Lisbon. The words are: "He must exercise his own military discretion whether to march to attack those troops, if so required by the Portuguese government, *or* to remain at Lisbon for the defence of that city and the entrance of the Tagus."

According to the literal construction of these words, he might consider that if he did not think it advisable to remain at Lisbon for the defence of the city, &c., he had no alternative but that of complying with the requisition of the Portuguese government, without obtaining the information you propose.

The proposed instructions will I think render what was really meant, clear; but make any alterations you may think necessary for further clearness.

You will observe that I make no distinction in the instruction, whether Lord Beresford has or has not large discretionary powers as Commander-in-Chief, because it would be very difficult to instruct Sir William as to the precise powers which Lord Beresford should have, in order to justify Sir William acting with the Portuguese troops without providing a continuance of their co-operation. Besides which, communications on such a subject belong more properly to the Foreign Office.

I do not imagine that there can be any difference of opinion on this explanation of the original instructions; I shall hear to-night, however, from Bath.

With respect to the other service, it may be the subject of another despatch.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Bath, 23rd January, 1827.

I received late last night your letter, with the copy of one which you have addressed to Lord Bathurst.

I have shown them to Canning, and we are both rejoiced that we had in a great measure anticipated your ideas, as you will find by my letter to you, by the despatch of Canning to Sir William A'Court, and by his letter to Lord Bathurst enclosing a Memorandum upon the subject of an army of observation—all of which will have reached you early this morning.

It appeared to be only necessary in addition that I should write to Lord Beresford to the same effect, and I enclose a copy of my letter to him, which will go by to-morrow's mail.

I trust that before these letters have arrived at Lisbon, the Portuguese rebel forces will have been entirely put down, or under the necessity of evacuating Portugal; and in either of these cases I am very strongly of opinion, for the reasons stated in the Memorandum to Lord Bathurst, that the British corps should form no part of an army of observation on the frontiers, if the Portuguese government should judge such an army of observation necessary or expedient.

I quite concur with you that in such an event, the proper station for the British forces is as an army of reserve in Lisbon or its neighbourhood; and that to place them in a more advanced or prominent situation could answer no military purpose, whilst it might involve us in considerable political difficulties.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, yours very sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lord Liverpool to Lord Beresford.

Bath, 23rd January, 1827.

[illegible] your letters of the 30th December and the 1st of this [illegible]ch that the Portuguese government have not thought

proper to agree to those conditions which you deemed indispensable for the purpose of enabling you to accept the command of the Portuguese army, upon the principle and for the objects contemplated when you left this country for Lisbon.

You have, however, decided quite right in setting this question aside for the moment, and in taking the command, with the view of extricating Portugal from her present difficulties.

I can hardly conceive it to have been the intention of the Portuguese government, in subjecting you to the authority of the Secretary-at-War, to fetter your discretion as to military operations in the field. But if there is the least doubt upon this subject, it must be distinctly understood that the only condition upon which a British corps is allowed to act in conjunction with a Portuguese corps, is that the Portuguese corps is not to be withdrawn from the operation once begun, unless with your full and entire consent and approbation.

Without such an understanding it is obvious the British arms might be exposed to disgrace and danger, and the Duke of Wellington is decidedly of opinion that there ought to be no ambiguity whatever upon this point.

Mr. Canning has accordingly given an instruction to Sir William A'Court, and for your information I transmit a copy of it.

I am, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

To Mr. Planta. ♦6

MY DEAR PLANTA, Stratfield Saye, 23rd January, 1827.

I send you with the enclosed despatch a note from Mr. Canning, in which he desires me to suggest any alterations to the despatch which I may think necessary; and you will see that I suggest a very important one. You will be the best judge whether you can make this alteration without reference to Mr. Canning. If you cannot, you had better send to stop the Lisbon mail.

I send you this instead of sending it to Mr. Canning, as I don't know exactly where he is; and it will most probably reach him sooner by going to you, supposing that you should think it necessary to send the despatch to Mr. Canning. My reasons for suggesting this alteration are these:—First, I think it most desirable that Lord Beresford should command this expedition to the north of Portugal. Secondly, I suspect that the Portuguese government are not very desirous that he should remain in command of their army. I form this opinion from Lord Beresford's statements, and I dare say that when Sir William A'Court's reports shall arrive it will appear that the discussion respecting the command was renewed by his Lordship, and not by the Portuguese government, on the arrival of the British troops. Thirdly, I am quite certain that Lord Beresford will

decline to take the command altogether as soon as he shall find that, in consequence of a Portuguese arrangement, he is not to have the command of the British troops. If I am right in my conjectures on these points, the despatch, as originally drawn, puts it in the power of the Portuguese government to deprive us of the services of Lord Beresford in Portugal.

I don't think there will be much inconvenience in their refusing to come to the explanation which I have suggested that they should be called upon to give. If Mr. Canning and Lord Liverpool should have agreed to an alteration which I proposed in a letter to Lord Bathurst yesterday to be made in Article Fifth of the Instructions to Sir William Clinton, we shall have a certainty of the force to be employed in co-operation with our troops, and that it will not be withdrawn or detached till the service shall be concluded; and, as for the rest, I would prefer to have Lord Beresford in command even nominally, without discretion, and in perpetual dispute with the Minister-at-War, to anybody else.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

PROPOSED ALTERATION OF MR. CANNING'S DESPATCH TO SIR WILLIAM A'COURT.

23rd January, 1827.

This sort of command is not that which his Majesty's government consider is calculated to enable the holder of it to perform with advantage the service entrusted to him to be carried into execution.

Lord Beresford is an officer in whom his Majesty's government are disposed to place entire confidence; and they had reason to believe that the Portuguese government felt the same confidence in his acknowledged talents and experience when they desired that his Majesty would permit him to resume his command of the Portuguese army.

Your Excellency will therefore come to an explanation upon this subject with the Portuguese Secretary of State, and have it clearly understood that Lord Beresford is to have an unfettered discretion in respect to the proposed operations against the deserters who have invaded Portugal from Spain; that the Portuguese troops which shall have been placed under his command

for the performance of this service are to be under his control and command exclusively, and that they are not to be withdrawn or detached to any other service till that on which they will have been employed under Lord Beresford will be brought to a successful termination.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [67

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Stratfield Saye, 23rd January, 1827.

I could not write to you in detail, yesterday, in respect to the employment of our troops as part of a corps of observation in Portugal. It is my opinion that we ought not to put ourselves forward as undertaking the defence of Portugal, upon a large scale, with a corps of 5000 men. I don't mean that we ought not to attack the Spaniards if they should invade that kingdom, if the commanding officer should think his force sufficient; but we ought not to put our troops *en ligne* in the first instance.

I am rather inclined to think that, after the deserters shall have been driven out, Lisbon will be the best situation for our troops. There is one advantage attending their being at Lisbon, and that is, that they cannot be supposed to be made use of to quell the insurrection. If, therefore, any threatening movements of the Spaniards should occasion an apprehension of invasion, and Lisbon should be deemed too distant, I would recommend that the first movement of our troops from Lisbon should be to Santarem.

You will see in the despatch to Sir W. A'Court the alteration which I have proposed; and in the letter to Mr. Planta the reasoning upon which it is founded. I believe you will concur as well in the alteration as in the reasoning.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Return the enclosed letter from Lord Liverpool.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Eastham, 24th January, 1827.
11 P.M.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

I have adopted your proposed alteration. But will it not be necessary that Sir William A'Court, as well as Sir William Clinton, should dis-

tinctly know what they are to do, if after all Lord Beresford *has not* the necessary discretion for the limited operation, and if the Portuguese government still *refuse* to give it to him?

It may be time enough to send this supplementary instruction by the next packet, and it is perhaps as well not to appear to anticipate the possibility of anything so absurd as this refusal of the Portuguese government would be in the first instance.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[675.] *To the King.*

Stratfield Saye, 24th January, 1827.

I have just received the intimation of your Majesty's appointment of me to the office of Commander-in-Chief; and likewise to be Colonel of the Regiment of Grenadier Guards. I beg leave again to express my most grateful acknowledgments to your Majesty; most particularly for this last mark of your Majesty's confidence; and I can only assure your Majesty of my earnest and constant endeavour, in all situations, to give satisfaction to your Majesty, and to merit your Majesty's most gracious favour and kindness.

Which is submitted by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

Sir Henry Torrens to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Horse-Guards, 24th January, 1827.

I am rather placed in a dilemma, between an apprehension that by what I am doing I am taking too great a liberty with your Grace, and a fear that by its omission I should show an indifference to what concerns your credit as connected with the official duties I am to fulfil under your orders. After giving this point my best consideration, I have determined to act according to the impulse, associated with the habits of freedom and confidence with your Grace which in earlier life it was my pride to enjoy; and therefore I beg to suggest that a General Order will be expected from your Grace to the army on your assuming the command. This will of [illegible]rse occur to yourself, and it is in the same spirit of the freedom and [illegible]nce I have dared to assume, that I transmit a rough draft of what [illegible] me would be well received by the army. In drawing this up [illegible] for my guide my thorough knowledge of the high opinion [illegible]d of the poor Duke, and my general recollection of the admi- [illegible]layed in your speech of thanks to Parliament as regarded [illegible]ess's administration of the army. No soul knows, or ever

shall know, that I have presumed to address this suggestion to your Grace; and whether you put the enclosed paper in the fire, or act upon it wholly, or partially, or not at all, I shall receive your decision and orders and act upon them with the alacrity you have a right to expect from me.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke,
most sincerely your Grace's faithful servant,
H. TORRENS.

[ENCLOSURE.]

[PROPOSED GENERAL ORDER.]

The King having been graciously pleased to announce to the army his Majesty's gracious nomination of the Duke of Wellington to be Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, his Grace feels it incumbent upon him before he enters on the duties of his office, to advert to the great calamity which has occasioned his appointment and afflicted the army and the nation.

The Duke of Wellington is aware that no tribute of respect which he can pay to the great character of the illustrious personage now lost to the country will adequately correspond with the heartfelt sympathy and grief which have pervaded all ranks of the service upon the mournful occasion of the Duke of York's death.

But the memory of his Royal Highness is already consecrated by the deep feeling with which his loss is deplored; and the eminent merits of his official life are placed beyond all panegyric by the sentiments of his Sovereign, as conveyed in the late General Order from his Majesty. While the Duke of Wellington, therefore, abstains from disturbing, by his own observations, the full force of the tribute his Majesty has so justly bestowed upon the virtues and services of his late Royal Highness, his Grace would fail in his duty if he did not embrace the earliest occasion of expressing his high sense of those great and important improvements which his Royal Highness has introduced and carried to perfection in every branch of the military service, and to which the army is indebted for the establishment of its discipline and the achievement of its successes in the field.

Impressed with these sentiments, the Duke of Wellington feels, that under the gracious favour and protection of his Majesty he can have no higher motive for ambition than to emulate the conduct of his illustrious predecessor; so that the great objects which have been attained by the excellent system laid down by his Royal Highness may be permanently secured, by conforming to the principles which guided his Royal Highness's administration; and his Grace is persuaded that a grateful remembrance of the benefits which the military profession has derived from the paternal care of the late Commander-in-Chief will act as a constant stimulus to the strict maintenance of that inflexible discipline, which, having been inculcated by his Royal Highness has given lustre and effect to the character of the British army.

By command of his Grace the Commander-in-Chief.

To Sir Henry Torrens.

MY DEAR TORRENS, Stratfield Saye, 25th January, 1827.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter. I had thought myself that it would be necessary to announce to the

army that I had taken the command, and I only regret that I had not sent you the order yesterday. I confess that I differ with you regarding the nature of the order. His Majesty has very properly, in my opinion, pronounced his opinion of the late lamented Commander-in-Chief in a G.O. to his army, at the conclusion of which he appoints me to the command.

My order follows that of his Majesty, and it is most respectful to his Majesty not to obtrude my sentiments, as an individual, upon the army in relation to their loss and my own; or to his Royal Highness's character and conduct. My opinion then is, that I ought to confine my order as nearly as possible to its object, and that it should be drawn in a few words. I enclose you, then, what I wish you would publish, and date it, if possible, as yesterday.

I dare say that this order will not be approved. But nothing that I shall do for some time will be approved, and I must follow the unbiassed dictates of my own understanding. No man can with justice accuse me of not feeling, even more than other men, the magnitude of the loss which we have all sustained. I say more than other men, because I believe that circumstances have put me in the way of being able to appreciate it more justly. Nor can they accuse me of want of respect and affection for his memory, and his acts and conduct, which I have taken other and substantial modes of testifying. But I confess I dislike to come before the army and the world with this parade immediately after the excellent order written by his Majesty.

Ever, my dear Torrens, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

G.O.—In obedience to his Majesty's most gracious command, Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington assumes the command of the army, and earnestly requests the assistance and support of the general and other officers of the army to maintain its discipline, good order, and high character.

677.] *To Sir Willoughby Gordon.*

MY DEAR GENERAL, Stratfield Saye, 25th January, 1827.

I have received your letter, and I trust to your assistance to enable me to get through the difficulties of the situation in

which I am placed. You know me well, and how ready I am to attend to the advice of your experience and talents. I shall be in town and at the Horse-Guards on Saturday, when I shall be happy to see you.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Stanhope Street, 25th January, 1827.

I return you the two papers as you desired. I adopted the alterations which you suggested in my despatch to Sir William Clinton, which went by the packet of this day, Planta having thought it prudent to stop the mail of yesterday, in order to send down to Mr. Canning, now at Eastham (Huskisson's), in his way back to Brighton, your suggestions respecting the despatch to Sir William A'Court. He has, as you will probably hear from the Foreign Office, adopted your alterations, in substance at least.

I took the opportunity of the messenger who went down yesterday to Mr. Canning, to send him the proposed instructions to Sir William Clinton, which he quite approves.

I have instructed Sir William Clinton to communicate a copy of my despatch to Lord Beresford. The matter now stands, I think, as safe as we could wish.

I am writing this over-night, as I shall set off to Brighton to-morrow morning.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Mr. Planta to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Foreign Office, 25th January, 1827.

On receiving yesterday your Grace's first letter through Lord Bathurst, I conceived that my best course would be to detain the Lisbon mail for one day, and to refer your Grace's alteration to Mr. Canning at Eastham. The answer from Mr. Canning will tell your Grace that he has adopted it entirely; and as Lord Liverpool has sent to me his letter to Lord Beresford unsealed, *to add* the despatch to Sir William A'Court as an enclosure, I can now send the *right one*, as altered by your Grace, to Lord Beresford.

You will see the drafts in due course.

Permit me most humbly but most cordially to congratulate your Grace on the distinguished honour lately conferred upon you.

I have the honour to be, my dear Duke,

your Grace's much obliged and faithful servant,

J. PLANTA.

678.] *To the King.*

Stratfield Saye, 26th January, 1827.

I have only this evening received your Majesty's most gracious commands of the 24th instant; and it is with the greatest satisfaction that I avail myself of your Majesty's permission to submit to your Majesty the official appointment of M.-General Sir Sidney Beckwith, K.C.B., to be Colonel of a battalion of the Rifle Brigade.

He commanded a battalion of this regiment during a great part of the war, in which command, as well as in other situations, he frequently distinguished himself.

Which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Brighton, 27th January, 1827.

I send you a separate letter from Lord Beresford, and shall be obliged to you if you will give me your opinion whether he is to be put on British pay when Sir William Clinton places himself under his command.

As I consider the British division to be an auxiliary army placed under the command of the Portuguese Commander-in-Chief for a special service, I should have had no hesitation in saying that Lord Beresford was not to be put on the British pay; but he refers to what was arranged in the Peninsular War. I certainly do not think that the cases are the same; and I see some inconvenience in breaking up Sir William Clinton's command; but pray tell me what you think about it.

With respect to the manner in which he is to carry on official correspondence. He is to carry on (I should imagine) his correspondence on military affairs with Sir William Clinton, until Sir William places himself under his Lordship's command, and then Lord Beresford will carry on his correspondence on military affairs with me, on those points at least on which he wishes to give information to his Majesty's government.

On all political events on which he wishes to communicate, he should address himself either to the British Ambassador for the information of his Majesty's government, or direct to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

To Lord Bathurst. [6

Stratfield Saye, 27th January, 1827.
½ past 11, P.M.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

I have received your letter of this day with its enclosures; and I send on the whole to Lord Liverpool with a copy of this.

It is my opinion that both Lord Beresford's letters are official; and must be laid before the King and his government. They contain some important details respecting the military state of Portugal; and some political opinions. There is nothing in general new in either letter. I had collected from newspapers and other sources that the Portuguese army was not ten thousand men, and in a terrible state of disorganization. We do not want evidence that the existing order of things is odious in Portugal. At the moment his Majesty's troops sailed from England we had reason to believe, from letters from the admiral as well as from the ambassador I believe, and private from Lord Beresford, that they would find the Regent in a British man-of-war, and a provisional government at least, if not the insurgents, in Lisbon.

Excepting details, then, there is nothing new in either of the letters.

It appears to me, however, that Lord Beresford has mistaken his position entirely; and ought not to have written such letters officially. Sir William Clinton commands his Majesty's troops in Portugal; and it is obvious from his instructions, not only that he is to conduct the details of their service, but he is responsible to his Majesty's government for the decision of the military question whether the troops should or not proceed on any service upon which the services of his Majesty's troops may be required by the Portuguese government through his Majesty's ambassador.

All this is very important, not only in a military, but a political point of view. We are not, and must *not* make ourselves, principals in what is *now* passing in Portugal. Our troops are and must be auxiliaries. But, although they are auxiliaries, we must keep the control over the details of their service, and over the question whether they should co-operate or not in any particular specified service, in our own hands, or in the hands of an officer responsible to this government;

because we are a responsible government, and this country will not hear of its fleets and armies being at the disposition of any foreigner, or foreign government, or person in the employment of a foreign government, for more than the immediate service contemplated and arranged for.

Sir William Clinton having decided that the troops shall act upon any particular specified service, has been directed to put himself under the orders of Lord Beresford on that service; provided Lord Beresford shall have taken upon himself the command of the Portuguese army at large, or of that Portuguese army employed on that particular service. Lord Beresford, then, was to take the command of his Majesty's auxiliary corps only in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese army; and that only after Sir William Clinton should have decided for his Majesty's government the military question whether the auxiliary corps should march on that particular service or not.

It is not reasonable to say that Lord Beresford ought not to correspond officially with the Secretary of State.

In all the situations of this sort which I have filled I have been in the service of the Powers whose armies I commanded; and in the exercise of unlimited powers, even to details if I had thought proper to enter into them, over all the armies; with the exception of the armies in France after the Peace of 1815.

But I never corresponded with the government on any subject excepting great military events, and never on the details of my own army. When I commanded the armies in France I don't recollect that I wrote a line to any of the sovereigns or their ministers; or ever interfered with details, excepting to keep order. Nor do I know to this day under what restrictions I was to be obeyed by each corps-d'armée, of which the Grand Army at that time in France was composed.

My situation was, in relation to all these armies, very different from Lord Beresford's in relation to our auxiliary corps; but still they are sufficiently analogous to shew that correspondence with the Secretary of State is not necessary; and I certainly think, as I told Lord Beresford and afterwards wrote to him, that he would strengthen his own position in Portugal by avoiding all such correspondence which should not be absolutely necessary.

It was on this principle that, when it was necessary that one of the King's ministers should write to Lord Beresford to let him know the opinion of the Cabinet on the course he ought to adopt in case he did not take upon himself the command of the Portuguese army, I recommended that it should be Lord Liverpool, in order that there might be no mistake respecting the relation towards this government in which Lord Beresford was considered as standing in Portugal.

Ever, my dear Lord Bathurst, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [6

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 28th January, 1827.

My other letter, which I send by this occasion, will shew you what the situation of our troops in Portugal now is.

If you appoint Lord Beresford a General upon the Staff, and give him a British Staff, he becomes Commander-in-Chief of the British force in Portugal; and, do what we will, we shall become principals in what is going on there. You must then recall Sir William Clinton under pretence of his being Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, as you cannot well have two Kings of Brentford in Portugal.

But observe! This course will make us principals in what is passing in Portugal; and from one at least of your colleagues I think you will experience some difficulty.

I recommend you, then, to tell Lord Beresford that our force is merely auxiliary; and that we propose so to keep it; and that it is to be under his orders when engaged in operations, combined with a Portuguese army under his command, only because he is Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese army; and that the Staff of the army of the principals in the combined operations must of course perform the general duty. That he could not be paid as a British general in Portugal without being put on the Staff of the troops in Portugal, which would totally alter the relation in which it was intended he should stand towards our troops, and that in which this government intend that his Majesty's troops should stand in respect to what is now going forward in Portugal.

That it appears to us here that he will do better not to have about him English Staff officers unless the Portuguese govern-

ment should consent to take them into their service. If they should consent, those he will desire to have will be sent out to him. If he wishes to have the services of some officers about him as extra aides-de-camp, the Portuguese government refusing to take them upon their establishment, there will be no objection to allow such officers as he will name so to attend him. But even these ought not to be paid by the British government.

The precedent of his receiving pay as a Lieutenant-General last war will not answer.

Ever, my dear Lord Bathurst, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Brighton, 28th January, 1827.

I return you the two letters which Peel sent me. I think the instructions as they stand guard us against any probable mischief, and we shall do better to wait for the next Lisbon mail, by which we shall hear what are Lord Beresford's powers.

I send you another letter from Mr. Canning on Lord Beresford's unfortunate letter, which I shall be obliged to you to return. By the interceptions of letters written from Lisbon by foreign ministers, which Mr. Canning sent me yesterday, it is clear that Lord Beresford is ill with a large party at Lisbon; and to say the truth, if he speaks of the Portuguese army openly at Lisbon as he has done in his letter to me, I am not surprised at his being unpopular. If Villa Flor has gained the victory which the telegraph announces, our marching will be unnecessary, and Lord Beresford will be soon deposed. I suppose you know that Villa Flor was sent out of Lisbon by the Infanta's father for being too great a favourite with the Infanta.

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

681.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 29th January, 1827.

I return your letters.

My opinion is that Lord Beresford should be informed what his situation really is.

I think there is nothing so foolish as for a government to decline to receive opinions of any kind; and I would not decline to receive any that Lord Beresford might think proper to communicate.

But I would recommend that Lord Beresford should be

reminded that he is not a servant of his Majesty in Portugal. That his Majesty has servants in that kingdom authorized and required to transmit information to his Majesty's government, and responsible for that which they should give. That if his Lordship should think it proper in his situation to give any political or military information to his Majesty's government, it is very desirable that he should communicate it to his Majesty's ambassador, in order that he may be aware of such information and opinions, and may communicate his opinions to the government upon both.

To reject information from anybody in authority, particularly from such a man, would not answer. But it must be fairly and regularly given.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [682.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 29th January, 1827.

Since I wrote to you this morning I have received the enclosed from Lord Beresford, which I beg you to show Mr. Canning and to send to Lord Liverpool.

Matters in respect to Lord Beresford have gone rather faster than I expected. The whole affair of Portugal is very serious.

It is really impossible, at once, to suggest anything.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Brighton, 29th January, 1827, 10 P.M.

The enclosed letter from Lord Liverpool to you, together with the papers which I had sent you, were brought here by the messenger, under the impression that you were at the Pavilion. I send you without opening it Lord Liverpool's letter, as it is docketed "*most private and confidential*," but I shall be obliged to you to let me know, without delay, the substance of it, so far as relates to the question which I proposed to you both.

I enclose also the letter which I have this evening received from Lord Beresford. By this you will see that the Portuguese government have refused to give the command to Lord Beresford. He refers me to his letter to Lord Liverpool for explanations; but I confess I am not surprised at this refusal, if he has abused their army openly as much as he did to me, more particularly *if the army deserve it, as is probably the case.*

This event, however I must lament it, decides the question as to my

showing Lord Beresford's two first letters to the King, though I shall wait to hear what Lord Liverpool says upon the subject. My reluctance in making the letter No. 2 an official letter proceeded from foreseeing that it was to be transmitted to Lisbon, and that it would therefore occasion quarrels there with Lord Beresford, by which the public service would have been essentially prejudiced. It matters little now how much they quarrel with his Lordship.

Pray send me back without delay his letter and Lord Liverpool's opinion, as I wish no longer to delay laying the whole before his Majesty.

Yours ever, my dear Duke,

BATHURST.

P.S.—This refusal will also supersede the necessity of giving him instructions with respect to his correspondence.

If Villa Flor's victory be true, it will account for the Portuguese government having ventured to reject Lord Beresford.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Brighton, 29th January, 1827.

I send you the last despatches from Mr. Lamb (lest the copies should not have reached you in circulation), and with them a draft which I have prepared in answer to them, and upon the present position of affairs (of *our* affairs, that is to say) at Madrid.

I direct the messenger *not* to disturb you to-night. I shall be obliged to you if you will return him to me *here* with the same direction; for these gentlemen have a marvellous pleasure in breaking in upon one's slumbers, especially if one is unwell.

I have been confined to my bed ever since my return here, and am still, with a cold caught at Windsor and matured by a long journey.

I hope you have gotten the better of your indisposition, which I presume had the same origin. I presume also that Mr. Mash, or whoever filched the cloth or the matting from under our feet in the aisle, had bets or insurances against the lives of the Cabinet.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Private.—Lord Beresford appears to me to have entirely mistaken his situation, and to have misconstrued both Sir William Clinton's instructions and his own.

G. C.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Brighton, 30th January, 1827.

I received this morning two letters from Sir William Clinton, both of the date of the 13th. In the one he says he is preparing to march, if necessary, and will not wait for the *two battalions from Gibraltar*, if they do not arrive by the time he shall be ready, which would be in the following week.

In the other letter he informs me that the Foreign Secretary of State, in the presence of the British ambassador, had offered him the command of the Portuguese army, with all the necessary powers; that he had at first accepted it; but on reflection he thought it was not altogether in the sense of his instructions, and therefore declined until he should hear from England. His reasons he sent in writing to the British ambassador, but he has not forwarded a copy to me.

In sending these despatches to Mr. Canning this morning, I told him that I was clearly of opinion that he could not accept the Portuguese command and retain the command of the British troops: that their duties were incompatible. The British troops were to be exclusively confined, in their operations in the field, to expel the invaders; but the Portuguese army would be employed in putting down internal commotions also.

Sir William A'Court's despatches will, I presume, give some account of the late proceedings; but as Mr. Canning is in bed with a return of the attack he had the week before the Portuguese message, I have not seen these despatches, nor has he returned me Sir William Clinton's letters. I mean to send them to the King. Lord Beresford's to me are sent to his Majesty. I am very glad to hear that you are coming to Brighton, when all this strange business may be talked over.

By-the-by, Sir William Clinton does not speak very confidently of the late successes of Villa Flor.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

To Lord Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Maresfield, 30th January, 1827.

Sir William Clinton was quite right to refuse the command of the Portuguese army. If he should be inclined to accept this command upon the offer being renewed, we must send out another officer to take the command of our auxiliary force. It will not answer for us to become, or to appear to be, principals in what is now doing in Portugal.

If we should have real war with Spain it may, and probably will be, necessary for us to become, and at all events we shall become, principals; and we must arrange our force, command, operations, &c., accordingly. But we must not do anything to accelerate that misfortune, or to give it the appearance of having occurred.

I don't think, however, that the offer to Sir William Clinton will be renewed. I confess that since I heard of the mode in which Beresford's offer to take the command was received in Portugal, I have suspected that there is another arrangement in contemplation. My opinion is that we shall soon hear of a despatch

to the Foreign Office, conveying the wish of the Portuguese government that his Majesty would be graciously pleased to permit Sir Robert Wilson to serve in Portugal. This permission will be given, and we shall see the despatch soliciting the permission, and the draft to Sir W. A'Court conveying it, upon the Cabinet table with other bundles of papers.

If, however, this arrangement should not take place, and the Portuguese government should require from us an officer to command their troops, I am considering of one. But it is really very difficult to find one.

He ought to have the experience derived from serving with our army in Portugal; but he ought not to have served with the Portuguese army.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

684.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Maresfield, 30th January, 1827.

In a letter which I wrote to Lord Liverpool lately, of which I sent you a copy, I stated that I believed that Almeida was dismantled.

It was Lord Beresford who, as I understood him, told me so. I see, however, in his letter to me which I sent to you yesterday, that one of his complaints against the Portuguese Minister-at-War was that he did not send Lord Beresford, according to his Lordship's requisition, returns of the stores, &c., which the insurgents had found in that place. I therefore conclude that it is still fortified; and that either I must have misunderstood Lord Beresford, or that he was misinformed when he told me, as I thought, that the place was entirely dismantled.

I state this now as this statement may have misled you. Pray send this letter to Mr. Canning, who, I believe, likewise saw my letter to Lord Liverpool above referred to.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL, Maresfield, 30th January, 1827.

Lord Bathurst will have sent you the letter which I had received from Lord Beresford informing me that he was out of the Portuguese service, upon which event I will say nothing at present, as, however sensible of the evil consequence which will attend this entire disappointment of our hopes of restoring the Portuguese army to some state of efficiency, I am not prepared to suggest any remedy.

I trouble you, however, upon one point upon which I may have misled you. I told you that the works of Almeida were entirely dismantled. Lord Beresford gave me this information. But you will see in his letter to me that one of his complaints of the Portuguese Minister-at-War, was that he had not given him a return of the state of the magazines and stores in Almeida when the rebels obtained possession of that place. I therefore conclude that there are still some works at Almeida capable of resistance; and that Lord Beresford was misinformed when he stated to me that the place was dismantled, or that I misunderstood him.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Mr. Guthrie.

MY DEAR SIR, Maresfield Park, 30th January, 1827.

I received at the time your letter of the 9th instant, and I should have answered it at the moment I received it, only that I did not think it proper to give an answer respecting intentions to be carried into execution when I should be appointed Commander-in-Chief till his Majesty should have thought proper to call upon me to take the command.

You are mistaken in supposing that Dr. Hume would not desire to be appointed Surgeon to the Commander-in-Chief, at least I believe so, and I certainly should not appoint anybody without first making the offer to him.

But the fact is that I have considered it a duty, and a proper mark of respect from me to my illustrious and lamented predecessor, to take his whole personal Staff.

I could not think of omitting his Surgeon among the number,

although not personally acquainted with him, not only on account of his own respectability, but his services to his Royal Highness to the last moment of his life, and the regard and respect for his talents and abilities which I know that his Royal Highness entertained and felt, but likewise on account of the injustice which I should thus have done to a meritorious individual thus excluded from a compliment which I intended to pay to the whole Staff, as well as to mark my respect for their late illustrious Chief.

I hope, then, that you will excuse my declining to comply with your wishes, and that

You will believe me yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Brighton, 31st January, 1827.

I enclose you the private letter which I have this morning received from Sir William Clinton, together with the report of Colonel Muir from Villa Flor's head-quarters.

Sir William Clinton's official despatch I have sent to the King. The two battalions from Gibraltar had arrived. He proposed to move the whole of the British corps out of Lisbon. He had declined complying with the request of Villa Flor, and indeed the Portuguese government, to detach part of his force to Oporto, but he was to place his corps into cantonments, at Santarem, Thomar, Leiria, and Villa Franca, thus keeping open the Coimbra and Abrantes roads, as well as that of Alemtejo.

As Almeida is to be again occupied by the Portuguese forces, I have not thought it necessary to send your letter to Mr. Canning on that subject. He has just sent me, and Ferguson will send you, Sir W. A'Court's letter enclosing Lord Beresford's extraordinary letter. Lord B. has brought the whole upon himself. I think it might be prudent (to prevent a more inconvenient nomination) to allow Sir William Clinton to accept the Portuguese command; placing him in the situation in which Lord Beresford would have been placed, with the command of our troops in the field, but giving the command of our troops to some other general officer, and thus removing Sir William from our pay. To make up however for this, he might be allowed to have continued to him his table-money.

I send you also a public letter from Sir William Clinton, with two proposals, to which I should be inclined to agree, particularly the first, if he continues with a separate command but in co-operation with a Portuguese general.

I shall be obliged to you to let me know if you are coming here before Saturday, on which day I go to London.

Ever yours, my dear Duke, very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Mr. Canning is better to-day.

To ——— ———. [

MY DEAR GENERAL, February, 1827.

I could not write to you on Friday respecting the subject of your letter which I had received, viz., your employment as Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies.

I don't know whether my case will or can be deemed a precedent. But I was the junior Lieutenant-General of the army when I was sent to command in Portugal in 1809. It is true that Sir John Moore had just been killed; and I had in the preceding year won the Battles of Roliça and Vimeiro. But still I was certainly the junior of many who had pretensions to command. It is also true that that was a time of war.

But this is not the only view which must be taken of this case. Your position at this moment must be considered. You are the only military adviser of the government; and there will not be wanting those who will accuse you, however falsely, of having secured this situation for yourself over the heads of two officers who must be displaced, each of them having claims founded upon services, and who must be recalled almost before they could have paid the expenses of going to and taking possession of their commands.

If the situation was particularly agreeable and desirable, or for the performance of a military service, I confess that I would not allow any of these considerations to influence my decision if the case were mine. I have stated them all strongly, but not, I believe, too strongly, in order that you may take them all into consideration.

I tell you at the same time that I will support any decision to which you may come.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Bathurst. [

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Maresfield, 1st February, 1827.

I return the letter from Lord Liverpool and its enclosures. I judged the matter quite right in regard to the wish of the Portuguese government respecting Lord Beresford's command. I think this is to be attributed to himself. He has very foolishly made himself a partizan in Portuguese politics, and

has pushed his objects with a perseverance and anxiety quite extraordinary in a man of his good sense and talents. Thus, the moment this country consented to give its aid Lord Beresford was thrown overboard instead of being strengthened, as he would have been by that measure if his objects had been at all consistent with the views of this country, or with reason.

I have not seen any report from Sir W. A'Court on this transaction; nor any report, either public or private, of the offer of the command of the Portuguese troops to Sir William Clinton.

If he should consent to take this command he must give up that of the British troops, excepting the general direction of the combined movements of both armies in case of co-operation, in the same manner as it was to have been held by Lord Beresford.

I recommend you not even to pay him his *table money*. Indeed if he is made Portuguese Marshal Commander-in-Chief he will not require this assistance; as he will be better paid than as Commander-in-Chief in his Majesty's service; and it is most important that we should be quite separated from him.

I have a letter from his Majesty inviting me to go to Brighton on Monday; and I shall of course go. I shall be in town on Saturday.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

689.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Maresfield, 1st February, 1827.

I return Sir W. Clinton's private letters. Lieutenant-Colonel Muir's is but a meagre report, from the perusal of which it is difficult to form any opinion.

I confess that I don't understand his forward movement under his instructions. It will be very difficult for him to return to Lisbon, whatever may be the state of things there, excepting to secure his point of embarkation. However it is difficult to decide positively upon any point of this description without seeing the official statement of all the reasons for it.

I think Sir W. Clinton is wrong in taking Portuguese Staff officers as interpreters with the general officers commanding

our brigades. This is, in fact, the office which they will fill; and they will perform the duty but badly, and will be in fact so many spies. I don't know anything more likely to be inconvenient, and even dangerous, than the intimacy of six or seven officers of this description in the interior of our army under existing circumstances in Portugal; and still more so in the storms likely to occur there.

The relation between the Portuguese officers and our Staff officers must be wonderfully altered since the peace, if the former should be necessary for the Staff duties of our army in Portugal. But it is a curious circumstance attending this arrangement, that while Sir W. Clinton takes Portuguese Staff officers for his English auxiliary corps, Lord Beresford required English Staff officers for his Portuguese army! All that could have been required was a few interpreters at first, till our officers should have acquired a little knowledge of the language.

I think Lord Liverpool is not sufficiently alive to the inconvenience of mixing the command of the British and Portuguese armies. It must lead to our becoming principals in what is going on there in spite of ourselves.

Ever, my dear Lord Bathurst, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

As explained, I believe the appointment of an English Staff officer at Lisbon will be necessary.

Sir Henry Bouverie to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Villa Franca, 2nd February, 1827.

In a letter which I received from Sir William Clinton last night, he informs me that he has seen in the 'Gazette' that your Grace has the colonelcy of the Grenadier Guards.

Having the honour to be intrusted with the command of a brigade in which the first battalion of your Grace's regiment bears a conspicuous figure, I am happy to be able to assure you that the high character of that distinguished regiment has, in everything in which it has had an opportunity of evincing it, been most admirably supported. It has never fallen to my lot to have to do with a battalion in a more perfect state of discipline; there has been little or no drunkenness, and they have made the two marches from Belem to Santarem, and from thence to this place, notwithstanding the very heavy rain, without having had, at the end of the march, one of them absent or lagging in the rear.

In making this communication to your Grace respecting the first battalion of the Grenadiers, I am far from wishing to detract from the merits of the 2nd battalion 3rd Guards, which forms the other half of my brigade, and I beg leave to assure you that the zeal of the officers and goodwill of the men of that battalion is not to be surpassed.

The brigade is at present very much inconvenienced by the non-arrival of a paymaster. I trust that this will soon be remedied, as I wrote soon after our arrival to Colonel Townshend to request that he would do his best to relieve us from this want.

I remain, my dear Lord, ever your Grace's most obedient and obliged servant,

H. F. BOUVERIE, Major-General.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, London, Stanhope Street, 5th February, 1827.

I send you four despatches to Sir William Clinton, and when you have read them, and made your comments upon them, I shall be obliged to you to send them to Mr. Canning, and to call upon him before you leave Brighton, to collect from him more fully his opinion if he should object to the substance of them. I do not, however, anticipate much difference of opinion, as the future destination of the army is not by what I have written decided, although you may think that I have laid the ground for their continuing in their present advanced position. The fact is I was, I confess, in my heart against our troops going out; but being there, I am in no hurry to withdraw them.

I have fixed the Cabinet at *three* on Wednesday, as Parliament meets on Thursday. If, however, it should be more convenient to you that it should be postponed to Thursday, I will give directions accordingly; and if Mr. Canning should be sufficiently recovered to have a hope of his being able to attend Saturday, I will still further postpone it to that day; but it will, I think, be attended with much inconvenience to delay sending out some instructions to Sir William Clinton beyond that time.

Ever yours, my dear Duke, very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[690.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 6th February, 1827.

The proposed treaty enclosed in Lord Granville's No. 24 goes a step farther than had yet been agreed upon, viz., to send commercial agents. Would you take this step without farther consideration? I don't understand that Greece is yet in he state in which the Spanish colonies were.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Burlington Street, Brighton,
6th February, 1827.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

I am not well enough to be able to answer your note with my own hand, nor shall I till a more advanced period of the day be able to read Lord Bathurst's despatches.

I am positively prohibited from seeing anybody to-day, or at least talking to anybody who comes to see me, which is much the same thing.

I will not fail to return the drafts in the course of the afternoon.

Pray let me know whether you return to London to-day, or stay till to-morrow.

Yours very sincerely,

GEORGE CANNING.

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR CANNING,

Fife House, 6th February, 1827.

I quite agree with you that the important discussion to which your confidential letter of yesterday refers does not press in point of time.

It may be as well, perhaps, to know a little more before we come to any decision upon it. At all events, the delay of a week or a fortnight, until you are sufficiently recovered to come to town and to meet the Cabinet, can be of no material importance.

I have communicated with no one upon the subject, nor is it my intention to do so till after your return to town.

I have no objection to making our occupation and evacuation of Portugal an assistance to France, or rather to Villèle's government, if this can be done without embarrassing ourselves as to continuing in Portugal or going out of it, when it might be our interest to come to a decision otherwise upon this point.

I feel likewise the full weight of all you say respecting the necessity of our continuance till Spain shall have carried into execution her promises, and even till she shall have dispersed the army collected on her frontier. But the question upon which I have my doubts (they are at present only doubts) is, whether our continuance in Portugal should not be limited to these objects.

If it should be so limited our policy would be simple and intelligible. We went to Portugal, not for the purpose of interfering in the internal disputes of parties in that country, not to support liberty on one hand nor despotism on the other, not to maintain the Charter (good as it may be), but because we were called upon by Portugal to enable Portugal to resist foreign aggression. Remove, then, the foreign aggression, give the necessary satisfaction, and ought we not, on our own principles, to retire?

But I look further, and more particularly, to what is most for our interest. If we do not limit our interference to the above objects, shall we not be necessarily, though unintentionally, involved in all the internal struggles which may take place in Portugal during our continuance in it? Shall we not become decided partizans of the Charter, against those who may wish,

as Portuguese, to destroy it; and shall we not be considered as keeping our army in Portugal for the sole purpose of maintaining it?

I admit that until the *whole question* connected with Don Miguel is determined Portugal will be subject to internal convulsion. But can we remain with a military force in Portugal during such convulsion without taking some decided part; and is it most for our interest to take such part, or to retire when satisfied as to the proceedings of Spain, declaring that the Portuguese must be left to themselves, and that we will not suffer Spain or any other country to interfere in their internal concerns?

If you were to canvass the opinion of the country I am satisfied it would be in favour of the latter course.

I do not, however, conceal from myself that this course may subject us to many difficulties and inconveniences. The overthrow of the Charter and the restoration of absolute power in the hands of Don Miguel, might be an eventual consequence; and such a termination, however it might happen, would be a triumph to Spain and the Apostolicals throughout Europe, and would for a time destroy British influence at Lisbon.

We must not, however, deceive ourselves. If we remain with our military force in Portugal, we remain there to support, influence, and direct their government. Indeed, if the result of which we may be apprehensive, the triumph of the Apostolicals, should take place with our army in Portugal, and taking no part, the consequences would in some respects be more disgraceful than its occurring when we were absent.

In considering this whole question, we must take into the account that our army has certainly not been well received in Portugal, and that we are by no means popular there.

The parties likewise into which the country is divided, are much more nearly balanced than we had reason to believe when we decided on the expedition.

Ever yours, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

691.] *To George Glenny, Esq.*

SIR, London, 8th February, 1827.

I have received your letter, which has much surprised me. I had no reason, and at all events have no right, to give you a *rebuke*. But I have a right to decline to act in any capacity with others of whom I know nothing, and to object to have my name used without my consent; and it is no rebuke to state such objections in very civil but very positive terms. I see, likewise, that the purport of my letters to you has been published in the newspapers, upon which I make no comment.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To H. R. H. the Duke of Gloucester.

SIR, London, 9th February, 1827.

I had the honour of calling at Gloucester House this morning in consequence of a letter which your Royal Highness wrote to Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Taylor, and which he communicated to me, and in order to lay before your Royal Highness the enclosed letter* from the Judge-Advocate General upon the subject of the confirmation of general regimental courts-martial in the Brigade of Guards.

This letter is quite conclusive upon the subject, and I propose to read and confirm that proceeding of a general regimental court-martial which had been laid before your Royal Highness, and of which your Royal Highness had approved.

I had likewise intended to enter into some explanation with your Royal Highness, if I had had the honour of seeing you, upon other points connected with the duties of the Guards, upon which I am apprehensive that I may have taken a different view from that taken by your Royal Highness; and I beg here to assure your Royal Highness that nothing but a sense of duty, and of the responsibility which I conceive rests upon me, could induce me to bring forward any opinion in which I might be so unfortunate as to differ from your Royal Highness.

The records of this office shew an uniform course of precedents of the promotions and appointments in and to the regiments of Guards passing through the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, equally with those of any other regiments of the army, with the exception of the Life Guards.

The records of this office likewise shew that the duties of the Guards have been invariably conducted under the special direction of the Commander-in-Chief, excepting in cases when an officer has been appointed on the Staff to conduct those duties under the general superintendence of the Commander-in-Chief.

It appears that when my late lamented predecessor in office was appointed Commander-in-Chief, in 1798, he was a junior Colonel of Guards to your Royal Highness's illustrious father. Yet the Duke of York took the King's pleasure upon all the promotions in and appointments to the Foot Guards, and superintended and directed the detail of all the duties.

* 29th January, 1827.

I will not trouble your Royal Highness further. Although the precedents are uniform, I could not produce one more in point; and I shall conclude by assuring your Royal Highness again, that I should not have troubled your Royal Highness upon this subject at all if it could be considered in my power to divest myself of the responsibility for the duties which are imposed upon the officer filling the office to which his Majesty has been pleased to appoint me.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with the highest consideration and respect, your Royal Highness's most obedient and faithful humble servant,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—The letter to which I have referred in the commencement of this, as addressed to Sir Herbert Taylor, is I see addressed to Colonel Clitheroe.

Mr. Scott to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Park Cottage, Devizes, 11th February, 1827.

I had the honour of receiving your Grace's reply to my letter by yesterday's post, and beg to return you my best thanks for the promptness and explicitness with which you have treated my application.

It is not with the view of repeating a request which you have satisfied me your engagements to those who have claims to your patronage will not permit you to grant, that I again address your Grace, but merely to rectify a mistake which seems to have arisen, that I am, or ever have been in the military service. I first had the honour of your Grace's acquaintance at Eton; we afterwards met in India, which country I left many years ago. I was at the Calcutta Bar, and held the situation of Accountant-General in the Supreme Court; after my return to England, when residing in London, in Cumberland Street, and also when your Grace was in command at Hastings, I had frequently the honour of being your Grace's guest. The time which has elapsed since that period may well have effaced me from your Grace's remembrance; and in thus disclaiming any distinction to which I am not entitled, and recalling myself to your recollection, I beg to subscribe myself your Grace's obliged and faithful servant,

THOMAS SCOTT.

693.] *To Thomas Scott, Esq.*

MY DEAR SIR, London, 12th February, 1827.

I beg you ten thousand pardons that I did not recollect your handwriting, but I thought that the letter addressed to me was

by Major-General Scott, of the establishment of Fort St. George.

That letter contains, however, an exact statement of what the means are at my disposal. I am under no positive engagements, because I make no promises, but there are hundreds of claimants upon me for services performed, and I have very little at my disposal which a gentleman of your station and acquirements would like to fill: and your habits have not led you to consider of the conduct of details such as we have under our charge. However, I hope you do not imagine that I feel any disinclination to be of service to you if in my power.

Ever, my dear Sir, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Brighton, 12th February, 1827.

The two last lines of your letter of the 10th instant entirely escaped my notice at the time of answering it.

Upon Stapleton's reading it over to me again this morning I have discovered that oversight.

I do not exactly understand what it is which you consider as "*provoking* in the course adopting respecting the Roman Catholic question." I thought that *you* inclined for an early discussion of it. *My* wish was, as you know, that it should sleep till after Corn, which would have been, in effect, till after Easter; and I wrote this wish as my opinion to Plunket, in a letter I think from Coombe, and which I think I showed to you.

I never heard more of the matter until I received Burdett's message through Huskisson.

Another opinion which I gave to Plunket, at the same time, in answer to his inquiries, was that a Resolution *would* be the best mode of launching the subject in the House of Commons. Whether this opinion has been mentioned as *mine* by Plunket to any one else I do not know. I rather think not, because Burdett, in mentioning his intention to Huskisson for my information, took more pains to furnish Huskisson with arguments for reconciling me to it than he would naturally have done if he had known me to be already of the same opinion. He did state it to be Plunket's opinion.

I still wish, no doubt, that the time of this discussion could have been put off, but, as we had already before the Christmas adjournment three notices on our books, the discussion of any one of which might have brought forward the whole question, most inconveniently because incidentally and collaterally, I confess I do not see, under all the circumstances of the case, that it is so much to be regretted that the sense of the new House of Commons upon this perplexing subject will be distinctly

taken soon after its meeting, and will be taken upon the substance of the question rather than upon the details of a Bill.

I agree, as you know, very much with you in thinking that no Bill which has been sent up to the House of Lords (my own excellent Roman Catholic Peer Bill always excepted) has been such as ought to pass in the shape in which it went up. But it is impossible to amend a Bill in the House of Commons against the judgments of the bringers in, in a case where the majorities are so slender and ticklish as they are upon this whole question. I can do nothing to that effect, unless I took the measure into my own hands, and *that* I could not think of venturing to do, unless the principle that *some* measure was necessary had been previously affirmed by the House of Commons, in a manner to leave no doubt that *some* measure or other would be carried.

I am afraid the K—— had been somehow or other led to cherish the expectation that the session might go by without any allusion to the subject.

Believe me very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR CANNING, Fife House, 13th February, 1827.

All that I meant by the word *provoking* in reference to the Catholic question was this, that it was *provoking* to have the debates upon the two questions so close upon each other that people's heads would be full of *both* at the same time. I thought it would have been wiser (if there had not been other reasons in the way) to have broken the neck of the Corn question before you had entered upon the Catholic question.

I have, personally, no objection to an early decision on the Catholic question, and upon reflection I am inclined to think that the two questions coming together may not, upon the whole, be an evil. It will certainly make the debate upon the Catholic question comparatively flat, for whatever may be the relative importance of the two questions, the greater part of those who vote on either side of the Catholic question will be *thinking* about Corn.

As to the mode of proceeding by Resolution instead of by Bill, I give no opinion upon it.

I certainly doubt the policy of sending to the House of Lords a Resolution in preference to a Bill, if this is the object of those who move in the business.

I wish you had said something about your health, but I conclude from your silence that you are going on well.

The two Houses were quite satisfied yesterday as to the propriety of fixing the 26th positively for the Corn question.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

The Duke of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Stowe, 14th February, 1827.

The friendship which I have always understood you to profess for me induces me to request you to permit Lord Chandos to wait upon you and lay before you the situation in which I now find myself with the government. In so doing I desire to be understood as not to wish to be indulged in childish complaint, but as being anxious to see whether any means under your advice or by your interposition exist to enable me to avoid a separation from the government, which in itself is no sacrifice to me, and I am not vain enough to suppose can be very politically formidable to government. But still, joining them as I did in a moment of great peril to them, I presume it cannot be the wish of honourable men unnecessarily to cast off interest and connexions after the use has been made of them which made that junction in the first instance desirable to ministers. Of Mr. Wynn's conduct to me I speak not. That is a private concern between him and me, and to his own conscience and future consideration, when the day of reflection comes, I leave his desertion of me. But Lord Liverpool ought to have recollected that in the former discussions with me relative to the government of India, he *eo nomine* stands pledged by two of his colleagues, and one of them Mr. Canning. This cannot be denied, because the pledge stands in writing on record. It is not for me to ask whether this was or was not done by his authority. It is not usual when a Cabinet Minister makes use of the name of another, to go to that other and ask him for proof that the name has been used by authority and honestly. This feeling ought to have induced Lord Liverpool to have lowered his tone when he thought fit to refuse me what in his name his colleagues had promised me. I trust that I am not so dishonest a man as to change my principles because I have been refused a place. I feel the debt of gratitude which I owe to the King too strongly to allow of my wishing to disturb his government. He overwhelmed me with honours. Some he graciously conferred upon me whilst I opposed his government, the last and greatest act of his goodness he gave me, not as a price of my supporting his government, but in remembrance of the promise made by his Royal father to mine, which he redeemed by turning it into a mark of distinguished favour to me. I feel that I owe all this to the King, and the King alone, and I wish to God the King could know how warm are my gratitude and attachment personally to him. But I cannot therefore wholly blunt and destroy my feelings when I am injured by others, neither can I permit others to presume upon my Sovereign's goodness to me, or to fancy that they are thereby justified in injuring and insulting me. I can with ease, and God knows, perfect comfort to myself, withdraw from the support of government without going into opposition, and leave Mr. Wynn to the comforts of his Cabinet Office, which by my nomination he enjoys. But this even I wish to avoid, if the means are made practicable to me. But under unmerited injury I neither can be expected to sit unmoved, nor will I. I owe you many apologies for thus taking up your time. You may with truth say this is no concern of yours, and you cannot help it, however you may regret it. But you have too frank a mind thus to put off one for whom you have professed hereditary friendship. I therefore

send my son to you, in the full conviction that you will talk the whole matter over with him, and if no means exist of setting them right, I shall have the satisfaction of knowing that I have done my best to avoid a separation, and you that of knowing that you have endeavoured and done your best to serve *my father's son.*

Believe me always, dear Duke of Wellington,
yours very sincerely,
BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

Sir Walter Scott to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Edinburgh, 15th February, 1827.

The two manuscripts safely packed leave this by post to-day, as I am informed your Grace's franks carry any weight. The public seem to impute the same power to your Grace, for feeling what a quantity of additional official duty your new situation must bring on your Grace, can make it scarce anything save a burthen considered in relation to your Grace personally, though so great an advantage must be derived from the appointment by the country.

I have been reading with equal instruction and pleasure the memoir on the Russian campaign, which demonstrates as plainly as possible that the French writers have taken advantage of the snow to cover under it all their General's blunders, and impute to it all their losses. This I observe is Bonaparte's general practice, and that of his admirers. Whenever they can charge anything upon the elements or upon accident, he and they combine in denying all bravery and all wisdom to their enemies. The conduct of Kutusow on more than one occasion in the retreat seems to have been singularly cautious, or rather timorous. For it is impossible to give credit to the immense superiority claimed by Ségur, Beauchamp, &c., for the French troops over the Russians. Surely they were the same Russians who had fought so bravely against superior force, and how should the twentieth part of the French army have been able to clear their way without cavalry or artillery in a great measure? and it seems natural to suppose that we must impute to tardy and inactive conduct on the part of their General what we cannot account for on the idea of the extremely superior valour or discipline claimed for the French soldiers by their country. The snow seems to have become serious on the 6th November, when Napoleon was within two marches of Smolensk, which he soon after reached, and by that time it appears to me that his army was already mouldered away from 100,000 men who left Moscow, to about 35,000 only, so that his great loss was incurred before the snow began.

I am afraid your Grace has done me an unparalleled injury in one respect, that the clearness, justice, and precision of your Grace's reasoning puts me out of all patience with my own attempts. I dare hardly hope in this increase of business for a note or two on Waterloo; but if your Grace had any, however hasty, which could be copied by a secretary, the debt ould be never to be forgotten.

am going to mention a circumstance which I do with great apprehen-

sion, lest I should be thought to intrude upon your Grace's goodness. It respects a youth, the son of one of my most intimate friends, a gentleman of good family and fortune, who is extremely desirous of being admitted a cadet of artillery. His father is the best draughtsman in Scotland, and the lad himself shows a great deal of talent both in science and the ordinary branches of learning. I enclose a note of the youth's age, studies, and progress, in case your Grace might think it possible to place on your list for the Engineer service the name of a poor Scots Fidalgo. Your Grace knows Scotland is a breeding not a feeding country, and we must send our sons abroad as we send our black cattle to England; and as old Lady Campbell of Ardkinglas proposed to dispose of her nine sons, we have a strong tendency to put our young folks "a' to the sword."

I have too long detained you, my Lord Duke, from the many high occupations which have been redoubled upon your Grace's head, and beg your Grace to believe me, with an unusually deep sense of respect and obligation, my dear Lord Duke, your Grace's much honoured and grateful humble servant,

WALTER SCOTT.

Captain F. B. Head to the Right Hon. Lord FitzRoy Somerset.*

MY LORD, Croydon, 15th February, 1827.

I cannot sufficiently express to your Lordship my sense of obligation for your Lordship's very kind note of the 9th inst.

I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship a few additional memoranda on the South American lasso, and I should feel particularly obliged to your Lordship if I might be permitted to defer replying to the latter part of your Lordship's note until I learn whether the Duke would wish to make any experiments on the subject upon which I ventured to address his Grace.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's very sincerely obliged,

F. B. HEAD.

[ENCLOSURE.]

A FEW ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RESPECTING THE SOUTH AMERICAN LASSO.

Croydon, 15th February, 1827.

If the cavalry have *not* forage-cords, but forage-nets, the lasso or hide-rope would be an additional equipment. It would, however, always serve as a forage-cord, and if knotted in a particular manner, it might perhaps also be used as a halter. If the forage-net could not be dispensed with, the lasso might be packed into it with great convenience.

With respect to the weight of these forage-cords: a South American lasso of the *strongest* description, as used by the mataderos for killing the cattle, with its ring complete, weighs 3 lbs. 8 oz. For the service proposed it might be

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* Afterwards the Right Hon. Sir Francis Bond Head, Bart.

made smaller and shorter, and would then weigh about 2 lbs. Should this be considered too heavy or too cumbersome, it might be cut into half-lengths, and then by common loops the lassos of two men would form one lasso for draft, and consequently every regiment of cavalry would have half as many lassos as horses.

The mode of manufacturing these lassos is so simple, that the evening before I left Buenos Ayres to cross the Pampas with a large van or carriage, and a cart containing 25 cwt. of iron, &c., I purchased some raw hides, and in the morning the lassos, with a great number of spare ones, were made by the Gauchos who accompanied me. A common knife is all that is necessary to make them.

The hide ropes are exceedingly durable, but the first expense of making them in England would be great. A few thousand lassos might, however, be purchased at Buenos Ayres for a small sum, and they or the raw hides might be brought home by the government packets.

The cavalry, men and horses, might be taught the simple exercise of drawing from the girth by common ropes, and upon active service the lassos might be obtained from *the hides of the bullocks killed for rations*, for which government receives little or nothing.

The lasso attached to the girth of a horse is undeniably a very *simple* means of draft, and there is so little in it to terrify a horse, that I believe three-fourths of the horses of an English regiment of cavalry would draw at the first trial. It, however, certainly does sound a very awkward sort of harness, yet I respectfully submit that the act of drawing is the exertion which an animal makes to *advance*, against a force which tends to *retain* him, and that the greatest exertion which an animal can make is when his limbs are unrestrained. In English harness the action of the fore-legs is certainly cramped by the collar, whereas in South America, the pressure being round the barrel of the horse, the action of the legs is quite free.

It is true that the lasso is applied to only one side of the horse; still he is able to exert the whole of his strength against it, in the same way as a man would, if retained by one skirt of his coat, instead of by two.

The two modes of harness might, however, easily be compared by actual experiment, but even admitting that a horse by his collar could draw a ton, when from his girth he could only draw 15 cwt., yet it may be observed, 1st., that in common draft it is not necessary for a horse to exert constantly the whole of his powers; secondly, that the lasso or single trace is certainly freer and better than the double trace for quick driving, for rough ground, or for driving across a country; and, thirdly, that the object of introducing it rests on the principle of not harassing the cavalry, but of employing them to *aid* the artillery, pontoon train, stores, &c., &c., in moments of emergency; to seize and CARRY AWAY the guns, stores, &c., of the enemy, and for many other services which might be detailed.

I have never had an opportunity of comparing together by actual experiment the two modes of harness, but I beg leave to state that I was travelling across the Pampas with a carriage, and was in a province from which almost all the horses had been driven away by the Pampas Indians, when my carriage stuck in the middle of a large morass, and the horses, after repeated efforts, were incapable to move it. After remaining some time in this situation, some Gauchos who were hunting ostriches came to my assistance.

They uncoiled their lassos, hooked on, dragged us through the swamp, and before I had time to thank them they unhooked, and galloped away to continue their sport. It naturally occurred to me, that if artillery were in a similar situation, what assistance they might receive from a cavalry possessing lassos.

For three thousand miles which I travelled with a heavy carriage or cart drawn by lassos alone, crossing, at a very rapid rate, a country in a complete state of nature, intersected by rivers with precipitous banks, morasses, and various other obstructions, I kept this idea in view; and I can declare that, under every circumstance, I found the South American lasso a rough but an efficient mode of harness, and admirably adapted for quick driving; and although a military subject was foreign to the particular duties which at that time were occupying my attention, yet I was so convinced of the advantages which (under the necessary modifications) might be derived from the use of the lasso, that it was my intention respectfully to have addressed his Grace the Duke of Wellington, and to have had the honour of forwarding to his Grace from Buenos Ayres the necessary details upon the subject, but I was unavoidably obliged to quit the country.

As a farther proof of the practical efficiency of the lasso, I may add, that not only are all the carriages and carts at Buenos Ayres drawn from the girth, but, from there being no pier or wharf, all vessels are unladen in carts which drive into such deep water, that the backs of the horses are generally covered, and that with their harness dripping wet, on reaching the shore, they drive up a short but very steep hill.

At Buenos Ayres the fish are caught by Gauchos, who swim their horses with a net attached by a lasso to the girth of the saddle; and I respectfully submit that this is a very severe trial, because from the exertions of the horse in water, it might be expected that the saddle when drawn backwards would slip.

The principle of the lasso is that it draws not from the saddle, but on either side of the horse it is buttoned to an iron ring, which is on a surcingle which goes over the saddle. Nothing, therefore, is necessary for the application of the lasso but a stout surcingle, which can scarcely be considered as an additional equipment, though with some regiments it would certainly be an alteration in the mode of girthing the horse, and it is probable that saddles with flaps might not answer, as the surcingle would perhaps slip off the flap.

Supposing for a moment that the lasso, which in *bonâ fide practice positively does answer in South America*, was to be generally introduced into the British cavalry, the result would be, that without injuring their efficiency as cavalry, every horse in the army would be an efficient draft-horse, with his harness always attached to him, and as the infantry for a moment lay aside the bayonet to work with the spade, so would the cavalry, in moments of emergency, lend an overpowering force, which has hitherto been dormant, and which might be exerted either *to carry off* the artillery, stores, &c., of the enemy, or to aid our own in their advance or retreat.

In case this general application of the system should be altogether objected to, it is with great deference submitted that a *portion* of the cavalry might carry lassos. Should this be objected to, a portion of the cavalry might be furnished with strong surcingles, and the artillery or pontoons, &c., might carry with them a few spare drag-ropes, to which this portion of the cavalry might occasionally be attached.

The introduction of the system would in its detail necessarily require a great deal of modification, reflection, and attention; and although it may altogether be disapproved of by the Commander-in-Chief, yet I trust his Grace will pardon the liberty I took in submitting it to his attention.

Should his Grace be disposed to order the experiment to be tried on a limited scale, I beg leave respectfully to state that I would furnish the officer to whom this duty might be committed with the few specimens I possess of

the lasso, surcingle, &c., and that should his Grace wish it, I would in any part of the country afford, to the best of my ability, any personal assistance on the subject, under the direction of any officer his Grace might appoint.

F. B. HEAD.

[694.] *To H. R. H. the Duke of Gloucester.*

SIR, London, 16th February, 1827.

I cannot express to your Royal Highness how much gratified I am by your Royal Highness's kind, and fair, and candid answer to my late address to your Royal Highness, nor how anxious I am that every question which may occur in the relation in which I have been placed towards your Royal Highness, may be viewed by your Royal Highness as not brought forward unnecessarily by me, but as occurring naturally in the course of the service.

I conceive that I stand, at present, in relation to your Royal Highness, nearly in the same position as his late Royal Highness the Duke of York stood towards your Royal Highness's illustrious father; and in consequence of your Royal Highness's letter, I have considered it my duty to refer the orders which your Royal Highness enclosed to me to those officers who have most experience in the conduct of duties of this description. Indeed this is the cause of the delay of this answer.

I enclose your Royal Highness the copy of a Memorandum which I have received, which clearly explains the course of business between the Quarter-Master-General and the regiments of Guards; and likewise the practice respecting reviews at the period of the command of the army by General Sir David Dundas.

Unless the practice recorded in the copies of the orders transmitted by your Royal Highness appears to have been invariable, I conclude the cases stated are exceptions to the general rule as laid down by the Quarter-Master-General.

I can assure your Royal Highness that I am anxious that, consistently with rule and regulation, every practice should be adopted which can be agreeable to your Royal Highness.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

When any change of Quarters is intended for the Guards, it is the practice for the Field Officer in Waiting to state the same in writing to the Quarter-Master-General, and then the Quarter-Master-General takes the Commander-in-Chief's pleasure upon the matter, and communicates the orders for the movement to the Field Officer in Waiting.

It will be found, on reference to the books of the Guards, that the orders for the march of the Guards to the interior, and to Deptford and Portsmouth for embarkation, were written in the Quarter-Master-General's own handwriting.

The Quarter-Master-General does not make any enquiry into the details as to what manner the detachments of the Guards have been made out, relying upon the statement of the Field Officer in Waiting; but it has been always the practice of the Quarter-Master-General (and he has more than once spoken to the late Duke of York upon the subject) that he cannot receive any communication from any one, whether Guards or other persons, to put any portion of his Majesty's troops in motion, but from the Commander-in-Chief himself.

It must be obvious that, whatever may be the internal arrangements of the Guards, or a division, that no change of Quarters or movement of any kind can be permitted without the previous sanction of the Commander-in-Chief.

It further appears that reviews were never made without the previous knowledge and sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. At the time Sir David Dundas was Commander-in-Chief, Lieut.-General Burrard was on the Staff, commanding the Guards, and when his Royal Highness the Duke of York wished to see the Guards, he applied to Sir David Dundas for his sanction.

To the Right Hon. George Canning. [695

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 17th February, 1827.

I return the enclosed papers addressed to you and myself. I don't doubt that some of the facts are true; such as relating to the composition, numbers, and station of the Legion of Hohenlohe, the name of the Irish officers employed in that Legion, the objects of the studies and conversation of the officers, the character and objects of Murphy, &c., &c. I don't doubt, likewise, that the French government consider Ireland one of the vulnerable points of the British empire, and it is not impossible that they may have listened to schemes for attacking Ireland, and that such projects are the common topics in some of the salons at Paris, among persons connected with the govern-

ment and the Court. But I very much doubt, indeed I do not believe, that any design of war with this country is entertained in France by the Ministry or the King. I don't know anything of the English consul at Brest, or of the French consul at Cork, but I don't think there would be much difficulty in discovering the characters of both; and in ascertaining whether it would be desirable to employ a more trustworthy person at Brest, or to observe the conduct of the French consul at Cork. I think I have seen the handwriting of these letters before. I should think the writer is one of the common givers of intelligence at Paris. You will be the best judge whether it will be desirable to encourage him to write any more by authorizing Lord Granville to publish the paragraph which he mentions.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall, 17th February, 1827.

If the account has not before reached you, you will hear with deep regret that Lord Liverpool was this morning seized with apoplexy about half-past ten, whilst he was at breakfast alone. Dr. Driver was in the house, and blood was immediately taken from Lord Liverpool's arm.

He has since shown more intelligence in his manner and countenance, but the right side remains incapacitated.

I have sent a messenger to the King.

Ever most sincerely yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Pavilion, Sunday evening,
MY DEAR DUKE, ½ past seven, 18th February, 1827.

As the account of twelve o'clock to day is unsatisfactory, and as the King is here alone, I have thought it better to remain until to-morrow morning at any rate.

We still think that while Lord Liverpool lives it would be better for the present to act as if we did not entirely despair of his recovery, and to go on with business in the House of Commons.

The King is still tranquil and composed, but appears very uncertain as to the course which it is best for him to pursue.

Ever most sincerely yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

Unless there appears a prospect of an *immediate* result of this fatal attack I shall return to-morrow.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Pavilion, Brighton,
MY DEAR DUKE, Sunday, ½ past 12, 18th February, 1827.

I have written you a letter which you can communicate to any or all of our colleagues if you please.

My coming here was precisely the right course, quite satisfactory to the King, and, as you will perceive from the enclosed, equally so to Canning.

I told the King that your impression on the first impulse of private feelings and personal regard for his Majesty, was to come to Brighton, but that you thought on reflection such a proceeding might excite and alarm the public. He said he should have been most happy to see you, but thought you had acted wisely in remaining in town.

I need not tell you in detail all that passed, as my intention is to return to town to-night, and I shall no doubt see you to-morrow.

Will it be advisable to have a meeting either with all our colleagues, or with those who are actively concerned in public business,—Lord Bathurst, Robinson, Huskisson, &c., &c.—to talk over the course of proceeding with the current business, in the course of to-morrow? If you think it will, pray make any arrangement.

Will you call on me to-morrow morning?

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Mrs. Canning to the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

DEAR MR. PEEL, ½ past 9 p.m.

Mr. Canning is happily so much better to-night that I have thought it best to communicate to him, without delay, the very afflicting intelligence conveyed in your letter. He desires me to say that it will be the greatest comfort and satisfaction to him to have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow morning, as soon after ten o'clock as it may suit you to call here.

Accept my best thanks for the kindness and consideration with which you have made this melancholy event known to Mr. Canning, and believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

J. CANNING.

P.S.—Mr. Canning has this moment received a letter from the King, enclosing your two notes to his Majesty, and written in the greatest affliction and dismay. We do not know whether you are aware that the King is laid up with a severe attack of gout in both feet, in the knee, and in one of his hands.

To the King.

London, 20th February, 1827.

Mr. Peel has delivered to me your Majesty's message in respect to Major-General Lord George Beresford; and I

assure your Majesty that there is no family respecting which I feel a more anxious desire to forward their views than I do those of the Beresford family. I now beg leave to enclose to your Majesty the statement of the relative services of Lieutenant-General Sir George Anson, and Major-General Lord George Beresford.

The former was aide-de-camp to his late Majesty, and served creditably as commanding officer of the 16th Light Dragoons, and subsequently as a major-general commanding a brigade of cavalry in the Peninsula, and for these services was created a Knight Commander of the Bath upon the reform of that order in 1814, and was appointed Colonel of the 23rd Light Dragoons, which regiment was reduced in 1818. The latter has never served in the field on any occasion. This is his misfortune rather than his fault; but the fact is material, and will be considered by those who will form a judgment upon this subject.

Lieutenant-General Sir George Anson is a Lieutenant-General of the 12th August, 1819; and Major-General Lord George Beresford a Major-General of the 4th June, 1814; and the first 175 on the Army List above the last. Moreover the practice has been generally to prefer for the command of regiments those who have been so employed, and have been reduced to half-pay. Lieutenant-General Sir George Anson is in Parliament, and uniformly opposed to government; and Major-General Lord George Beresford and his family have as uniformly supported the government. But your Majesty, for seventeen years, and my lamented predecessor in office had, during thirty-two years of exercise of the command of the army, established the principle that the pretensions of officers to your Majesty's favour, and to the honours and advantages of their profession, should be fairly considered notwithstanding their conduct in Parliament. There is no part of the uniformly meritorious conduct of my lamented predecessor in office which has been more highly approved of by your Majesty, extolled by your ministers, and applauded by the public, than this impartial selection of officers recommended to your Majesty for your gracious favour; and I thought it most important for your Majesty's service that the first occasion, at least, which should offer, should not afford the instance of a marked deviation from former practice in this particular.

I am perfectly aware of all the disadvantages under which I

labour in undertaking the duties of the office to which your Majesty has been most graciously pleased to appoint me, in succession to your Majesty's illustrious and lamented brother. One of these is that I am one of your Majesty's ministers, and I must be supposed by the army and the public in general to be more or less influenced by the party views of the Ministry; and it did and does appear to me to be of importance, not to myself, but to your Majesty's service, that in the very first act of this kind which I should submit to your Majesty, I should not be supposed to have forgotten all the claims of service, the examples of my illustrious predecessor, and your Majesty's approbation of the conduct from the example of which I should be supposed to have departed solely for the purposes of party and political influence.

The only way in which I can serve your Majesty, to your Majesty's honour and advantage, is by my zeal for your service, my anxious desire to give your Majesty satisfaction, and by an honest and fair character; and I entreat your Majesty not to deprive yourself of the benefit which you would derive from my preserving this last advantage, which would, in fact deprive your Majesty of all the advantages to be derived from the two first.

All which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

SERVICES OF LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GEORGE ANSON.

Cornet	16th Light Dragoons	3 May, 1786.
Lieutenant	"	16 Mar., 1791.
"	20th Light Dragoons	20 Jan., 1792.
Captain	"	9 Sept., 1792.
Major	"	25 Dec., 1794.
"	16th Light Dragoons	15 June, 1797.
Lieut.-Colonel	20th Light Dragoons	21 Dec., 1797.
"	15th Light Dragoons	16 Sept., 1798.
"	16th Light Dragoons	12 Dec., 1805.
Colonel	"	1 Jan., 1806.
Major-General	"	25 July, 1810.
Colonel	23rd Light Dragoons	3 Aug., 1814.
Reduced	"	Feb., 1818.
Lieut.-General	"	12 Aug., 1819.

Served in Jamaica with 20th Dragoons from 1791 to September 1797; was in the command of the 15th Dragoons as Lieut.-Colonel, in Holland,

in 1799; brigadier-General in Portugal, 22nd May, 1809; commanded a brigade of cavalry at Talavera, and was continued on the Staff in Peninsula as a Major-General from 25th July, 1810, to July, 1813, and frequently distinguished.

SERVICES OF MAJOR-GENERAL LORD GEORGE BERESFORD.

Cornet	14th Light Dragoons	30 Apr., 1794.
Lieutenant	107th Foot	31 May, 1794.
Captain	124th Foot	24 Sept., 1794.
"	88th Foot	29 July, 1796.
Major	6th Dragoon Guards	3 Dec., 1800.
Lieut.-Colonel	Dillon's Regiment	24 Sept., 1803.
"	71st Foot	16 Aug., 1804.
"	2nd Dragoon Guards	30 July, 1807.
Colonel	"	1 Jan., 1812.
Major-General	"	4 June, 1814.

The 2nd Dragoon Guards were not on service while Lord George Beresford was in that corps, nor was he even employed on the Staff or otherwise in the field.

Sir W. Knighton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Pavilion, Brighton,
23rd February, 1827.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

I have proceeded to business with his Majesty this morning, and you will find all your boxes sent back, and with the approval of your recommendation of Lieut.-General Sir George Anson to be colonel of the 4th Dragoon Guards vice Fane. I am commanded to acquaint your Grace that his Majesty approves entirely of the principle contained in your letter, and that his Majesty imagines that his explanation to Mr. Peel was imperfect. His Majesty in conclusion added that he highly approves of Sir George Anson as a *highly* meritorious officer. Your Grace will see that a little quiet conversation this morning has put it all right.

The King commands me to acquaint you, with his very kind regards, that his Majesty will be most happy to see you any day this next week that will suit your convenience. His Majesty does not name any particular day, that you may suit your own time; but the King seems particularly happy at the thoughts of seeing you.

His Majesty's gout is rapidly subsiding, and is, I thank God, much quieter since my arrival.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke, yours very sincerely,

W. KNIGHTON.

P.S.—I bore my journey tolerable, but I am not equal to much, and have still some fever hanging about me. You must excuse a feebleness in writing. W. K.

[FROM SIR P. ROCHE.]

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from a person of high consideration in Madrid, to a BRITISH OFFICER in London, dated 28th February, 1827, and received 14th March.

The aspect of affairs here is every day assuming a more warlike character; the Quintos in the provinces are raising with the utmost activity, and contracts are made for the purchase of arms in France and Holland.

No reflecting man can be deceived that things are working fast to a crisis, and that the ultimate issue of them must infallibly be war. It suits, however, the policy of Spain (identified as she now is with France) to temporise for the moment; but no man of common sense, at all acquainted (as most certainly you are) with this country, can believe in the sincerity of the promises and declarations of neutrality which this government feigns to profess, opposed as those promises are to her vital interests and political existence.

We are, as you know, making every effort to assemble a considerable corps of an army on the Estremadura frontier, the chief command of which is given to Sarsfield, remarkable chiefly for habitual drunkenness, but also for personal bravery, extreme rashness, and inveterate hatred to the English. He served in the Peninsular war, almost exclusively under Abisbal in Cataluña.

The utmost precautions are taken in the selection of officers, free from the suspicion of constitutional principles; and if any symptoms of this nature should break out, Sarsfield has peremptory orders to use the most summary process to stifle it. There is scarcely an officer that you remember employed. Few, if any, old soldiers are admitted upon this service. *Quintos* and drafts from the militia are for obvious reasons preferred; and, wholly the reverse of the former state of things, of nakedness and of misery, this force is altogether now well paid, clothed, and armed.

The Guards are magnificent, and your old friend Luis Rios is a colonel in them.

You greatly undervalue in England our means and resources for equipping this corps, and if need be, for carrying on a war, which the King, the Church, the Nobles, and the whole body of the Royalists call a war in defence of the monarchy and the whole of the property belonging to its respective establishments; the total subversion and spoliation of which is threatened by the introduction of the new institutions which the government of England is forcing upon Portugal.

And who can doubt, if such succeed, that the contagion must not spread to Spain, and that a repetition of the same scenes will be acted over again as took place in this country from 1820 to 1823? And who also can doubt that the moment that these same principles and institutions (so ill-understood and so ill-suited to the Spaniards) shall be again re-established, the whole of the numerous Liberals now supported by the British government in London are not destined to be sent back upon us to carry confiscation and desolation into the bosoms of innumerable families?

With the entire conviction, therefore, of these incontestable truths before the eyes of the King, the Church, and the Nobles, who can blame

them for opposing with all their might those innovations, believing also, as they do, that it is utterly and morally impracticable that two extreme systems, such, on the one hand, as your government is forcing on Portugal, and such, on the other, as actually exists in Spain, can *co-exist* in two countries, bordering on each other, as Spain and Portugal are, and under the circumstances of excitement which recent events have produced in both, and that eventually and infallibly one or the other must give way?

This being our universal feeling and our case, I repeat, can anybody blame us for using every effort, open and secret, to counteract the dangers which threaten us?

Rely upon it funds will not be wanted so long as there is a dollar belonging to every Catholic Church in Europe; for our cause is their cause, and the cause of every State upon the continent is the suppression of revolution.

Well, then, let us examine the alternative of our continuing to assist the Royalist Portuguese; and let the alternative and the threats of your government be what they may, depend upon it, we shall continue to do so. But it is said if we persevere, you will declare war against us. What a spectacle! the most powerful nation in Europe against the poorest!

Will the Duke of Wellington order ten or fifteen thousand British to cross the frontiers and penetrate into Estremadura? Nobody can doubt that such a corps would drive ten times the number of Spaniards before them; but where are they to stop? This British corps could not extend itself far beyond the basis of its operations or from the sources of its supplies, and would not assuredly devastate towns and villages which they so recently, under their great commander, shed their blood in defending. As a military operation, I assume, therefore, that this aggression would be worse than useless.

But I grant you, if this same British corps has orders to raise the standard of rebellion, and foment revolution against the government, a civil war may be excited, the ultimate issue of which I shall not take upon myself to decide.

But should you adopt this dangerous expedient, which I contend is the only weapon you have to use against us, where is this principle to end? Besides, if under any pretext whatsoever the British cross the frontiers, will the French army remain quiet spectators? and if not, are the British and French to change the positions they reciprocally held during the Peninsular war, so glorious to the former?

Believe me, my dear Sir, the prospect of the future is perilous, and from my heart I wish that Sir Henry Wellesley and yourself were back with us, who so well understand these people, and who might assuage the present irritation against your government. For we contend that you first strip us of our colonies; next, you are proceeding to measures calculated to upset the monarchy and to confiscate our properties; and, thirdly, your government has in its pay the whole of the persons who have brought upon us all our misfortunes, and you threaten us, if we take steps to defend ourselves against the approach of the calamities and ruin with which these very people desolated us in 1820 and 1823, with your vengeance.

And is it not a remarkable fact that neither the Duke of Wellington, nor Sir Henry Wellesley, nor Sir William A'Court could (as both Lord FitzRoy

Somerset and yourself well know) do anything practicable with these very people you now encourage.

I shall soon write to you again, but I indulge the hope of seeing you once more among us. Ballanzat is in Granada, Frias is expected here every day; Heredia goes as minister to London, and in my next I will let you know of further events.

Adios, amigo mio.

Sir W. Knighton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Pavilion, Brighton, 1st March, 1827.

I am honoured with the commands of the King to acquaint you that his Majesty will be happy to see you on any day that it may quite suit your convenience.

In my last letter I had, by the King's commands, named your coming any day in the course of this week that might be agreeable to you.

I write with some difficulty; I have had another attack, and this is my first day of getting up.

His Majesty is, I thank God, quite well; but in consequence of my severe indisposition I have not been able to see his Majesty for several days.

I have the honour to be yours very sincerely,

W. KNIGHTON.

To Mr. Planta.

MY DEAR PLANTA, London, 7th March, 1827.

If you intended to send me a second despatch to Mr. Stratford Canning you have omitted to enclose it. I have not seen anything from Mr. Stratford Canning these six months. But I conclude that he has made no progress. The way in which we stand is this: all the Powers agree in the principles of the Protocol; but none, not even the signing parties, in the mode of carrying that instrument into execution. There is a great deal of useful truth in the despatch from Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven. But this country is very far yet from what is therein proposed. Indeed, I don't think the Cabinet have ever looked farther than to withdraw ambassadors if other Powers should consent to do the same.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, 16, Cavendish Square, London, 8th March, 1827.

I annex the information I have received from Lisbon, which probably you are already informed of, as this is of the 17th ultimo. But the curious part relative to the state of the Infanta is still, in a letter of the 24th, said to remain equally suspicious. However, you will see it is not certain, and when I left Lisbon there was not a suspicion of it. I would be glad to see you any day (not pressing) that you are at leisure, to speak to you on the present state of the political horizon, as I have now all the Beresford interest put into my hands.

Yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

Major-General Sir J. Carmichael Smyth to General Mann.

SIR, Nutwood, Reigate, 10th March, 1827.

I have read with attention, Major-General Sir Howard Douglas's letter of 2nd January to the Duke of Wellington, forwarded to me by you yesterday, according to his Grace's desire. I take the liberty, with every respect, of submitting the following remarks.

In reading the Report of the Commission, of which I had the honour to be President, his Grace was pleased particularly to express his approbation of the reasoning relative to the impolicy (as it appeared to me) of occupying St. Andrew's, Grand Manan Island, or any other detached posts in the province of New Brunswick; and to concur in the opinion therein expressed, that the sovereignty of his Majesty's North American provinces will be better preserved by occupying important military points within the country, than by constructing batteries upon a coast or shore of such an extent. This principle was indeed suggested and laid down by his Grace himself, for the Niagara frontier; has been since acted upon by his authority upon the St. Lawrence; and I submit, with deference, is equally applicable to the province of New Brunswick.

An hostile armament entering the bay of Fundy must have one of the three following objects in view; the capture of St. John's town; the invasion of Nova Scotia by the Gut of Annapolis; or an attack upon the same province, by the Bay of Mines: there is nothing else for an enemy to attempt. If the island of Grand Manan (situated sixteen miles from Nova Scotia and ten from the coast of New Brunswick) was made as strong as Malta and was held by a garrison of 5000 men, and if St. Andrew's or the main land was also fortified and occupied by a similar force, nevertheless by such measures a superior enemy could not be prevented from entering the bay of Fundy and undertaking either of the three operations I have supposed he might contemplate. With a view consequently to the defence of the rear of the province of Nova Scotia, or to the prevention of any hostile approach by sea against St. John's Town, it is pretty evident that the occupation neither of Grand Manan Island nor of St. Andrew's is necessary. With respect to an attack by land from the state of Maine upon St. John's Town, it is equally evident that the occupation of Grand Manan Island by a British force could in no ways contribute to oppose

such a measure, and that therefore, in considering the subject of any hostile movement by land, Saint Andrew's only need be kept in view.

From St. Andrew's there are two roads leading into the province of New Brunswick; one, along the coast to the town of St. John's, about fifty miles in length, practicable for wheel carriages and partially settled; the other, a bridle road, cut through the forest, about seventy miles long and leading to Fredericton. The occupation of St. Andrew's would not, however, prevent an enemy advancing by either of these roads, as the communication from the United States across the St. Croix River is at Mile Town, higher up the river than at St. Andrew's, which is situated on a projecting point. If however the proposed post at St. Andrew's could be even so situated as to command the very point from which both these roads emanate, I humbly conceive the merits of the question would be very little altered. An enemy moving in force from the St. Croix River upon St. John's would, of course, either turn or blockade any post established at St. Andrew's. It is, indeed, evident that a province in close contact with the territory of a foreign power for several hundred miles must be liable, in time of war, to occasional inroads, not to be prevented by the establishment of a variety of posts, much less by that of the one under consideration. I humbly conceive, that there is no good reason for deviating, in the present instance, from the general principle laid down by his Grace. I take the liberty of adding, that it appears to me, by maintaining a regular military post at St. Andrew's, we should incur the certain inconvenience of further dispersing the King's troops; a circumstance surely in every point of view to be deprecated; be liable, moreover, in the event of hostilities, to be drawn into a war of petty posts, decidedly contrary, in my humble opinion, to what ought to be our military policy, and undertake the performance of a duty which I humbly submit had much better be confided to the militia and local authorities of the province. The Gut of Annapolis, the harbour of Picton, and all the important bays and harbours of Nova Scotia, with the exception of Halifax Harbour alone, are protected by batteries in charge of the militia artillery: I respectfully submit, that in time of war, such works as may be deemed advisable may be constructed at Grand Manan Island, and at St. Andrew's, and be given in charge to the militia of the two places, who surely will be fully equal to the performance of a similar duty for the protection of their own coasting trade, as that which is undertaken by the settlers in the province of Nova Scotia. In time of peace, I humbly conceive that nothing can be required at either.

With so many important claims of a serious magnitude upon the attention and upon the finance of the mother country (with a view to the maintenance of the King's authority in his Majesty's North American Provinces), I must confess I take a very different view of the propriety of the posts proposed either to be established or kept up at Grand Manan Island and at St. Andrew's, from that described by Sir Howard Douglas.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. Carmichael Smyth, Major-General.

From Sir Herbert Taylor.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE 1ST REGIMENT OF GUARDS.

12th March, 1827.

The old order of Charles II. gives to the Colonel of the 1st regiment of Guards the seniority as to the brigade.

Sir Charles Wills exercised the command under the authority of that order, although the youngest of the three Colonels, 1731.

The Duke of Cumberland exercised it in 1748, although younger than Lord Dunmore, Colonel of the 3rd Guards; Lord Ligonier issued the orders to the brigade, although junior by date of appointment to Lord Dunmore and Lord Tyrawley, Colonels of the two other regiments of Guards.

But in 1770 and 1771, Lord Tyrawley, Colonel of the Coldstream Guards, gave orders to the brigade.

But at that period the late Duke of Gloucester had succeeded Lord Ligonier, having been removed from the 3rd regiment to the 1st. His Royal Highness was at the bottom of the list of Major-Generals, and Lord Tyrawley was an old Field Marshal, when his Royal Highness was Colonel of the 3rd Guards, but he was in the same year made a Lieutenant-General.

The late Duke of Gloucester was the oldest Colonel and the oldest Field Marshal in 1805, when he died. But he was Colonel of the 1st Guards.

The Duke of Argyll then became senior Colonel in the brigade of Guards. He died in 1806, and as far as I recollect and can learn never assumed any command of the brigade as senior Colonel.

From these minutes it would seem clear that the command of the brigade has been vested in and exercised by the Colonel of the 1st regiment of Guards, although not the senior by date of appointment, and without reference to the question of his being in command of the army or on the Staff.

The late Duke of Gloucester's command of the brigade, or rather his giving orders to it while the Duke of York was Commander-in-Chief, would serve to confirm this.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Colonel Woodford to Sir Herbert Taylor.

MY DEAR SIR, Orderly Room, Grenadier Guards, 12th March, 1827.

When you can spare a moment from your more urgent business, you will perhaps be good enough to give a little consideration to the old order of Charles II., which has lately been talked of, and which confers a privilege of such importance on the 1st regiment of Guards that its claims really deserve to be weighed.

They would, indeed, have been very questionable if the records of that (rather remote) period had been studiously ransacked, and this old order thereby brought to light as an isolated document, unsupported by any later proofs of its agency. But it stands at the head of the Regimental Archives, in a book of orders of George II.'s reign, the first of a tolerably connected series from that to the present time.

The warrant, or order, of King Charles, and one or two orders by the Duke of Marlborough, are prefixed to this regular series, and are clearly intended to be registered as Standing Orders. Sir Charles Wills was Colonel of the

regiment when this book commenced, and the orders to the brigade of Guards are given in his name—and he appears to have had the command of the Guards under the authority of that very order of King Charles; for he was the youngest of the three Colonels, but nevertheless took military precedence of Lord Dunmore, Colonel of the 3rd regiment, and Lord Scarborough of the Coldstream. As appears not only from his giving brigade orders, but also from a letter signed "W. Strickland," addressed to "Sir Charles Wills" by the King's command, respecting certain disputes between the regiments of Guards and the Governor of the Tower, dated 19th August, 1731. And also from an agreement, respecting a roster, drawn up by the three Colonels and signed,

CHARLES WILLS.
DUNMORE.
SCARBOROUGH.

Sir Charles Wills is never mentioned as Commander-in-Chief, and it does not appear whether he was on the Staff. The latter, however, is not improbable, as there is an order in which he is named, together with "his Lieutenant-General, and *his* Major-General." He appears to have been of the Privy Council, and is also occasionally styled "His Excellency;" but the latter title may perhaps have belonged to his rank in George II.'s time, as it does still in Germany to that of Lieutenant-General. Of the reign of James II. and William and Mary there are no orders in our books. In Queen Anne's reign the Duke of Marlborough gave orders, and in him all the three claims were united—Colonel of the 1st regiment, Commander-in-Chief, and senior Colonel by date of appointment.

To the Duke of Marlborough Lord Cadogan succeeded, and then Sir Charles Wills.

After Sir C. Wills, when the Duke of Cumberland became Colonel of the 1st regiment, there is unfortunately a chasm of about eight years in the collection of orders; but at the end of the year 1748 they recommence and are given in the Duke of Cumberland's name. He was not senior Colonel by date of appointment (as Lord Dunmore was still in the 3rd regiment), and must therefore have given orders either as Colonel of the 1st regiment, or as Commander-in-Chief. After the death of the Duke of Cumberland, the orders to the brigade were given by Lord Ligonier, Colonel of the 1st regiment, but junior (by date of appointment) both to Lord Dunmore of the 3rd regiment and to Lord Tyrawley, Colonel of the Coldstream.

Lord Ligonier therefore gave orders to the brigade, either as Colonel of the 1st regiment or as Commander-in-Chief.

After Lord Ligonier's death the command, for the first time, ceased to reside with the Colonel of the 1st regiment. Lord Tyrawley of the Coldstream gave orders to the brigade during the years 1770 and 1771; but probably this may be accounted for by the peculiar circumstances of the case. His Royal Highness the late Duke of Gloucester succeeded Lord Ligonier as Colonel.

At the beginning of the year 1770, his Royal Highness was at the bottom of the list of Major-Generals and Colonel of the 3rd regiment, Lord Tyrawley being then an old Field Marshal and Colonel of the Coldstream.

In April of the same year his Royal Highness was made Lieutenant-General and Colonel of the 1st regiment.

To have given his Royal Highness the command which had till then accompanied the Colonelcy of the 1st regiment would have been to supersede the only Field Marshal then in the army, and an old man, who died in two or three years after.

To revert to King Charles's order, it appears to have been certainly acted upon in the case of Sir Charles Wills, if not also in the cases of the Duke of

Cumberland and Lord Ligonier—and until the year 1770 there are no orders whatever given, except through the field officer in Brigade waiting, by the King, or by the Colonel of the 1st regiment.

The antiquity of the warrant tends rather to give it weight, as dating from the first establishment of the *brigade*, when King Charles added General Monk's regiment of the Line to the Royal Guards.

Believe me, my dear Sir, very truly yours,

J. WOODFORD.

I think the Duke of Argyll did not command the brigade at the death of his Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, although he was a senior Colonel of Guards to his Royal Highness the late Duke of York.

There was no Commander-in-Chief when Lord Tyrawley commanded the brigade, or at least the Commander-in-Chief did not belong to the Guards. Lord Granby resigned about that time. He never seems to have interfered with the Foot Guards.

COMPARATIVE RANK OF MILITARY AND CIVIL OFFICERS.

Horse-Guards, 14th March, 1828.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter * of the 11th January, together with its enclosures, regarding a question of comparative rank, arising in the pretensions of the surgeon of the — regiment to take precedence as a President of a Board of Survey, upon the plea of seniority in the date of his relative commission.

Upon a careful consideration of all the documents transmitted by you on this occasion, the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that this whole subject is misunderstood; and that the late Commander-in-Chief could not have had the question in all its bearings brought under his view, when his Royal Highness authorised the reply, upon the claim of Mr. T——, Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, communicated in the Adjutant-General's letter of the 11th December, 1823.

The General Regulations, which define the relative rank of all the civil officers of the army, were framed for the express purpose of regulating their corresponding claim to quarters, allowances, prize-money, &c.; and it is clearly stated that such relative rank is not to extend to "the exercise of any military authority or command whatever." It would be quite inconsistent with the letter and spirit of this regulation, to permit officers of the civil departments to assume any control at mixed Boards; and it is quite clear that the late Commander-in-Chief never contemplated that they should assume the station of a President at such Boards. Such a pretension on the part of a surgeon of a regiment, as assumed by Mr. G——, Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, in his departmental order, renders it quite necessary that the exercise of this relative rank, on the part of the civil officers of the army, should be strictly confined to the letter of the King's Regulations.

His Grace is aware that it is essential to the interests of the public

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* This Instruction was transmitted by the Adjutant-General (Sir Henry Torrens) to Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Warde, K.C.B., commanding at Barbadoes.

service that certain Boards should, according to the object of their inquiry, have the advantage of the information which the officers of the civil departments can best afford; and they are employed upon such Boards for the express purpose of giving the assistance which comes within the limits of their departments; but it would be an anomaly to invest them with the control which must attach to the situation of a President, who must have a general, and not a departmental, view of the object on which a Board is assembled. It is the military officer alone who can have this view, and he only can be the President of a Board; his claim to which must not be disturbed by any pretensions as arising in the relative rank of civil officers of the army, granted for other and express purposes.

This principle may be fully illustrated with reference to the claim of Mr. T——, Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, in 1823, to the rights of his relative rank in a Board assembled to decide on a proper situation for a lunatic asylum. His opinion on this point could only be departmentally professional; but there were many other objects for consideration, which could only be under the view of the military officer, and which give the latter an undoubted claim to precedence and the control belonging to it, which, if assumed by a departmental civil officer, the King's Regulations would be violated.

Impressed with the considerations arising out of this view of the subject, and with the necessity of putting this question at rest, in conformity with the spirit, as well as the letter, of the King's Regulations, I have received the Commander-in-Chief's commands to desire that you will be pleased to cancel your General Order of the 11th January, which gives to the officers of the civil departments of the army the advantages of their relative ranks; and likewise that of the 19th January, dispensing with the nomination of President, in cases where such officers are employed in the formation of Boards.

I am, at the same time, to desire you will convey to Mr. G——, Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, the expression of the Commander-in-Chief's displeasure at the extreme irregularity of issuing his departmental order, which has a reference to points affecting the general service; and further, that you will admonish Mr. G—— not to issue any such order in future, and particularly without the knowledge of the Commander of the Forces.

I have, &c.,

H. TORRENS, A.-G.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 19th March, 1827.

I saw the Prince Lieven yesterday; he put into my hands the four papers which I send to you, requesting my opinion on the *Projet de Traité*, which he has framed on the sketch transmitted to him from St. Petersburg, and the suggestion of any alterations in it.

With these papers I send two (which you have seen before) necessary for the better understanding of them, viz.: copy of a despatch from Pozzo to Prince Lieven, and the draft (enclosed therein) of the *Projet de Traité* drawn up by M. Damas, with the marginal notes of Granville and Pozzo.

You have thus the three drafts of treaty before you.

1st. The French.

2nd. The amendments proposed in the French.

3rd. The draft suggested by Russia.

We may, I am persuaded, do pretty much as we think right in framing a final amended draft out of the whole.

In the few pencilled observations upon Lieven's draft, I have chiefly had in view to bring back everything to which France appeared to attach importance, and which the Russian sketch had (probably without intention) omitted.

When you have had leisure to consider these papers, I shall be very glad to fix a time when you and I and Granville can meet to frame a *projet* out of them, which I will forthwith transmit to Paris; where both Damas and Pozzo are impatient to put the finishing hand to this treaty.

Prussia, and more tardily Austria, will most certainly accede; when the latter sees that there is no help. But I confess I think the signing in the first instance, by Russia, France, and England only, at once the *only sure* pledge of the co-operation of the other Powers; and in itself, for effect in Europe, a matter of the highest interest and value.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

698.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 20th March, 1827.

I have perused the papers in the box, which I return; and I will attend you and Lord Granville any day you please excepting Thursday, when I am to be at Windsor.

I think the objectionable part of the Treaty is the separate article. It alters the character of the measure originally proposed to be carried into execution by the Protocol, and renders the mediation one of force instead of one founded upon the interests of the hostile parties and the friendly disposition as well as the interests of the mediators. It tends to render recognition of an insurgent State a measure of war, contrary to all the principles on which this country has hitherto proceeded in adopting such measures; and, in fact, the measures proposed under this separate article would not forward the object in view by one day, unless the first, that of withdrawing the ambassadors, was adopted by all Christian Powers; and unless it should turn out, as I believe it will not, that the Greeks are not strong enough to contend with the Turks at sea in the approaching campaign.

Ever, my dear Mr. Canning, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

To the Duke of Buckingham. [699

MY DEAR DUKE, London, 21st March, 1827.

I did not return from the House of Lords last night till after eight o'clock, when I did not perceive your letter; and I have therefore opened it only this morning.

I hope you will allow me to return it to you and to consider it *non avenue!*

I am going to Windsor to dine and pass to-morrow with his Majesty. It is most probable that his Majesty will not talk to me upon any business; and that he will continue in that state of reserve in which he has kept himself towards all his ministers, I believe without exception, upon the subject of the successor to his Prime Minister since the misfortune occurred which has deprived his Majesty of the services of Lord Liverpool.*

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

To the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Buckingham House, 20th March, 1827.

I have just parted from Lord Londonderry, who informs me that your Grace is going to Windsor either to-day or to-morrow.

After great consideration, Lord Londonderry has encouraged me to write to you this note in the fullest reliance upon your honour, and being convinced that you will only make use of it in such a way as may be in your opinion most conducive to the real interests of the country and the feelings of his Majesty. It is most probable that your Grace's opinions may be demanded by his Majesty upon the present state of his government, and possibly upon the formation of a new one. We both think it due to your Grace that we should make known to you the following fact, viz., that there exists in the minds of many persons who think differently upon the Catholic question, and of considerable influence in the country, a strong disposition to afford to his Majesty their best assistance and support should his Majesty contemplate the formation of a balanced government without Mr. Canning's assistance. My principal object in thus entrusting to your Grace our sentiments upon this subject, is, if possible, to avoid measures being forced upon the country through the means of Mr. Canning, and by the influence of the Opposition to his Majesty's government, which we cannot but fear might lead to results dangerous to the peace of the country, as with respect to its foreign relations, as well as to its internal prosperity, and which we think might be done without compromising our opinion

* The Earl of Liverpool had an attack of apoplexy on the 17th February, 1827, and remained for some time insensible. He did not resume official life, and died 4th December, 1828.

upon the Catholic question, which we retain as strongly as ever. In leaving it to your discretion to act upon this letter, I also depend implicitly upon your doing so without compromising the Marquess of Londonderry's name or mine.

Believe me, my dear Duke, with the greatest regard, yours very sincerely,

BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 22nd March, 1827.

The Cabinet will attend here to-day at three o'clock, for the chance of hearing anything that you may have to report to them.

Will you, therefore, have the goodness to come here as soon as you conveniently can after your arrival in town.

I intended to have written to you to this effect by the messenger of last night, but unfortunately I forgot to do so.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

0.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 26th March, 1827.

In the Memorandum which I sent you yesterday I omitted to advert to that article of the Treaty which limits the guarantee of the arrangement to such of the contracting parties as may choose to undertake it. This will, in fact, leave the guarantee to France and Russia, or to one of those Powers.

This Greek State will sooner or later become independent. It will be a continental maritime Power; and it will certainly not be advisable to leave it under the influence of France or Russia, or both. I believe that the other Powers mentioned in the Protocol have not pronounced upon the guarantee. But it surely would be desirable to leave them the option of becoming parties to the Treaty, or to the guarantee if they should think proper, which is, as well as I recollect, what was held out in the Protocol.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

1.] *To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

MY DEAR HUSKISSON, Royal Lodge, Windsor, 28th March, 1827.

I send you a paper which Lord Gwydyr has sent me regarding the averages. The objections to the scheme proposed in this paper are obvious, and I have stated some of them to him; but it is as well that you should see all that is proposed on this subject.

I believe the best preventive of fraud would be the average taken upon a fortnight of some of the smaller and more distant markets, and a week in London and some of the larger ones.

I liked very much your scheme of excluding from our ports the corn of those countries which should not admit our produce and manufactures as those of the most favoured nations. But in the execution of your measure you will have to exclude this corn from warehousing in England. Indeed I think the whole system of warehousing will require revision and attention, as being that through which all the speculative frauds in the corn trade will in future be carried on.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn. [7

MY DEAR WYNN, Royal Lodge, Windsor, 28th March, 1827.

I return your box, having perused the paper which it contains.

I pronounce with great hesitation a difference of opinion with Lord Hastings upon a local matter. He must have had more recent experience than I had, and most particularly in these establishments of horse artillery of which there were none in my time in the East Indies; the artillery, excepting some guns attached to the cavalry and horsed by the regiments to which they were attached, being all drawn by bullocks. But I should say, generally, that eight guns formed a better battery than six; and that if they are accustomed to horse eight they will perform that duty equally well for eight guns as other troops accustomed only to six would for six. A reduction of two guns a troop is a very great reduction of *horsed* guns; and will not be compensated for by any augmentation of the foot artillery or Golundauze* with guns drawn by bullocks. In my time in the East Indies there existed a great prejudice against Golundauze; and the principle of the service was to employ none. Just at that time, I believe, they were introduced into Bengal. If there are any they should be in small bodies, and officered by European officers; and I like the scheme proposed because it provides for both objects.

* Native artillery-men.

The chief engineer and the commanding officer of artillery are the principal men at all sieges, but before I can give you my opinion on these claims I should like to see the 'Gazette' on Bhurtpoor. I wait to see this, also, to write to you upon Lieut.-Colonels Cunliffe and Bryant.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Colonel Burgoyne to Lord FitzRoy Somerset.*

MY DEAR LORD FITZROY, Elvas, 31st March, 1827.

Many thanks for your kind letter of the 14th March, and for your good wishes; I am quite satisfied that in this, as I believe in everything else, you have done what is right.

In consequence of some late movements of the Spaniards in this direction and a variety of reports, Sir William Clinton has again sent me here to ascertain and report to him what they were about. It certainly was subject for jealousy, that they should maintain an army of 9000 or 10,000 men (which they were even increasing) to threaten this province or Beira, at a time when everything was perfectly tranquil, no rebels near, and the Portuguese force of no strength whatever;—the main body of that army is about Talavera, with a corps called of Observation, about 3000 strong, at Caçeres, and large stores of provisions, &c., on the immediate frontier, at Albuquerque, &c. If they should continue this system, the Portuguese government would be put to considerable expense to keep up in some measure a counteracting force. In the early part of March the measures of the Spaniards seemed to indicate an invasion of Portugal, which was even strongly reported among themselves; whether the entire discomfiture of the rebels in the North, or whether the result of negotiations have caused any change of policy, I don't know; but since the middle of the month some changes have had a more pacific appearance; in particular, an extensive recruiting that was ordered has been suspended. Should they advance, the war would be one of opinion in the two countries; and from what I can hear and perceive, I think the constitutional party would decidedly get the advantage of the other, having Great Britain for a support, as it would in the present instance.

There is much less fermentation of spirit in Portugal now than on our arrival, the party against the existing order of things seems to be laid for the present, nor do they show any symptoms of even underhand opposition.

Constitutional sentiments are working their way into men's minds; that cause may be checked, but I think that nothing now can stop it in the Peninsula generally—the speeches in the Chambers are eagerly read all over this country, the people's minds are opening, and they comprehend affairs, and discuss their merits with much more understanding than used to be the case.

Should Spain, Great Britain, and Portugal, come to an amicable understanding, I shall be anxious to know what will become of our little army;

* Afterwards Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne.

certainly the Portuguese will be sorry to lose us at present. We have been of infinite service by our presence, and are still the anchor that keeps everything steady; the fault of the present government is the want of firmness and confidence. I believe the greatest friends of the existing system are very anxious for it as a system, but have doubts about the legitimacy of its introduction; they blink the question of the *rights* of Don Pedro and Don Miguel, and are not yet bold enough to adhere to the former professedly as the best friend of the country independent of strict right; while the opposite party maintain in direct terms that Don Pedro, since assuming the empire of Brazil, virtually abandoned all right to interfere with Portugal.

The natives, particularly at a distance from the army where their genuine feelings can be best appreciated, are more civil to us than ever; one now seldom even meets with the serious countenance of an Anti-Constitutionalist; I have had opportunities of being very good friends with some who were notoriously so.

The regular soldiers that I have seen retain much more of the good system that was introduced among them than I expected to have found; they are still very respectable looking troops; the militia are wretched and expensive, and it is bad policy, I think, that keeps so many of them employed.

I remain, my dear Lord FitzRoy,

your very obliged and faithful,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

MINUTE ON THE OBSERVATIONS OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR H. DOUGLAS AND MAJOR-GENERAL SIR J. C. SMYTH ON THE DEFENCES OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK.

April, 1827.

I have perused these papers with attention, and I agree very much in opinion with Sir James Smyth.

There is nothing so ill-judged, on general principles, as to carry a *System of Defence* to the extreme frontier of a country which can be entered at all points.

St. Andrew's and the Island of Grand Manan may be in themselves important points, and it may eventually be necessary to occupy those points with defensive works to enable the militia and colonial troops to maintain them. But these posts must not be considered as points in the general defensive system of the province.

WELLINGTON.

[Let these papers be sent to the Board, and copies of them be kept for me; and desire the Board to transmit them to Sir Howard Douglas.

WELLINGTON.]

Lord Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, London, 1st April, 1827.

However much to be lamented, I am fully aware of the difficulty, if not impracticability, of reforming the administration upon the Protestant principles; and consequently that we must acquiesce in having a Cabinet of mixed opinions upon the subject now of the greatest importance to the whole United Kingdom—*the government of Ireland.*

Our only hope rests on your Grace, fortified and supported, as we trust will be the case, by the stipulations which his Majesty may make with others of less pure principles, upon the subject of the Romanist demands.

To govern Ireland effectually without some thorough understanding among the members of Cabinet upon this subject, and their acting entirely in unison upon it, I conceive would be impossible. The government, *as a government*, must take a tone and a decided one upon this matter; what has dropped from this or that member of Cabinet at this or that time, or has been imprudently written by this or that Lord-Lieutenant on retiring from the Lieutenancy, or the exposure of a Cabinet Minute through the bad faith of him to whom it was imprudently confided, is no longer to serve as a basis to the proceedings of factions and illegal meetings, and to be construed into pledges which could not be redeemed without the destruction of the Constitution. This sort of deception, it is to be hoped, is no longer to be practised. If it is intended that Ireland shall be admitted within the pale of civil government and protection, the Romanists must be given to understand their real situation, and a common tone, as far as it can be agreed upon, towards them, assumed by his Majesty's government, supported and maintained, if necessary, by firmness and unison of action.

Presuming that the government to be framed through his Majesty's exertions will be such as to admit thereof (and if it should not, as far as Ireland is concerned, it will be no government at all), I have hastily thrown together (very far indeed from considering the announce as perfect) my thoughts on what I should conceive might well be the avowed language of that government towards the Romanists.

Some of the advantages of a fair and candid avowal of this sort are, That it denotes union and firmness,—both of which it were to be wished could be established.

That it negatives all hope of unlimited or unqualified concession, and throws the responsibility from the government upon the suitors themselves, and this without any pledge upon the part of the State.

That it tends to divide the laity of the Romanist persuasion from their clergy.

That it may afford time; and time, with what is passing now in Ireland, is of the utmost consequence.

Other advantages might be enumerated; among the rest, no mean one will be found in the encouragement of the Protestants, who stand much in need of it; and these, and those set forth, may be obtained without impeding, but rather on the contrary forwarding any negotiation at Rome, should such a measure be resolved upon. Whether it should or not indeed —as by the Act of Congress at Vienna, subsequently sanctioned by Parliament, the Pope is acknowledged by us as a temporal Prince and his terri-

tories guaranteed to him—his Majesty ought, totally abstracted from the Roman Catholic question, to have the power of sending a minister to that Court, if he shall so think fit.

It will be essential to send us to Ireland a Lord-Lieutenant (the higher in rank the better) of strong understanding and nerves, prepared for the utmost abuse, strengthened with law officers who know and will do their duty, and by the full support of the Cabinet; with a Chief Secretary acting on the same, and not on contrary principles; with instructions to do equal justice to *all* without regard to religion, but to vindicate the laws and to re-establish and uphold his Majesty's authority, reduced at this moment to nearly nothing. If the laws, as existing, shall prove sufficient for this purpose—well. If not, Parliament may then be resorted to for the enactment of stronger measures.

The state of such a Lord-Lieutenant, it is admitted, will not be an enviable one, for, no doubt the Popish hierarchy and their partisans, who feel the very ground crumbling under their feet from the progress of knowledge and consequent reformation (however ignorantly sneered at by some) incipient among the people, will use every effort to deny and put down such a governor, and possibly to excite even to rebellion the enthusiasm of their flocks, already to a considerable degree organised and armed, under the *blessed* system of miscalled *conciliation*, which has of late been substituted for legitimate government.

But, as your Grace knows better than any man, the greater the difficulty, the more the *real* honour and self satisfaction to be derived from its firm, steady, and successful encounter; and that man is not fit for public life who would shrink from a duty of this sort at such a time.

I shall only add that I should hope all *experimental* legislation for Ireland (and specially upon the reports of the Education Commission) will be avoided. Farewell, and prosper.

Most sincerely your Grace's ever faithful and obliged friend,

CLANCARTY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM OF THE TONE TO BE ADOPTED BY HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO THE ROMAN CATHOLICS.

London, 31st March, 1827.

The Roman Catholics can have no *right* to what they call emancipation, because *unqualified* emancipation would be neither more nor less than an absolute overthrow of the Constitution as established at the Revolution, inasmuch as thereby *all* foreign jurisdiction was excluded, &c. Neither would such emancipation be, as pretended, the placing his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects merely upon an equality with, but, in effect, to a certain (and no very trifling) degree, giving them an ascendancy over the Protestants of this realm. For, while they would thus be placed in a situation to legislate for, and, as forming a part of both Houses of Parliament, to control and direct all matters concerning the Church of England, and other denominations of Protestants; they would doubtless, under their *unqualified emancipation*, deny all power to the Legislature

(and consequently to the Protestant part of it) of interfering with their religious concerns.

The Roman Catholics therefore can have no *claim of* RIGHT *to unqualified* emancipation.

They can therefore only appear before the Legislature as suitors.

By the Revolution, the Constitution of the then two kingdoms, now united in one, was declared to be essentially Protestant, and the King, to the exclusion of *all* foreign jurisdiction, supreme head of the Church. By the union with Ireland this provision was expressly guaranteed. Moreover, from the very nature of the Church of Rome—from its tendency to grasp at and usurp upon the temporal power of every State—every nation, that of England when papal among the rest, has thought fit to enact salutary provisions, whether by Concordat with the Court of Rome or otherwise, to prevent the encroachments of that power upon the sovereignty of the State. Besides all this there exists, and to a considerable extent, an unwholesome and misapplied influence through a large part of his Majesty's dominions, existing in and exercised by a popish hierarchy unknown to the law, which already has been felt both *in* and *out* of Parliament, and which under no circumstances can be suffered to remain uncontrolled by the State.

As suitors therefore it behoves the Roman Catholics, seeking admission into the Legislature, and other franchises, to show how foreign jurisdiction within this realm is to be obviated, or placed under the salutary control of the State. How the Church of England and other Protestant denominations, acknowledged and supported by law, within this realm, are to be upheld, maintained, and effectually guaranteed. In what manner their religion and its ministers are to be placed under the *practical* control of his Majesty and of his Parliament, so as to assimilate them with their Protestant fellow subjects, who already cheerfully submit to the beneficial control and direction of the Legislature, acknowledging no head upon earth, but what is to be found in the State. As suitors it behoves the Roman Catholics seeking further franchises to point out how all this is to be effected; and instead of senseless brawling, and identifying themselves with every factious demagogue, to the ruin of the credit, peace, and prosperity of their country, calmly to reflect, that the difficulties which exist to oppose the advancement of their views are solely to be found within their own (as it is thought misconstrued) religion, the institutions (and perhaps still more the abuses) of which are, apparently at least, incompatible with the free Constitution of the United Kingdom.

If, compatibly with their religion, means cannot be found to obviate the difficulties above set forth, then (however much to be lamented) the Roman Catholics must attribute to their religion, and to their religion alone, their exclusion from the farther franchises of the State. But if, with real zeal and anxiety to uphold and support in *all its entirety* that Constitution, into all the privileges of which they profess to be so desirous of entering, they shall find the means (as it is firmly believed they can), without violating any essential doctrine of their faith, to place themselves and their priesthood *practically* in the same position with reference to the Crown and Parliament of the United Kingdom, wherein their Protestant fellow subjects are already found, it behoves them to go the full length of doing so. Should they be prevented from performing this, by which their demands can alone be rendered reasonable, through the arbitrary interference of their usurping hierarchy, to their hierarchy they must attribute the disappointment of their views.

Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Stanhope House, 3rd April, 1827.

If you should not see Mr. Peel before you see Mr. Canning, it may be right to suggest to you that from what I collected from the former, he believes that Mr. Canning did not feel by any means propitious to your being called from your present high military office to a civil one, as it would appear a forced measure, adopted for the purpose of excluding him from what otherwise must have been conceded to him.

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

To General Viscount Combermere. [7(

MY LORD, Horse-Guards, 5th April, 1827.

I have perused with great attention the proceedings of the general courts-martial held upon the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel ——— and Lieut.-Colonel ——— of the —th Light Dragoons, the General Orders issued by your Lordship and his Excellency Lieut.-General Sir George Walker, and the other papers and documents transmitted by your Lordship for the information of my lamented predecessor in office, regarding the state of the —th Light Dragoons; and as some principles affecting his Majesty's service at large have been discussed in the various observations, orders, letters, &c., which have been written upon this subject, I have thought it proper to review the whole, and to convey to your Lordship my opinion upon those principles.

I will advert presently to the state of the discipline of the —th Light Dragoons, which is undoubtedly to be attributed to the misunderstanding and disputes between its superior officers; but it is necessary first that the relative situation of these officers should be clearly defined and understood.

His Majesty's commissions to the lieut.-colonel or other superior officer of a regiment, clearly state that they "are to take the said regiment into" their "care and charge," and to use their best endeavour to keep the "officers and soldiers thereof" in good order and discipline, "and, further, that they are to observe and follow such orders and directions as they shall receive from us," their "colonel, or any other" their "superior officer according to the rules and discipline of war."

There is no limitation or exception unless such exception can be found in the "Rules and Discipline of War."

The organization of his Majesty's service, and the practice of

taking officers from their regiments to employ them on the Staff, or to exercise the duties of more extensive and important commands, still leaving them as effectives on the strength of their several regiments, and the practice of giving officers leave of absence, have occasioned a partial distinction in the office of commanding officer; which office, although not recognized in his Majesty's commission, is recognized in practice in his Majesty's orders and regulations, and in the Articles of War, and this office comes clearly under the description of one known in the "Rules and Discipline of War." But it must be observed that his Majesty's commission contains clear and positive orders; and the exception must be confined strictly within the limits of the rule and practice which justify the departure from an observance of such orders.

There can be no doubt that an officer absent from his regiment is not the commanding officer of the regiment according to the "Rules and Discipline of War," whether such absence is by leave or on account of sickness, or because such officer is employed on the Staff or in the exercise of a superior command, whether by command of his Majesty, or by command or with the permission of those authorized by his Majesty.

Such officer, so absent, cannot be considered responsible for the conduct of the duties of the regiment; and the senior officer present must be so considered according to the same rules and practice.

But it must be observed that the rules and the practice of the service have limited the powers and responsibility of the actual commanding officer of a regiment, when he is not the colonel in some instances, and in others when he is not the lieut.-colonel next in rank to the colonel.

For instance, the powers of appointing agents and paymasters to the regiment, and certain other Staff officers, and every matter relating to the clothing and appointments, and, in many instances, to the recommendation for the promotion and appointment of commissioned officers, the power of appointment of warrant officers, and that of reduction of non-commissioned officers, are in the hands of the colonel; and there is a positive regulation, page 127 of his Majesty's General Regulations and Orders, which states that officers in the temporary command of regiments are not to issue orders contradictory to the standing orders of the regiment.

It is obvious, then, that the rules and practice of the service recognize an authority in the colonel and other officers of a regiment, of rank superior to that of the actual commanding officer; and I observe that the orders, of which I enclose copies, issued by your Lordship's predecessors in office, the Marquess of Hastings and Sir Edward Paget, clearly recognize this principle—the former in the case of recommendations for the promotion and appointments of officers; and the latter even in the most minute details. The order of General Sir Edward Paget goes so far as to direct that the 20th Regiment should not be detached from the station at which it might be convenient to the service to employ Colonel Fitzgerald, in order that he might be able to exercise a command over that regiment, even to the most minute details, notwithstanding that the Colonel should have permission to accept from the East India Company's government and to exercise, a command of a higher and more extensive nature.

These orders and precedents, and the practice in daily use, point out how difficult it is to lay down any strict rule for the exercise of the powers granted, by his commission, to the colonel or other officer of a regiment senior to the actual commanding officer present; such senior officer, whether absent or present, is responsible for the exercise of the powers entrusted to him by his commission in every case in which it may appear to him to be necessary; but, on the other hand, he must be aware that the rules and practice of the service have necessarily imposed duties on the actual commanding officer, and that such actual commanding officer must be vested with powers to enable him to conduct the duties for which he is responsible; and the colonel, or other senior officer, must feel that his own superior powers must be used with discretion, and that he is responsible for the undue use of those powers, as well as for not using them when the necessity of the case requires it.

I now come to consider of the case of the colonel, or other superior officer of a regiment, permitted to accept and exercise a superior command, in which command the regiment is stationed to which he is commissioned; which is the case of Lieut.-Colonel ——— and Lieut.-Colonel ———.

Such officer, having higher and more extensive duties to perform, must be considered absent from his regiment, to all intents and purposes of actual command. This appears to be

the practice of the service, from the enclosed copy of a letter written by order of his late Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, to General Lord Charles Somerset, on the 22nd July, 1825, on the exercise of the command of the 49th Regiment by the lieut.-colonel who had been appointed to command the citadel at Cape Town.

This case is exactly similar to that of Lieut.-Colonel ———, and it is quite clear that, although Lieut.-Colonel ——— was by his commission required "to take under his care and charge" the —th Light Dragoons, and "to keep them in good order and discipline," still "by the Rules and Discipline of War," and the practice of the service, he was required not to interfere unnecessarily in the command and in the conduct of the duties and discipline of the regiment by Lieut.-Colonel ———, its actual commanding officer; most particularly after having been required to refrain from such unnecessary interference by command of his superior officer, Major-General Sir Theophilus Pritzler.

The interference of Lieut.-Colonel ——— was not necessary or discreet, and, in its exercise, he does not appear to have had in view, exclusively, the benefit of his Majesty's service; and, in the form of the exercise of this interference, he disobeyed the positive command of "his superior officer."

The consequence of this indiscretion of Lieut.-Colonel ——— and of the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel ———, which I cannot approve, is, that there existed two authorities in the —th Light Dragoons: both exercising command in detail, both desirous of retaining the influence and authority over the officers and soldiers of the regiment which such command gives, and each jealous of obedience to the orders of the other. The consequence was that these superior officers of the —th Light Dragoons naturally and necessarily became the heads of parties in the regiment, and all sense, and practice, and spirit of discipline and order, have been lost in the interest and objects of the parties.

It is absolutely necessary that this state of things should be brought to a termination. Accordingly I beg that your Lordship will be pleased to have the —th Light Dragoons cantoned where it can be alone; that the lieut.-colonel of the regiment may have no superior command to take him from his duties as lieut.-colonel of the —th Light Dragoons, that none of the

officers of the —th Light Dragoons may be employed on the Staff, or have leave of absence from the regiment, and that no officer in that corps shall be recommended for promotion till these unfortunate divisions and this state of party shall no longer exist.

I beg that the regiment may be frequently inspected by a general officer, who will report upon its state, particularly in relation to these divisions among the officers, and to the discipline and order among the non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

GENERAL ORDER.

Head-quarters, Madras, 14th May, 1819.

With reference to General Orders of the 10th November, 1818, Lieut.-General Trapaud, in pursuance of instructions from his Excellency the most noble the Commander-in-Chief in India, is pleased to direct that recommendations for promotions, as well as returns and other regimental papers, are to be signed by the officers in immediate command of his Majesty's regiments on the establishment of Fort St. George, the said recommendations being forwarded, however, through the channel of the senior officers exercising higher duties than those of regimental command when actually present where the head-quarters of their respective corps are stationed.

By order of Lieut.-General TRAPAUD:

E. J. MACGREGOR MURRAY, Lieut.-Colonel,
Deputy-Adjutant-General H.M. Forces.

SIR, Head-quarters, Calcutta, 17th March, 1825.

In transmitting to your Excellency the accompanying copy of a letter addressed [16th March, 1825] by desire of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to Lieut.-General Bawser, commanding the army in chief at Madras, relative to circumstances which have occurred in the 20th Regiment, and with reference to the 7th and 8th paragraphs of that communication, I am here directed to explain, lest doubts should arise referable to the management of the 20th Regiment by Lieut.-Colonel Fitzgerald, that it is not meant by the Commander-in-Chief that by the arrangement proposed Major Jackson shall be deprived the benefit of any emolument which may result to him in virtue of his rank and the exercise of the *immediate* command of the regiment, nor should any disadvantage of a similar description fall on Colonel Fitzgerald, whose rank in the army of colonel may draw him into a station or other command. The object the Commander-in-Chief has in

view is, that if Colonel Fitzgerald be assigned a superior command to that of his regiment as lieut.-colonel, the 20th, if possible, should form a component part until those unhappy differences which distract the corps shall subside, and which will afford great happiness to the Commander-in-Chief whenever that desirable object can be effected; and he feels assured that in no hands towards its accomplishment could it be better placed than in your Excellency's, whose long experience and zealous endeavours will, he is convinced, be applied with his in endeavouring to restore harmony, respectability, and good order, in this once inestimable and splendid old corps.

I have, &c.,

Thomas McMahon, Colonel, Adjutant-General.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel McMahon, Adjutant-General, to Lieut.-General Bawser, dated Calcutta, 16th March, 1825.

"It is accordingly determined by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces in India, that Lieut.-Colonel Fitzgerald of the 20th Regiment, notwithstanding his rank, by brevet, of lieut.-colonel in the army, which may draw him into a certain sphere of command on the Bombay establishment, whenever he gets there, shall have general charge of the regiment until he can report through his Excellency Lieut.-General the Honourable Sir Charles Colville, that unanimity and good understanding have been restored, and prevail among the officers in all respects, and that until then *the whole promotion* in the corps will be stopped in India, although the lists are to be transmitted to head-quarters as usual."

8. "For the general management and discipline of the 20th Regiment Colonel Fitzgerald will henceforth be held responsible, and he is to be considered as actually, though not immediately, in command: he is not to be separated from the corps, although he may hold a station or other command, nor is anything to be done without his privity and concurrence."

9. "The good of the service requires the adoption of this measure, and the Commander-in-Chief assures himself Colonel Fitzgerald will see its necessity in the present state of things, and he will, if it can be effected by lenient and conciliatory means, endeavour by every exertion to restore discipline and proper subordination throughout."

Sir, Head-quarters, Bombay, 25th March, 1825.

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date to the address of the Commander-in-Chief, I am directed to observe that though on your arrival at Poonah you will, as senior officer, find yourself in temporary command of that cantonment, under the orders of Major-General Sir Lionel Smith, K.C.B., commanding the division, his Excellency, nevertheless, under consideration of the service-like motives which induced you to adopt the same line of conduct in Malabar, concurs in the propriety of your continuing the exercise of so much in the interior command of his Majesty's 20th Regiment as to you shall seem fit.

Having, yourself, superior allowances for commanding the station, it will be necessary that Major Jackson sign the monthly and other returns to enable him to draw those granted for that of a regiment, and which, of

course, it is neither your wish or within propriety should be withheld from him.

I have, &c.,

THOMAS HUNTER BLAIR, Lieut.-Colonel, Military Secretary.

II.

To Lord Charles Somerset.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse-Guards, 22nd July, 1825.

I have received and laid before the Commander-in-Chief your Lordship's letter of the 29th April, enclosing one from Major Glegg of the 49th, in which he claims the allowances for commanding that regiment in consequence of Lieut.-Colonel Daniel's being appointed commandant of Cape Castle, and I am directed to acquaint you that his Royal Highness considers Major Glegg's claim to be well founded, and perfectly conformable to the established rules and principles of the service.

The appointment of commandant in Cape Castle, as in other garrisons, is a distinct one, to which extra pay and allowances are attached, and as such it removes the individual, for the time being, from the immediate duties and responsibility of his regimental situation, whether the regiment which he would otherwise command, or to which he belongs, do or do not form a part of the garrison. The command of the regiment, therefore, devolves on the next in seniority, who is, consequently, entitled to the allowances for command, and who ought to sign the returns of the regiment, with the interior details and economy of which the commandant (so specially appointed) can have no further concern. As commandant he is responsible for the garrison, and signs the returns and reports of the *garrison*, receives the reports and returns of the corps forming the garrison, but he cannot act in the two capacities of commandant and commanding officer of a regiment. His duties are local and stationary, and would not be affected by any change of the garrison, as his situation would equally not be affected by the removal of his regiment from the garrison, unless he were ordered to accompany it, in which case, of course, he would resume the command of the regiment with the allowance for command.

The limits of the authority of a commandant are clearly defined in the Memorandum which I enclose, and the principles therein laid down are strictly applicable to the case of Lieut.-Colonel Daniel, whether the 49th or any other corps form the garrison, and whether it consist of that regiment only or of more regiments or detachments.

I remain, &c.,

H. TAYLOR.

MEMORANDUM.

Horse-Guards, 30th August, 1824.

The authority of a governor, lieut.-governor, or commandant of a garrison or fortress, extends to the engineer limits of the fortress, and to everything short of interference in the interior discipline of corps and in regimental courts-martial, whether the officers in the immediate command

of corps forming the garrison be of higher or inferior rank to the governor or commandant. In all matters not relating to the interior discipline of regiments (which includes regimental courts-martial) the authority of the military governor or commandant, although of inferior rank, would be supreme. The duties and detail of the garrison, the arrangements of military departments of the Staff, the inspections of garrison, parades, &c., would be under his control. Detachment courts-martial would be held under his authority, and their proceedings would be subject to his approval and confirmation, the returns of corps would be made to him, no detachment could be made, no post changed, increased, or diminished, no leave of absence or furlough granted without his sanction.

[705.] *To Lieut.-General Sir George Murray.*

MY DEAR MURRAY, London, 10th April, 1827.

Torrens has shown me a letter from you of the 5th instant, regarding the G. O. issued respecting ammunition.

My object in issuing this G. O. was to remedy an abuse from which some great inconveniences and evils had resulted, viz. that of commanding officers of regiments leaving behind them in the barrack stores the ammunition of their regiments, whether for practice or for use. One of the consequences was the blowing up of some persons last summer in the Isle of Wight; and another, the approach to a similar misfortune in the populous town of Macclesfield last winter, when the Guards removed from Manchester to be embarked for Portugal.

In giving out this order it was necessary to state a given quantity of ammunition as the minimum which a soldier was always to have in his possession, which quantity might be increased, according to circumstances, to sixty rounds, the whole amount which his pouch would carry.

Circumstances in Ireland render it necessary that the troops there should always have twenty rounds instead of ten, and the same circumstances might render the same alteration necessary in Byng's command. There can be no objection to either you or Byng making any alteration you please, whether in the first or second article of the G. O.; but I recommend that your alteration should not go further, as if it does it will alter the system settled between the Ordnance and Horse-Guards for the final arrangement of this question.

I have thought it best to write to you myself on this subject, as, although I did not draw the order myself, it was a subject to

which my attention had long been drawn, and to which I had frequently drawn the attention of my lamented predecessor as requiring a remedy.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, London, 10th April, 1827.

I rather conceive that the enclosed looks like an unwillingness to talk to me while Mr. Canning's projet is under consideration. As I am informed, he was yesterday commanded to lay *his names* and arrangement immediately before the King, I regret very much that my interview is postponed; not that I could do good, but that it is easier to converse when an arrangement is in contemplation than when it may be unfortunately completed.

I would have called on you with the enclosed, but one of our little girls is taken dangerously ill with inflammation, and the doctors, &c., are here, and I cannot just now leave Lady L.

Ever yours, my dear Duke, most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

Query?—Whether desiring to see me may not be a measure to prevent my saying anything in the House of Lords until after the adjournment.

To Lord Londonderry. [7

MY DEAR CHARLES, London, 10th April, 1827.

It is impossible to form an opinion of the reason for which the King has postponed to receive you, excepting that he has up to this moment not settled his government, and his time is occupied by the necessary reception of his ministers.

It was said in the House of Lords yesterday afternoon that Mr. Canning had been appointed the minister, but I have no reason to believe the report to be true up to this moment, half-past two.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Pray say everything that is kind from me to Lady Londonderry about her little girl, who I hope will get quite well immediately.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 10th April, 1827, 6 P.M.

The King has, at an audience from which I am just returned, been graciously pleased to signify to me his Majesty's commands to lay before his Majesty, with as little loss of time as possible, a plan of arrangements for the reconstruction of the administration.

In executing these commands it will be as much my own wish, as it is my duty to his Majesty, to adhere to the principles on which Lord Liverpool's government has so long acted together.

I need not add how essentially the accomplishment must depend upon your Grace's continuance as a member of the Cabinet.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,
your Grace's sincere and faithful servant,
GEORGE CANNING.

[707.] *To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 10th April, 1827.

I have received your letter of this evening informing me that the King had desired you to lay before his Majesty a plan of arrangements for the reconstruction of the administration, and that in executing these commands it was your wish to adhere to the principles on which Lord Liverpool's government had so long acted together.

I anxiously desire to be able to serve his Majesty as I have done hitherto in his Cabinet, with the same colleagues. But before I can give an answer to your obliging proposition, I should wish to know who the person is whom you intend to propose to his Majesty as the head of the government.

Ever, my dear Mr. Canning, yours, &c.,
WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 11th April, 1827.

I believed it to be so generally understood that the King usually entrusts the formation of an administration to the individual whom it is his Majesty's gracious intention to place at the head of it, that it did not occur to me, when I communicated to your Grace yesterday the commands which I had just received from his Majesty, to add that, in the present instance, his Majesty does not intend to depart from the usual course of proceeding on such occasions.

I am sorry to have delayed some hours this answer to your Grace's letter; but, from the nature of the subject, I did not like to forward it, without having previously submitted it (together with your Grace's letter) to his Majesty.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,
your Grace's sincere and faithful servant,
GEORGE CANNING.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 11th April, 1827.

I have received your letter of this day; and I did not understand the one of yesterday evening as you have now explained it to me. I understood from yourself that you had had in contemplation another arrangement, and I do not believe that the practice to which you refer has been so invariable as to enable me to affix a meaning to your letter which its words did not in my opinion convey.

I trust that you will have experienced no inconvenience from the delay of this answer, which I assure you has been occasioned by my desire to discover a mode by which I could continue united with my recent colleagues.

I sincerely wish that I could bring my mind to the conviction that, with the best intentions on your part, your government could be conducted practically on the principles of that of Lord Liverpool; that it would be generally so considered; or that it could be adequate to meet our difficulties in a manner satisfactory to the King and conducive to the interests of the country.

As however I am convinced that these principles must be abandoned eventually, that all our measures would be viewed with suspicion by the usual supporters of the government, that I could do no good in the Cabinet, and that I should at last be obliged to separate myself from it at a moment at which such separation would be more inconvenient to the King's service than it can be at present, I must beg you to request his Majesty to excuse me from belonging to his councils.

Ever yours, my dear Mr. Canning,
WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, Whitehall, 12th April, 1827.

Pray let me see you *before* you send your letter to the King; the letter which Arbuthnot has mentioned to me. It is as to the time of sending it on which I wish to say a word to you. I will call at Apsley House at half-past one. If you leave home before then, tell your porter where you are gone to.

Ever most truly yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

709.] *To the King.*

London, 12th April, 1827.

Mr. Canning will, I doubt not, have submitted to your Majesty the letter which I have written to him in answer to the one announcing to me that he had been appointed by your Majesty to be at the head of your government.

I have frequently had occasion to express to your Majesty my most grateful acknowledgments for your Majesty's most gracious favour and kindness towards me; and your Majesty can now more easily conceive than I can express the pain and grief which I feel upon requesting your Majesty to excuse me from attendance in your councils, and in consequence thereof and adverting to the tenor of the letters which I have received from your Majesty's minister by your Majesty's command, upon asking your Majesty's permission to lay at your feet those offices which connect me with your Majesty's government.

There is only one point on which I wish to trouble your Majesty, and that relates to my conduct when Mr. Canning was appointed Secretary of State, in reference to the events of the present moment.

I certainly was one of those who advised your Majesty to take Mr. Canning into your councils in the year 1822; and I think it possible that circumstances which had occurred at that moment gave to my advice more weight than it would otherwise have deserved or obtained.

It is likewise true that till within the last two years, during which Mr. Canning has given your Majesty entire satisfaction, a circumstance which fully justifies the advice which your servants had given your Majesty, it fell to my lot more than once to reconcile your Majesty's mind to some of Mr. Canning's acts, and to regain for him your Majesty's confidence.

But to recommend to your Majesty to appoint Mr. Canning Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to entrust to him the conduct of all the business of your Majesty's government in the House of Commons, is one thing; and to act under him as your Majesty's minister is another, considering the difficult circumstances in which the government is placed.

I would beg to submit to your Majesty that these difficulties have not been occasioned by the appointment of Mr. Canning to his office in 1822, or by any act or advice of mine; and as I feel that it is out of my power to overcome or counteract those difficulties, I have entreated your Majesty to be permitted to retire.

All of which, together with the expression of the most profound sense of all your Majesty's most gracious favour and kindness towards me, is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most grateful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

St. James's Palace, 13th April, 1827.

The King assures the Duke of Wellington that the King receives the Duke's resignation of the offices of Commander-in-Chief and Master-General of the Ordnance with the same sentiments of deep regret with which the Duke of Wellington states himself to offer it.

The King abstains from any further expression of his feelings.

G. R.

Lord Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, London, 13th April, 1827.

I have scratched very hastily, this evening, a minute of my interview with the King. Make any use of it, in considering it, that you think judicious. His Majesty's mind is certainly very sore at his notion of desertion by those who forced Mr. Canning on him originally. It would be very desirable, I think, if it could be clearly shown to him, the difference between taking Mr. Canning in, and consenting to take office under him. If it were possible for you to see him again, or if the Chancellor saw him, I still think if a *head* could be pointed out to him, he sees his dilemma is so great, that he would yet hold on to his real *Protestant* friends. This is the great watchword with him, and with Mr. Canning. It must be *lowered*. I wish to God you, Peel, or the Chancellor could see him again, if not *too late!*

I will call on you in the morning.

Ever yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

Pray return my letter to the King at your leisure, as I have no copy.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

MINUTE OF LORD LONDONDERRY'S AUDIENCE WITH HIS MAJESTY.

13th April, 1827.

On entering his Majesty's apartment, he extended his hand in the most gracious manner, and expressed his regret at the affliction I had sustained. He said he was anxious to see me, but had deferred doing so for some days, in consequence of my misfortune, which he thought would prevent my going out. He begged me to sit down, and said he was sure I was very unhappy, as I appeared. I told his Majesty I felt deeply my private sorrow; but I thought it became me, at the present juncture, especially since the event of yesterday, to lose no time in humbly endeavouring to see his Majesty, and state to him with that candour and devotion that I trust belonged to my character, how I felt myself circumstanced at the present moment.

"What is it, then, that you wish to say to me?" replied the King, in rather a severe tone.

"Sire," said I, "through the whole course of my life I have been devoted to your sacred person. You have conferred on me great and signal marks of your approbation and favour. In my limited sphere, and placed in positions by your Majesty's confidence abroad, I have endeavoured by my conduct to evince all the gratitude I have felt for your Majesty's goodness. But, Sire, a moment is now arrived, when I feel that, consistent with what I owe to the memory of my beloved brother and consistent with his principles, I fear I could not support that minister whom your Majesty has placed at the head of your councils; and under this impression, as a point of honour, I throw myself on your Majesty's consideration in what I am going to urge"—

"I see," replied the King, "what you are going to say. But, let me now have some conversation with you, and state how I have acted and how I have been placed by the late extraordinary events, and let me shew you that those who have now deserted, or are deserting me, are alone the cause why the pernicious drug and bitter pill which they forced upon me is now the cause of all the present confusion. To those persons who pressed Mr. Canning upon me against my will—to those friends who now leave me in the lurch—may all the mischief and perplexity which I feel be ascribed. When I lost your incomparable brother and my best friend, a friend and a minister that never can be replaced, I will state to you what occurred when I was on board ship, and Peel came to me with the news. But, first, I must say with regard to him that of all men I ever saw he was the most clear and correct in all his views, and in 999 times he was ever perfect in every judgment he formed; but in the thousandth he had an obstinacy, arising from a conscientious feeling of honour, he never would be moved from."

[Here the King went into a very minute history of all my brother's latter feelings as connected with persons and circumstances wholly irrelevant to the present moment, and unnecessary and painful to put to paper.]

"Well, when Peel came to me, it was arranged between us that in order to keep my mind quiet, nothing was to be settled nor no arrangement made until I returned to London, and under that understanding I wrote a letter to Liverpool of the following purport:—

"'I am so totally overpowered by the catastrophe that has occurred, that I can say nothing more than that I have seen Peel, and agree that all arrangements must for the present stand over. But there is only one thing that I would add, that no change whatsoever is to take place in the arrangement fixed for India.'

"This was the substance of what I stated, and I parted with Peel, who went up by land to town with Mrs. P., his eyes being bad and he wearing a low green shade, and I heard nothing more until I came to London. At that time many of the ministers were out of town; however, I saw some of them soon. But all were silent until after some meetings at Walmer, and then Liverpool announced to me they could not go on without Canning; and it ended, chiefly at the instigation of the Duke of Wellington, in my consenting to that measure of his introduction into the Cabinet, which was of all others the most disagreeable to me.

"I must, however, here do Mr. Canning the justice to say that, since he has served me, I have found him considerate and behaving well to me in every respect. So things proceeded until the calamity of Liverpool, and what I formerly would have thought a desirable event, has certainly turned out for me one of the most unfortunate. It is true, however, that Liverpool would not have stayed in beyond the present session, and he declared to me if he did not carry the Corn Bill, he would not remain minister; but had he gone out, he would have arranged matters so as not to have me placed in the dilemma in which I now stand. Now with regard to the principles upon which my government is to be formed, I will tell you what passed between me and Londonderry on the Catholic question—that question was the *thousandth*, from which nothing could move him. But I told him, after repeated discussions, it was in vain to attempt to shake me, because what Charles Fox could not accomplish, no other man could; but that, as I was about to take the Coronation Oath as King, I wished Castlereagh to consider if he thought, by any act of the legislature, it could be so modified or arranged previous to my taking it as would satisfy my mind that I could, consistently with my oath, depart from those bars which impede the Catholics from the privileges of their Protestant brethren. After three weeks' reflection, he came to me and told me he saw at present no mode of framing or proposing such a course. I then said, 'Remember, once I take that oath, I am for ever a Protestant King, a Protestant upholder, a Protestant adherent, and no power on earth will shake me on that subject.'"

I observed here to his Majesty that I believed his sentiments were pretty generally known on this head; but that I had never heard it before so distinctly as in confidence he was now pleased to state it to me.

"*Not in confidence*," resumed he, quickly, "I declare it to you openly, broadly, and distinctly. You are at liberty to state it everywhere, and the very act of the present men who desert me is to throw me into the arms of the Catholics, or commit me towards them in a manner they should have saved me from. But yet the resignations of Protestants I can in some degree understand. Peel, for instance, is a man of the highest integrity and honour, and respected by the whole country; rich in reputation, rich in domestic happiness, rich in wealth, wanting nothing. He steers himself above every petty consideration."

I said no man in his Majesty's empire, I believed, was more respected; but I could not say the same of that individual whom his Majesty now confided in, and when his Majesty's words in 1821, as to that person, were deeply recorded in my breast, when I knew and remembered how he had acted to my sovereign and my brother, it was impossible, if I loved one or the other, that I could forget it or support his rule.

"Well," replied his Majesty, "you have strong feelings. But why Lord Melville has taken the line he has I cannot understand; and none of them have estimated my difficulties, nor the course honourable to them all that I pursued. When I got Lady Liverpool's answer on the Monday, I had them down at the Lodge; and I saw Wellington first, and here, if there ever was a man to

whom I have paid every honour and devotion, it is him. I have bestowed on him every gift of my crown; not that he does not deserve it, but I have done as much on my part as he has done for me. Well, how could I suppose that he would condescend, after my uniting the command of two armies in his person, on my brother's death, that he would ever leave that position to be minister?"

I said, "I suppose, Sire, he never could have done such a thing but at the wish of your Majesty, and the belief that it was for the real good of your service."

"Well, I told him all the difficulties. I desired him to consult with his colleagues, especially Mr. Canning and Mr. Peel, and endeavour to form an arrangement to conduct the government as heretofore, and I told him I would name any head that might be in common agreed upon.

"I then saw Mr. Canning, and stated pretty much the same thing to him. He said there were innumerable difficulties, but still thought they might be got over. I then saw Mr. Peel, and had a similar conversation with him. At my party at the Lodge, I endeavoured by mixing all friends to show no partiality. In this state of things I arrived in town, having, however, seen the Duke of Newcastle, who conversed with me in a very unbecoming manner; and I should also say I had seen the Duke of Rutland and his brother, but he said nothing in any shape but what was of the most conciliatory and respectful description, although I told Wellington I had heard of persons in office combining their opinions as to what I should or should not do, in the most unconstitutional and improper manner, which, however, he (Wellington) had wisely arrested."

As I felt that, at this, the king looked at me, I immediately replied—

"Sire, it is quite true there are various individuals who think most unfavourably of Mr. Canning as I do, and, without presuming to express an opinion to your Majesty, they have communicated these sentiments to each other; and they are derived from his speech in Parliament, as well as the new principles of the government."

"I am not one of those," rejoined the King, in great bitterness, "who take up men's words in the heat of debate, and bring them out afterwards as palliatives for any course of conduct I adopt. If speeches were to be considered, I should allude to yours in the House of Lords, when I was under all this embarrassment."

"Sire," said I, most respectfully, "I felt myself in duty bound, in respect to my brother's principles, to show in the interregnum that prevailed that I had every confidence in those men who acted with him, while I reprobated the new system that was introducing; and I hope, with humble abilities, I have been always too straightforward not to express my thoughts."

"Ay, but you forget that it was owing to a factious meeting of Whig Lords, that Lord Liverpool was appointed minister."

"Sire, there was no faction on my part. My opinion of Mr. Canning has been taken from your Majesty's lips, and I have seen no cause to change it."

Here the Duke of Clarence was announced, perhaps *fortunately!*

His Majesty then resumed, "Well, when I came to town, after seeing Wellington, the Chancellor, and Canning, and Peel, and finding nothing done—and indeed nothing is *done* yet, although a good deal of writing has passed—I found it was absolutely necessary to act. The Chancellor, to do him justice, has acted right and consistently, for he stayed in before against the grain at my positive entreaty, and I can say nothing to him. But what can I say to those who have left me so unexpectedly and wholly uncalled for? The Duke of Wellington I cannot understand. Mr. Canning certainly informed me that

Mr. Peel had named a person under whom he thought they could both act, and that was the Duke of Wellington. But this Mr. Canning said he did not think would answer, or be consistent with his views in carrying on the government. What, then, had I to do? or what course had I to steer? No one would take the responsibility of any arrangement but Mr. Canning, and this is the predicament I am placed in."

I said, "Sire, I cannot know, nor do I presume to defend, any person's conduct. I am sure those individuals so long devoted to your Majesty will best defend their own; but, it appears to me, nothing can be so strong against the principles and conduct of Mr. Canning in your Majesty's service, as his losing seven of his colleagues. My sole object, Sire, in soliciting your Majesty's gracious attention, was to offer this letter in person which I now put in your hands, assuring you that nothing can ever shake my personal devotion and attachment."

The Duke of Clarence then again sent up, and I withdrew, leaving my letter, which I here annex.

VANE LONDONDERRY.

II.

Lord Londonderry to the King.

SIRE, Holdernesse House, 12th April, 1827.

Influenced by that devotion to your Majesty's interests and service which I trust has ever marked my humble career, as well as the important one of him whose name I bear, who was so long honoured by your Majesty's entire approbation and confidence, I venture to address your Majesty under that indulgence which your Majesty has uniformly extended to me.

Your Majesty will doubtless recollect the grounds which induced me humbly to offer my resignation of the Vienna embassy in 1822. Since that period, I have been strongly attached to the principles of those individuals in your Majesty's administration who continued to uphold the system of that great government, which, under your Majesty's direction, carried the country through a glorious war, terminating in a most triumphant peace and powerful alliances which will transmit to posterity your Majesty's reign as surpassing that of any of your predecessors.

Understanding that your Majesty has, in your wisdom, appointed Mr. Canning exclusively to form a government, and remembering the whole of his political career, especially in 1821, when your Majesty vouchsafed to me such strong marks of your approbation and favour, and referring also to Mr. Canning's late declared principles in his speech in Parliament on the Portugal question, so wholly subversive of those sentiments which previously regulated our diplomatic relations, as well as fatal in my mind to the best interests of your Majesty's empire, I feel it would be dishonourable in me to retain the office your Majesty was so graciously pleased to confer on me, in your household; because I hold it to be impossible for me, now that Mr. Canning is placed in a position to carry his declared principles (so opposite to those of my late brother) more fully into effect, to support him and his principles, in my capacity as a peer of Parliament.

With undiminished devotion and affection to your Majesty's sacred person,—with undiminished gratitude for the many and great favours I have received at your hands,—with a stronger attachment than ever to your Majesty's former government,—and with my fervent prayer that your Majesty's real interests will be preserved, in whatever direction your Majesty may place them, I humbly lay my resignation of Lord of your Majesty's Bed-chamber at your feet, being persuaded that I shall not forfeit your good opinion by adopting a

line of conduct in unison with my former principles, which your Majesty deigned to approve, and which approbation will ever constitute my greatest pride and support, being ever

Your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

MEMORANDUM ON QUITTING THE CABINET.

'10.]

April 13th, 1827.

There are two points of my conduct which have been called in question. First, my quitting the Cabinet. Secondly, my resignation of the command of the army.

Fortunately I can elucidate my conduct upon both these points without reference to any communication which I have had with his Majesty, or to any fact mentioned in private conversation with me which was not likewise mentioned to others.

On the evening of the 10th April I received from Mr. Canning a note, of which the following is a copy:—

Foreign Office,
10th April, 1827, 6 P.M.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"The King has, at an audience from which I am just returned, been graciously pleased to signify to me his Majesty's commands to lay before his Majesty, with as little loss of time as possible, a plan of arrangements for the reconstruction of the administration.

"In executing these commands it will be as much my own wish, as it is my duty to his Majesty, to adhere to the principles on which Lord Liverpool's government has so long acted together.

"I need not add how essentially the accomplishment must depend upon your Grace's continuance as a member of the Cabinet.

"Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"your Grace's sincere and faithful servant,

"GEORGE CANNING."

It will be observed that this note did not state of whom it was intended that the proposed administration should be formed, although I have since learned that this information was conveyed to my colleagues; nor who was to be at the head of the government; nor was I invited as others were, to receive further explanations, nor referred to anybody who could give [illegible] nor, indeed, did I consider the invitation that I should [illegible] the Cabinet to be conveyed in those terms to which [illegible] customed in my constant intercourse with Mr. [illegible] hat moment, nor to have been calculated to [illegible] ue in the administration about to be formed.

I was determined, however, that I would not allow such considerations to influence my answer, and I wrote to Mr. Canning as follows:—

"MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 10th April, 1827.

"I have received your letter of this evening informing me that the King had desired you to lay before his Majesty a plan of arrangements for the reconstruction of the administration, and that in executing these commands it was your wish to adhere to the principles on which Lord Liverpool's government had so long acted together.

"I anxiously desire to be able to serve his Majesty as I have done hitherto in his Cabinet, with the same colleagues. But before I can give an answer to your obliging proposition, I should wish to know who the person is whom you intend to propose to his Majesty as the head of the government.

"Ever, my dear Mr. Canning,

"yours very sincerely,

"WELLINGTON."

It will be observed that I stated my anxious desire to form part of a Cabinet with *the same colleagues;* but that I postponed to give my answer to Mr. Canning's *obliging proposition* till I should know the name of the person intended to be recommended by Mr. Canning to his Majesty as the head of the administration.

To this note Mr. Canning wrote me in the afternoon of the 11th the following answer:—

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 11th April, 1827.

"I believed it to be so generally understood that the King usually entrusts the formation of an administration to the individual whom it is his Majesty's gracious intention to place at the head of it, that it did not occur to me, when I communicated to your Grace yesterday the commands which I had just received from his Majesty, to add that, in the present instance, his Majesty does not intend to depart from the usual course of proceeding on such occasions.

"I am sorry to have delayed some hours this answer to your Grace's letter: but from the nature of the subject I did not like to forward it without having previously submitted it (together with your Grace's letter) to his Majesty.

"Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"your Grace's sincere and faithful servant,

"GEORGE CANNING."

I will discuss this answer more fully presently; but I will only observe here, upon it, that it did not tend to remove the impression which Mr. Canning's first note had made upon my mind, viz., that he did not wish that I should belong to his Cabinet. However, as will be seen from my reply, that impression was not the reason which influenced my conduct in desiring to retire from the Cabinet, nor did it influence the tone or terms of my answers to Mr. Canning:—

"MY DEAR MR. CANNING, London, 11th April, 1827.

"I have received your letter of this day; and I did not understand the one of yesterday evening as you have now explained it to me. I understood from yourself, that you had had in contemplation another arrangement, and I do not believe that the practice to which you refer has been so invariable as to enable me to affix a meaning to your letter which its words did not, in my opinion, convey. I trust that you will have experienced no inconvenience from the delay of this answer, which, I assure you, has been occasioned by my desire to discover a mode by which I could continue united with my recent colleagues.

"I sincerely wish that I could bring my mind to the conviction, that with the best intentions on your part, your government could be conducted practically on the principles of that of Lord Liverpool; that it would be generally so considered; or that it could be adequate to meet our difficulties in a manner satisfactory to the King, and conducive to the interests of the country.

"As however I am convinced that these principles must be abandoned eventually, that all our measures would be viewed with suspicion by the usual supporters of the Government, that I could do no good in the Cabinet, and that I should at last be obliged to separate myself from it at a moment at which such separation would be more inconvenient to the King's service than it can be at present, I must beg you to request his Majesty to excuse me from belonging to his councils.

"Ever yours, my dear Mr. Canning, most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON."

I here leave the question of my quitting the Cabinet.

The events which have occurred in the short time which has elapsed since the termination of this correspondence, will tend

to shew that I did not form an incorrect judgment of the matters discussed in my letter of the 11th, and I am much mistaken if experience does not prove, hereafter, that I was quite right.

The next point for consideration is my resignation of the command of the army, which I conveyed to his Majesty in the following words—being the extract of a letter to his Majesty, dated London, April 12th, 1827:—

"Mr. Canning will, I doubt not, have submitted to your Majesty the letter which I have written to him, in answer to the one announcing to me that he had been appointed by your Majesty to be at the head of your government.

"I have frequently had occasion to express to your Majesty my most grateful acknowledgments for your Majesty's most gracious favour and kindness towards me; and your Majesty can now more easily conceive than I can express the pain and grief which I feel upon requesting your Majesty to excuse me from attendance in your councils; and, in consequence thereof, and adverting to the tenor of the letters which I have received from your Majesty's minister by your Majesty's command, upon asking your Majesty's permission to lay at your feet those offices which connect me with your Majesty's government."

I had considered it necessary, for the reasons stated in my letter to Mr. Canning of the 11th of April, to decline to sit in the Cabinet; and, of course, my office of Master-General of the Ordnance was at the disposal of his Majesty. I remained still in the office of Commander-in-Chief, which I might have continued to hold, whatever might be the difference of my political opinions with his Majesty's minister. But in addition to political differences, the tone and temper of Mr. Canning's letters, and of that of the 11th particularly (which had been previously submitted to his Majesty, and which, therefore, was a communication from the King), were of a nature to render it impossible for me to retain the command of the army.

I could not exercise that command with advantage to his Majesty, the government, and the public, or with honour to myself, unless I was respected, and treated with that fair confidence by his Majesty and his minister which I think I deserve; and nobody will consider that I was treated with confidence, respect, or even common civility, by Mr. Canning in his last letter.

But it has been stated by Mr. Canning's friends, as I understand, that in my letter to him of the 10th I had given him cause of offence, and had provoked this answer; and it is but fair to consider whether the letter which he had received from me does give to Mr. Canning any ground to complain.

My letter of the 10th is a clear distinct answer to the one from Mr. Canning of the same date, in as polite terms as it could be written, and in the usual forms of my correspondence with Mr. Canning.

I stated my anxious desire to remain in the Cabinet *with my colleagues;* and, for the purpose of receiving information, I asked who was to be at the head of the government, hoping always that the information I should receive might enable me to belong to the Cabinet.

Mr. Canning had, in a conversation which I held with him on the 2nd of April, explained to me, that in case his Majesty should commission him to consider of a scheme for the reconstruction of the government, one of his designs was to propose that Mr. Robinson should be removed to the House of Lords and be made First Lord of the Treasury; and if the answer to my letter of the 10th had been that this was the plan which he still intended to follow, it would then have been suggested by me that he should think of an arrangement which might have been better calculated to keep the government together.

The question, therefore, in my letter, was fairly founded upon a former communication from Mr. Canning. The question was likewise fully justified by former practice.

In 1812 Mr. Canning was the channel of communication from Lord Wellesley to Lord Liverpool respecting the formation of an administration. Mr. Canning apprised Lord Liverpool upon that occasion, that the Prince Regent had laid his commands on Lord Wellesley to form a plan of administration, to be submitted for his Royal Highness's approbation.

Lord Wellesley, upon the same occasion, waited upon Lord Grey and Lord Grenville by order of his Majesty, then Prince Regent, with a view to consider of the formation of an adminis- and Lord Wellesley, in the course of the discussion, he considered himself merely as the instrument of yal Highness the Prince Regent's commands on he even went so far as to say that he neither for himself, any share in the administration.

Subsequently, in the same year, 1812, Lord Moira had "the Prince Regent's instructions to take steps towards the formation of a new ministry." It does not appear that Lord Moira, or Lord Grey, or Lord Grenville, to whom he addressed himself, considered that he was the head of the ministry which he had a commission to form.

In speaking in the House of Lords on the 12th of June, he says, "I came to the subject unfettered in every way. Not an individual was named for a seal; and no place was pointed out even for myself."

How then could I take it for granted that his Majesty had nominated Mr. Canning to be his minister, merely because Mr. Canning informed me that his Majesty had signified to him his commands to lay before his Majesty a plan of arrangements for the reconstruction of the administration?

Before I could give Mr. Canning an answer to his proposition that I should be one of the Cabinet, it was necessary to ascertain who was to be the minister, and this it was which induced me to ask the question. I will now shew, from the best authority possible, viz., Mr. Canning himself, that the question asked by me in my letter to Mr. Canning might be asked without offence. On the * May, 1812, Lord Liverpool waited upon Mr. Canning by command of his Majesty, then Prince Regent, to invite Mr. Canning to become a member of his councils. Mr. Perceval had just then been assassinated.

The first question which it appears (from a memorandum drawn by Mr. Canning himself) that Mr. Canning asked was, "Who is to be the First Lord of the Treasury?" and it does not appear that Lord Liverpool rebuked Mr. Canning for asking that question. The negotiation failed for other reasons not worth discussing now, excepting to observe that Mr. Canning then thought that the influence of the head of the government was likely to be paramount in the discussion of the Catholic question!

Surely then I could not merit a rebuke for asking Mr. Canning, in 1827, the same question, under nearly similar circumstances, which he asked Lord Liverpool, without offence, in 1812.

I must also add that Mr. Canning's letter of the 11th convinced me that on the 10th he had not been appointed his

* Blank in manuscript.

Majesty's minister, nor had received any commission from his Majesty, excepting the one to suggest "a plan of arrangements for the reconstruction of the administration."

If Mr. Canning had on Tuesday the 10th been appointed his Majesty's minister, he might, without reference to his Majesty, have stated the fact in his answer to me, with as much of rebuke as he might have thought proper to use.

I cannot believe that he referred to his Majesty in order to cover this rebuke with his Majesty's sacred name and protection. This step must have been taken because, in point of fact, he was not his Majesty's minister at the moment at which he received my question.

Upon the whole, then, I considered that there was no very cordial desire that I should be a member of the Cabinet; and that in the course of the communications with the minister whom the King had honoured with his confidence, I had not been treated in a manner calculated to render my continuance in the command of the army satisfactory to myself or advantageous to his Majesty.

WELLINGTON.

711.] *To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 15th April, 1827.

I have not the most distant notion of publishing anything. Eventually I dare say that all will be forced out; but I don't think I have any right to publish even the letter written to me by the King's command, much less my letter to the King.

However, there are so many lies published by authority, and one's friends are so eager to be able to contradict them, that I have shown the letters to the following persons:—Taylor, Lord FitzRoy Somerset, Gordon, and I think Hardinge. My principal object in showing them was to ascertain whether or not I took a correct view of Mr. Canning's letter to me of the 11th, and they have one and all (particularly Lord FitzRoy, who suffers most), decided that I could not have done otherwise.

[illegible]wise showed them to Lord Londonderry, who com-[illegible]ood deal of my having resigned the Command till [illegible]rs; but he now says that I could not have done

[illegible] the whole system is founded on fraud, to which

I believe the King is willing quietly to submit. But both he and Mr. Canning knew that it could not be carried on while I should be in office without his Majesty *knowing* of it. Therefore I was to be forced out; and if I had not gone when I received the letter of the 11th, I should before now have received another.

I send you the whole, which I beg you will return, and his Majesty's answer, which is a curious family document.

It is very clear by what pen it was written.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

To the Marquess of Anglesey. [7

MY DEAR LORD ANGLESEY, London, 15th April, 1827.

Sir Henry Hardinge has just confirmed to me the report which I had heard, that you were to be my successor as Master-General of the Ordnance; and I shall be most happy to give you charge of the office at any time that you will appoint to receive it. I am going out of town this afternoon; but I will come up on any day that it will be convenient to you to receive charge.

I beg to assure you at the same time that I will give you every information and assistance in my power, both now and whenever you may think proper to call for it, to enable you to conduct the duties of the office; and I will use any influence that I may have with those who have determined to quit their offices in the existing crisis to remain with you, till you can fill their situations to your satisfaction.

There is one thing which however I must tell you even at this moment; and that is, that you will find it necessary that the offices at the Board should be filled by men capable of doing business.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Marquess of Anglesey to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Uxbridge House, 16th April, 1827.

Many thanks to you, my dear Duke of Wellington, for your friendly communication. It is not positively settled that I shall take your situation at the Ordnance. Certain little difficulties present themselves; but as there

is every probability that they will be overcome, I gladly and gratefully accept your kind offer of assistance until I am fairly in my stirrups.

I was much pleased to hear of your flattering approbation of the appearance and performance of the 7th the other day.

I remain, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

Anglesey.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to the Right Hon. George Canning.

My dear Canning, Whitehall, 17th April, 1827.

The letter which I have received from you gives me the opportunity of recording, and indeed makes it necessary that I should record, the grounds on which I felt myself compelled to decline being a member of the administration over which you are to preside as Prime Minister.

I do not consider that my objections to remain in office resolve themselves merely into a point of honour. The grounds on which I decline office are public grounds, clear and intelligible, I think, to every man who has marked the course which I have pursued in Parliament on the Catholic question, and who understands the nature and the functions of the office which I have filled.

For the period of eleven years I have been connected with the administration over which Lord Liverpool presided. Six of those years I was chief Secretary for Ireland, and for the remaining five Secretary of State for the Home Department. In each office I was in immediate contact with Irish affairs, and deeply responsible for their administration. During the whole of that period, indeed during the whole of my public career, I have taken a very active and prominent part in opposition to the Catholic claims, concurring in opinion, and acting in unison, with the head of the government of which I was a member.

Can I see the whole influence and authority of the office of Prime Minister transferred from Lord Liverpool to you, without a conviction that the sanguine hopes of the Roman Catholics will be excited, and that the Catholic question will be practically and materially affected by the change?

It is not merely that you differ from Lord Liverpool on the Catholic question. It is the extent of the difference which must be regarded. It is that the opinions avowed by Lord Liverpool on the last occasion on which he had an opportunity of avowing them must be compared with those opinions which you have uniformly and so powerfully enforced.

The transfer of the influence of Prime Minister from Lord Liverpool to you is the transfer of that influence from the most powerful opponent to the most powerful advocate of the Roman Catholic claims.

If I were to be a party to this arrangement by accepting office under it, I should (always bearing in mind the particular situation in which I am placed) be subject to great misconstruction; and in fact should be lending myself to the advancement of a cause, which under a different aspect of political affairs I had uniformly and strenuously resisted.

My position as minister for the home department, responsible in that capacity for the administration of Irish affairs, has long been one of considerable difficulty and embarrassment.

I have been the only minister of the Crown, with a seat in the House of Commons, taking a part in opposition to the Catholic claims, differing from all my colleagues, who are members of that branch of the legislature of which I am a member, on a question peculiarly affecting Ireland, and on the issue of which, on the last occasion on which it was discussed, depended my own relation to the government.

While Lord Liverpool was head of the government, I found material relief and assistance; because my opinions on that question—the only question on which I differed from my colleagues—were in concurrence with his. Is it not obvious that my efficiency and authority, as a servant of the Crown, must be materially impaired by an arrangement which transfers the highest and most powerful office from him with whom I entirely concurred, to you from whom it is my misfortune on that question to differ?

Such are the grounds on which, most reluctantly but without hesitation, I felt myself compelled to relinquish office. Had your opinions on the Catholic question been in accordance with those of Lord Liverpool, I should have been perfectly willing to place my humble services at your disposal, and to co-operate with you in the conduct of public business with the same cordiality and good will with which I have hitherto acted in concert with you on all points, save the one which now compels our separation.

That separation has caused me the deepest regret; regret which would be still more embittered if I were not conscious that I had done everything in my power to prevent the disunion that has taken place—everything, at least, consistent with a sense of public duty and the maintenance of my character as a public man.

Ever, my dear Canning, most sincerely yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Horse-Guards, 17th April, 1827.

I received a summons yesterday to attend the King, at half-past three. I found Mr. Canning and Sir William Knighton at St. James's, and was told by them that his Majesty meant to take the command of the army into his own hands, and to retain me *here* as the channel of his communications and orders, with the title of Adjutant-General. I objected strongly on various grounds, and pointed out that the Secretary-at-War is the constitutional secretary for army business when there is no Commander-in-Chief, and that if it were his Majesty's object to have a military man in that situation, the rumoured promotion of Lord Palmerston would offer the opening, and that Sir George Murray was the only individual who could do justice to his Majesty's choice, and give satisfaction to the army. That I could not hope to do either, and that I felt too forcibly the odium of being placed in a situation to supersede Gordon and Torrens, not to object most strongly to such arrangement. Some objection was made to so filling the situation of Secretary-at-War, and I suggested that Sir George Murray might be named Chief of the Staff, leaving the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General as they were. Mr. Canning saw the King afterwards, but told me, when he came out, that nothing had passed on this

subject. Sir William Knighton also went to his Majesty, but I did not see him again. I was called in at quarter-past five, and stayed two hours, during which his Majesty explained all his difficulties, the impossibility of selecting any member of the Royal Family or any other General Officer of sufficient rank to succeed your Grace, and finally came to the point, observing at the same time that Sir William Knighton had mentioned my suggestion about Sir George Murray; but that he could not be spared from Ireland, nor did he like the idea of a Chief of the Staff, and that he considered what he had proposed for me would alone suit his views. I began to state my objections, but his Majesty cut me short, and desired me to consider the subject and to return to him at eleven this day. Nothing could exceed his kindness in manner and words.

I thought it best to write to his Majesty, and I beg to enclose to your Grace a copy of my letter, which I left for him at ten this morning. Half an hour afterwards I received his commands to attend him. I did so, and his Majesty told me he was satisfied with my letter, but that something must be done, and he objected to a Chief of the Staff. I observed that the simple arrangement would be to leave the three situations as they were, and in direct communication with him. He replied that he did not object to this, and that he had no wish to get rid of his friends Gordon and Torrens; but that he never had considered the Quartermaster-General as belonging to the office, and that he had been told Torrens wished to go to the Cape, and he wished to favour him and reward his services by sending him there. But that if such were to be the arrangement, my objection on the score of feeling must be removed, and that he called upon me as the person who had been the confidential servant of his blind father, and the attendant on his late brother to the hour of his death, to take this situation. That he had long wished to have me about him, and that in fact he must remove my scruples by laying his commands upon me. I did not feel that I could object any longer, and he said I might mention the proposed arrangement to your Grace, and to Torrens and Gordon, but fixed no time for giving effect to it.

In the course of the conversation I had an opportunity of doing justice to the efficient, just, and impartial manner in which your Grace was conducting the business of Commander-in-Chief, and to your anxiety to give effect to your lamented predecessor's wishes and intentions to the entire exclusion of all personal feeling and consideration; and I added that, short as had been the period of your holding this situation, it had been long enough to make Torrens, Gordon and me feel how serious a loss you would be. His Majesty met this very kindly, and assured me that no person could estimate your Grace's value and abilities more highly than he did, or feel more strongly the importance of your services at the head of the army.

Your Grace will permit me to add that the chief consolation I feel in undertaking a duty, which will probably *knock me up* in every sense, is [illegible]ll remains here as it was, and in such a state as to admit of your [illegible] event which, for the sake of his Majesty, the country, and the [illegible]nd hope may not be distant.

[illegible] honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,

[illegible] your Grace's most obliged and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Sir Herbert Taylor to the King.

SIR, Horse-Guards, 18th April, 1827.

I felt so overwhelmed yesterday afternoon by your Majesty's gracious communication, by the kind and condescending manner and terms in which it was made, and by every expression of your Majesty's unbounded favour and partiality that I should have been ill able to give utterance to my grateful sense of them, or to reply, even if your Majesty had not so graciously allowed me time for reflection, and commanded me to submit this day what I might have to offer for your Majesty's consideration. I humbly venture to do so by letter, as I shall be better able to connect what I cannot trust myself to state clearly and distinctly by word of mouth; and, having presumed to do this, I shall respectfully wait your Majesty's further commands.

I should be wholly unworthy of that favour and protection which I have so long and so amply experienced from your Majesty, if I were not most deeply impressed with the value of the mark of approbation and confidence, so gratifying to the feelings of a devoted and attached subject and of a zealous soldier, with which your Majesty has been pleased to honour me.

But, Sire, I should be equally unworthy of all that your Majesty has done for me, if I did not humbly but honestly and candidly submit to your Majesty what occurs to me, not from considerations of personal convenience and comfort, but from a deep and, I trust, a just sense of what is due to your Majesty and to the service; and I have less hesitation in so doing, as it must be obvious that if I were disposed to yield to ambitious views or to the gratification of vanity—possibly, a justifiable vanity—I should not hesitate to take advantage of that which your Majesty's too favourable opinion of me has suggested to you. I hesitate less, also, because I do feel that during a long course of official life I have not shrunk from the responsibility which belonged to the situations I have filled, nor from the labour, application, and confinement for which they called.

Above all, I owe all I possess to your Majesty's bounty, and I am in duty and in gratitude bound to devote my services to your Majesty, and to contribute by my humble efforts to any arrangement that can promote the execution of your Majesty's intentions, and contribute to your satisfaction.

I therefore most solemnly assure your Majesty that it is not on personal grounds that I humbly presume to submit this representation.

Circumstances have determined your Majesty to take into your own hands the command of your army, and your Majesty has been graciously pleased to intimate to me your desire that I should become the immediate and exclusive channel of the communication of your Majesty's orders, with the denomination of Adjutant-General.

I take the liberty of submitting to your Majesty that your Adjutant-General and your Quartermaster-General are the immediate heads of your Majesty's Staff, and, in virtue of their offices, in direct communication with your Majesty on all matters relating to their respective departments when there is no Commander-in-Chief. Their duties are defined by your Majesty's regulations, and they act under those regulations. From the admirable system now established, and which by their able and zealous exertions they have so essentially contributed to uphold, these regulations are so clear, so well understood, and so readily applicable to any case, that no difficulty can arise in the discharge of their duties, and that a reference to your Majesty's high authority can seldom become necessary, if they be permitted to use your name in the enforcement of

your General Orders and Regulations with respect to discipline and the movement of troops.

This might be said to apply equally to the office of Military Secretary (supposing him to be your Majesty's secretary in the absence of a Commander-in-Chief), if the nature of the business were the same, and if to the execution of your Majesty's general regulations were not added the details of extensive patronage, the consideration of points involving the character and interests of individuals *of all ranks*, the expression of censure and approbation, and the communication with the offices of State on questions affecting the general interests of the empire.

It is in this view of the subject that I have presumed to submit to your Majesty that I am not of sufficient standing among your Majesty's Lieutenant-Generals, nor of sufficient character and weight in your Majesty's service, to do justice to your Majesty's choice and gracious intentions, or to do justice to myself; and it is with this view of the subject, also, that I have humbly presumed to suggest that Sir George Murray, from the high character he has established in most important and responsible situations, and from the estimation in which he is generally held from the respect entertained for his experience and talents, is the officer not only best calculated, but the only individual who can hope to fill the proposed situation with satisfaction to your Majesty and with credit and *safety* to himself.

I humbly submit that, at all events, the office may be distinct from those of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General; and that the service in general and in detail may be carried on with the same facility under your Majesty's immediate command as by the nomination of one individual, who should be solely responsible to you. I may add that there will be ample occupation for each of these executive offices, although the business to be submitted to your Majesty will not be thereby increased.

Your Majesty will graciously forgive me, if I state that upon this point, and this point only, I am influenced by personal feeling. Sir Willoughby Gordon and Sir Henry Torrens have served your Majesty most ably, zealously, and honestly for many years. They were my predecessors in office, they enjoyed and merited the confidence of the late lamented Commander-in-Chief. They have long been my intimate friends, and during the last seven years we have co-operated cordially and affectionately in the same building. The former is my senior in rank, and has been employed to your Majesty's advantage in various departments; the latter has been longer in the service than I have, and has, as a military man, been more usefully employed and has served with greater distinction. Both must be superseded by the appointment which has suggested itself to your Majesty, and I should be placed in the invidious position of excluding them from their present situations.

This would not be the case if Sir George Murray were the individual selected, although your Majesty should be pleased to confer upon him superior authority, and to direct that he should be the exclusive channel of communication, although even this might be obviated by considering the three departments as distinct, all responsible to your Majesty, as they have been to the Commander-in-Chief. The long-established system would be thereby preserved, the duties would be more efficiently discharged, and the business to be necessarily submitted to your Majesty would be kept within the same limits.

I humbly assure your Majesty that, in what I have ventured humbly and dutifully to submit, I am not actuated by selfish motives. I certainly have thought that I required respite and rest from laborious occupation, and from duties which during thirty-four years have not allowed to me the free disposal of as many weeks; but my health is unimpaired, and I am able and willing to

serve your Majesty in any way and in any quarter that you are pleased to command. The appointment to the Cape, in the event of its becoming vacant, was suggested by others; but has never been proposed to me by Lord Bathurst. I was aware that Sir Henry Torrens had thought of it, and I abstained from indulging any idea of it until I had ascertained from him that he had abandoned the project from a conviction that the situation would not suit his circumstances with a large family, of whom three are grown up, and the remainder are fast advancing to an age which would render his absence very prejudicial to their interests.

But I had expressed no desire to go to the Cape before that service was suggested, and your Majesty's gracious permission to travel on the Continent, and thus to obtain a short respite from laborious occupation, was the boon which I had contemplated, your Majesty's bounty to me having rendered increase of income an object of comparative indifference.

I have, &c.,

H. TAYLOR.

Lord Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

London, 18th April, 1827.

I have just heard, my dear Duke, from Gordon. The King is decided to keep the army himself, in his own person, with a military secretary. How can this be, and who is the responsible person? Not even a Secretary-at-War under this plan. However, it has one advantage at present; it facilitates your return more than if a Royal Duke was put in.

They have no Secretary of State yet, and all seems to hang; and I think they are trying Lansdowne again.

The King is so furious, I hear, at all the refusals and resignations, that he swears he will give up the Catholic question sooner than be separated from Canning.

In haste, your devoted

VANE LONDONDERRY.

Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven.

[Communicated to Mr. Canning by Prince Lieven, May 6.]

PRINCE, St. Petersburg, 6th (18th) April, 1827.

After some delay Count Bombelles has at length communicated to us the instructions which the Court of Vienna has furnished by its ambassador to his Britannic Majesty relative to the projected treaty which we have invited our Allies to conclude for the pacification of Greece.

When this reaches you, you will already have had time to judge of the opinions of Austria, and you are too well aware of the principles as well as the wishes of the Emperor not to have foreseen that his Imperial Majesty will deeply regret to find the Court of Vienna determined to persist, with regard to the pacification of Greece, in ideas which we have so often opposed, to support them by arguments which experience refutes, to alter the bases of the Protocol of 23rd March (4th April), subjecting to fresh conditions arrangements whose object would be the restoration of peace in European Turkey, not adhering to the coercive measures the adoption of which appears to us indispensable in case the Porte should oppose only

obstinate refusals to our just demands, herself indicating in this hypothesis the undoubtedly decisive measures of a rupture, but hastening immediately to destroy its whole effect, to render it only a vain menace, and to subject its employment to all the chances of an ulterior negotiation, of which nothing could regulate the progress nor enable the end to be foreseen.

Such overtures are certainly far from replying to the hopes which we had conceived from the despatch of M. Tatistcheff, of which I addressed a copy to your Highness dated the 11th March, and especially the despatch No. 18, which he placed before Prince Metternich, and which that minister approved of in its whole tenor. Moreover, whatever may be the system which Austria follows, or proposes to follow, in Eastern affairs, the determination of his Majesty the Emperor is irrevocably fixed. We declared with complete frankness, as soon as it became seriously a question of the execution of the Protocol of 23rd March (4th April) that, when once engaged in the question of the re-establishment of peace between the Greeks and Turks, it would no longer be in our power to retrace our steps, that any step on this subject would compromise the principal result of the Convention of Akerman for us, that consequently we would only enter upon the affair with the immovable resolution of terminating it. Now this step has been taken it has been made by the ambassador of his Britannic Majesty at Constantinople, it was only supported at his request by the agent of his Imperial Majesty, and it is again through his solicitations and in concert with him that it has been renewed by M. de Ribeaupierre. In such a state of things, the Emperor cannot draw back from the consequences of the engagements which he has taken, and the propositions which he has supported. To accept now a negative response on the part of the Turks, would be to renounce on ours the prestige which our negotiations of 1826 acquired for us at the Porte, it would be to lose it in the eyes of all Europe. His Majesty could never consent to this double sacrifice, and the pacification of Greece, upon the terms of the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April), becomes for Russia a necessity from which she cannot escape.

We flatter ourselves that, seeing and sharing this necessity, since, on the one side, England has signed the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April), and, on the other, it was her ambassador who first opened the question of the re-establishment of peace in the Levant at the Porte, the Cabinet of London has already adhered without reserve to the principles and measures indicated in the projected treaty which you have made known to it, whatever may be in this respect the resolutions of the Cabinet of Vienna. It will, doubtless, deplore them, as we do; but, like us also, far from allowing itself to be turned away by them from a beneficial enterprise, far from rejecting the only measure which can insure its success, it will feel the necessity of redoubling its efforts to accomplish this salutary work, while leaving Austria full liberty to follow the policy she may judge most suitable.

We express the same hope to the Cabinet of the Tuileries, and we address the present despatch to your Highness through Count Pozzo di

Majesty's intention that you should communicate it to the y of State.

Receive, &c.,

Nesselrode.

Colonel Trench to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, London, Wednesday, 18th April, 1827.

I passed two hours with the Archbishop of Canterbury this morning, and heard much of what passed between the King and him.

If his Majesty is sincere—and it would be treason to doubt it, and the Archbishop does not doubt it—he is a stronger Protestant than his father, and will not allow the Catholic question to be made a Cabinet question, or carried in any shape; and with the pledges which his Majesty (without any reserve) says he has exacted from his minister, it is impossible the Whigs can come to his standard; and yet this day I hear that, failing in recruits of the Protestant party, he will be obliged to throw himself upon the King *to allow him to go to the Whigs.*

Of course your Grace has accurate and better information than I can give you; but I thought you would like to hear that the Archbishop, after a conversation of five hours, left his Majesty in the conviction that by the system and *measures* which his Majesty says he will pursue, the Protestant Church would stand firmer than before. My inference (and his Grace's too) is, that Mr. Canning *cannot* carry this system into effect without a sacrifice of *more than consistency.* He cannot get Protestants to fill his offices, and Catholics of character will not go to him on these terms. I therefore fear he will make an attempt to shake that firmness which his Grace of Canterbury seems to rely on so confidently. I had a letter from the D. of R. to-day in precisely the same strain as that which Lord Londonderry showed your Grace yesterday. I found the Archbishop writing to the Duke (and I believe by the desire of the *K.*) to give him an account of what passed between them, and I write also to give my version of his Grace's interview.

I hope you will excuse this trespass, and will not think it necessary to give me any answer. I am sure that I shall not feel any want of courtesy or kindness on your part, and am aware how very delicate is your present situation. I believe the King is longing to get you back; though the Archbishop says he expressed himself very angrily at the desertion of his friends, and most so of your Grace. But I think and hope the day will soon arrive when he may call upon you to protect him.

With sincere respect and esteem, your devoted servant,

F. W. TRENCH.

The Right Hon. Frederick Robinson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Downing Street, 19th April, 1827.

Sir Charles Stuart delivered to me your message, and I trust that he expressed to you on my part the very strong sense which I entertained of the kind feeling towards me, which induced you to desire him to see me. But, indeed, I cannot rest satisfied with merely expressing myself through a third person. Believe me, that the separation which has unhappily taken place in the King's government has been to me a source of unquali-

fied pain on every account, both public and private; and with respect to yourself, will you pardon me if I say, that although our official connection had not (from a thousand circumstances) led to a great personal intimacy, I have always felt for you that regard and esteem which is your due, both from those who know you and those who do not; and I never shall cease to regret that any circumstance, whether avoidable or otherwise, should have placed us in a relation towards each other different from that in which we formerly stood.

I hope you will not think what I have written to you an intrusion. It certainly has been written in a very different spirit.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

F. ROBINSON.

[713.] *To the Right Hon. Frederick Robinson.*

MY DEAR ROBINSON, London, 19th April, 1827.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter, and I assure you that nobody laments the unfortunate circumstances which have occurred more than I do. I think I have some reason to complain. But no selfish feeling shall induce me to depart from my usual practice of endeavouring to soften animosities and to prevent existing differences from extending further than is necessary.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[714.] *To Sir Herbert Taylor.*

MY DEAR GENERAL, London, 19th April, 1827.

I have received your letter; and of course have no opinion to give upon any system according to which his Majesty may think proper to conduct the business of the command of his army.

I think you are quite right to afford your assistance to his Majesty in any manner that he may think proper to facilitate the execution of such system.

I have thought it better to write this than to talk to you upon the subject; notwithstanding that I am going to the office immediately.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know from what period it is proposed that the new system should commence.

Believe that I am infinitely obliged to you for the kind and cordial assistance which I have received from you; and that you will always find me ready to give my assistance and support in the maintenance of the order, discipline, and subordination of the army.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Francis Leveson Gower to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Richmond, 19th April, 1827.

I am induced by the recollection of the kindness and condescension with which I have invariably been treated by you, to take, perhaps, an extraordinary step in throwing myself once more on that kindness for your opinion in a matter of much embarrassment to myself. It is a great favour which I am about to ask, and perhaps you will think yourself unable to grant it. I have reason to think that before long an opportunity may be offered me of taking office under the new government. On public and political grounds I have no hesitation about accepting it, but on private grounds I hope that you will believe me when I say that there is no one of the many personally attached to yourself who feels more intensely and bitterly than I do the circumstances under which the late changes have been effected. Is it an unfair question to ask whether I shall forfeit in any degree your good opinion by omitting to investigate those circumstances which regard yourself, and by accepting on public grounds the opportunity which presents itself of making myself acquainted with public business, which is, of course, my only personal object. If you, with that clearness of judgment on which I now throw myself, can think that in so doing I should be deserting yourself, whom I courted when in power, and that it is a case in which I am called upon to sacrifice public views to private honour and private regard, I feel sure that you will not withhold your opinion. If not, it would certainly be a great consolation to me to know that I could take my part in public affairs without forfeiting your regard. But if that forfeiture is to be the price of my acceptance of office, I shall refuse it, without assigning any reason in which your name shall be mixed up, or mentioning to any one that I had consulted you on the subject. If you are of opinion that there is any impropriety in my consulting you on this subject, I trust you will forgive it, in consideration of the great embarrassment which I feel on this occasion.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours very faithfully,

F. LEVESON GOWER.

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* Afterwards Earl of Ellesmere.

[15.] *To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.*

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS, Stratfield Saye, 20th April, 1827.

I have received your letter, by which I am much flattered; and I assure you that there is nothing that would give me so much concern as that you should omit to take office, in which career you are so likely to distinguish yourself, when an opportunity offers which you think suitable; and above all, that you should do so upon any question personal to myself.

It is impossible that you should have any knowledge what my case is. Without intending it I may be entirely in the wrong, and may be deceived myself. Besides, I don't think that the private case of any man should influence your decision whether to take office or not. If you should be satisfied with the principle on which the government is formed, and with the men of whom it is composed, and that it will probably be capable of standing, you ought to accept office. I suggest the two first requisites as applicable to any government. The last is a matter of prudential consideration, applicable to the present moment, and refers to the possibility of your finding yourself involved with a small knot of men.

You must be a better judge than I can be upon this point, as, excepting for a few hours that I was in town yesterday and saw nobody, I have been out of London since Monday, in which time much must have been done towards the formation of the government of which I can have no knowledge.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[16.] *To the Marquess of Londonderry.*

MY DEAR CHARLES, Stratfield Saye, 20th April, 1827.

I was so short a time in London yesterday, and was so much occupied whilst I was there, that I had not time to read the enclosure in your letter to me, viz., that of the Duke of Newcastle to you, till I was in my carriage.

You stand in a particular situation. The King sent for you, spoke to you, and, if I mistake not, desired you to repeat what he said to you. But I would not recommend to you to communicate what passed further than may be necessary.

But the Duke of Newcastle asked the King to admit him to an audience in order that he might speak to his Majesty, and he had no authority from his Majesty to repeat the conversation.

The King may or may not have repeated the conversation himself; and reports of its purport may have been circulated with more or less of accuracy either proceeding from his Majesty himself, or from those to whom his Majesty may have repeated, or who may represent that his Majesty repeated, the conversation. But of this I am certain, that the Duke of Newcastle cannot with any propriety do more in respect to that conversation than deny that certain things passed which he may hear it asserted did pass, of the truth of which he entertains no recollection.

We must recollect who the Sovereign is. He cannot come like any other individual and face his opponent; and it is not fair to ask him for an audience and then to repeat his conversation.

An individual of whose conversation with the King incorrect reports are circulated is certainly very ill treated. But every individual who seeks to converse in private with the King exposes himself to the risk of such incorrect representation, and all that he can do with propriety is solemnly and firmly to deny the truth of the representation of those who have taken upon themselves to report conversations at which they were not present.

I am the more anxious upon this subject because I see that the Duke writes very warmly. Rely upon it, my dear Charles, the object of the great aristocracy, and of the *parti conservateur* of this country, is to secure the Crown from the mischief with which it is threatened, by moderation, by consistency, by firmness and good temper. Matters have been brought to the state in which they are by a man (for after all there is but one man) who does not possess a particle of any one of those qualities. The aristocracy must not aid his views. They must not render perpetual the unfortunate separation between the Crown and the party to which I have above referred. I earnestly recommend, then, moderation and temper, and above all, respect for the Crown and for the person of the King.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Whitehall, 21st April, 1827.

The negotiation with the Whigs is suspended; not, I believe, irrecoverably broken off.

The government in Ireland is to be of too Protestant a character to suit Lord Lansdowne's taste.

The Whigs disapprove of his scruples. Their language is: do anything to gain power and exclude the Tories.

The Bar here cry out loudly against Mr. Plunket going to the Rolls.

There are to be four new Peers: Copley, Plunket, Robinson, and the Chief Justice.

I return Colonel Trench's letter.

Ever, my dear Duke, most truly yours,

Robert Peel.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

My dear Duke, Whitehall, 22nd April, 1827.

I very much regret that I did not see you yesterday. I have a strong impression that the time has come when you should make known the grounds on which you gave up the Cabinet, and the office of Commander-in-Chief.

The Press is all on one side. That would signify very little, if it were not for the time that must elapse before the effect of the Press can be counteracted by any statement in Parliament.

In the interval of ten days there may be some new wonder, which will have drawn the public attention away from the old one. The impression made will not only be too deep to be effaced, but the world will be sick of the subject, and indifferent about explanation. Canning is stating to every one the whole of the story, including the first communications with the King, the message to the Cabinet, &c.

Do consider whether a temperate and dignified statement, containing, however, the whole of the transaction, ought not to be prepared immediately by you, professedly for your friends, but really for the public. I would include every letter in that statement.

Ever yours most faithfully,

Robert Peel.

Lord Westmorland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Dear Duke, London, 22nd April, 1827.

Sir H. Halford endeavoured to see you yesterday. If you come to-morrow send him word when you come to town.

I understand the Whig negotiation is renewed. The Duke of Devonshire has a fancy to be Chamberlain, and went yesterday to Lord Lansdowne. A gentleman making enquiry for Tierney, wrote to him by the

post that the negotiation was renewed, and would do. There was some alteration about the army supposed to be proposed to the King yesterday, but whether to fill up or offer to you, my informant either did not know or would not tell. Lord Manners has agreed to remain in Ireland, and the Duke of Rutland says, I am told, the King has pledged the government to be Protestant, and therefore he must upon that principle stand by him. You had better not repeat this unless you otherwise know.

I think Lord Lansdowne has come to terms about the Catholic question, and their separation was on terms. The rupture of official negotiation was very ill received at Brooks's. I shall hope to see you if you come to town.

Yours very sincerely,

WESTMORLAND.

Lord Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, London, 22nd April, 1827, 5 o'clock, Sunday.

As you are not in town to-day I cannot help sending you down these few lines, because the universal reports here are that the negotiations are closed with Lansdowne; that he comes in as Home Secretary, has three seats, his own included, in the Cabinet, and that Calcraft, Abercromby, &c., and all the Opposition but *two* in the House of Commons will join. The Duke of Devonshire is to be Lord Chamberlain, and his efforts have mainly brought about the coalition. The difficulty for a long time is said to have been the King's insisting on a Protestant Lord-Lieutenant. But that has been, as everything else, yielded by his Majesty to the overpowering influence which subjugates him. While writing, Falmouth, who has just parted from Auckland, Lansdowne's bosom friend, has called in. Auckland said the thing was *not* closed, but the communications had gone, that left scarce a shade of difference; he added that Lansdowne, in his high position, with sentiments often recorded, had no right to insist on knowing what the King and Mr. Canning might stipulate between themselves. But as one of the high contracting parties, he was alone to look to the arrangement as between him and Mr. Canning. Neutrality as to the Catholic question being a Cabinet measure might possibly be yielded. But a preponderance of Catholics could not but be more favourable to the ultimate arrangement of the question.

Ever yours most faithfully and affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

MINUTE OF CABINET OF APRIL, 1827, RESPECTING THE ROMAN CATHOLIC QUESTION.

23rd April, 1827.

The Catholic question is to remain, as in Lord Liverpool's government, an open question; upon which each member of the Cabinet is at perfect liberty to exercise his own judgment in supporting that question, if brought forward by others, or in propounding it either in the Cabinet or in Parliament.

But if any member of the Cabinet should deem it an indispensable duty to bring forward individually the Catholic question in Parliament, he is distinctly to state that he does so in his individual capacity.

Lord Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE, 24th April, 6 p.m., 1827.

The following details, which I have learnt since I left you, may interest you.

Lords Grey and Holland, the latter being one of the negotiating referees, told Lauderdale that all was now at an end. William Lamb's appointment by Canning as Irish Secretary did not *dis*satisfy the Whigs; but *they* required, as Lord Melbourne is supposed to be dying, that *they* should then have security for another Catholic secretary. This very trifling difference, and the lead in the House of Lords, has caused *now* the breaking off; but Holland, as the other two *adverse* Whig Lords were of opinion it would be *on* again, and as so much *principle* has been given up, thinks that in the end the two parties would come to. Lansdowne comes to town to-night, and if it cannot be settled, it is said Canning will fill the offices *provisionally* in Friday's 'Gazette.'

One curious fact about Canning and Brougham was let out. Brougham wrote to Canning (on circuit) that he was so resolved to support *him*, that if there were personal objections to his coming in on the part of the King, he begged not to be considered; but this was not to be made known *unless necessary*. Canning instantly showed this letter to the King, saying, You see, sir, we are sure of him in any event, and your feelings shall not be outraged. Brougham stands pledged to support, and some large unction is already in preparation for his soul. They talk of a command from the King for you to resume the army being to be issued. So much is dreaded from your losing this, and so fatal do *all* see the present arrangement of the Horse-Guards.

I probably shall know more how things stand to-morrow.

Ever yours affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Whitehall, 27th April, 1827.
3 o'clock, p.m.

MY DEAR DUKE,

I have not despatched your messenger at an earlier hour because I had nothing of importance to communicate to you before.

Sturgess Bourne is to be my successor. I know not what better arrange- [illegible]ld have been made, and I wish it were to be a more permanent [illegible]ngly suspect that the Whigs have an understanding with [illegible]eir acceptance of office, but that they have not manliness [illegible] in a straightforward manner. They are afraid of Lord [illegible]ho like Lord Grey, will be no parties to the coalition. [illegible]robably support during the session, and when they

can be no longer attacked in Parliament for the abandonment of their principles, will abandon them, and take office.

The only appointments which I hear are finally decided on are these: the Duke of Devonshire to be Chamberlain; the Duke of Leeds Master of the Horse; James Macdonald to be at the India Board, one of the junior Commissioners; Sturgess Bourne, Home Department.

I hear that it is not decided that Calcraft is to be at the Woods and Forests, nor decided that Abercromby is to be Judge-Advocate.

Perhaps some temporary arrangement will be made as to those offices, and that they will continue baits for a Whig till the end of the session, or rather promised spoils to be divided at that time.

We are to give up the seals on Monday next. I am strongly inclined to think that impressions have gone abroad with respect to your correspondence which will be effaced when the real tenor of it is known.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

To the Marquess of Anglesey.

MY DEAR LORD ANGLESEY, London, April 30th, 1827.

I conclude that your appointment will be in the 'Gazette' of to-morrow, in which case I would propose to give you over the office on Thursday at twelve o'clock, if you please, and I will desire that all the principal officers may be here. I would propose Wednesday, only that I am to receive at the Horse-Guards on that day, unless his Majesty should have directed that the new system should be carried into execution there. But I believe that your appointment must be first notified in the 'Gazette,' or in some other official mode.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Since writing the above I have received an intimation that it is his Majesty's wish that the new system should commence forthwith at the Horse-Guards. I shall not receive there on Wednesday therefore, but I think we had better continue to have Thursday for my delivery to you of the office of Ordnance in order to leave time for your being Gazetted.

WELLINGTON.

[718.] MINUTE RESPECTING SIR J. C. SMYTH'S APPLICATION FOR FOREIGN EXTRA PAY.

1st May, 1827.

These matters must always be considered in reference to the precedent likely to be created, particularly when they relate to a man of such high character as Sir James Smyth.

His services and opinions have been so useful since his return from his commissions in the West Indies and in Canada, as to be absolutely necessary. But the Master-General and Board could not remunerate those services by allowing him to draw the foreign extra pay while he is living in England, without such a breach of rule applicable to establishments as would be most inconvenient and expensive as a precedent. The truth is that foreign extra pay allowed to officers of Engineers on committees, &c., is given for the period they so serve, and not permanently.

My opinion is, then, that Major-General Sir James Smyth ought to be allowed extra pay for home service to this period.

WELLINGTON.

[719.] ORDER ON THE DUKE'S QUITTING THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

1st May, 1827.

Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington having laid at his Majesty's feet his resignation of the office of Master-General of the Ordnance, avails himself of this opportunity of expressing his thanks to the Lieutenant-General and Board of Ordnance, to the general officers, officers and troops, employed under the Ordnance, and generally to all the gentlemen employed in the Civil Department, for their uniform support, good conduct and obedience, during the period that he has presided over the Ordnance.

The Field Marshal took charge of this department at the close of the operations of an extended and eventful war, when it became the duty of the Master-General and Board to reduce all the establishments to the lowest scale consistently with the public security, and to make many alterations and reforms which time, experience, and altered circumstances had sug-